THE REALIGNMENT OF EUROPE

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SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1939–1946

THE REALIGNMENT OF EUROPE

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EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE THREE WORLD MAPS

THE object of these maps is to visualize the change in the shape of the arena of international affairs during and since the Second World War.

Down to 1940 the arena of international affairs was still, for practical purposes, the flat oblong shape that it had been since the beginning of history. Admiral King's achievement of conducting naval operations across the whole breadth of the Pacific transformed this oblong into a continuous belt by sewing together the two ends. The conquest, since then, of the air over the North Pole has expanded this circular belt round the globe, which still had a northern as well as a southern edge, into three-quarters of a sphere, with no edge left to it except one round a still untraversable South Polar circle.

As a result, each of the two surviving Power-groups is now threatened by the other surviving Power-group on *three* fronts, east, west, and north, whereas before 1940 no Power was ever threatened on more than two fronts, and even this only happened to a 'central' Power, such as France was in the sixteenth century and Germany from 1871 to 1945.

This change in the 'geo-political' map is a first-class revolution in international affairs. It is so revolutionary, and has come so suddenly, that it is not easily grasped or taken into account. The purpose of these maps is to make the new shape of the human race's habitat visible to the eye.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE

Authorization has been obtained for all major quotations, and full reference to the book, the author, and the publisher has been given in a footnote in each case under the first mention of the work.

ABBREVIATIONS

USED IN THE TEXT AND FOOTNOTES

ACC	Allied Control Commission (Italy).
AMG [OT]	Allied Military Government [of Occupied Territory].
Anders	Lt.-General W. Anders: *An Army in Exile* (London, Macmillan, 1949).
Bor	Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski: *The Secret Army* (London, Gollancz, 1950).
BOTRA	Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs of the Republic of China.
CCFE	Committee of the Council [of UNRRA] for the Far East.
Churchill, i-vi	Winston S. Churchill: *The Second World War*, vols. i–vi (London, Cassell, 1948–54; Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948–53).
Ciechanowski	Jan Ciechanowski: *Defeat in Victory* (New York, Doubleday, 1947).
CLN	*Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale* (Committee of National Liberation [in Italy]).
Cmd. 6315	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Inter-Allied Meeting held in London at St. James's Palace on September 24, 1941. Report of Proceedings*, Cmd. 6315 (London, H.M.S.O., 1941).
Cmd. 6491	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Washington, 9th November 1943*, Cmd. 6491 (London, H.M.S.O., 1943).
Cmd. 6585	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Conditions of an Armistice with Roumania, signed at Moscow, 12th September 1944*, Cmd. 6585 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).
Cmd. 6586	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Conditions of an Armistice with Finland, signed at Moscow, 19th September 1944*, Cmd. 6586 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).
Cmd. 6587	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Conditions of an Armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, 28th October 1944*, Cmd. 6587 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).
Cmd. 6598	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Report of the Crimea Conference, 11th February 1945*, Cmd. 6598 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).
Cmd. 6693	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Documents relating to the Conditions of an Armistice with Italy (September–November 1943)*, Cmd. 6693 (London, H.M.S.O., [1945]).
Cmd. 6709	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Proposals . . . on Trade and Employment as transmitted by the Secretary of State of the United States of America to H.M. Ambassador at Washington, Washington, 6th December 1945*, Cmd. 6709 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).
Cmd. 7087	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, Berlin, 2nd August 1945*, Cmd. 7087 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947).
Cmd. 7088	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Yalta, 11th February 1945*, Cmd. 7088 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947).

ABBREVIATIONS

Cmd. 7118	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Financial Agreements between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, Rome, 17th April 1947*, Cmd. 7118 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947).
Cmd. 7481–2	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, 10th February 1947*, Cmd. 7481–2 (London, H.M.S.O., 1948).
Cmd. 7484	Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaty of Peace with Finland, Paris, 10th February 1947*, Cmd. 7484 (London, H.M.S.O., 1948).
CNR	*Conseil National de la Résistance* [French].
CNRRA	Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
DNSAP	Danish Nazi Party.
EAM	*Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon*: National Liberation Front, Organization of the Greek Communist Party, founded 27 September 1941.
EDES	*Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos*: Greek Democratic National League, an association of republican politicians, founded in Athens in the autumn of 1941.
ELAS	*Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*: National People's Liberation Army [Greek]: EAM guerrilla forces.
ERO	European Regional Office [of UNRRA].
Facts and Documents	*Facts and Documents Concerning Polish Prisoners of War captured by the U.S.S.R. during the 1939 Campaign*, compiled in 1944 by a special Commission under the Council of Ministers of the Polish Government in Exile.
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization.
FFI	*Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur.*
Finnish Blue-White Book	Finland: *Finland reveals her secret documents on Soviet policy, March 1940–June 1941: Official Blue-White Book of Finland* (New York, Funk, 1941).
Fuehrer Conferences [year]	Great Britain, Admiralty: *Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939 (–1945)*, 8 vols. mimeographed (London, H.M.S.O., 1947–8).
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Goebbels Diaries	Paul Joseph Goebbels: *The Goebbels Diaries*, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1948).
H.P.C.	*A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, ed. H. W. V. Temperley, 6 vols. (London, Oxford University Press for British Institute of International Affairs, 1920–4).
Hull: *Memoirs*, i, ii	*The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. (New York, Macmillan, 1948).
I.M.T. Nuremberg	*Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1945–1946.* Proceedings and Documents in evidence. 42 vols. (Nuremberg, International Military Tribunal, 1947–9).
IRO	International Refugee Organization.
Italy, February 1951	Great Britain, Board of Trade, Commercial Relations and Exports Department: *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Italy, February 1951* (London, H.M.S.O., 1951).
KRN	*Krajowa Rada Narodowa* ([Polish] National Council of the Homeland).
Lane	Arthur Bliss Lane: *I saw Poland betrayed* (Indianopolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1948).
MERRA	Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration.

Mikolajczyk	Stanislaw Mikolajczyk: *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., 1948).
MRP	*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*: moderate Catholic Party in France.
Nagy	Ferenc Nagy: *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, Macmillan, 1948).
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [Russian].
NSZ	National Armed Forces [Polish].
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation.
OFRRO	Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.
PCIRO	Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization.
PCNL	Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin).
Piano di Massima	Italy, Ministero dell'Industria e del Commercio: *Piano di Massima per le importazioni e le esportazioni industriali dell' anno 1946–1947* (Rome, Ministero dell'Industria e del Commercio, 1946).
PPR	*Polska Partia Robotnicza* (Polish Workers' Party).
PPS	Polish Socialist Party.
PRL	*Parti Républicain de la Liberté* [French].
PSL	Polish Peasant Party.
P.S.R.	Poland: *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1943, Official Documents* (Washington, Polish Embassy [1945]).
Rapporto della Commissione Economica	Italy: Ministero per le Costituente: *Rapporto della Commissione Economica presentato all'Assemblea Costituente* (Rome, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1947).
Review of AMG	Allied Commission in Italy: *Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission in Italy, July 10, 1943, D-Day Sicily to May 2, 1945, German Surrender in Italy* (Rome, U.S. Army, Public Relations Branch, 1945).
Rothstein, i, ii	*Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials*, tr. A. Rothstein, 2 vols. (London, Hutchinson, [1946]).
RPF	*Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (de Gaulle's party).
SCAEF	Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*	Robert E. Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, Harper, 1948). English edition: *The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins*, 2 vols. (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949).
Stettinius	Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.: *Roosevelt and the Russians* (London, Cape, 1950).
UDB	*Union Démocratique Belge*: a branch of the Belgian Catholic Party.
UDSR	*Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance* [French].
U.N.: *E/156*	United Nations, Economic and Social Council: *Preliminary Report of the Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas* (E/156), 18 September 1946.
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

ABBREVIATIONS

United States and Italy	U.S.A., Department of State: *The United States and Italy, 1939–1946* (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1946), Department of State Publication 2669.
UPP	Union of Polish Patriots.
VNV	*Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond*: Organization of Flemish nationalists in Belgium.
WHO	World Health Organization.
Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i, ii, iii	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Office of the Chief Historian, George Woodbridge: *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, 3 vols. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950).
WRN	[Polish] Socialist Underground Organization.
Wuorinen	John H. Wuorinen, ed.: *Finland and World War II* (New York, Ronald Press Company, 1948).

NOTE

British Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) are cited in footnotes in the form suggested in the bound volumes of the official Reports, preceded by the date (if not given in the text) and followed by the column number, e.g.

(for the House of Commons)
22 February 1944, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 397, coll. 697–8.

(for the House of Lords)
18 December 1945, H.L. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 138, col. 780.

INTRODUCTION

By ARNOLD TOYNBEE

(i) The Subject and the Title

THE subject of this volume is the sequel to the break-up of Hitler's Europe. The Third German Reich's dramatically successful career of military aggression had resulted in a temporary unification of a large slice of the mainland of the Old World, stretching, at its widest extent, from the North Cape to the Libyan Desert and from Calais to the western outskirts of Stalingrad. Under National Socialist German domination, this great area had been unified, in degrees that varied locally, for military and political, and therefore also for economic, purposes. The meteoric rise and fall of this supra-national Power, established by a continental European national state round a European nucleus, have been recorded in a previous volume.[1] The present volume records what happened to the debris of Hitler's Europe in the next chapter of the history of world affairs.

The Governments of the three Powers constituting the Grand Alliance that had destroyed Germany's military power and had broken up Germany's ephemeral European empire all used at the time, and continued to use, the same word to describe what they had just accomplished by their military exertions. The Russians, as well as the Americans and the British, called their common work the 'liberation' of Europe; for, midway through the twentieth century, 'liberty', like 'democracy' and 'science', was a word to which everyone had to pay at least lip service. The tribute was demanded by a ubiquitous climate of feeling and faith which transcended all contemporary geographical boundaries between different states, civilizations, and ideologies. There was, however, a wide gulf, in practice, between the respective interpretations of the word 'liberty' on the Anglo-American side and on the Russian side of the line, running from the southern shore of the Baltic Sea to the head of the Adriatic, along which the victorious armies were now confronting one another, after Germany's total military collapse, in accordance with agreements that the three victor Powers had concluded in advance. From the very moment when their respective occupations of ex-German-occupied territory had started, the Western Allies, on the one side, and the Russians, on the other, had each begun to contest the opposite party's claim to be genuinely liberating the local victims of a previous German conquest. Either party accused the other of misusing its power by installing local régimes that, instead of being genuine local expressions of 'democracy', were being imposed on the nominally 'liberated' peoples to suit the interests of their new lords and masters. On

[1] *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*.

the Western side there was undoubtedly a genuine belief that this was what the Russians were doing in those non-German portions of Hitler's Europe that had now come under Russian military control, and an equally genuine belief that, in those other non-German territories that had now come under Western control, the Western Powers had been restoring to Hitler's non-German victims a genuine and complete political independence just as fast as military exigencies had been allowing of this. Westerners believed sincerely that the picture, as they saw it, was the truth. They did not know, and had not discovered down to the time of writing in 1954, whether what the Russians, on their side, really felt and thought corresponded, as closely, to what the Russians said.

Meanwhile the word 'liberation' continued to be used, on the two sides, in senses that differed extremely. The reality of this difference was perhaps the one point on which the two sides did not disagree. In this situation, the historian found himself constrained to forgo the use of the contentious word 'liberation' and to substitute for it some word which, like 'realignment', would beg no disputed questions. Whatever the truth about the alleged 'liberation' of Europe might be, it was an unquestionable matter of fact that a 'realignment' of Europe did occur between the autumn of 1942, which had seen the beginning of the end of Hitler's Europe, and the close of the year 1946. Between those two dates the political structure of an area which, at the former date, had constituted a single military, political, and economic bloc, forcibly united under the domination of a European Power, had been 'realigned' through having been wrenched out of Germany's grasp and been incorporated in a political structure on a different pattern and a different scale. By the end of 1946 Western Europe, together with Greece, had been built into a new supra-national combine with its centre outside Europe in North America, while Eastern Europe, except for Greece, had been built into another new supra-national combine with its centre likewise outside Europe—in this case, in Russia. Manifestly this realignment of Europe was a major international event with world-wide implications.[1]

The line along which Europe was thus partitioned, between 1942 and 1947, into a Russian and an Anglo-American sphere corresponded rather closely, though not exactly, to an older line that was not military or political, but cultural and social. The Anglo-American sphere embraced most of those European countries in which the middle class was numerous, competent, and powerful and in which the institution of parliamentary government was well established and effective, whereas the Russian sphere embraced most of those European countries in which the middle class was small, inexperienced, and weak and in which parliamentary government had been exotic and perfunctory. At the same time, the

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 757–60.

Russian sphere also included, in Finland and Czechoslovakia, two countries of the 'Western' type, and the Anglo-American sphere also two countries of the 'Eastern' type in Greece and Southern Italy. This partial non-correspondence between the new military line and the older cultural line of division in Europe might have been a help in bridging the gulf that was now rapidly reopening between the Soviet Union and the West if the possible mediatory effect of this cross-division had not been nullified by an overwhelming combination of untoward circumstances.

(ii) The Uprooting of Populations in the Soviet Sphere

In the Catholic and Protestant part of Europe, since the end of the Wars of Religion, changes of political frontiers brought about by wars had no longer been accompanied by expulsions or exchanges of populations. In the peace settlement after the First World War, in which the political frontiers in Europe had been redrawn far more extensively than they were to be after the Second World War, the statesmen had not thought of uprooting human beings in order to make the geographical distribution of nationalities coincide with the new pattern of boundaries between states. Even the settlers of German nationality who, since 1888, had been planted by the German authorities in Posen and West Prussia, on land forcibly expropriated from previous owners or tenants of Polish nationality, had obtained some protection from the League of Nations, when a newly re-established Polish state had started to turn them out.[1] So far from condoning the expulsion of ethnic minorities, the Peace Conference of Paris had done its best to ensure that life should be tolerable for ethnic minorities under an alien majority's rule by underpinning a minority's recognized moral rights with juridical sanctions in the form of international treaties and declarations.

When, in 1922, the Greek and Armenian Christian minorities in Turkey had been expelled from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace in the catastrophic denouement of a Graeco-Turkish war-after-the-war, public opinion in the West had been reluctant to acquiesce in the *fait accompli*, and still more reluctant to countenance the logical consequences by providing for the counter-transfer, to Turkey, of the Muslim minority in Greece and by arranging for the compensation of each group of *déracinés* out of the expropriated property which the other group had been compelled to leave behind. The West had sought consolation for having thus condoned a barbarity that was morally repugnant to Western feeling by reminding itself that this barbarity had been committed in the Near East, where, unfortunately, such barbarities had not yet become obsolete. It was taken for granted in the West that the Graeco-Turkish 'exchange of populations' (as the process was euphemistically called) could not happen in a Western

[1] See *Survey* for 1920–3, pp. 222–5.

World in which the expulsion of the Huguenots from France, after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, had been the most recent signal barbarity of the kind.[1]

This optimistic Western expectation was tragically falsified by the uprooting of European populations on a vast scale in and after the Second World War. It was true, and was also to the Western World's credit, that, west of the line of demarcation between the Anglo-American and the Russian armies of occupation after Germany's collapse, no Germans or any people of any other nationality were uprooted after the Second World War, any more than they had been after the First. On the other hand, by 1 July 1947 the German territory west of the Oder–Western Neisse Line had received more than $9\frac{1}{2}$ and perhaps not many fewer than $10\frac{1}{2}$ million Germans from regions east of that line, who had fled, or been expelled, from Hungary, from Czechoslovakia, and from those parts of Eastern Germany that had been annexed *de facto* to the Soviet Union and Poland.[2] Thereafter, the number of German displaced persons in Western Germany was continually increased by an unceasing flow of German refugees from the Soviet zone of occupation in the unannexed part of Eastern Germany. There were also numbers of non-German displaced persons in Western Germany—Ests, Letts, Lithuanians, White Russians, Ukrainians, Cossacks, and even Great Russians—consisting partly of people who had been deported by the Nazis during the war to work in Germany, and had been unwilling to return to homes that had since fallen under Soviet rule, and partly of people who had fled into the Western zones of occupation before the face of the Soviet armies during their westward advance. In this category, the Ests, Letts, and Lithuanians alone were estimated to aggregate about 300,000 persons.[3]

This twentieth-century *Völkerwanderung* into Western Germany was a result of displacements of population in Eastern Europe, east of the dividing line between the Western and the Soviet zones of occupation, which were unprecedented in scale and which produced changes in the ethnic map of this quarter of the Old World such as had not been seen there since the *Völkerwanderung c.* A.D. 375–675.

The pre-war ethnic map of Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia had borne on its face the record of an eastward tide of conquest and colonization which had been flowing from the year 772, in which Charlemagne had launched his first campaign against the pagan continental Saxons between the Rhineland and the Elbe, down to the latest settlements

[1] The Protestant minority in the Prince-Bishopric of Salzburg had been expelled in 1731–2; but in this case the number of the victims had been small, while the public indignation in other Western countries had been lively and vocal.

[2] E. M. Kulischer: *Europe on the Move* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 285–6.

[3] Ibid. p. 270.

of German colonists on previously Polish-inhabited lands in Posen and West Prussia in the latest generation before the First World War. The ethnic map, as it had stood on the eve of the outbreak of war in 1939, had revealed a series of three eastward-breaking waves of population: a German wave breaking upon the Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs, Magyars, and Slovenes; a Polish wave breaking upon the White Russians and Ukrainians; and an Ukrainian and Great Russian wave breaking upon the Turkish peoples in the Crimea and on the steppes to the north of the Black Sea, and on the Turkish and Finnish peoples in the Volga Basin and in the Urals. Each of these waves had flung spray, in the form of isolated enclaves of pioneer settlers, in advance—and, in some cases, very far in advance—of its crest. There had, for example, been enclaves of German settlers in Estonia, Latvia, East Prussia, Western Poland, Slovakia, the Hungarian Alföld, the Banat of Temesvar, Transylvania, the Bujāq (south-eastern Bessarabia), and even as far east as the River Volga, which had been bestridden, in the neighbourhood of Saratov, by a German settlement that, at its nineteenth-century maximum, had numbered some 600,000 souls. There had been enclaves of Polish settlers at Kovno, Vilna, and Lwów. And there had been enclaves of Great Russians and Cossacks along the banks of the Ural, Irtish, Amur, and Ussuri rivers and on the shore of the Sea of Japan at Vladivostok. After the Second World War the Russian wave was still in being and was still travelling eastward, but the Polish and the German wave had now disappeared.

The first retreat of a German wave that by this time had been advancing, at the Slavs' expense, for no less than a thousand years—since the reign of Otto I—had been ordered, during the Second World War, by Hitler himself. After the partition of inter-war Poland between the Third German Reich and the Soviet Union when Polish military resistance had collapsed in 1939, Hitler had negotiated with the Soviet Government the evacuation of all German inhabitants of Soviet territory within the new western frontiers of the Soviet Union, which included the three Baltic republics and the ethnically White Russian and Ukrainian eastern provinces of inter-war Poland. The Germans who had thus been uprooted from East European homes that had been theirs, in some cases, since the thirteenth century had been resettled by Hitler along the south-eastern border of the Polish-inhabited territory that he had annexed to the Reich, with a view to making them serve there as a human breakwater behind which the Polish-inhabited territory to the north-west of this dyke could gradually be germanized. These unfortunate German victims of a German dictator's doctrinaire policy had not been completely resettled in Poland before they were overtaken by the final westward advance of the Russian armies and were compelled to migrate again—this time, into Western Germany.

The largest of all the contingents of German displaced persons, amounting to some $7\frac{1}{2}$ million,[1] was furnished by the German population of East Prussia and of the main body of Germany east of the Oder–Western Neisse Line. When Churchill decided to agree to the post-war frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland being drawn along the 'Curzon Line', which approximately coincided with the eastern edge of what was ethnically Polish territory, he was prepared also to agree that the Polish diasporà, some 3 or 4 million strong, from territory east of the Curzon Line should be provided for by compensating Poland territorially with the minimum amount of German territory that would suffice to rehouse those Polish displaced persons; and he was also prepared to see the German inhabitants of such ceded German territory pushed out of it into other parts of Germany. This westward shift of Polish and of German displaced persons in approximately equal numbers seemed, in fact, to have been originally Churchill's own idea;[2] and he acquiesced in Stalin's demand for the Oder–Neisse Line as the future frontier of Poland on the assumption that the Eastern Neisse was the river in question and in the belief that the former German territory east of this line would, in fact, suffice for meeting the needs of the Polish *déracinés*.[3] When he discovered that the Western Neisse was the river that Stalin had in view Churchill vigorously declared his dissent from a proposal that would entail a displacement of Germans on an enormously greater scale than he had ever contemplated.[4] His protest, however, was of no effect: for, although the question of Germany's future eastern frontier was officially reserved for settlement at an eventual peace conference, the Poles and the Russians lost no time, after the occupation, in expelling the German inhabitants from all former German territories to the east of the Oder and the Western Neisse.

Meanwhile perhaps as many as $2\frac{3}{4}$ million other Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after the rehabilitation of the Czechoslovak state under the Soviet Union's aegis,[5] and perhaps 178,000 others, again, from Hungary.[6] As for the German minority in Rumania, they were not officially expelled, but in 1951 the able-bodied male members of some sections of this German community were rounded up and deported to work in the Soviet Union.[7] On the other hand, the Magyar minority in

[1] Kulischer: *Europe on the Move*, pp. 285–6.

[2] See Winston S. Churchill: *The Second World War* (London, Cassell, 1952), v. 319–20, 348–51, 356–7, 359; (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951), v. 361–2, 394–7, 403, 406; ibid. vi. 327; U.S. edition, vi. 374. [This work will be referred to hereafter as Churchill, v, vi, and the pagination of both English and U.S. editions will be given.]

[3] See ibid. vi. 327, 561, 572, 581; U.S. edition, vi. 374, 648, 660–1, 671–2.

[4] See ibid. pp. 323–4, 326–7, 328–9, 337–9, 566–72, 581–2 and 370, 373–4, 375–6, 385–7, 654–61, 670–1, respectively.

[5] See below, p. 381.

[6] See Kulischer, op. cit. p. 285, and the present volume, p. 323 below.

[7] See *Survey* for 1951, pp. 197 seqq.

the ex-Hungarian territory that had been ceded to Rumania after the First World War and that was restored to her after the Second World War was preserved by the Russians, under what amounted to a Soviet protectorate, as a lever for Russian interference in Rumania's internal affairs.[1]

After the capitulation of Finland, for the second time, in September 1944 the Finnish population of the Karelian Isthmus had consequently for the second time had to evacuate their homes and to be resettled once again, and this time definitively, in Finnish territory west of the new Finno-Soviet frontier.[2]

The three Baltic nations—Ests, Letts, and Lithuanians—suffered the most cruel fate of all. Part of the population had been deported during the war to work in Germany; part managed, before the Russians occupied the three states for the second time in the last stages of the war, to escape across the Baltic to Sweden. But those members of the middle class in these three countries who were overtaken by the Russian occupation were afterwards, apparently, deported *en masse* into Russia and were replaced, in the Balticum, by Great Russian and other colonists.[3] By this inhuman method the national life of each of these three peoples was deliberately extinguished, as far as this lay within the Russians' power. This liquidation of a new non-German middle class, recruited originally from the peasantry, that had been growing up in these three countries during the inter-war years, was a shocking contrast to the experience of the previous German middle class and land-owning aristocracy in Esthland and Livland at the time when these two Baltic provinces had been first incorporated in the Russian Empire in the course of the Great Northern War of 1700–21. On that occasion annexation by Russia, so far from having been a death-sentence, had made the fortunes of the Baltic nobility and bourgeoisie by giving them access to a lucrative hinterland. The Baltic Barons had had a vast field opened to their talents in the Russian Imperial military and civil service, and the bourgeoisie a vast field in an expanding trade between the Baltic ports and the Russian interior of the continent. This contrast was a melancholy index of the regress of civilization during the intervening 220 years.

The total effect of these sweeping and devastating transfers of population in Eastern Europe was to cancel the ethnic effects of a thousand years of German, Polish, and Lithuanian conquest and colonization, and to restore the ethnic map to something like the *status quo ante* A.D. 1200. In Austria alone the descendants of German settlers and of germanized Slavs were now left in possession of their homes. On the other hand, of all the famous commercial and industrial cities that the Germans had founded along the southern and eastern shores of the Baltic from the latter years of the twelfth

[1] See below, pp. 290–1.
[2] See below, p. 279.
[3] See below, p. 260.

century onwards, Lübeck alone was now still a German community. Stettin, Danzig, Königsberg, Memel, Libau, Riga, and Reval had all now ceased to be German in population as well as in nomenclature. Breslau, the capital of Silesia, which had been German in nationality for the last 700 years and had eventually become more populous than the contemporary English and American cities Sheffield and Houston, had once again become the Slav city that its name had always proclaimed it to have been originally. As between one Slav nationality and another, the Second World War had wiped out, no less completely, the ethnic effects of the sweeping conquests of White Russian, Ukrainian, and Great Russian territory by the non-Slavonic Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Slavonic Kingdom of Poland in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries—conquests which had all eventually redounded to the benefit of the Polish partners in a progressively polonized United Kingdom of Poland–Lithuania.

These were changes on the ethnic map which could not be reversed, even partially, except at the cost of a third world war, and even then only at the price of unparalleled further suffering for all the human beings concerned, including those enlisted or conscribed on the nominally victorious side. Whatever might be the next chapter of this dreadful story, it looked, in 1954, as if the *Völkerwanderung* of 1939–46 had been a major event which was likely to have an enduring effect on the history of the north-western quarter of the Old World.

(iii) Changes of Frontiers

By comparison with these vast displacements of population, the changes of frontiers in Europe as a result of the Second World War were less extensive than might have been expected *a priori*.

In Western Europe these changes were few and slight. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, whose decisions on local issues concerning other parties were by that time already being governed by the exigencies of the victors' struggle for world power with one another, were unanimous in refusing to redress the injustice that had been done to the Austrian population of the South Tyrol when their country had been ceded to Italy in the peace settlement after the First World War. Though the number of human beings and the extent of territory involved had been relatively small, the injustice had been flagrant. But in 1946 neither the Western Powers nor the Russians were willing to restore the South Tyrol to Austria at the risk of perhaps throwing Italy into the arms of their rivals, since, as a piece on the international chessboard, Italy was of manifestly greater potential value than a poor Austrian pawn. The Dano-German frontier in Slesvig was also left standing at the line along which it had been drawn after the First World

War, in accordance with the results of the plebiscite taken in Slesvig in 1920. The Germans, during their occupation of Denmark, had resisted the temptation to reannex Nord Slesvig from Denmark, and the Danes, in their turn, resisted now, as after the First World War, the temptation to turn Germany's dark hour of impotence and disgrace to Denmark's account by seeking to reannex South Schleswig.[1] Except for some slight modifications of the Franco-Italian frontier in the Western Alps,[2] the only territorial change in Western Europe was the separation from Germany, and association with France, of the territory of the Saar. In insisting on this being done after the Second World War, as they had insisted on it after the First, the French were characteristically showing for the second time their lack of that prudence and self-restraint which prevailed upon the Danes, for the second time, to refrain from asking for South Schleswig. The results of the plebiscite held in 1935 had proved conclusively that the Saar was as thoroughly and unshakably German in national feeling as Alsace-Lorraine was French,[3] and the disposal of the Saar was bound to be fateful for the future of Franco-German relations, not only because of the strength of the feelings about this question in the rest of Germany, as well as in the Saar itself, but also because the richness of the Saar's mineral resources, the calibre of its industry, and the density of its population gave it an importance of which the smallness of its area was no adequate index.

In Eastern Europe, south of the Carpathians and the Lower Danube, the territorial changes after the Second World War were also remarkably few and small. The fragments into which Yugoslavia had been broken up in the construction of Hitler's Europe were now all reunited again. In particular, Yugoslavia's inter-war frontiers with Bulgaria, Albania, Austria, and Hungary were all reinstated, and so, likewise, was the inter-war frontier between Hungary and Rumania.[4] Thus both Macedonia and Transylvania, which were the two largest bones of contention in South-East Europe, were both now replaced in the hands of their inter-war possessors. The four South-East European territories in which there was a change by comparison with the *status quo ante* 1939 were the Southern Dobruja, Carpatho-Ruthenia, the Bratislava bridge-head, and Venezia Giulia; and, in three out of these four cases, the change was in accordance with the principle of national self-determination—if it might be assumed (though this assumption was not invariably well warranted) that a population would wish to be included in a state in which the ethnic majority was of that population's own nationality, rather than be included in a state in which the ethnic majority was of a different nationality.

[1] See *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, ed. H. W. V. Temperley, 6 vols. (London, Oxford University Press for British Institute of International Affairs, 1920–4), ii. 197–206. [This work will be referred to hereafter as *H.P.C.*] See also below, pp. 575–7.

[2] See below, pp. 456–8.

[3] See *Survey* for 1934, pp. 578–627.

[4] See below, p. 328.

The Southern Dobruja, which had been filched from Bulgaria by Rumania in 1913 and had been restored to Bulgaria by the Axis Powers in 1940,[1] was now left by the Russians in Bulgaria's possession. Carpatho-Ruthenia was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union for inclusion, together with the ethnically Ukrainian provinces of inter-war Poland, in the Soviet Union's Ukrainian constituent republic; and thus, for the first time in history, all Ukrainians, except for a tiny and easily exchangeable minority in Poland west of the Curzon Line, were now united within the frontiers of a single state. While thus ceding the Ukrainian territory in Carpatho-Ruthenia of which she had been the caretaker between the wars, Czechoslovakia obtained a tiny increment of territory in the shape of a bridge-head south of the Danube, opposite Bratislava.[2] The case for this change on topographical grounds was held to be stronger than the ethnic case against it.

As for Venezia Giulia, the uncontested transfer of most of the Yugoslav-inhabited part of this territory from Italy to Yugoslavia after the Second World War redressed the crying injustice that the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War had committed when it had placed very nearly half a million Yugoslavs under Italian rule. Pending the final disposal of the Territory of Trieste, the numbers of the Yugoslavs now left under Italian rule and of the Italians now brought under Yugoslav rule were relatively small. The Yugoslav-speaking population in the north-east corner of Venetia Proper had been under the sovereignty of the Venetian Republic from 1420 to 1797 and under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy since 1866, and the Western members of the Four-Power Commission,[3] who visited this district, as well as Venezia Giulia, in 1946, received, at first hand, the impression that these Yugoslav-speaking ex-subjects of Venice (like the French-speaking ex-subjects of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the Valle d'Aosta)[4] were Italians in political feeling, and that they wished to remain citizens of an Italian national state. The Italian diasporà that had now come under the rule of Yugoslavia at Zara, at Fiume, in Istria, and in Zone B of the Territory of Trieste (which had passed, *de facto*, under Yugoslav occupation, though it had not passed, *de jure*, under Yugoslavia's sovereignty) were less fortunate than either the Yugoslav-speaking Italians in the Cividale district or the inhabitants of Zone A of the Territory of Trieste, where an Anglo-American occupation continued to give protection to the local Yugoslav minority as well as to the local Italian majority.

In Eastern Europe, north of the Carpathians and the Lower Danube, by contrast both with Eastern Europe south of that line and with Western Europe, the territorial changes after the Second World War were revolu-

[1] See below, p. 348.
[2] See below, p. 349.
[3] See below, pp. 467, 473–4.
[4] See below, p. 457.

tionary—though it must be noted that, in the northernmost sector of this region, two of the three departures, in the Soviet Union's favour, from the inter-war position of the Russo-Finnish frontier were restorations of an earlier state of affairs. In taking back from Finland the Petsamo district, with its nickel deposits and its outlet on the Arctic Ocean, the Soviet Union was reacquiring a common frontier with Norway along the line along which this frontier had run, down to 1918, since the fourteenth century, when this coast had first been opened up from the west by Norwegian pioneers and from the east by Russian pioneers whose base had been Novgorod. In re-establishing, in 1944, the Russo-Finnish frontier of 1940 on the Karelian Isthmus to the north-west of Viborg (in Finnish called Viipuri), and likewise in annexing Estonia and that portion of Latvia, including the city of Riga, which, till 1918, had constituted the Baltic province of Livland, the Soviet Union was reannexing territories which, though ethnically non-Russian, had belonged to the Russian Empire continuously for two centuries running from 1721 to 1918.

The Soviet Union now acquired a frontage along the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, and of the Gulfs of Finland and Riga, extending from Viborg (Viipuri) inclusive on the north to Königsberg (now renamed Kaliningrad) on the south. The three inter-war sovereign independent Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were now deprived of their independence by being converted into constituent republics of the Soviet Union. The Vilna district, with its once predominantly Jewish urban population and its still predominantly White Russian rural population, which had been an object of bitter dispute between Lithuania and Poland between the wars, when it had been under Polish occupation, was now awarded to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's White Russian and Ukrainian constituent republics now acquired, between them, all the rest of inter-war Poland as far west as the Curzon Line. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic also acquired from Rumania the ethnically Ukrainian north-western half of the Bukovina and north-western tip of Bessarabia, together with the ethnically variegated south-eastern end of Bessarabia (the Bujāq). The whole of Bessarabia, which had been annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812 from the Ottoman Empire, and which had been occupied by Rumania in 1918 without any subsequent recognition, on the Soviet Union's part, of this temporarily accomplished fact, was now retaken from Rumania by the Soviet Union—a territorial change which made the Soviet Union one of the riverain states of the River Danube, as the Russian Empire had been from 1812 until its collapse in 1917. The parts of Bessarabia that were not now annexed to the Soviet Union's constituent republic of the Ukraine were combined with the fragment of Rumanian-inhabited territory east of the River Dniester to form the constituent Republic of Moldavia.

Farther west, the south-western portion of East Prussia, which had not been annexed by the Soviet Union to the R.S.F.S.R., was now assigned *de facto* to Poland. Poland's share of East Prussia included a strip, south of the Masurian Lakes, whose inhabitants were Polish in language but Protestant in religion and German in national feeling. Poland also now acquired the territory of the inter-war Free City of Danzig; she recovered the 'corridor' of inter-war Polish territory in West Prussia; and this Polish Corridor's narrow seaboard, on which the inter-war Government of Poland had built the port of Gdynia, was now extended westward to the line of the River Oder and across the Oder, at its mouth, to include within Poland the port of Szczecin (Stettin). The revolutionary new western frontier that had been assigned to post-war Poland by the Soviet Union *de facto*, but which had not been recognized by the Western Powers *de jure*, ran up the course of the Oder to its confluence with its west-bank tributary, the Western Neisse, and thence up the course of the Western Neisse to this tributary's headwaters on the Oder–Elbe watershed, along the Erzgebirge, which here constituted the frontier of Czechoslovakia. This new *de facto* western frontier of Poland, between the mouth of the Oder and the crest of the Erzgebirge, was the shortest line that could be drawn across the great North European plain anywhere to the east of the Ardennes.

In terms of the new scale of operations—military, political, and economic—that, by the middle of the twentieth century, had been imposed on human affairs by the still accelerating advance of technology, the post-war frontiers in North-Eastern Europe were decidedly more rational than the inter-war frontiers that they had replaced. The city of Leningrad, for instance, was now no longer within a stone's-throw of the Russo-Finnish frontier, as it had been from 1918 to 1944. The north-western approaches to the city overland were now once again under the sovereignty of the same state as the city itself—as they had been from 1721 to 1918, when the same city had stood on the same site under the successive names of St. Petersburg and Petrograd. Again, the ex-German maritime cities along the east and south shores of the Baltic, from Reval to Danzig inclusive, were now all united politically with their economic hinterlands—Tallinn (Reval), Riga, and Liepaja (Libau) for the first time since 1918; Gdánsk (Danzig) for the first time since 1795; Klaipeda (Memel) and Kaliningrad (Königsberg) for the first time in their histories. The inter-war Polish 'corridor', interposed between two pieces of German territory, had now disappeared, and Poland, as well as the Soviet Union, had emerged with a Baltic coastline that was proportionate in length to the area of the territory under the same sovereignty that depended on a Baltic outlet and inlet for its overseas trade. The western march, in the North European plain, of the combine constituted by the Soviet Union and her satellites had been located in a zone in which the width of the plain, between the Baltic

and the Central European mountains, was relatively small. Moreover, within these rationalized frontiers, the ethnic map had been rationalized as well. The historic eastward-breaking waves of German and Polish population had been expunged from a map in which they had figured for hundreds of years. The area inhabited by the Polish people now coincided with the territory under the sovereignty of the Polish state once again for the first time since the fourteenth century, which had seen Poland simultaneously lose her westernmost and northernmost territories to the Germans and, in compensation, win, at the Ukrainians' expense, a dominion over Eastern Galicia.

In 1954 it was not yet possible to foresee whether this drastic rationalization of both the ethnic and the political map of North-Eastern Europe was, or was not, likely, in the long run, to secure for this long-distracted region a greater measure of peace and prosperity than it had enjoyed in the past. But there was one feature of the change that was already an accomplished fact and that was also a tragic one. The reconstruction of Eastern Europe had cost an appalling price in terms of human misery.

In this barbarously forcible and merciless redistribution of population, by far the greatest sufferers—next to the Jews, whom the Germans had exterminated—had been the Germans themselves. In Eastern Europe, for a thousand years ending in the date of Hitler's advent to power, the Germans had been sharing with the Jews in the performance of a social and cultural function which had been as lucrative to the performers as it had been valuable to the non-German and non-Jewish beneficiaries. Eastward-drifting German and Jewish diasporàs had been the two main carriers of the arts and crafts of Western civilization; and their services had been so highly appreciated by enlightened governments in Eastern European countries that, in many cases, these had enticed German immigrants to settle in their domains by granting them land and commercial privileges and even civic self-government. In the course of those thousand years ending in January 1933 a German diasporà had thus been broadcast, by 'peaceful penetration' for the most part, from the banks of the Lower Elbe as far as the banks of the Lower Volga, to the mutual benefit of the German colonists and of the indigenous non-German majority of the local population. This sphere of cultural influence in Eastern Europe had been more profitable and more honourable for the German people than any political Reich that had ever been established by force of German arms. Yet Hitler, who was a child of the local German diasporà in the Sudetenland, and who boasted that his Third Reich was being built to last for a thousand years, made history, in the event, by erasing from the map throughout Eastern Europe, including his own Bohemian native land, a German diasporà which, by his day, had no less than a millennium of life and growth behind it.

Hitler doomed the whole German diasporà in Eastern Europe to liquidation by doing two things that were as short-sighted as they were wicked. He tempted or bullied the *Auslandsdeutsch* minorities in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, and the Soviet Union to collaborate as a fifth column in the Third Reich's aggressive assaults upon its eastern neighbours; and, not content with thereby having made the presence of German minorities no longer tolerable for the nations who had thus been betrayed by their local German fellow citizens, Hitler showed Eastern Europe how to liquidate the German diasporà by setting the example, himself, at the expense of two German communities. Hitler's unholy alliance with Mussolini was sealed by an agreement which compelled the German-speaking Austrian population of the South Tyrol to make the cruel choice of renouncing their nationality or else leaving their homes.[1] Hitler's unholy alliance with Stalin was sealed by an agreement for transferring, to Hitler's side of the partition line of 1939, the German diasporà in territories on Stalin's side.[2] These acts of Hitler's, taken together, made it certain that the ancient German diasporà in Eastern Europe would be liquidated if the Third Reich were to suffer defeat. Hitler had made the German diasporà's position impossible by making this minority insufferable and by demonstrating at the same time how this insufferable minority could be got rid of.

(iv) The Problem presented by a Power Vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe

For half a dozen years immediately following the completion of Italy's political unification in 1870 and of Germany's in 1871 the political map of Europe was simpler in appearance than it had been at any date since the break-up of the Roman Empire. During those few years by far the greater part of Europe was occupied by the domains of five Great Powers and one ex-Great Power, the Ottoman Empire, with a few minor states lodged in the interstices between the six large states; and the simplicity of the pattern, during that brief period, was at its maximum in Central and Eastern Europe. The whole of Central and Eastern Europe was then under the sovereignty or suzerainty of four empires—the German, the Russian, the Habsburg, and the Ottoman—except for Montenegro and Greece, which, at this time, were the only other fully independent states in the whole of that vast area. The official colours on the map at this time were, however, misleading. The Ottoman Empire, for example, had begun to break up, *de facto*, as early as the morrow of the Great Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74, and this break-up had gone far enough by 1798, if not before that, to present an 'Eastern Question' to the Western Powers.

[1] Details will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Initial Triumph of the Axis*.
[2] See above, p. 5, and also *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 83, 84–85.

In 1875–8 the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in South-Eastern Europe, westward and northward of Adrianople, was carried such a long stage farther that, from then on, it was certain that, sooner or later, the process of liquidation would be completed. The end of 'Turkey-in-Europe', outside Eastern Thrace, duly came in 1912–13; and, by 1918, the entire Habsburg Monarchy, together with large slices of the German and the Russian Empire, had gone the same way as all but one small remnant of the European dominions of the Ottoman Empire.

The two European political convulsions of 1875–8 and 1912–18 transformed the political map of Europe in two ways. They complicated the previously simple political map of Central and Eastern Europe to a degree that made the political map of Western Europe now look relatively simple by comparison. On the political map of Europe as it was between the First and Second World Wars, the old-established lesser states in Western Europe—Switzerland, the three Low Countries, the three Scandinavian countries, and the two Peninsular countries—were now outnumbered by a host of parvenu successor states of mutilated or disrupted Central and East European empires. These successor states now occupied an area extending from Greece in the south to Finland in the north and from Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States on the west to Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and the Baltic States on the east.

The inter-war situation of Poland and the Baltic States was conspicuously precarious—wedged in, as all four states were, between a Germany and a Russia that had been mutilated without being permanently crippled; but all the Central and East European successor states were in truth in the same plight during the inter-war period. It was tacitly recognized that these states were 'not able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the Modern World';[1] but, unlike the new Arab successor states of the Ottoman Empire to which this phrase was frankly applied in the text of the Versailles Peace Treaty signed on 28 June 1919, the European successor states were not placed under the authority of Great Powers entrusted with mandates to take charge of them; they were left to depend for their survival on the general guarantees that the Covenant of the League of Nations gave to all states members of the League alike. At the same time it was recognized, by all parties concerned, that, if the successor states were, in fact, to survive, they would need to supplement the measure of security provided by the League with some more substantial form of insurance. It was also recognized that it would not be enough for the successor states to make defensive treaties with one another, as was quickly done by the parties to the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. The collective weakness of the European successor states was aggravated by the

[1] Great Britain: *The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany . . . signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919* (London, H.M.S.O. [1919]), Art. 22.

fact that they, like the Great Powers around them, were divided between the two classes of ex-victor and ex-vanquished states, or, in other words, 'haves' and 'have-nots'; and merely regional alliances could not guarantee either restitution to the 'have-nots' or territorial integrity to the 'haves'. In these unpropitious circumstances the successor states of both classes found themselves constrained to seek the patronage, or submit to the hegemony, of one or other of the surrounding Powers as their only practical recourse for defence or for redress, as the case might be. Accordingly, the 'haves' among the successor states became satellites of France, while the 'have-nots' became satellites of Italy and Germany.

The vast area in Central and Eastern Europe that was now occupied by a mosaic of weak successor states was, in fact, an enormous power vacuum; and the question how this vacuum was eventually going to be filled was the fundamental question of European power politics between the two world wars. Was France strong enough—at any rate, so long as her army held the Rhine bridge-heads—also to hold the area covered by the successor states as a French sphere of influence? Or would Germany and Italy be able to supplant France here? Or would the Soviet Union be the eventual legatee of the four nineteenth-century Central and East European empires?

The prize at stake was a great one; for, though the successor states, collectively as well as severally, were weak, an effective foreign command over their combined territories, material resources, and man-power, gathered into the hands of some single Great Power, would give a Power that acquired this asset a perhaps decisive superiority over its peers. During the inter-war period Great Britain, as well as the United States, was sincerely and transparently concerned to keep clear of Central and East European entanglements, while neither France nor Italy was a serious competitor for the Central and East European prize. Either of these two Powers was too weak to make itself effectively master of this asset; and France shared with Great Britain and the United States the handicap of being insulated geographically from the belt of successor states by the Rome–Berlin Axis. Germany and the Soviet Union were the only two Great Powers of the day whose geographical location and native strength gave either of them a chance of being able to make itself still stronger by incorporating the whole cluster of successor states in its own body politic. When Hitler made the Second World War, he was, no doubt, looking forward to conquering the world as his second move in a power game in which the first move was to be the conquest of the Central and East European successor states; and he did come within sight of achieving world conquest along this road at the height of his success, when he had made the Third Reich master, not only of the whole belt of successor states, but also of the western territories of the Soviet Union, up to the outskirts

of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad, and of the whole of continental Western Europe north of the Pyrenees, except for Switzerland and Sweden.

The disintegration of Hitler's Europe, which began as early as the autumn of 1942 and which continued thereafter *accelerando*, created a far greater power vacuum in Europe than had been produced by the events of 1875–8, or even by those of 1912–18. The vacuum now extended over the whole of continental Europe, since Switzerland, Sweden, and the two Peninsular countries, which had remained inviolate during the Second World War as well as during the First, were, none of them, capable of defending their independence if the three victor Powers were to agree to deprive them of it. It was now evident that these three Powers—the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States—were going to fill the new European power vacuum between them, but how they were going to fill it was a question that remained an open one until it was answered implicitly, and perhaps even inadvertently, as a corollary to their answer to the question how they were going to occupy a defeated Germany and a re-established Austria.

There were two possible alternative methods of occupying Germany and Austria: either the whole of either country might be occupied by an inter-Ally garrison under inter-Ally command or, alternatively, Germany and Austria might be partitioned into zones, and each zone might be occupied by one single Ally exclusively. Both alternatives were considered and the second of the two was adopted in the, no doubt, well-founded belief that an inter-Ally occupation of either Germany or Austria would have been unmanageable. The decision to partition Germany and Austria into separate zones of occupation was perhaps prudent, or even unavoidable, as a solution for the local problem; but, in choosing this solution for the local problem of Germany and Austria, the Allied Powers were also settling the destiny of the greater part of the remainder of the huge power vacuum that had recently constituted Hitler's Europe. If a co-operative occupation of Germany and Austria by the victor Powers had proved feasible, this might have been a step towards the establishment of a common government for the whole of Europe and perhaps eventually for the whole world. Conversely, the decision to partition Germany and Austria into separate zones of occupation was implicitly also a decision that all European countries lying between the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and the western frontier of the Soviet Union should fall within a Russian sphere of influence, and that all European countries lying west of the American and British zones of occupation in Germany and Austria should similarly fall within an American-British sphere.[1] This was what

[1] Zones of occupation in Germany and Austria were assigned to France, as well, by the three victor Powers, but this act of courtesy had no magic potency to make France a Great Power again. France remained part of the European vacuum left by the disintegration of Hitler's Europe.

determined the post-war alignment of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Russian side of the boundary between the Soviet Union's zone and the Western Powers' zone in Germany and in Austria, and the simultaneous alignment of Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and France on the Anglo-American side of the same military demarcation line running through the heart of Austria and Germany. Moreover, this realignment was in accordance with the contemporary realities of military power; for, in a world in which the military power of Hitler's Third Reich had been annihilated, the agreed line of demarcation between the Soviet zone and the Anglo-American zones in Germany and Austria approximately coincided with the line along which Russian power was in equilibrium with North American power transmitted to the Continent through a pumping station in the British Isles.

The military partition of Germany and Austria, which thus settled the destiny of so much of the rest of Europe, did not, however, dispose of Italy and South-Eastern Europe; for, in this quarter of Europe, the line of equilibrium between Russian power and American-British power did not run through Austria and Germany. The locus of the line here would have to be discovered by experiment, in a competitive occupation of this part of Hitler's crumbling empire, unless, like the demarcation lines across Austria and Germany, it could be agreed in advance. A bid for agreement in this quarter was made by Churchill at Moscow on 9 October 1944, when, as between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, he wrote down, on a half-sheet of paper, the suggestion that, in Greece, Great Britain, in accord with the United States, should have 90% of the power and the Soviet Union 10%, and that in Rumania the power should be shared between the parties in the same ratio inversely (i.e. that 90% of the power there should go to the Soviet Union). Churchill's schedule also suggested that, in Bulgaria, the division of power should be 75% in the Soviet Union's favour, and that in both Yugoslavia and Hungary the division should be 50–50. After Churchill had pushed across the table his half-sheet inscribed with these fateful figures, Stalin ticked it with a blue pencil and passed it back.[1]

Both the method and the speed of this informal diplomatic transaction might give an impression of cynicism and casualness, as Churchill remarked to Stalin a moment later. Yet, in the aggregate, though not in respect of each item taken separately, the percentages thus agreed upon by these two statesmen in the autumn of 1944 actually anticipated, with an astonishingly close approximation to accuracy, the eventual realignment of this quarter of Europe after the local liquidation of Hitler's Europe had been completed. In the event, the Soviet Union secured 100% of the power in Rumania, and the United States (as Great Britain's successor) 100% of it in Greece; and, though the Soviet Union also secured 100%,

[1] Churchill, vi. 198; U.S. edition, vi. 227.

instead of only 50%, in Hungary as well, this gain was offset by her loss, in 1948, of even the 50% that Churchill had assigned to her in Yugoslavia. In the event, Churchill's forecast was appreciably falsified only in Bulgaria, where the Western Powers did not secure even the 25% that he had asked for here. But the Soviet Union's acquisition of 100% of the power in Bulgaria was more than offset by Turkey's entry into the Western Powers' camp after the Soviet Union had tried, and failed, to intimidate her into agreeing to a rectification of the Russo-Turkish frontier in Transcaucasia and to the lease of bases to the Soviet Union in Turkish territory and territorial waters at the Black Sea Straits.[1] Thus the boundary between the Soviet sphere and the Western sphere was eventually carried right across continental Europe from the south shore of the Baltic Sea to the west shore of the Black Sea, with Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Rumania, on the Soviet side of the line, but with Turkey and Yugoslavia, as well as Greece, on the Western side of it—after a brief experience of the realities of a Russian hegemony had provoked the Yugoslavs into breaking away from their previously voluntary and cordial association with the Soviet Union.

(v) The Breach between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union

Thus the realignment of Europe after the Second World War was a change from the unity that had been imposed by German conquest to a partition into two spheres; and this partition was the consequence of the victorious Powers' inability to maintain the unity of the continent that had been their defeated adversary's sole, but signal, constructive achievement. Hitler's forcible military, political, and economic unification of Europe had been a practical answer to Europe's most pressing need; and, though Hitler's brutal way of solving Europe's problem had been made odious to the reluctant beneficiaries by the acts of aggression through which it had been achieved, the methods of barbarism by which it had been enforced, and the selfish German national purposes for which it had been exploited, it was, nevertheless, a grave misfortune for Europe that part of the price of her release from German tyranny should have been the loss of the one great benefit that this tyranny had brought with it. The misfortune was the greater considering that, in all the European countries, except Finland, that found themselves on the Russian side of the line by which Hitler's Europe was now partitioned into two spheres, the change was merely the substitution of a Russian tyranny for a German one. But the greatest misfortune of all was that the new alignment of Europe, resulting from the victory of Germany's adversaries, disappointed the hopes that had sustained Hitler's victims and opponents throughout the war. Instead of bringing to a ruined and exhausted continent the longed-for political

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Middle East, 1945–1950*, pp. 21 seqq.

stability and freedom from fear, the new dispensation, under which Europe found herself partitioned between two camps, each under the command of a non-European super-Power, brought with it, for Europe, a further bout of political rivalry and tension that threatened to discharge itself in a third world war with Europe as its arena.

Why was the post-war partition of Europe into a Russian sphere and an Anglo-American sphere, which was a misfortune in itself, thus aggravated by a quarrel between two groups of Powers that had recently been allies in a war against a common enemy? In the lore of power politics it was, of course, proverbial that victories were apt to dissolve alliances when these had been contracted just for the purpose of winning a war. It was also proverbial that, the more decisive the victory, the sooner the recent allies were likely to fall out. This lore would go far to account for the quarrel, in 1946, between the Powers whose aggregate efforts had forced Germany to surrender unconditionally in 1945; for it was manifestly true that nothing short of a common danger of imminent destruction at German hands could have induced the Soviet Union and the Western Powers to join forces; and it was also evident that, on V-E Day 1945, the military power of the Third Reich was at a lower ebb than the power of the Second Reich had been on Armistice Day 1918, or the power of Prussia in 1806 after her defeat at the Battle of Jena. Yet these two historical precedents were two strident warnings to the victors of 1945 that the most apparently crushing victories over Germany were apt to be wasting assets. Why was it that, after V-E Day 1945, a knowledge of historical facts that were known to every schoolboy did not hold the latest anti-German alliance together?[1]

The American people, perhaps, might have been tempted to underestimate their need for keeping on friendly terms with the Russians through being insufficiently alive to the abiding threat of German militarism; for the Americans had, perhaps, never realized that, after the fall of France in 1940, the United States, as well as Great Britain, had been in danger of being conquered by German arms and might have found herself unable to stand, if Britain had then fallen. But in Russian minds there was no such invincible ignorance to account for the Soviet Union's willingness, in 1946, to quarrel with the United States and Britain; for the Russians had seen their country overrun and devastated by German armies twice in one lifetime, and this repetition of a terrible experience must have graven the fear of Germany very deep in Russian hearts. Why was it, then, that, even before the Second World War had been won, the Soviet Union began to make a series of moves that progressively wore out the goodwill of her Western allies? Why did she provocatively deprive them of any effective

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 652–61, for the change in climates of opinion between September 1945 and December 1946, and for a discussion of the causes.

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voice in the post-war realignment of those East European countries in which the German occupation or ascendancy was liquidated by Russian arms? Why, on 29 April 1946, did Molotov reject Byrnes's draft of a four-Power treaty—to run for twenty-five years, with the possibility of renewal—providing for the complete disarmament of Germany, for inspection to prevent her from rearming secretly, and for immediate four-Power military intervention if the treaty provisions were ever broken by a future German Government?[1] Why, in the same year, did the Soviet Government forgo a proffered American loan rather than accept the economic conditions attached to the American offer?[2] Why, in 1947, did they refuse the offer of Marshall Aid for the Soviet Union herself and veto the acceptance of it by her East European satellites?[3]

Presumably the Russians did not believe in the sincerity of professions of friendliness and offers of co-operation and assistance on the part of the United States or any other Western Power. To have believed in it would have been incompatible with a Marxist's orthodox faith; and, though the makers of policy in the Kremlin might cherish as few illusions as a Roman cardinal in the early modern age, they could not be immune, any more than the sixteenth-century cardinal could, against the influence of their own world's contemporary climate of belief. To some extent, at least, they must have been the prisoners of their official creed; and the Communist creed required its adherents to believe that all 'capitalists' were cloven-hoofed beasts of one uniform malignant species. Yet what would the men in the Kremlin have lost by continuing to make the outward gesture of taking the American 'capitalist' satyr to their bosom? It could not, surely, have exposed them to any risk if they had become parties to the proposed mutual guarantee treaty directed against Germany; and then, with their tongues in their cheeks, they might have pocketed American financial and economic aid and, fortified by this windfall, have held their hand till an unsuspecting American people had once again compelled the Administration at Washington to disengage the United States from traditionally compromising European entanglements. Why did the Soviet Government choose to flaunt their hostility to the United States so frankly in American faces? If the foremost aim of Russian policy had been to put the Americans on their guard against the Soviet Union and to goad them into militantly opposing Russian designs, the Russians could not have achieved this aim more successfully than by behaving as they did. Yet it was impossible to believe that this could really have been their purpose.

While any Western attempt to explain Russian policy could not be more than guesswork, the most plausible guess seemed to be that, in taking action

[1] Ibid. pp. 724–5.
[2] Ibid. pp. 690–2.
[3] Ibid. p. 692; *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 24–39.

that provoked the United States to quarrel with them, the Soviet Government were not unaware of the seriousness of this consequence, but were prepared, nevertheless, to put up with it as a lesser evil than the payment of the necessary price for the preservation of America's friendship. This necessary price would have been the renunciation of Russian objectives in Eastern and Central Europe; and the Soviet Government must have calculated that the gain, in terms of security for the Soviet Union, that was to be won from achieving these objectives at all costs decidedly outweighed the loss, in terms of security, that would be entailed by transforming America's friendship into hostility.

After having, twice within one lifetime, had the experience of seeing their country invaded overland, from the west, by enemy ground forces armed with conventional weapons, the Russians must have come to be intensely security-minded; and in the critical years 1944–6, when the future of Russo-American relations was being decided, they must have still been thinking of their country's security in terms of pre-atomic warfare. In these terms, the best security for the Soviet Union against the danger of another invasion from the west might seem not to lie in alliances with insular Powers situated on the western side of Germany, since, at best, these islanders might once again be slow in relieving Russia by opening a second front, while, at worst, they might, next time, enter the lists against Russia as allies of their German fellow-capitalists. The best security might seem to lie in acquiring for the Soviet Union, on her own eastern side of Germany, a broad glacis of territory under the Red Army's permanent military control; and, in the Russian view, in so far as this could be surmised by Western observers, this military control would not be assured unless two non-military conditions were fulfilled. One condition was that the countries on the Red Army's line of communications to the rear, between their front on German soil and their base within the western frontier of the Soviet Union itself, must be purged of all Western economic interference, whether in the form of private business concerns or in the form of treaty rights in such matters as inland navigation on the River Danube. The second condition was that these countries must be brought under the rule of local governments on whose amenability to the Soviet Government's will the Soviet Government could rely. The event made it evident that the Soviet Government were bent, at almost any price in terms of loss of Western goodwill, on bringing amenable governments into power, and keeping them in power, by fair means or by foul, in all European countries within the Russian sphere; and the paramountcy of this aim over other considerations in the minds of the makers of Soviet policy was the rock on which the Grand Alliance split as soon as this rock was laid bare by the ebb of the tide of German conquest; for, in most of the Central and East European countries in question, the only kind of government

that could be counted on to be amenable to Moscow would be one in which the local Communists had the whip hand; and, in most of these countries, again, a government under Communist domination would be a government that would never be voluntarily chosen by a majority of the electorate if the people were genuinely left free to declare their true wishes without intimidation.

As the progressive expulsion of the Germans by the Red Army from one country after another in Eastern and Central Europe raised the question how the governments of these countries should now be reconstituted, Russian and Western statesmen found themselves able to agree on the formula that the new governments must be both 'democratic' and friendly to the Soviet Union; but, since, by a 'democratic' government, either party meant a government of the same complexion as its own, and since the current Russian and Western régimes were most unlike one another, the agreement was a merely verbal one. To enable the two parties genuinely to agree on the basis of the pair of conditions in their common formula, the Russians, in the countries now in their power, would have had to feel it compatible with the Soviet Union's security to tolerate governments that were 'democratic' in the Western sense of being based on majorities in parliaments of which the members had been freely elected. But there was only one country in which the Russians did tolerate a government so constituted, and that country was Finland.

At first thoughts it might seem strange that Finland, of all countries, should have been singled out by the Russians to be treated with forbearance and even with consideration; for, of all Germany's satellites in the Second World War, Finland was the one that, for the Russians, had proved to be the most dangerous adversary; and, even now that the Third Reich had collapsed, Finland's immovable geographical location left her still standing uncomfortably close to Leningrad, in spite of the removal of the Finno-Soviet frontier to its new position west of Viborg. Why, then, in the solitary case of Finland, did the Soviet Union pursue a policy which would have preserved for her the friendship of her Western allies if she had also applied it elsewhere—above all, in Poland? Possibly the Russians' policy towards Finland was governed by two considerations: they could and did achieve, in this quarter, a degree of military security for the Soviet Union that was great enough to make measures of political reinsurance seem superfluous; and they were convinced that the Finns had learnt, and were going to act upon, the lesson that Finland's existence depended on her giving the Soviet Union no further incentive to rase Finland from the map.

After the surrender of Finland the setting back of the Finno-Soviet frontier, the lease, by Finland to the Soviet Union, of a base at Porkkala-Udd, on the south coast of Finland to the west of Helsinki, the acquisition by the Soviet Union of the eastern shores of the Baltic from the south shore

of the Gulf of Finland to Kaliningrad (Königsberg) inclusive, and, last but not least, the transfer, from Germany to the Soviet Union, of the command over the Baltic Sea, both on the water and in the air, the Soviet Government could feel confident that it would be strategically impossible for any future Western aggressor against the Soviet Union to use Finland as a 'jumping-off ground' against Leningrad, as Finland had been used by Germany in the First World War as well as in the Second. Moreover, from the Russian standpoint, the neutrality of Sweden, on the opposite shore of the Baltic, was both an additional security and a special inducement for the Soviet Union to treat Finland relatively leniently, for fear that, if she were to sweep this pawn off the international chessboard, Sweden might be provoked by so threatening a Russian move into taking shelter in the camp of the Western Allies.

The Finns, on their side, had not lost their dislike of Russia—which had been implanted in them by attempts to russify Finland between about 1890 and 1918, and which had been embittered since 1939 by two Russo-Finnish wars. But the Finns had realized that they now were, and would remain, militarily at the Soviet Union's mercy, and that therefore they must henceforward take care to be above suspicion from the Russian point of view, if they were to retain the unique privilege, which, on this condition, the Russians were willing to allow them, of living their own life in their own way.[1]

In the Scandinavian section of the border between the two spheres into which Europe and the rest of the world were being realigned after the Second World War the Soviet Union behaved well, not only to her ex-enemy Finland, but likewise to her allies Norway and Denmark. Towards both of them she played the part of a liberator in the Western meaning of the word by duly evacuating the northern extremity of Norway[2] and the Danish island Bornholm[3] after the Red Army had expelled the local German garrisons. Thus, in Scandinavia, the inevitable process of re-alignment had a relatively happy ending for all parties concerned. Unfortunately, the circumstances were not so auspicious in that much larger section of the borderland that extended across the neck of the European peninsula from the south shore of the Baltic to the west shore of the Black Sea and the east shore of the Adriatic. Here, military security was more difficult than it was in the Scandinavian area for the Soviet Union to

[1] One factor in the Finns' attitude towards Russia was their feeling of gratitude towards the two Tsars Alexander I and Alexander II. The first step in Finland's advance towards the political recognition of her national individuality had been Alexander I's magnanimous decision to erect her into a constitutionally governed autonomous Grand Duchy, associated with the Russian Empire by a mere personal union of his grand ducal coronet with his imperial crown. In March 1954 his statue was still standing in the Lutheran Cathedral at Porvoo, where in 1809 he had come to this arrangement with the members, for Finland, of the Swedish Diet. At the same date, Alexander II's statue was still standing in the principal square in Helsinki.

[2] See below, p. 489.

[3] See below, p. 575, note 2.

achieve, and the political and psychological situation was also less propitious. It was true that the Czechs and Serbs, unlike the Finns, were attached to Russia by a sentiment of Pan-Slavism that was a legacy of their traditional hostility to their defunct enemy the Habsburg Monarchy; and the dominant faction in Serbia was now linked to the Soviet Union still more closely by the double tie of a common Communism and a need for Russian support for Yugoslavia's claim to Trieste. On the other hand, the Poles, Magyars, and Rumans were all as hostile to Russia as the Finns were, while, at the same time, they were decidedly more awkward characters for the Russians to cope with. All these three peoples were conspicuously lacking in the realistic common sense which enabled the Finns to achieve their miracle of winning the Russians' confidence; and, while the Rumans might be malleable, the Magyars were notoriously stiff-necked, and the Poles notoriously unrealistic-minded as well as irrepressible.

In Hungary, Rumania, and Poland, the Russians were confronted, by the disintegration of Hitler's Europe, with as difficult a political and psychological problem as the British had to handle in Greece. Yet the British in Greece were eventually more successful than the Russians were in any country in their sphere except Finland. The irreconcilability of the Greek factions with one another, and the determination of EAM to seize power by making a violent revolution, drew Great Britain into military action against ELAS in and around Athens and the Piraeus;[1] and Churchill had never concealed his intention of using British military force in Greece, if this should prove to be a necessary means to the end of thwarting a Communist attempt at a *coup de main* there.[2] Yet the British in Greece, when once they had defeated the Greek Communists in the field, were successful in bringing them to terms; and they were also able, thereafter, to turn to account a revulsion of feeling in Greece that had been provoked by the Communists' excesses. In this changed atmosphere British diplomacy secured the holding of a general election in Greece in which the anti-Communists won a majority under conditions of voting that perhaps came as near to being free as was practicable in the violent and vindictive atmosphere of Greek politics at the time.[3] By contrast, the Soviet Union's handling of the countries realigned into her sphere was, except for Finland, clumsy and self-stultifying. It is true that the Red Army, unlike the British army in Greece, was never engaged in open warfare with any faction in a satellite country; for when, in 1948, Yugoslavia quarrelled with the Soviet Union and broke away from her, the Russians did not attempt to bring her back into the fold by force; and, in all the other countries in question, the Red Army was too firmly in the saddle for any

[1] See below, pp. 393 seqq.
[2] See Churchill, vi. 247–83; U.S. edition, vi. 283–325.
[3] See below, p. 404.

anti-Communist faction to be able to challenge it to ordeal by battle. But this avoidance of open warfare was the limit of the Russians' success. On the political plane they not only failed to win over their enemies; they also alienated their friends.

In Eastern and Central Europe the Russians' most disastrous failure was their driving of Marshal Tito into political revolt in spite of the ties of sentiment and interest that bound him to them.[1] Only less ill advised, as seen through Western eyes, was their policy in Czechoslovakia of liquidating Beneš's régime and consequently alienating the sympathies of the Czech bourgeoisie.[2] These two miscarriages of Russian policy both occurred, however, in 1948—that is, at a stage at which the quarrel between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers had already become flagrant. They were consequences of it, not causes; and the turns of a Russian screw which caused Tito to assert his independence and Beneš to forfeit his could both be explained as attempts at making assurance doubly sure in a situation in which the Russians no longer dared to take chances. It was true that Beneš, as well as Tito, had compelling motives, of a less sentimental kind than pan-Slav feeling, for holding fast to his alliance with the Soviet Union. All Czechs, of all parties and classes, remembered that Great Britain and France had been unwilling, or at any rate unable, to save Czechoslovakia from Germany in 1938–9, and that the Soviet Union had not been implicated in the deal between the two West European Powers and Hitler at Czechoslovakia's expense. Moreover, after the liquidation of Germany's 'protectorate' over Czechoslovakia in 1945, the restored national government, under Beneš's leadership, burned their boats when they expelled all but a small remnant of the large German minority in the country.[3] And thus both Czechoslovakia's experience before V-E Day and her action after it might have been expected to make her lean on the Red Army as her one sure guarantee against the risk of a German *revanche*. The Russians must have feared that, nevertheless, now that it had come to an open breach between Russia and the West, a bourgeois régime in Czechoslovakia, under Beneš's leadership, would take sides with the West if Czechoslovakia were eventually to find herself compelled to make the unwelcome choice. And, whether this fear were well-founded or not, its existence would explain why the Russians did what they did in 1948 in Czechoslovakia.

It was not so easy to explain their *Gleichschaltung* of the non-Communist parties in Hungary and Bulgaria;[4] for, in both these countries, there was a strong and widespread demand for radical changes, and, though the radicals' objective was not, in either Bulgaria or Hungary, the establishment of a Communist régime, it was revolutionary enough to make the

[1] See *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 160–7.
[2] See ibid. pp. 153–7.
[3] See below, pp. 380–1.
[4] See below, pp. 317–19 and 302.

radicals fear a counter-revolutionary reaction, and therefore to dispose them in favour of friendship with the Soviet Union if, in return, they could look forward to receiving Russian support. This present need, in Hungary and Bulgaria, for Russian backing in the execution of revolutionary programmes was an element in the local situations here that was favourable to the Soviet Union, since the local revolutions would automatically make a breach with the past and would therefore give an opportunity for overcoming the hostility towards Russia that was traditional in Hungary[1] and the suspicion of her that was traditional in Bulgaria.[2] Yet, in Bulgaria and Hungary, Russian statesmanship proved unable, or perhaps, rather, unwilling, to take the opportunity of providing for the military security of the Soviet Union by patronizing local non-Communist régimes that might have been induced by Russian diplomacy to be voluntarily Russophil. Russian action in Bulgaria and Hungary was not, however, a decisive factor in bringing about the breach between the Soviet Union and the West. The crux was Poland, and here it would have been difficult indeed to devise a settlement that would have satisfied both the Western and the Russian desiderata.

For Great Britain and the United States, the Soviet Union's treatment of Poland was 'the acid test' of the Soviet Union's general intentions, and this for several reasons. One of these was that, for Great Britain in 1939, Germany's conduct towards Poland had been the test of Germany's general intentions. The occasion of Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany had been Germany's invasion of Poland after Poland had received a British guarantee of aid in the event of German aggression. Great Britain had not, however, guaranteed Poland's territorial integrity against the Soviet Union, and, at the time of the redrawing of the political map of Europe after the First World War, she had put on record her disapproval of Poland's annexation of territories with a predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian population at a moment when the Soviet Union was compelled, by a temporary weakness, to yield to Poland's territorial demands on the east. British statesmanship had ascertained, and had advocated as being the right eastern frontier for Poland, the line east of which a majority of the population was non-Polish, and Russian statesmanship astutely chose this British 'Curzon Line' for the westward limit of the Soviet Union's territorial demands at Poland's expense when the progressive disintegration of Hitler's Europe raised the question of the

[1] This hostility dated from 1849, when Tsar Nicholas II's military intervention in Hungary on the King-Emperor Francis Joseph's side against the Hungarian insurgents had been the decisive factor in foiling the Magyars' attempt to recover their independence by force of arms.

[2] The Bulgarians had been suspicious of Russia since their discovery, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8, that, in Russian mouths, the word 'liberation' meant the replacement of Turkish rule by Russian domination. The Bulgars' gratitude to the Tsar Liberator Alexander II did not deter them from breaking loose in 1883, as the Yugoslavs were to break loose in 1948.

Russo-Polish frontier afresh. This frontier was not the Polish issue over which Churchill and Roosevelt became estranged from Stalin. They both acquiesced in Stalin's demand for the Curzon Line, and Churchill made energetic efforts to induce the Poles likewise to reconcile themselves to it. The Western statesmen's only serious territorial dispute with Stalin in regard to Poland was over the extent of the territorial compensation at Germany's expense that Poland was to be granted, to make up for her having to cede to the Soviet Union the area between the Curzon Line and the Riga Line; and here the dispute arose out of the Western statesmen's reluctance to agree to the Big Three's being as generous to Poland at Germany's expense as Stalin wished. The crucial dispute arose, not over Poland's future frontiers, but over her future régime. The Polish régime that Stalin felt to be requisite for the Soviet Union's security was one which, in Western eyes, was not 'democratic' at all, but was, as they saw it, a puppet government which could never have climbed into the saddle if it had not been hoisted into it by Russian hands commanding irresistible force. Stalin's persistence in imposing this non-representative government on Poland, and in quickly pushing out of it again those few representative Poles whom Churchill and Roosevelt temporarily succeeded in pushing in, was the most effective single cause of the post-war breakdown of the war-time Grand Alliance.

Another reason why the West felt so strongly about Poland was the Poles' characteristic indomitability in extreme adversity. There were no Polish quislings; and the hardihood, endurance, and vitality of the Polish underground Resistance Movement against a merciless German occupation had won in the West an admiration which had partly effaced from Western minds the unhappy memories of Poland's equivocal policy in the inter-war years and of her ignominious military collapse in the first round of the Second World War.

For Stalin, on the other hand, the Polish underground movement's glorious war record did not tell in Poland's favour, since the prowess with which these Polish patriots were resisting the Wehrmacht might come into play against the Red Army, now that this was progressively replacing the Wehrmacht as the foreign army of occupation in inter-war Polish territories west of the Riga Line. It might also be guessed that Stalin was influenced by Russian experience of the temperamental difference between the Poles and the Finns. The Finns were no less hostile to Russia than the Poles were, and, in the Second World War, they had proved more redoubtable adversaries in the field for the Red Army than the Polish regular army had proved for the Wehrmacht. Yet, in the end, the Finns had recognized realities and had bowed to the inevitable, and Stalin had responded by granting Finland the least onerous terms that were compatible with his insistence on taking effective military guarantees. On the

other hand the Poles, unlike the Finns, could not be trusted to see reason or to make a virtue of necessity; and a deficit in political trustworthiness could not be offset here by a surcharge of military guarantees, since Poland's geographical position made it impossible for the Soviet Union to insulate her strategically, as Finland could be and had been insulated by the Soviet Union's occupation of both Estonia and Porkkala-Udd. Poland lay in the heart of the Continent, and, for Russia, her position was strategically crucial, because Poland, however far her frontiers might be shifted westward, could not remain on the map without straddling right across a North European plain which was bound to be the main avenue for any attack upon Russia from the west. For the security of the Soviet Union, Poland mattered more than, for instance, Czechoslovakia. It might be true that Bohemia was 'the bastion of Europe' and that whoever held Bohemia held the rest of Europe in the hollow of his hand. Hitler had demonstrated the truth of these propositions about Bohemia in the years 1938–41. But, as Stalin put it to Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta on 6 February 1945, 'throughout history Poland had been a corridor through which Russia's enemies had passed to attack her. During the last thirty years the Germans had twice passed through Poland.'[1]

The conclusion that Stalin professed to draw from these geographical and historical facts was that the Soviet Union's interest lay in having for her neighbour a Poland that would be not only friendly to Russia, but at the same time free and strong, because Russia wanted to have the corridor through Poland closed against potential future invaders, and this could be done for Russia by nobody except Poland herself. Yet, in view of the Polish people's temperament and tradition, it was difficult to see how any Polish régime on whose friendship the Kremlin would feel itself able to count could at the same time be genuinely free; for, after the lamentable death by misadventure of General Sikorski,[2] the only Poles on whom the Kremlin could at all confidently rely would be Polish Communists, and a Communist-controlled Polish régime would not be one that a majority of the Polish people would freely choose for themselves. Hence, when Stalin proceeded to install in Poland a régime that met his requirements on the point of friendliness towards the Soviet Union, his Western allies felt that he was defaulting on his professed agreement with them in their wish that Poland should be free and independent. Conversely, Stalin felt that his Western allies were defaulting on their professed concern for the Soviet Union's military security in Poland when they made efforts to broaden the basis of the Lublin Government by pressing for the inclusion

[1] See Churchill, vi. 322–3; U.S. edition, vi. 369.

[2] See below, p. 149. As between the Soviet Union and Poland, Sikorski, if he had lived, might perhaps have played the conciliatory role that Paasikivi played, with such success, as between the Soviet Union and Finland.

of representatives of the Polish Government in Exile and of the underground Resistance Movement in Poland itself.

Stalin's grievance, like Churchill's and Roosevelt's, was, no doubt, sincere; for Poland was not only of greater importance for the Soviet Union's military security than any other Central or East European country; it also necessarily fell within the Russian sphere in Europe *de facto*, if the Russian sphere was to include a Russian zone of occupation in Germany; and probably Stalin felt that his Western allies ought to have recognized the predominance of Russia's stake in Poland as a matter of geographical fact—even though Poland had not been one of the countries that, at Moscow on 9 October 1944,[1] had been allocated by him and Churchill between the Soviet Union and Great Britain on a graduated scale of percentages of influence for each of the two Powers. If, in execution of this agreement with Churchill, the Soviet Union was scrupulous in refraining from anti-British activities in Greece,[2] then, Stalin might feel, it was an unfriendly act, on the part of Great Britain and the United States, to make trouble for the Soviet Union in Poland—a country that mattered so much more to the Soviet Union than it mattered to either of them.

In this conflict of interests, standpoints, and feelings about Poland, there was the inevitability of a Greek tragedy. In Poland, if Stalin was to make sure of having a régime there that would be friendly to the Soviet Union, the same Stalin could not fulfil his Western colleagues' requirement that his Polish puppet government should be a 'democratic' government in the Western sense; and perhaps, conversely, if Churchill and Roosevelt had had it in their power to install in Poland a régime that would have satisfied their standard of 'democracy', it would have been beyond their power also to ensure that such a Polish government should be friendly to Russia. The problem was, in fact, perhaps beyond the wit of statesmen.

(vi) Reactions of Realigned European Countries to Realignment

In all European countries that had been temporarily included in Hitler's Europe this harrowing experience, brief though its duration had been, had produced one peculiar effect which was ubiquitous and which was also one of the most awkward of all Hitler's legacies to his successors. In all countries that had been under Nazi German domination the normal civic virtues had automatically turned into vices and the normal vices into virtues. Where the reigning authorities had been constituted by a criminal act of military aggression, to co-operate with them had been shameful treason, while it had been patriotic to fight them, to outwit them, and to frustrate them by every means—including means that would have been anti-social behaviour if the target had not been an anti-social régime. In

[1] See above, p. 18.

[2] See below, p. 396 and note 3.

these abnormal circumstances the Resistance Movements had been recruited largely from three elements in the community—malcontents, idealists, and Communists—which, heterogeneous though they were, had in common the one negative characteristic of having had no experience of the exercise of political power and responsibility under ordinary conditions. When Hitler's Europe collapsed these incongruous war-time comrades in arms were the natural candidates for the political succession to the now evicted German conquerors and their local native collaborators; for no one could deny that the Resistance had borne the heat and burden of the day; theirs had been the *beau rôle* by comparison with the relatively sheltered and comfortable war-time life of the Governments in Exile; the question was how the *ci-devant* Resistance would acquit itself now that, partly thanks to its exertions, the war had been won by the Allies and the victory had automatically restored the usual state of social affairs in which a good citizen's duty towards the government is not to try to paralyse it, but to help to make it work.

The fate of the *ci-devant* Resistance in each of the realigned European countries was decided, in the first post-war chapter of their history, by the interplay between two factors: the local national tradition and the side of the line of demarcation between the Russian and the Western sphere on which a country now found itself realigned. In most cases the country's realignment had been determined partly by its geographical location, partly by military events, and partly by understandings between the Big Three. Except in the case of Yugoslavia the people concerned had not had very much say; and, in Yugoslavia, the country's realignment had been decided, not by the freely and constitutionally expressed will of a majority of the population, but by the military victory of one Yugoslav armed Resistance group over another.

In all the realigned West European countries that found themselves on the Western side of the new demarcation line between the Western and the Russian sphere, the *ci-devant* Resistance failed to achieve its ambition to play the leading part in the post-war régime, and this failure was as natural as the ambition itself. It was not surprising that the idealists, as well as the malcontents, should fail, in the play of constitutional politics, to hold a position that they had won for themselves in militant opposition to an ephemeral foreign conqueror. Among the idealists who had come to the front in the Resistance Movements during the war, there were few who, like Bidault, proved to possess the political ability to take a lasting place among statesmen of the first rank in the post-war world. As for the Communists, the impressiveness of their contribution to the Resistance Movements after Hitler had launched his attack on the Soviet Union did not win them sufficient popular support, in the next chapter, to allow them to come into power by constitutional means in countries in which

constitutional government was genuinely re-established and was not overridden—as it was on the Russian side of the demarcation line everywhere except in Finland—by the intervention of an irresistible occupying Power. This failure was the fate of the local Communist Party in every realigned country, including Finland as well as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, and Italy, that was thoroughly Western in its cultural tradition; and it looked as if the Communists would have been no more successful in so thoroughly Western a country as Czechoslovakia, or even in semi-Western countries, such as Poland and Hungary, or in a semi-Westernized Eastern Orthodox Christian country, such as Rumania, if Russian intervention had not here thrust a local Communist minority into power.

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, it was conceivable, though perhaps improbable, that, after the ebb of the tide of German conquest, the local Communists might have succeeded in seizing power even without the Soviet Union's potent support. In Yugoslavia they did, in fact, succeed in seizing power unaided; and, in Albania, any foreign aid that the local Communists received seems to have been given by Yugoslav and not by Russian hands. In Greece, too, the local Communists had to depend on their own resources in the first post-war stage, since, at this stage, Stalin kept his pact with Churchill by withholding Russian aid from them;[1] yet Greece would almost certainly have gone the way of Yugoslavia if ELAS's unaided attempt at a military *coup de main* had not been resisted and defeated by force of British arms. The sequel in Greece, however, indicated that, here, a successful seizure of power by the local Communists, even though achieved without Russian aid, would have been no proof that a Communist régime was what was wanted by a majority of the Greek people; for, in Greece, after the attempted Communist coup had been frustrated by forcible foreign resistance to it, an anti-Communist majority was returned to parliament in a general election in which the voters were as free from intimidation as was possible in the political atmosphere of an Eastern Orthodox Christian country where 'democracy', in the Western sense, was at this time still a recently and imperfectly acclimatized exotic plant. This anti-Communist sequel to the abortive unaided Communist coup in Greece suggested that the successful unaided Communist coup in Yugoslavia perhaps did not reflect the will of a majority of the population there either.

A synoptic view of the diverse experiences of the realigned countries in the early post-war years made it evident that the character of a country's native cultural and political heritage counted for more, in the determination of its political fate, than the character of the foreign Power within whose sphere it now happened to find itself included. The contrast between

[1] See above, p. 30, and below, p. 396 and note 3.

Greece's experience and Finland's experience was particularly striking. In the deal between Churchill and Stalin, Greece had been allotted to the Western Powers' zone; and, in the first chapter of the subsequent story, Stalin, as has been noticed, duly refrained from intervening here. Yet the sincere, resourceful, and unremitting efforts made by British statesmanship to induce the discordant Greek factions to co-operate 'democratically' in the Western sense failed to avert the tragedy of an armed conflict between one Greek faction and a Graecophil Western Power whose first concern in Greece was to see to it that the Greek people should have an opportunity of securing a native Greek government that would be genuinely representative of a majority of the electorate. Greece was plunged into civil war by the defects of her still only superficially Westernized native political tradition, in spite of her comparative good fortune in emerging from the war on the winning side under the aegis of a Western Power whose own political traditions and ideals were 'democratic' in the parliamentary constitutional sense. On the other hand, Finland, who had emerged from the war on the losing side and had found herself forced to surrender, on Russian terms, to the Soviet Union, proved able, thanks to a Western constitutional tradition that she had inherited from her Swedish past, to preserve her freedom, and maintain a parliamentary régime of a thoroughly Western kind, though she now lay at the Soviet Union's mercy, right in between the forepaws of the bear.

The importance of the local heritage in determining a realigned country's post-war destiny was also apparent in Western Europe in the contrast between the post-war experiences of Norway, Denmark, and Holland on the one hand and Belgium, France, and Italy on the other. In the Latin countries, as in the Teutonic, the Communists neither continued for very long to participate in the post-war Ministries nor attempted to seize power by unconstitutional means. Here, as elsewhere in Western Europe, they withdrew into the political wilderness without firing a shot. But on this familiar terrain they were more formidable than they had been in the uncongenial role of holding office without being able to dominate any of the coalitions in which they had at first been willing to serve; and in the Latin countries, at this stage, the general political and social situation was decidedly favourable to the Communists' present waiting game. In these countries the Communists' fortune was made for them by the ineffectiveness of the Social Democrats, by the gulf between the industrial working class and the bourgeoisie, and by the bourgeoisie's unwillingness to make even the minimum concessions that were required of them if they were to have any hope of convincing the proletariat that social justice would be attainable without red revolution. In Belgium, France, and Italy the bourgeoisie continued to hug their money-bags while trembling for their lives, and moderate-minded seekers after reform who, in Great Britain or

in Holland, would have pursued their objective by joining the Labour Party, were apt to join the Communist Party in Italy and France, because this seemed to them to be the only Left-wing party that meant business. This unfortunate and, on a long view, alarming trend of post-war domestic politics in the Latin countries was all of a piece with the history of the working of parliamentary institutions there in the past; for these had never worked satisfactorily—except, perhaps, in Belgium in a halcyon period before the First World War, when the Liberals and the Catholics had been the only two parties in the field. Conversely, the greater past success of parliamentary institutions in the Teutonic countries seemed to account for their happier political experience in the post-war period. The contrast, on the political plane, between a Teutonic Holland and a half-Teutonic Belgium was particularly noteworthy, because it was inexplicable on the theory—by no means peculiar to Marxists—that economics alone are the true substance of human life, and that politics, culture, and religion are mere reflections of economic realities.

If economic prosperity had been, in truth, an inevitable generator of political well-being, Belgium ought to have been the best-governed country in the whole of post-war Europe; for she was certainly the most prosperous European country of the day—thanks partly to the wisdom, courage, and promptness of the economic measures taken by the reinstalled Belgian Government,[1] as well as to Belgium's good luck in escaping rather lightly from the scourge of the war in Europe and in preserving intact a colonial empire in Central Africa whose inhabitants were still behaving as docile 'natives' and whose mineral wealth included large deposits of uranium. On the other hand, Holland had to relinquish her hold on a colonial empire in Indonesia on which her own economy had been more dependent than Great Britain's had been on the British Indian Empire—and this at a moment when the ruin and the famine that had been inflicted on Holland by the war made her need to draw upon her lost colonial empire's resources more pressing than it had ever been in the past. In these dramatically diverse economic circumstances, Holland ought to have been seething with political unrest and Belgium to have been enjoying a honeymoon of domestic political peace and goodwill if the economic interpretation of history had been a master-key. But, as a matter of fact, the relative positions of the two countries on the economic plane in the post-war period were not reproduced on the political plane but were actually reversed there. Holland's present economic adversity could not cancel the auspicious political influence of a tradition of constitutional self-government in an independent national state that, in Holland, dated back to the sixteenth century. In Holland after the Second World War the danger of a sharp division of the electorate between the parties based on religious denomina-

[1] See below, p. 544.

tions and an anti-clerical Marxian social-democratic party was averted by the foundation of a Labour Party which cut, English-fashion, across the conventional continental European lines of political division.[1] Belgium's experience of constitutional self-government in an independent national state had, unlike Holland's, begun no longer ago than 1830; and the relative weakness and callowness of Belgium's political tradition was not made good by her unique economic prosperity when, after the recession of the tide of German conquest, the task of political reconstruction made the same heavy call on Belgian as it had made on Dutch political resources. Under this post-war strain the rifts in Belgian political life between Christians and Marxians, between Flemings and Walloons, and between supporters and opponents of the reigning King of the Belgians promptly gaped wide open; and this political schism was the more dangerous because the three different lines of division tended to run together into one single deep-cut cleft.

On this evidence, it looked as if even the revolutionary experience of realignment was not so fateful for the realigned European countries as their own native tradition and ethos. The accident that had now placed them under either a Russian or a Western star might, after all, not prove decisive for their fortunes.

[1] See below, pp. 559–60.

PART I

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS ECONOMIC REHABILITATION

(i) The Economic Consequences of the War[1]

By R. G. Hawtrey

WHILE the war was still at its height the need for international action on the return of peace to deal with so immense an economic upheaval was foreseen. The agreement to set up the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was concluded on 9 November 1943.[2] The purpose was stated in the preamble, in which the signatories expressed themselves as

> determined that immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services.

Thus UNRRA was intended to follow in the wake of the armed forces. An army is compelled in its own interest to see to the provision of essential supplies for the civilian population of the territory which it occupies, or through which its communications pass. But there may be a gap between the exercise of military authority and the restoration of a competent government even of a provisional character. The primary purpose of UNRRA was to provide essential supplies and services in that interval, and to assist the 'resumption' of urgently needed production. Its resources were to be provided by contribution from the countries which were parties to the agreement, 1 per cent. of a year's national income from each. The total was $1,800 million, of which $1,350 million came from the United

[1] See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 661–74, where the economic situation of the Big Three during the period immediately after the war is discussed, with special reference to the change in the balance of economic power, and American efforts to liberalize international trade.

[2] Text in Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Washington, 9th November, 1943*, Cmd. 6491 (London, H.M.S.O., 1943). [This will be referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6491.] See also *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943–1944*, ed. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1945), pp. 251–7.

States and $320 million from Great Britain.[1] When liberation came a very short experience showed that these contributions would not be enough, and in August 1945 the United States, Great Britain, and some others agreed to double their contributions. Even so UNRRA could compass no more than the preliminary steps towards the restoration of economic life. It could keep people alive while the many millions of displaced persons, released prisoners of war, and demobilized troops were in course of returning to 'resume' urgently needed production. Reconstruction in any adequate sense was a task to occupy the world for decades.

The economic prostration of Europe was more grave than had ever been expected. It was not merely the direct ravages of war and the physical destruction that had exhausted the resources of the Continent. The strain of the war effort had interrupted the normal flow of economic activity and had diverted resources from the upkeep and renewals of plant and property of all kinds. Huge arrears of necessary capital outlay had thus accumulated, and the resulting deterioration of the capital equipment of industry meant a disastrous loss of productivity. Nor was the deterioration confined to the material means of production. In many cases privation had reduced the strength and efficiency of the work-people. And the millions who had been withdrawn from their peace-time occupations, either for service in the armed forces or for specialized war work, had suffered a loss of the training and experience by which skill and aptitudes are acquired.

The direct destruction took several distinct forms. The most widespread was that caused by air-raids. As methods of precision had been developed, the bombing had become more and more concentrated on specific objectives. In the final phases of the war the British and American bombing of Germany and the occupied countries had caused especially extensive destruction of the means of transport and communication, road and railway bridges, &c. On the other hand, the pilotless planes and rockets resorted to by Germany had caused more indiscriminate damage than had ever before resulted from bombing.

The destruction caused in an area which had been the scene of actual fighting was more localized than that caused by air-raids. The mere passage of armed forces under the stress of active operations was sure to cause damage, but it was at places where actual contact had been made between hostile forces that the intensified destruction began. And when

[1] Corresponding to national incomes in 1942. By 1944 the American national income had risen to $183·8 thousand million dollars, the British to $33·7 thousand million. An account of the organization and achievements of UNRRA is given below, pp. 51 seqq. For a detailed history see *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, prepared by a special staff under the direction of George Woodbridge, Chief Historian of UNRRA*, 3 vols. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950). [This work will be referred to hereafter as Woodbridge: *UNRRA*.]

contact had been prolonged for days or weeks in one place the devastation had become almost complete.

A very great part of Europe had been fought over: Poland in 1939; Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France in 1940; Greece and Yugoslavia in 1941; then White Russia, the Ukraine, and the western part of the R.S.F.S.R. Italy had been invaded in 1943, and in 1944 renewed fighting in France, Belgium, and Holland had led up to the invasion of Germany itself. In the east, the invaded portions of Russia had been liberated step by step at the cost of further destruction, while both Germany's satellites (Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria) and her victims (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria) had been traversed by the Russian forces, fighting their way up to the invasion of Germany from their side.

In some parts the destruction had been added to by a 'scorched earth' policy, that is to say, measures taken by a retreating army to make the area relinquished as inhospitable as possible to the advancing enemy. The Ukraine in particular had suffered in this way both from the retreating Red armies in 1941–2 and from the retreating Germans in 1944–5. Moreover, besides casual looting by troops in transit, there had been systematic requisitioning and plunder by occupying forces, particularly in those countries of Western Europe which had been subjected to prolonged German occupation.

An impressive survey of the destruction caused in Europe is contained in a report of 18 September 1946, made to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations by one of its Sub-Commissions.[1]

At the end of the war there was an acute shortage of food in Europe. Areas under cultivation had declined in most countries and yields in all. There had been loss of man-power through mobilization and compulsory displacement of agricultural workers, and there had been deficiencies of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, draught power, and seeds, and of such things as pesticides and twine. The area sown to bread grains (wheat and rye) in 1944–5 was about 23 per cent. below the pre-war average. A severe drought in 1945 affected the crops, and the yield per acre was about 25 per cent. below normal. The harvest of bread grains in continental Europe (excluding the Soviet Union) was only 31 million tons, compared with a pre-war average of 59 million. The loss of livestock was also very heavy. The number of pigs had been reduced by more than half, and there had been heavy losses of sheep and cattle, especially in Eastern Europe. The production of oils and fats showed a fall of 40 per cent.

Even in the summer of 1946 the Sub-Commission estimated that

100 million people in Europe were being fed at a level of 1,500 calories or less

[1] United Nations, Economic and Social Council: *Preliminary Report of the Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas* (E/156). [This will be referred to hereafter as U.N.: *E/156*.]

—the level at which health suffers severely and working capacity is quickly reduced or destroyed. Another 40 million were living at the little less dangerous level of between 1,500 and 2,000 calories. These people were also desperately short of housing, domestic equipment, tools, clothes and footwear.[1]

The supply of housing had suffered both from destruction and from the restriction of new building. A report[2] of 1949 to the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations showed that in seventeen countries of Europe[3] 2,756,000 dwellings had been totally, and 2,923,000 partially, destroyed (apart from those described as slightly damaged), or 4·24 per cent. and 4·5 per cent. of the 65 million dwellings which these countries contained in 1939. The number of new dwellings constructed before the war had averaged 824,000 a year. The arrears of new building must have been very heavy, and a great part of the resources of the building industry was needed to repair the houses partially destroyed.

These statistics exclude both Germany and the Soviet Union, which had been the heaviest sufferers of all. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that in Germany 490,000 residential buildings were destroyed and 415,000 heavily damaged.

When fighting ended in the middle of 1945 the intricate network of communications, on which the whole economy of Europe depended, was virtually paralysed.[4] For some time there was hardly any international traffic apart from military convoys. Railways, ports, and bridges had been among the main targets for destruction. In France 4,000 kilometres of railway track and more than half the marshalling and trans-shipment yards had been destroyed. In Yugoslavia and Greece two-thirds of the railway system had been put out of use. In Czechoslovakia one-fourth of the tunnels were blocked. In Poland 70 per cent. of the bridges were destroyed and about one-third of the stations, workshops, and other installations.

In Belgium, France, and Poland only about 40 per cent. of the steam locomotives were left in a serviceable condition. In the Netherlands half the locomotives had been lost, and half of those remaining were unserviceable. The losses of freight cars had been proportionately quite as heavy. The rolling-stock was scattered all over Europe, so that the first need was to sort out wagons and get them returned to the countries to which they belonged. Current repairs were greatly hampered for want of spare parts

[1] U.N.: *E/156*, pp. 26–27.

[2] United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Industry and Materials Committee, Housing Sub-Committee: *The European Housing Problem: A Preliminary Review* (E/ECE/110, Geneva, 1949).

[3] Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom.

[4] See U.N.: *E/156*, pp. 58–63, from which the following facts are taken.

and equipment, though in this need the military forces were able to give considerable assistance.

In the course of the final operations culminating in the invasion and surrender of Germany, road blocks had been erected and vital bridges destroyed. Road transport was therefore everywhere difficult, and in many places impossible. Vast numbers of road vehicles had been requisitioned and destroyed, and throughout Europe there was an acute shortage of petrol, oil, and tires. Long-distance road transport of civilian goods and passengers was practically suspended.

On inland waterways traffic was likewise at a standstill. Air-raids and sabotage had destroyed canals, dikes, and bridges. At the time of the liberation of France in the summer of 1944 only 509 out of 9,624 kilometres of French inland waterways were open to navigation. Of the Rhine fleet of river craft 35 per cent. had been lost. Of the Oder fleet the proportion was 90 per cent.

In most of continental Europe industrial production had fallen very low. At the lowest point touched, immediately after liberation, industrial production was reduced to less than one-fifth of the pre-war level in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia. By the summer of 1945 there had been some recovery, the French index being 44 and the Belgian 33, but the difficulties were still acute.[1]

The limiting factors in industrial activity were chiefly the shortage of coal, machinery, and transport, and the dispersion, physical weakness, and want of training of the work-people. There was also in many cases a lack of raw materials, due sometimes to a general scarcity, for example of timber or hides; sometimes to foreign exchange difficulties or the breakdown of transport.

The shortage of coal was of fundamental importance. In July 1945 the output on the Continent (excluding the Soviet Union) was only 42 per cent. of the pre-war amount. Coal-mining was no less affected than industry generally by the deficiencies of man-power and transport, and there were heavy arrears of maintenance, and a lack of machinery and equipment to make good war damage and to provide for necessary renewals.[2]

The difficulties of Great Britain differed in some respects from those of continental Europe, but were no less acute. The direct war damage had been serious, but less so than in France, Holland, or Germany. But the whole economic life of the country had been concentrated on a war effort sustained for six years, the accumulated wealth of centuries had been dissipated, and the nicely poised economic structure, which balanced the mass imports of foodstuffs and materials not only against exports, but against the earnings of external investments and mercantile, financial, and shipping enterprise, was shattered.

[1] See U.N.: *E/156*, pp. 27–28.

[2] Ibid. p. 40.

The supplies from the United States under the Lend-Lease Act had been an indispensable contribution to the war effort. But their purpose and their effect had been to increase the receiving countries' war effort, rather than to ease the strain of the effort that they were making out of their own resources. When the act was passed in March 1941 the United States was still at peace. To ask Congress to vote material support to a belligerent was a course not easily defended against political criticism, and the United States Administration thought it necessary to show that the British were drawing upon their own resources to the very verge of exhaustion before the American taxpayer was called upon to assist.[1]

British export trade was remorselessly sacrificed. Man-power, materials, and productive capacity were diverted from the export industries to war purposes to the very limit of what was possible. By 1944 the volume of exports had fallen to 31 per cent. of what it had been in 1938. Some curtailment of imports was possible, but the indispensable supplies of food and materials, as well as munitions and war equipment, had to be provided. The gap was bridged by American Lend-Lease and Canadian Mutual Aid.

The shrinkage of exports was only one manifestation of the general diversion of productive resources to the war effort. Consumption was kept in check not only by heavy taxation but by direct limitation of supplies for civilian use. Capital outlay not required for the war effort itself was reduced almost to nothing by licensing of work, control of materials, and restriction of new capital issues. Not only were improvements and extensions of equipment prevented, but the necessary upkeep and renewals were allowed to fall disastrously into arrears.[2]

In addition to the impoverishment due to war damage, and to the neglect of upkeep and renewals, Great Britain suffered heavy losses of external assets. External investments represented by marketable securities were requisitioned from the British holders and realized in the United States, Canada and other Dominions, and in India, to the amount of £1,118 million. Loans were raised (mainly from the United States and Canada) to the amount of £303 million. And a huge floating indebtedness was incurred in the form of sterling which had been received by countries in the sterling area, and also elsewhere, in payment for supplies, and which under war conditions could not be spent. This sterling indebtedness had reached £3,355 million in June 1945, and subsequently rose to £3,700

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 773 seqq.

[2] See Great Britain, Treasury: *Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Negotiations*, Cmd. 6707 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945) for estimated 'disinvestment within the United Kingdom', in the years 1940–4, at £885 million exclusive of deterioration of private property. Later statistical material points to much higher figures. And when allowance is made for increased costs the arrears of upkeep and renewals might well prove to have been of the order of magnitude of £3,000 million.

million (December 1946). The corresponding net indebtedness at the outbreak of war in 1939 had been £476 million. In fact Great Britain, from the world's greatest creditor nation, had been transformed into the world's greatest debtor.

Moreover, the direct war damage had gravely injured the country's invisible exports in another direction. More than half its merchant shipping was lost through enemy action. A part of the losses was made good by new building and acquisitions, but at the end of the war the merchant fleet was less than three-quarters of what it had been at the beginning.

Great Britain's means of paying for indispensable imports of food and materials had thus been disastrously diminished, and the gap was being bridged by the Lend-Lease supplies received from the United States. But Lend-Lease was brought to an end abruptly by the unexpectedly sudden surrender of Japan.[1] On 21 August 1945, by authority of President Truman, the Governments receiving Lend-Lease supplies were notified that all Lend-Lease operations were to be discontinued forthwith. Supplies already in stock or in process of delivery were to be the subject of negotiations, that is to say would have to be paid for,[2] and Leo Crowley, the Foreign

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 674–8, 784–8.

[2] White House Press Release, 21 August 1945 (*Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, p. 126). This decision had to be revised a few days later. The formal surrender of the Japanese did not take effect until 2 September, and it was from that date, not from 21 August, that Lend-Lease supplies ceased.

President Truman's decision was a political act taken, as he told Churchill at Potsdam, because he was anxious not to have 'any embarrassment with Congress' (see Admiral William D. Leahy: *I Was There* (London, Gollancz, 1950), p. 483). Truman was, in fact, bound by a promise which he had made to the Senate in April 1945, when the Lend-Lease Act had come up for its annual re-enactment.

A Lend-Lease agreement which had been concluded with France (28 February 1945) included provision for the delivery of instrumental goods (vehicles, ships, industrial plant, &c.) the use of which would continue after the end of the war. These, along with materials and foodstuffs remaining unconsumed, were to be paid for by a loan (text in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1944–1945*, pp. 307–9). Republican members of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee protested that a loan for post-war needs was alien to the purpose of the Lend-Lease Act, which was to promote the defence of the United States, and an amendment was introduced (16 April 1945) excluding post-war relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction from its operation. A proviso (text, ibid. p. 138) designed to meet the case of the French agreement was, however, added, giving the President discretion to allow payment, in the form of a long-term loan, for defence articles supplied to a foreign government after the President had determined that they were no longer necessary for the defence of the United States. Truman, who was then speaker of the Senate in his capacity as Vice-Chairman, secured the passage of this proviso through the Senate by giving his casting vote against its omission, and by a personal promise that Lend-Lease would be discontinued as soon as the war was over. Of this promise there was no published record. On 7 June the American Chiefs of Staff informed their British colleagues that there was no legal authority to continue Lend-Lease after the end of the war with Japan; but the authorities concerned at Washington were not of one mind on the subject, and some contended that the President had authority under the law 'to use Lend-Lease money for post-war purposes'. The question came up for consideration at the Potsdam Conference, and when Churchill, on 24 July, supported the British contention that 'Lend-Lease could be used in the occupation of Germany and Austria', Truman intimated that the Senate had been informed that the Act was 'a weapon of war only' (Leahy: *I Was There*, p. 483). On 5 July Truman had directed that

Economic Administrator, announced that the means of payment could be provided by thirty-year loans at $2\frac{3}{8}$ per cent. That would mean either a constant annuity of $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., or equal instalments of capital which would make the initial charge 5·71 per cent. The consequent blow to Great Britain's economy was only partially mitigated by the loan agreement concluded between the United States and British Governments on 6 December 1945.[1]

The Prime Minister had announced in the House of Commons on 24 August 1945 that an invitation had been received from the Foreign Economic Administrator 'to enter into immediate conversations to work things out in the manner which will best promote our mutual interests', and that the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax (who was then in England), was to return to Washington taking with him Lord Keynes and others for this purpose.[2]

Keynes, at a press conference in the United States on 12 September, had something to say of the circumstances in which his mission had originated.[3] A mission to Washington had for some time past been contemplated 'to discuss the mutually convenient basis for winding up Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease, and the financial and other arrangements to follow on so as to cover the transitional period before normal conditions of trade could be re-established'. Several months before, on the assumption that war with Japan would last beyond the end of 1945, September had been fixed on as the convenient time to start the discussions. Japan's sudden collapse had thrown the time-table out. But the British Government had had 'no reason to expect that Lend-Lease would continue for a significant length of time after the end of the war or would be available for any expenditure except that which arose out of the war in its concluding phases'.

The negotiations which ensued lasted for nearly three months, agreement being reached on 6 December. There was to be a loan of $4,400 million (including $650 million for the post-war residue of Lend-Lease supplies).

Keynes, speaking in support of the agreement in the House of Lords (18 December 1945)[4] acknowledged that he would have liked to obtain a free grant. But what the agreement gave was substantially more generous than a loan on commercial terms. The rate of interest was 2 per cent.

Lend-Lease supplies of military and naval equipment were to be limited to those needed for use in the war against Japan (ibid. pp. 439–40); but he modified this decision, in response to British pleas, by directing on 28 July that Lend-Lease should continue for the use of occupation troops so long as the war with Japan continued. This concession, however, was rendered valueless by the early ending of the war with Japan.

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 682–8. For the text see Great Britain, Treasury: *Financial Agreement between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom dated 6th December 1945*, Cmd. 6708 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945).

[2] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 413, coll. 956–7.

[3] *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, 20 September 1945.

[4] H.L. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 138, col. 780.

Neither interest nor repayment was to begin till 1951, and repayment was then to be spread over fifty years, the requisite constant annuity being 3·18 per cent. of the capital sum. In any year interest might be waived (not merely postponed) if the Government of the United Kingdom should find that the exchange and reserve position made waiver necessary, provided the exporting power of the country was not sufficient to procure imports equivalent in volume to the average of the years 1936–8.

Concurrently with the loan agreement the United Kingdom agreed to support the United States' 'Proposals for consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment'.[1] The 'Proposals' embodied a liberalizing policy which had been pursued by the Roosevelt Administration from its inception. Cordell Hull, who was Secretary of State from 1933 to 1944, had long identified himself with the traditional low-tariff policy of the Democratic Party.[2] That policy had only too often tripped up on dissentient interests within the party, and in 1934 the Administration obtained from Congress the Trade Agreements Act which empowered the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries, without requiring subsequent ratification by the Senate, provided no duty were changed by more than 50 per cent. Most-favoured-nation treatment was to be extended to any country which did not discriminate against the trade of the United States, that is to say, any reduction of duty on a product conceded to one country was to be extended to imports of the product from all non-discriminatory countries. A similar policy had been initiated by Great Britain in the heyday of free trade, when the most-favoured-nation clause was embodied in the Cobden Treaty of 1860 with France.

But an obstacle was encountered to the efficacy of the most-favoured-nation principle. In the nineteen-thirties the world was suffering from a trade depression of unexampled severity. A collapse of world prices made the export trade of every country unremunerative. Many, rather than submit to the agonies of deflation, or to a depreciation of the exchange value of their money units, resorted to import restrictions and exchange controls. A quantitative restriction of imports of any products raised the question of allocating the permitted imports among several sources of supply, and opened the door to methods of discrimination among them, against which the most-favoured-nation clause did not guard.

[1] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Proposals . . . on Trade and Employment as transmitted by the Secretary of State of the United States of America to H.M. Ambassador at Washington, Washington, 6th December, 1945*, Cmd. 6709 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945). [This will be referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6709.]

[2] See *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. (New York, Macmillan, 1948), i. 352 and *passim*. [This will be referred to hereafter as Hull: *Memoirs*. Quotations from the *Memoirs* (copyright 1948 by Cordell Hull) in later sections of this volume are made by permission of The Macmillan Company, New York.]

The discrimination became a serious trouble for the United States. Against a weak country with an adverse balance of payments there was no inducement to discriminate, for the means of paying for imports from it would be available in plenty. The discrimination was all against the strong countries with a favourable balance of payments, among which the United States, after the devaluation of the dollar in 1934, became conspicuous. To procure a general abandonment of the practices which gave rise to this discrimination became a paramount object of American commercial policy.

Article 7 of the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement of 23 February 1942 (the 'Master Agreement' under the Lend-Lease Act)[1] was an expression of that policy. As part of the consideration for Lend-Lease supplies, the recipient countries pledged themselves 'to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers'.

The proposals[2] which the American Administration asked the British to support in connexion with the Loan Agreement of 6 December 1945 were an elaboration of Article 7. There was to be an International Trade Organization 'to promote international commercial co-operation', and, in particular, 'to promote national and international action for the expansion of the production, exchange and consumption of goods, for the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and for the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce'.

Two forms of discriminatory treatment were especially aimed at: tariff preferences, such as those prevailing in the British Commonwealth and Empire; and discrimination through the allocation of import quotas. It was not politically possible for the British Government to agree to abandon Imperial preference. In agreeing to Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement, Churchill had obtained from Roosevelt an assurance that the United Kingdom was 'no more committed . . . to abandoning Imperial Preference than was the United States to abolish her tariffs'.[3]

The proposals of December 1945 did nevertheless definitely lay down 'as an initial step in the process of eliminating tariff preferences' that preferences should not be increased and should in certain circumstances be diminished or eliminated. They committed the British Government a little more definitely to supporting in principle a gradual reduction of preferences towards vanishing point. But the Government's concurrence was confined to declaring that

> it is in full agreement on all important points in these proposals and accepts them as a basis for international discussion, and it will, in common with the

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 780.
[2] Cmd. 6709.
[3] 13 December 1945, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 417, col. 723.

United States Government, use its best endeavours to bring such discussions to a successful conclusion, in the light of the views expressed by other countries.[1]

It was, no doubt, the preferences received by Great Britain from the Dominions and Colonies rather than those granted by Great Britain to them that were a matter of concern to the United States. And British policy was actuated not only by Imperial sentiment, but by a desire to retain advantages which would contribute materially to restore British export trade.

The nature and extent of the obligation assumed by the British Government were not very clearly indicated. The United States Government would presumably take the lead in the proposed negotiations, and the British would then have to afford them support, and to refrain from opposing them, even if British interests would seem to justify opposition. But they would not be bound to take the initiative or to press for the principles formulated being carried into effect. 'Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive officiously to keep alive.'

The American Proposals required a 'general elimination of quantitative restrictions' of imports and exports, but allowed important exceptions. The British Government, in their anxiety regarding the future balance of payments, were unwilling to forgo important restrictions. But the exceptions included not only restrictions imposed during a post-war transitional period, but such as might be needed at any time to safeguard the balance of payments. And though there was to be no discrimination in the application of the restrictions, that was not to prevent a country from 'utilizing inconvertible currencies for buying needed imports'.

By 'inconvertible' currency in this context was meant currency of a country which restricted the use of externally owned balances to the purchase of the country's own products. The currency was inconvertible in the sense that it could not be exchanged for the currency of another country, and so made use of to pay for the products of the latter.

The British exchange control tied up sterling held outside the sterling area in this way. American-held sterling could be converted into dollars, but that was exceptional; in other cases sterling accruing to holders resident outside the sterling area could only be used in purchases from the sterling area.[2] Every country with which the sterling area incurred an adverse balance of payments tended therefore to attract imports from the

[1] Joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the understanding reached on commercial policy (Cmd. 6709, p. 18).

[2] The sterling area consisted in principle of countries which were accustomed to hold their monetary reserves in the form of sterling in London, and which had combined with Great Britain in 1939 in a unified system of exchange control. It included the Empire (except Canada and Newfoundland) and British Mandates, together with a few other countries, such as Egypt and 'Irāq.

sterling area. There resulted the kind of discrimination against imports from other sources which American policy was seeking to prevent.

A condition was inserted in the Anglo-American Loan Agreement of 6 December 1945 [Articles 8 (ii) and 10 (ii)] that, within a year of the Agreement coming into effect, Great Britain would abandon the practice: sterling balances available for current payments were to be 'freely available for current transactions in any currency area without discrimination'. That did not apply to the sterling balances accumulated as the result of British war expenditure, but the Agreement attributed to the United Kingdom the intention of making agreements for an early settlement of these.

Simultaneously with the conclusion of the Loan Agreement the British Government undertook to adhere to the Bretton Woods Agreements of July 1944,[1] establishing the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Adherence to the Fund raised once again the question of convertibility. The Articles of Agreement of the Fund forbade 'restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions', but, as exception was made in favour of 'the post-war transitional period', this applied no additional limitation. On acquiring membership, however, a country was required to fix a gold parity for its money unit, and thereby to determine rates of exchange on dollars and all other money units, and could only modify this parity in case of a fundamental disequilibrium. For a change which, added to previous changes, whether increases or decreases, exceeded 10 per cent. of the original parity the consent of the Fund would be necessary.

The general effect of the various commitments which the British Government were to enter into was to limit their freedom in resorting to any measures to maintain the balance of payments. In particular, though they were not to be precluded from maintaining import restrictions and control of capital transfers, they would not be able to discriminate in applying these measures against payments to those countries of which the money was especially sought after, in particular to the United States.

The problem was not peculiar to Great Britain. All Europe was desperately impoverished. Only in the Western Hemisphere, and particularly in the United States, was productive power so far unimpaired that an effective contribution could be made to the needs of Europe. The winding up of Lend-Lease had provided some immediate supplies, to which could be added surplus stores, &c., left behind by the United States forces. France was allowed credits to the amount of $720 million (in addition to the

[1] Text in Great Britain, Treasury: *United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A., July 1 to July 22, 1944: Final Act*, Cmd. 6546 (London, H.M.S.O., 1944); *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943–1944*, pp. 333–98. See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 449 seqq.

Export-Import Bank loans)[1] for the purchase of supplies from these sources; the Soviet Union, $360 million for the residue of Lend-Lease; other countries, smaller amounts. The Netherlands obtained loans to the amount of $300 million from the Export-Import Bank, the Netherlands East Indies $100 million, Belgium $100 million.

Canada, though engaged in the war from the beginning, had come through with some surplus productive power, and made an important contribution towards the immediate post-war needs of Europe. In addition to the loan of $1,250 million to the United Kingdom there were Canadian loans of $240 million to France, $140 million to the Netherlands East Indies, and $100 million to Belgium.[2]

The needs of the impoverished countries took shape in adverse balances of payments. The supplies which they could not provide at home they procured from abroad, thereby incurring a growing burden of external indebtedness for excess imports. But need does not of itself procure supplies. Need, to constitute effective demand, must be associated with purchasing power.

A country's adverse balance was not necessarily a true measure of its need; it might be a symptom rather of monetary laxity. The war had left the inevitable legacy of inflation. After the experience of the First World War and its sequel, Finance Ministers and monetary authorities were alive to the danger. It was impossible to cover the cost of the war effort by revenue and by loans subscribed out of genuine savings; there was a gap that could only be filled by the creation of bank money. Governments endeavoured to keep the resulting inflationary tendency in check by controlling prices. In contrast with the attempts made after the First World War, this expedient met with a considerable measure of success. Under war conditions it was possible to limit supplies for civilian consumption and use; indeed, the war effort itself demanded the limitation. Had prices been uncontrolled the limitation of supplies would have accentuated the inflationary rise of prices, but, when both supplies and prices were limited, spending was restricted for want of objects to spend on. The redundant money remained perforce unspent.

Only two countries of Europe, Hungary and Greece, sustained a complete collapse of their money. Others suffered in varying degrees from the inflationary poison. Belgium grappled with the menace in October 1944 immediately after her liberation, resorting to a forced loan to extinguish a substantial proportion of the currency and bank deposits. The Netherlands, Norway, and Czechoslovakia rid themselves of redundant money by similar measures in 1945.

[1] France had borrowed $550 million in December 1945 and $650 million in May 1946.

[2] For particulars of the principal international lending operations in 1945 and 1946, see Bank for International Settlements: *Seventeenth Annual Report* (1946–7), pp. 118–28.

Great Britain and the United States had both relied on price controls during the war, and continued to do so thereafter. But in the United States there was opposition to the renewal of the Price Control Act in June 1946, and the controls were considerably relaxed, and by the end of the year practically abandoned.[1]

The effect was to release the underlying tendency to inflation, and a rise of prices ensued, which was to continue for more than two years. The pound being linked to the dollar by the unvarying rate of exchange of $4·03, the rising price level was communicated from the United States to Great Britain, and the inflationary tendency was felt there in spite of the controls. And as the price level rose, the equivalent in goods of the American loan to Great Britain shrank. The loan was not sanctioned by Congress till July 1946, and by that time the rise was beginning to be felt in the prices of British imports. By the end of 1946, when only $600 million had been drawn against the loan, the dollar had already lost 20 per cent. of its purchasing power since the amount of the loan had been agreed on a year before, and the process was continuing. The sum that had then been judged adequate was in effect falling short.

The dollar supplied the standard for all rates of exchange. The parities adopted for the purposes of the International Monetary Fund were to be reckoned in terms either of gold or of the dollar. The dollar basis was a recognition of well-established practice, and gold was merely the equivalent of dollars at the American price of $35 an ounce. The first Schedule of Par Values, announced by the Fund on 16 December 1946, recorded dollar equivalents which had for the most part been already in operation during the war.

For any country which had to make an effort to maintain the foreign exchange value of its money, the decline in the wealth-value of the dollar lightened the task; a little inflation could be indulged in without endangering parity.

France and Italy had had to submit to inflationary issues of currency under military occupation, and both found it impossible to keep the inflationary tendency in check by means of price controls. France was unable to maintain the rate of 50 francs to a dollar, adopted at the time of liberation, and it was altered to 119·10 francs in December 1945. That was the rate notified to the International Monetary Fund, but further devaluation became necessary in January 1948. Italy, like France, had to abandon the war-time rate of exchange. In January 1946 the official rate for the dollar was raised from 100 lire to 225, but even that rate could not be held. There were several different rates for different kinds of transactions. Italy could not conform to the conditions of the International Monetary Fund.

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 664–6.

Outside Europe the war had the same devastating economic effects, but different countries suffered in different ways. The Middle East was exposed to relatively little direct destruction. Egypt suffered invasion, but nearly all the North African fighting was in the desert. Egypt, along with other Middle Eastern countries, became an important source of supply. Enormous sums were spent on the British and Allied forces based on Egypt, and Egypt, Palestine, and neighbouring countries accumulated them in the form of sterling balances. Under war-time conditions their imports were restricted to a minimum. The money could not be spent on goods; nor were the recipients disposed to tie it up in securities. There resulted an accumulation of redundant money waiting to be spent, and corresponding arrears of spending. The money was partly in the form of currency in the hands of individuals, against which the monetary authority (the National Bank of Egypt, the Palestine Currency Board, &c.) held sterling, and partly in the form of sterling to the credit of the more considerable traders.

There was thus a powerful inflationary pressure, which the Governments concerned tried to keep in check by means of price controls, with less success, however, than was achieved in Britain. Their possession of a sterling backing for their redundant currency tended to transmit the pressure to Great Britain, and to aggravate the inflationary tendency there.

A similar situation appeared in India. India was threatened with invasion from 1942 to the end of the war, and incurred heavy defence expenditure on her own account. But she also became an important source of supplies for British and Commonwealth forces in the Middle East and in South-East Asia, and accumulated sterling balances exceeding £1,000 million.

Farther east were some of the principal battlefields of the war. China had been in conflict with Japan since 1931 and actively at war since 1937. The whole of South-East Asia had come under Japanese occupation or at any rate domination. There had resulted the same lamentable tale of destruction and economic deterioration as in Europe.

Except in China, UNRRA gave very little help to Asia. Colonies were the responsibility of their metropolitan Powers, who would spare but little of their depleted and heavily burdened resources. And the progress of recovery was soon delayed by the recrudescence of civil war in China, and by internal disorders in Indonesia, Indo-China, Burma, and Malaya.

Nevertheless, the recuperative power of primitively organized peasant communities made itself felt. Being self-contained and never having become dependent on mechanical appliances, they were able to resume by their own unaided efforts the simple methods of production to which they were accustomed.

Tin-mining in Malaya and Indonesia had been reduced to a very low

ebb, but the product was important enough to attract resources for replacement of the plant destroyed. On the other hand, manufacturing industry in Japan, suffering not only from destruction, dislocation, and want of materials, but from loss of markets, had been reduced in 1946 to one-fifth of pre-war production, and made little progress in the ensuing years.

(ii) The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

By F. Ashton-Gwatkin

Introductory Note[1]

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was one of the organizations, created during the Second World War, that were intended, from the beginning, to be temporary; and, among these non-permanent bodies, it was also one of the shorter-lived. UNRRA, however, was distinguished among its kind by being temporary without being ephemeral; for the very idea of bringing such an organization into existence was a new departure in history; UNRRA's success in translating this idea into action was an historical landmark; and in 1954, more than five years after the date at which UNRRA had been wound up, it could be prophesied, with some confidence, that this temporary product of the Second World War was going to be heard of many times again, and that the methods applied, and the experience obtained, in the course of UNRRA's relatively brief working life would continue to be of practical interest to future statesmen who were going to find themselves confronted with similar tasks.

By the time, within the fifth decade of the twentieth century, when UNRRA was conceived, born, operated, and liquidated, the whole habitable and traversible surface of the globe had been knit together into a single solid nexus by the extraordinary development of modern western technology. This achievement of the unification of mankind on a world-wide scale on the technological plane was illustrated by the fact that the Second World War came, before it was over, to be literally world-wide in its range. But the same melancholy fact also bore witness to the truth that, in this generation, mankind had been effectively united for the purpose of trade and war without having yet become one family; and, when the dire demands of the Second World War had stimulated a remorseless technology to invent an atomic weapon, it became evident that the human race had entered on a period in which it would continue to be in mortal danger from itself unless and until the already accomplished technological

[1] By Arnold Toynbee.

unification of the surface of the globe into a single military arena had been followed by the moral unification of the globe's human inhabitants into a single community in which all men would act on a feeling of being members one of another.

The historic importance of UNRRA lay in its marking a notable step forward towards the attainment of this now imperatively urgent goal of human endeavours; for the decision to create UNRRA was tantamount to a declaration of the moral solidarity of the whole human race; and this declaration was the more impressive for being not just a form of words but a practical programme of action. Moreover, the action for which UNRRA was called into existence was effectively carried out, for the benefit of those peoples whom the course of the war had left in need of help, through the voluntary generosity of other peoples who were in a position to give their neighbours this help because their own sufferings in the war had been less extreme.

In the work of UNRRA, a group of relatively well-to-do and powerful peoples were deliberately taking responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation of more unfortunate fellow human beings in war-devastated countries, and were systematically catering for the needs of the whole living generation of mankind without discriminating between different races, religions, or civilizations. For example, provision was made, through UNRRA, for the rice-eating half of mankind, as well as for the bread-eating half, though the initiators of this world-wide relief operation and the masters of the military and political situation at the time were all members of the bread-eating half, and though their concern for the relief of the rice-eating peoples obliged them to ration severely their own consumption of a foodstuff which was this other half of mankind's staff of life.

Such charity was not of course, in itself, a virtue that was previously unknown in the history of civilization. Communities that had been smitten by war, famine, flood, or pestilence had often, in the past, been succoured, in their emergencies, by the charity of private individuals in distant lands, and even the governments of state had occasionally emulated the good deeds of their subjects—as, for instance, in the Hellenic World in 227 B.C., when a number of governments had vied with one another in coming to the help of the Rhodians when Rhodes had been devastated by an earthquake. The new feature presented in UNRRA was that, in this mid-twentieth-century international organization, a great majority of the local governments then in existence co-operated with one another to provide relief and rehabilitation for afflicted peoples on a world-wide scale. UNRRA was, in fact, the unmistakable harbinger of a future oecumenical welfare state; and, though this was only a brief flash of light in the darkness that the Second World War had left behind it, it did lay a flare-path signalling the direction along which mankind must travel farther if it was

to save itself from the destruction with which it was now threatened by its own technological prowess.

(*a*) The Genesis of UNRRA[1]

(1) *The Early Recognition of the Need for a Post-War Relief Organization*

UNRRA is . . . the first great test of the capacity of the present world partnership of the United Nations and associated governments to achieve a peacetime goal. It represents a first bold attempt of the free peoples to develop efficient habits of working together. It is now up to all of us to prove that it is not only for war and destruction but also for help and healing that nations can be united to act for the common good. Then will peace have her victory no less than war.[2]

The need for 'Relief and Rehabilitation' was first anticipated and defined in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, the department devoted to the spread of economic distress in enemy countries. In August 1940 the blockade was extended to the whole of Europe. There was at the time considerable doubt as to how the exiled Allied Governments and their nationals serving in the Allied cause (especially the Norwegian seamen)

[1] For the facts given in this section of the volume the writer is indebted, first and foremost, to *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, prepared by a special staff under the direction of George Woodbridge, Chief Historian of UNRRA*, published in three volumes, by the Columbia University Press in 1950. With the permission of the United Nations and of the Columbia University Press the writer has quoted from this official history extensively, directly and indirectly; and it is essential for anyone studying the subject. Volumes I and II of the official history tell the story; Volume III contains the principal documents from the UNRRA Agreement (9 November 1943) onwards. It does not contain documents of the earlier period such as Churchill's speech of 21 August 1940, or the London Resolution of the Inter-Allied Powers (24 September 1941), or President Roosevelt's message to Congress of 11 December 1942—all of which are extant in published form. It does not contain the minutes and report of the Inter-Allied Committee, or the Leith-Ross proposals of February 1942, or the various drafts and counter-drafts that prepared the way for the UNRRA Agreement. From November 1943 onwards it gives all the Council Resolutions and a selection from the Resolutions of the Central Committee. It gives the texts of the agreements with the Military Authorities, with the Governments of receiving countries, and with other international authorities; a selection of the more important administrative orders; and nearly a hundred pages of statistical and financial tables covering Personnel, 'Displaced Persons', Distribution of Supplies, Budget, and Finance. Volume III also gives (pp. 3–18) a list of the senior officials in the Administration with the positions held by them before they joined UNRRA; and a bibliography of selected printed UNRRA documents given circulation outside the Administration.

As stated above, the official history does not deal in any detail with the period of gestation (1940–3) before the signature of the Agreement, though it fully acknowledges the leading role played by the British Government during this period. ('The major public suggestion that the work which was to be UNRRA's should be performed was made by Winston Churchill, although he did not suggest that an international organization should be created for the purpose.') Within the restricted compass of this chapter the writer has tried to fill in some of the leading events of this period and to analyse their significance. In this, as indeed throughout his work, he has been greatly helped by the advice and suggestions of Sir F. Leith-Ross, Miss Rosemary Miller, and Mr. Dudley Ward—all of them leading members of the staff of UNRRA with wide and intimate knowledge of its history and operations.

[2] Testimony of Governor Herbert H. Lehman before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, quoted in Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 114.

would take this threat to their families and people in the occupied territories. It was felt, therefore, that the extension of the blockade should be linked up with an announcement that Europe would be fed as soon as it was liberated and that the British Government would build up reserves for that purpose. It should be remembered that at that date the United States was still a 'neutral' country.

At the same time the stoppage of trade caused, or seemed about to cause, a problem of surpluses. The foodstuffs and raw materials formerly exported to Germany, to Italy, to Belgium, to the Netherlands, to Denmark and Norway, to France, and to Central Europe would no longer find their normal markets. So it seemed as if large stocks were likely to accumulate in producing countries with consequent distress for the producers. Their difficulties were further increased by scarcity of shipping.

The problem of surpluses affected many countries in the British Commonwealth, the French colonies in Africa which had thrown in their lot with de Gaulle and the 'Fighting French', and the Belgian Congo. It was also a matter of concern to the countries of South America; and in July 1940, at the Havana meeting of the American Foreign Ministers, they discussed measures for the temporary handling and orderly marketing of accumulated surpluses of those commodities which were of primary importance to the American Republics.

In Great Britain, a Ministerial Committee on Export Surpluses (Chairman: Arthur Greenwood, M.P.) was set up in August 1940, and also an interdepartmental Committee of Officials, under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross (Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare). The questions before these Committees were: (1) the adjustment of the surpluses problem to that of the post-war relief of Europe, and (2) the possibility of co-operation with the United States of America. The response of the United States authorities to inquiries made was at that time disappointing. They seemed to prefer the idea of *ad hoc* measures of relief.

The preparatory history of UNRRA, therefore, falls into two periods: (1) August 1940 to September 1941 (St. James's Palace Meeting)—the period of surpluses; and (2) September 1941 to November 1943 (signature of the UNRRA Agreement)—by which date the problem of shortages had taken the place of that of surpluses. By that time, too, governmental work on 'Surpluses and Relief' had been transferred from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Board of Trade, and the interdepartmental Committee of Officials had been renamed the Committee for Post-War Commodity Policy and Relief. In August 1940, the starting-point of this history, the surpluses which were being considered were those of groundnuts, copra, coconut-oil, palm kernels, palm oil, cottonseed, linseed, castorseed, wheat, maize, rice, meat, cattle, hides, sugar, coffee, cocoa, pepper, bananas,

cotton, sisal-wood, copper, tobacco; and the producing countries affected were all those of the British Commonwealth (then including Burma, as well as the future domains of Pakistan, India, and the Indian Union, in addition to Ceylon), the British colonies in Africa, Malaya, and the West Indies, the French colonies in Africa, the Belgian Congo, the Netherlands Indies, and the Central and Southern American countries.

On 21 August 1940 Winston Churchill gave to the invaded countries of Europe a definite pledge of eventual relief, in the following terms:

> It is our intention to maintain and enforce a strict blockade, not only of Germany, but of Italy, France and all other countries that have fallen into the German power. . . . Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full and let the peoples of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the day when that yoke will be broken. Meanwhile, we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of German forces, and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our best to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including—I say it deliberately—the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.[1]

This pledge to bring relief with victory was the foundation of the UNRRA movement. A Relief Section was set up in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, charged with the task of marrying the problem of surpluses and the problem of the relief that was to be given to 'liberated' countries.

This chapter will show how, from this small beginning, a great international organization grew into effective activity. UNRRA was the first organized effort to counteract the destruction caused by the war, to create rather than to destroy. It was to take its place at the head of a series of great international bodies—the International Bank and the Monetary Fund (children of the Bretton Woods Conference), the International Trade Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Organization itself—as the indispensable forerunner of a new, united, harmonious, and constructive world. The creation of this new world was to be frustrated by the outbreak of the Cold War. Yet, in the period immediately following the Second World War, UNRRA proved to be necessary for democratic and Communist countries alike, and it received sincere and effective, though sometimes troublesome and rough-edged, support from the Soviet Union.

A vast organization was built up which, at its peak, employed some 25,000 persons and spent some £920 million on commodities distributed

[1] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 364, coll. 1161–2.

over a period of four years (December 1943 to December 1947). This organization evolved its own international civil service. It acquired semi-sovereign rights, and could make treaties with the governments and military authorities of states.

The emphasis was to be on Relief rather than on Rehabilitation; and, when both the Relief and the Rehabilitation problems that followed the war had been solved, there were Reconstruction problems still remaining to be dealt with, later on, by the constructive generosity of the United States Government and people, as expressed in Marshall Aid and in the European Recovery Programme and by the international body known as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Rehabilitation, as distinct from Reconstruction, was, however, within the scope of UNRRA. This was a sort of transitional stage before Reconstruction, and it covered a great deal. It was soon seen that it was more economical to send ploughs and tractors and seed to Europe than cargoes of grain, and to send raw cotton rather than finished textiles. So, although Rehabilitation was perhaps left unemphasized in the original advertisements of UNRRA's purposes, it became a very important part of UNRRA's work. UNRRA, therefore, in its conception, in its operation, and in its administrative shape and status constituted an important link in the contemporary chain of social, economic, and diplomatic developments; and it was one of the beginnings of the new internationalism which was, or was to have been, embodied in the United Nations Organization.

By April 1941 Lend-Lease had started, and the United States Government were preparing to modify their attitude towards the relief and rehabilitation problem. They were also discussing the possibility of supporting the economies of the Commonwealth countries in the Pacific area. By July United States officials were intimating semi-officially that their Government would be prepared to discuss participation in purchasing and holding stocks together with the United Kingdom and the producing countries.

The first practical demand for UNRRA's services (long before there was an UNRRA) came from the representatives in London of the exiled governments of occupied countries in Europe; and the first large-scale project for meeting their appeal which was, in fact, the scheme for the creation of UNRRA had to be worked out mainly between British and American experts; for it was to the United States that countries were already beginning to turn as the greatest source of supplies likely to be available when hostilities had ceased.

The British initiative; the 'liberated' countries' requirements; the American resources—somehow these three factors in the Relief and Rehabilitation problem had to be brought into agreement and evolved into a practical plan of action. Meanwhile, the war was continuing; and, with the fall

of France, the belligerency of Italy, the over-running of Central Europe and Greece, the early successes of the German armies in Russia, and the intervention of Japan, the prospects were not very bright. Would the Relief plans emerge too soon or too late? Or would they fail to emerge?

(2) *The Meeting of Representatives of Allied Governments at St. James's Palace in September 1941, and its Results*

On 24 September 1941 the British Government convened a meeting of the representatives of fifteen governments,[1] allied in the struggle against Germany, in St. James's Palace in London to discuss the establishment of machinery to deal with the preliminary questions relating to post-war relief in Europe.[2] The United States Government were not represented (the United States was not yet at war), but they had been consulted in advance, and they sent a message of encouragement. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, presided; and a resolution was passed embodying the following points:

1. That it was a 'common aim' to secure supplies of food, raw materials, and articles of prime necessity to meet the post-war needs of 'liberated' countries;
2. that, whereas each government was primarily responsible for the needs of its own people, their respective plans should be co-ordinated in a spirit of inter-Allied collaboration;
3. that all governments welcomed the preparatory measures already taken, and expressed their readiness to collaborate in the future;
4. that they would proceed to prepare estimates of what would be required, and indicate the priorities;
5. that estimates for the most economical use of shipping for the reprovisioning of Europe should also be prepared as a concerted undertaking;
6. that a bureau should be established by the British Government, with which the Allied Governments should collaborate in framing estimates of their requirements; this bureau should prepare proposals to be submitted to a Committee of Allied Representatives (later known as the Inter-Allied Committee) under the chairmanship of Sir F. Leith-Ross.[3]

The Netherlands Government asked for an assurance that this resolution did not preclude action by individual governments; and Eden, in giving

[1] The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, 'La France Combattante'.

[2] For the report of the proceedings, see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Inter-Allied Meeting held in London at St. James's Palace on September 24, 1941. Report of proceedings*, Cmd. 6315 (London, H.M.S.O., 1941) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6315].

[3] For full text see Cmd. 6315, pp. 17–18.

this assurance, added: 'I wish to make it clear that our idea is that responsibility rests, in the first place, with the individual governments to help their own people. But we shall also do our best to help one another.'[1] This assurance, taken together with the resolution passed at the St. James's Palace meeting and Churchill's speech in August 1940,[2] represents the earliest foreshadowing of UNRRA.

But the plans for the building of UNRRA could not be completed until the attitude of the Soviet Union and of the United States had been made clear.

The Soviet representative did not accept in its entirety the St. James's Palace resolution; nor were the Soviet Government represented on the Inter-Allied Committee.[3] The Soviet Government

considered that the Bureau should itself be built on the basis of equal representation of all the governments concerned. It proposed that detailed plans concerning the scope and form and methods of work of the Bureau should be submitted for preliminary consideration to the Allied Governments so that a final decision could be approved at the next Inter-Allied conference, and reserved the right to put forward, at a later date, certain fresh proposals concerning that part of the resolution which covered the constitution of the Bureau.[4]

The British conception of an Inter-Allied Secretariat for the future Relief organization was that the directing body, the Inter-Allied Committee, should consist of national representatives, but that the Secretariat should be entrusted to one individual, who would organize the Bureau without regard to nationality and would be responsible to the Committee and not to his government. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, wanted five secretaries, each appointed by and responsible to his own government. It was this difference which kept the Russians from participating in the work of the Inter-Allied Committee.

On 13 January 1942 the Soviet proposals were submitted to the governments who had taken part in the St. James's Palace Conference and also

[1] Cmd. 6315, p. 31.

[2] See above, p. 55.

[3] The Inter-Allied or Leith-Ross Committee, or its main sub-committee, met continuously for the best part of two years and finally agreed a Report on 30 June 1943 (see below, p. 74). This Report, which was submitted formally to the first meeting of the UNRRA Council, was a comparatively short document setting out various questions of principle which had to be settled and covering a very detailed programme of requirements in all the main fields. This programme had been worked out by a score of sub-committees consisting of British and Allied experts together with observers from the American Embassy. The Committee, in fact, did much careful and detailed work, based on the data available at that stage in the war, and on the understanding that estimates would need to be revised as soon as the countries concerned were liberated. But the programme was rejected by the American representatives on the ground that the Allies were opening their mouths too wide; and, when UNRRA was set up, they worked out fresh programmes. In fact, the estimates of the Committee were found in many cases to be insufficient rather than excessive, although they included some items, particularly metals and minerals, which the UNRRA planners regarded as going beyond their scope.

[4] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 10.

to the Government of the United States—who, by this date, was a full ally in the war. Except for the above point relating to the Secretariat, the Soviet proposals were in close agreement with the views of the other governments.

(3) *The 'Suggested Outline of Post-War Relief', dated 2 February 1942, and the Reaction to it in the United States*

The Outline of Post-War Relief Organizations, known as the 'Leith-Ross Plan', dated 2 February 1942, was the first 'blue-print' of UNRRA, the first vital step towards post-war reconstruction. It was prepared in the Relief Section of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. It was not an official statement on the part of the British Government, but the proposals made in it were regarded as practicable by the British government departments concerned. It was to be used in the first place for discussion with the Commonwealth countries and with the United States in order that their views might be obtained before the United Kingdom submitted any statement of policy to the Allied Governments in Exile. The proposals were based on the hypothesis that post-war relief would afford the first opportunity for a renewal of international collaboration, and that therefore the principles underlying it ought to derive from the Atlantic Charter, of which it would be the first concrete exposition.

The progamme would fall naturally into three divisions:

1. Examination of requirements (by the small British bureau working for the Inter-Allied Committee);
2. ascertainment of sources of supplies and of the conditions on which supplies could be made available;
3. arrangements for acquisition, transport, and distribution to consuming countries.

Provision had also to be made for an executive body that would put this programme into action. The Inter-Allied Committee and Bureau were already in existence, and it was agreed that an Inter-Allied Council and Executive should be created next; that the existing Bureau should be expanded into a Planning and Intelligence Section; that a nucleus of Relief Services and a Financial Section should be added; and finally, that the Purchasing, Shipping, and Transport Section should be built up, utilizing existing inter-Allied agencies, if possible.

The Plan set forth the probable conditions likely to prevail in Europe and in the Far East at the close of the war, the lack of foodstuffs and raw materials, the financial weakness and lack of foreign exchange, the methods to be employed for meeting these difficulties, the allocation of supplies and shipping, and the machinery for the procurement of supplies and for their effective transfer and distribution. It assumed that the leading

part in the organization of relief would be shared between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. It proposed that estimates of requirements prepared by the Allied Governments should be co-ordinated by the existing Bureau, and that potential sources of supply should be ascertained both in Allied and in neutral countries. It also proposed that an International Relief Council, with a membership of ministerial rank, should be set up before the conclusion of an armistice, and that this should have sufficient authority to control imports to, and the relief of, Europe, China, and any other region in which it was decided that relief should be given; that the Council should consist of the representatives of all Allied nations and of such neutral countries as might be prepared to assist; that the President should be an American; and that there should be two Vice-Presidents, one British and one Russian.

The International Relief Council was to appoint Advisory Committees for special purposes, and it was to be served by a full-time Executive, with an American in the chair as Director-General of Relief and some six members in charge of the main branches of the relief work.

The existing Bureau was to carry on until the new Council and Executive had been established; it was then to be expanded by the addition of qualified experts from countries which were members of the Council, and was to become the Planning or Intelligence Section.

The task of the Executive was to be the production of the flow of resources required for the immediate needs of the 'liberated' countries—both in cash and in kind. As soon as the location and availability of these resources had been ascertained, the Executive was to set up a Financial Committee to facilitate their purchase. Co-ordination of purchasing was most desirable, or governments would be found to be competing against the Relief Administration or against other governments. The Executive was also empowered, in case of need, to establish an Allied Food and Supplies Agency for the purchase and control of supplies. The Allied 'shipping pool' was to be maintained in some form under post-war conditions, since it would be useless to accumulate supplies if, owing to lack of shipping, these could not be transported.

The preponderance of the share which the United States would have to take in post-war relief was recognized, in the Leith-Ross Plan, in the proposal that an American should be President of the Relief Council, and that another American should be Chairman of the Executive.

The Plan was sent to the United States Ambassador in London, John G. Winant, on 2 February 1942; and in May 1942 the United States Government replied with their observations on the Plan and on the Soviet memorandum of 13 January.

The American note agreed with the Plan as regards the Relief Council, but proposed that the Council should be enlarged to include representa-

tives of all countries that were or might be interested in relief work and should thus be made competent to act as a channel of communication with the principal governments, and as a means by which their views might be made known and discussed. The note accepted the proposed Executive Committee as the organ for the working out of policy and also for its execution at the higher level, but not for the operational details. This, the note suggested, should be in the hands of a 'Director-General of Relief Operations'. It was proposed that this officer should organize a 'United Nations Relief Bureau', which would form his operational staff and would correspond to the 'Executive' as envisaged in the Leith-Ross Plan.

The Executive Committee, as envisaged by the United States Government, was to consist of the British, American, Russian, and Chinese representatives on the Relief Council, with the American representative 'possibly acting as President'.

The United States reply also proposed that a round-table discussion should be held at Washington between British, American, Russian, and Chinese representatives—to be followed by a conference of all governments to be represented on the United Nations Relief Council. The Allied Post-war Requirements Bureau in London was to be reconstituted as a 'Permanent Advisory Committee on European Relief'.

Leith-Ross was invited to Washington to take part in the four-Power discussions. He arrived there towards the end of June 1942; but it was many months before the four-Power discussions took place. Instead, he had a series of meetings with an American interdepartmental committee, representing the principal United States Government departments. Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, was chairman. The Americans produced a new draft plan of their own, which differed in some respects from the Leith-Ross Plan, and this State Department draft of June 1942, not the Leith-Ross Plan, became the basis of the eventual constitution of the Relief organization. The main features of this were a clear-cut division between executive and policy making, the vesting of executive authority in one man (the Director-General), and the provision that the standing committees should be responsible to the Council and not to the Executive, and these features all reflected American rather than British ideas. The British authorities were disposed to fall in with their American colleagues' wishes, since it was evident that the United States would be more likely to assume leadership if the planning were left to her. The principal controversies over the constitution of UNRRA revolved round the membership and powers of the executive or policy committee. The Americans were then (though on this point they changed their mind later) in favour of policy-making powers being in the hands of the 'Big Four' countries only, and so (until Canada began to claim a seat) were the British Government.

The Leith-Ross Plan would have left the Director-General to some extent under the control of 'regional committees'. The Americans were in favour of his being given the maximum amount of authority, and their view prevailed—with the incidental consequence that the final executive power in UNRRA came to be located in Washington and not in London.

Discussions and differences of opinion also ranged round the question of the scope of the proposed organization. Was it to be confined to 'relief' in the narrower sense of feeding the hungry (on the lines of the Hoover Organization in 1918)? Or was it to comprise economic rehabilitation and reconstruction in the broad sense of rebuilding broken national economies (more or less on the lines of what Marshall Aid and the European Recovery Programme were later to undertake)?

The American Committee was sceptical and suspicious about the work of the Inter-Allied Bureau in London, and thought that it was asking for too much. Leith-Ross, quoting the report on relief after the First World War made by the British Director of Relief, Sir William Goode,[1] pointed out that, unless relief was to be continued indefinitely, the populations in the distressed areas must be got back to work, so that they might become self-supporting again, and that this required the organization of transport, fuel, and raw materials. Mere 'relief' was not enough. The American Committee then agreed to admit the second R (Rehabilitation) into UNRRA; but, even so, the rehabilitation aspect was very much played down in the definition of UNRRA's functions as finally adopted. The American representatives knew that it would be easy to get Congress to vote money for the relief of starving people, but that to ask them to contribute to economic rehabilitation, i.e. to support the rebuilding of competitive industries abroad and to restrict the markets for American exports, would be to invite criticism and refusal.[2]

[1] See report from Sir William Goode contained in Great Britain: *Economic Conditions in Central Europe* (i), (London, H.M.S.O., 1920); and compare the 55th Resolution of the Council of UNRRA (Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 127), which cites Sir W. Goode's statement of 1 January 1920: 'Of one thing I am absolutely convinced, that is, that to continue to provide food without at the same time providing raw materials on which to re-establish industry, is merely to aggravate the problem of Europe.'

[2] Within the possible scope of UNRRA lay Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction. The inclusion of Relief was agreed by all parties, and at an early stage it was decided to exclude Reconstruction (e.g. there were to be no 'Reconstruction Loans'). It was difficult to persuade the United States to keep the Rehabilitation element in at all. The narrower conception of the scope of UNRRA dominated the American approach to the question, and, even after the United States Government had accepted a wider definition, the more restrictive conception kept cropping up again and again. Thus Governor Lehman, when Director-General of UNRRA, objected strongly to the sale by recipient governments of UNRRA supplies. He said that the American public would never accept an arrangement under which the recipient governments were free to sell to their people goods which they received free, gratis, and for nothing. It was pointed out to him that, while supplies ought to be distributed gratis to people without any means of payment, most of the populations of the recipient countries could well afford to pay in their local currency, and that inflation was almost as great a danger as starvation. At last, Governor Lehman

On his return to London, early in September 1942, Leith-Ross reported to the British Government and to the Inter-Allied Committee, and strongly recommended acceptance of the draft agreement that he had negotiated in Washington. He had been asked by his American colleagues to explain to his Committee that he had gone to the United States for informal discussions with American officials, the object being to enable them to obtain first-hand information and impressions in regard to the work and experience of the Allied Committee in London, and to be in a position to have definite studies for submission to the President. But though the United States was vitally interested and was ready to play her part in due course, she did not believe that the time had yet come for formal discussion of an agreement looking to these ends.

(4) *The Three Draft Agreements of 1942–3*

In all, there were to be three draft agreements for the constitution of UNRRA. The first draft of August 1942 was the outcome of the discussions between Leith-Ross and the American Committee. The second draft of May 1943 was prepared by the representatives of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (the long-awaited Four-Power Conference). The third and final draft (officially adopted in November 1943) was the work of the four Governments after they had received the views of the other Governments concerned. The history of these drafts is given in the following paragraphs.

The scope of UNRRA activities, the question principally in debate between Leith-Ross and the American Committee, was defined as follows in the first draft:

> To plan, co-ordinate and, where desirable, administer international measures for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations, through the provision of food, fuel, clothing and other basic necessities, housing facilities, medical and other essential services, *and to facilitate in areas receiving relief the production and transportation of these services so far as necessary to the adequate provision of relief.*

The words here italicized represent the compromise reached regarding 'rehabilitation'.

In the subsequent draft agreements the main field of dispute was the actual organization of UNRRA, and the size, authority, and voting procedure of the Policy (or Executive or Central) Committee. In the first draft, the Council, which was to be the Parliament of all the UNRRA

accepted a compromise under which, if a recipient government sold UNRRA goods, the proceeds of sale should be placed to a special account and be used for internal relief or rehabilitation services, and not for the general balancing of the budget. In agreement with this stipulation the Italian 'Lire' Fund was formed from resources made available to the Italian Government through sales of UNRRA goods to the population (see below, p. 107).

countries, was called upon to meet 'in normal session not less than twice a year'. When the Council was not in session, all interim decisions on policy questions were to be taken by the Policy Committee of the Council, consisting of representatives of the four Powers only (United Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R., China).

The first draft agreement (Leith-Ross and the American Committee) was submitted in September 1942. It was approved by the Secretary of State (Cordell Hull) and by President Roosevelt, and was then presented to the British, Soviet, and Chinese Governments, with a view to the convening, at an early date, of a Relief Conference of all interested Powers.

In the event, this meeting was delayed by the alarming uncertainty of the military position in the latter half of 1942; by the desire of the British Government to consult the British Dominions; and by the imminence of the congressional elections (November) in the United States. The Administration in Washington were anxious lest the spending of money on 'relief', and still more the spending of it on 'rehabilitation', might be used against them as an election cry. Thus very little information was issued to the public regarding the work done at Washington during June–September 1942.[1]

There was, in fact, a pause until January 1943. By that time the American elections were over and the military situation had improved as a result of the Alamein, North African, and Stalingrad campaigns and the offensive against the Japanese. Moreover, by that time the European Allies were becoming restless and were showing themselves anxious to proceed with purchases for relief. The Allied Governments were now beginning to hope for a return from exile to their own countries, and they knew that their reception might be a chilly one, especially if they came with empty hands.

In January 1943 representatives of Britain, the Soviet Union, and China entered upon a series of meetings with Dean Acheson at the State Department in Washington; and these meetings continued until May, when the second draft agreement was approved by the President and was then circulated to the other forty Allied and Associated Governments. During this second phase of the preliminary discussions, the main field of difference and debate, as already stated, was the constitution of the Policy (or Executive or Central) Committee.

The British Government had, at first, been in favour of a Policy Committee of Four, representing the four Great Powers: Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Then Canada, an important supplying country, began to press for full membership of the Committee. The United States Government had come to favour a Committee of Seven, the extra three to be chosen annually by the Council; and the British

[1] See above, pp. 61–63.

Government, influenced mainly by Canada, now began to come round to the same idea of a Committee of Seven. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, maintained their insistence on a Four-Power Committee, on the ground that the constitution of UNRRA would be the pattern for United Nations organizations in the future, and that, on more controversial subjects, the choosing of the three extra members to sit with the Big Four would be most embarrassing. Impressed by this argument, the United States Government changed over to support the figure four against the figure seven, but the British Government remained in favour of a Seven-Power Committee, since they believed that a Four-Power Committee would win no more than a half-hearted support for the relief organization. The eventual compromise restricted the membership of the Policy Committee to the four Great Powers, but changed its nomenclature to 'Central Committee', and reduced its authority by setting up, in addition, a 'Supplies Committee' on which the principal supplying countries, including Canada, were to be represented. The chairman of this new Committee was to be invited to attend Council meetings whenever questions affecting the provision of supplies were to be discussed. The Soviet Government accepted this compromise, and Canada was satisfied. The Soviet Government had also proposed that a unanimous vote should be declared necessary in all matters put to the vote in the Policy Committee. This was a foreshadowing of the famous 'veto' stipulation in the Charter of the United Nations. But, on this occasion, the Soviet Government gave way and withdrew their proposal.

The delay in reaching a decision on these points, which persisted during the winter of 1942–3, might have wrecked the whole project of UNRRA, for, all the time, it looked as if, at any moment, the United States might abandon the international scheme and adopt an independent American plan on the lines of the Hoover organization at the end of the First World War. Such action would have been a bad omen for all inter-Allied co-operation in the post-war years.

Meanwhile, in July 1942, the British Government had set up their own Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA).[1] On 18 November 1942 President Roosevelt established the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO). On 21 November he appointed Herbert H. Lehman, Governor of New York,[2] to be the head

[1] MERRA was merged into UNRRA early in 1944. It was the first substantial effort to deal with the problem of displaced persons in its new form (see below, pp. 103, 111).

[2] Governor Lehman was subsequently appointed Director-General of UNRRA by the President without any reference to the British Government or to that of any other Power. When, later, he was 'nominated' by the Central Committee of UNRRA (see below, p. 79) this was merely a formal recognition of a *fait accompli*.

There was no constitutional document defining the functions of OFRRO. Its expenses were met from the President's Emergency Fund. It was established under the wing of the State Department, but its exact position with regard to other agencies and departments was never

of it and 'to undertake the work of organizing American participation in the activities of the United Nations in furnishing relief and other assistance to victims of war in areas reoccupied by forces of the United Nations'.[1]

In the Seventh Lend-Lease Report to Congress (11 December 1942) President Roosevelt observed:

> The policy of the United States, already announced, is to provide food, medicines, and other necessities to alleviate the hunger and suffering of the people in any territory occupied by our forces so far as it is humanly within our power to do so. . . . Methods of carrying out this policy will differ between areas, and different methods may be necessary within the same area. Where commercial channels of supply have been cut off, lend-lease can be the instrument for renewing them. Where relief distribution is necessary, lend-lease can supply the materials of relief. . . . Relief and rehabilitation of the reoccupied areas will be the common responsibility of all the United Nations, and must be a combined operation in the same sense as the military operations themselves. Success in restoring the countries we free will be a powerful factor in shortening the war and giving the liberated peoples their chance to share in the victory.[2]

These acts and statements of the United States Government indicated that they would be faithful to the conception of an international relief organization. In April 1943 Lehman and his special assistant, Hugh R. Jackson, went to London to discuss future plans for UNRRA. Lehman attended a meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee on 16 April. It was his office which drew up the 'Handbook, United States Delegation', which was used as a guide to the first Council session and in the subsequent shaping of UNRRA.

(5) *The Law–Keynes Mission to Washington in October 1943*

The second draft for the constitution of UNRRA, as approved by the Big Four Governments, was circulated to the Allied Powers on 30 May 1943. The third draft, adapted to meet their observations, was circulated on 23 September. Three points of major importance were still undecided, viz. the financing of relief supplies, the relation of UNRRA to the Combined Boards, and the relation of UNRRA relief with that of the military relief organizations. In September 1943 a British delegation, headed by

clear. In September 1943 it was merged with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Office of Economic Warfare (former Board of Economic Warfare) to form the Foreign Economic Administration. The drafting and negotiation of the UNRRA Agreement remained with the State Department and Dean Acheson. 'OFRRO devoted itself to the study of relief requirements in the occupied countries, the development of procedures for the procurement and handling of supplies, and to plans and policies for the international organization to be' (Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 22).

[1] Ibid. p. 21.

[2] *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1942–1943*, pp. 264–5.

Richard Law (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office; later Lord Coleraine) and J. M. (later Lord) Keynes, visited Washington to discuss monetary and commercial policy in the post-war period. In this they were preparing the way for the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944[1] and also for the Havana Conference of 1947–8 on Trade and Employment and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[2] But Law and Keynes were also instructed to reach a final agreement with Acheson and other United States representatives regarding the method of allocating UNRRA supplies and the basis for financial contributions to UNRRA. The Mission obtained United States agreement that UNRRA was to be a temporary operation with the objective of obtaining relief and rehabilitation supplies and services through the already existing allocating agencies (i.e. the Combined Boards) and that it was to distribute these benefits to nations not possessing sufficient foreign exchange to finance imports. UNRRA was to keep an eye on the local distribution of these supplies and services and was to attempt to secure an allocation of such supplies and services, at the hands of the Combined Boards, that would be fair in relation to the quantities available and to the just claims of less indigent countries that would also be in competition with them.[3]

The Law–Keynes Mission was successful in obtaining United States agreement to the subordination of UNRRA claims to the Combined Boards machinery; and the Memorandum agreed between Law and Acheson formed the basis for the instructions to the United States and British delegates to the first Council session in November. Agreement was also reached in favour of the right of paying governments (e.g. France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to have independent access to the Combined Boards—a provision which detached Western Europe from the field of UNRRA activities, with results that were not foreseen at the time. It was also confirmed that UNRRA was to have such power of disposition

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 449–52, and above, p. 47, note 1.

[2] Signed at Geneva, 30 October 1947.

[3] There was never any question of turning UNRRA into a super-state. The only question was how to arrange a fair distribution of supplies as between the United Kingdom (which had a seat on the Combined Boards); France, the Netherlands, and Belgium (the paying countries); and UNRRA acting for the non-paying recipients of relief. There was some justifiable suspicion that the United Kingdom might try to use her privileged position on the Combined Boards for obtaining an undue share of the supplies available for allocation. As things turned out the military authorities soon found that they had to provide much more than had been expected, in order to maintain tranquillity in the occupied areas, and they were in fact the spearhead for securing a fair allocation of supplies. This aspect of the matter was, of course, not presented by the negotiators at the first Council session (see Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 31–32). In 1941 Keynes had had much wider ideas of financing reconstruction after the war. He had wanted to set up an International Reconstruction Fund, which would give credits to all countries for the purchase of their requirements. Later on, perhaps as the result of further experience at the Treasury and realization of the immense cost of the war, he changed his attitude; and it was he who joined with the United States Treasury in laying down the means test for United Nations relief, as adopted at the first Council session.

or veto as would secure the equitable division of supplies among the various claimants.

In short, the Law–Keynes Mission prepared the way for the first session of the UNRRA Council. It established the practical lines on which UNRRA would be able to obtain a fair allocation of relief supplies in a period of world shortage without dislocating the established machinery of the Allied Supply Organization. It also worked out the basis upon which financial contributions could be raised from the member states to meet the cost of UNRRA operations.[1]

(6) *The Definitive Agreement of 9 November 1943*[2]

The Agreement was signed by the Governments of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R.,[3] Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, 'Irāq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Forty-eight countries, in all, thus became participants.

The tasks of UNRRA were defined in the Preamble as

1. aid and relief, food, clothing, and shelter;
2. aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people for the population of any area liberated by the armed forces of the United Nations;
3. arrangements for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes;
4. assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services.

Article I defined the powers, purposes, and functions of the Administration by describing, in greater detail, the tasks laid down in the Preamble.

Article II specified that the members of UNRRA were to be the Governments signatory to the Agreement and such others as might subsequently apply for membership.

Article III laid down the constitution of the Council of UNRRA as the policy-making body of the Administration (the Council was to be convened in regular session not less than twice a year and in special session when

[1] See below, pp. 70–71.

[2] For the full text see Cmd. 6491.

[3] The Byelorussian S.S.R., Denmark, Turkey, and the Ukrainian S.S.R. were not original signatories; they adhered later and were admitted by Resolutions of the Council (see Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 93, 149, 255–62, 332–9).

deemed necessary); the constitution of the Central Committee (to consist of representatives of China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the Director-General presiding, but this without a vote); and the constitutions of the Committee on Supplies, the Committee of the Council for Europe, and the Committee of the Council for the Far East (CCFE). The Committee of the Council for Europe was to replace the Inter-Allied Committee on European Post-War Relief (i.e. the Leith-Ross Committee) and take over its records. The Council was empowered to establish such other standing regional committees as it might consider desirable.

Article IV: Executive authority was to be in the hands of the Director-General appointed by the Council on the unanimous vote of the Central Committee; he could be removed by the Council on a similar unanimous vote. He was to have full power and authority. He could appoint Deputy Directors-General; he was to submit periodic reports to the Central Committee and to the Council on the general progress of activities; and he was to arrange for periodic reports on the progress of activities within each region.

Article V: Each member government was to contribute to the support of the Administration. Supplies and resources thus made available were to be kept in review by the Director-General, and purchases made by member governments outside their own territories were to be made only after consultation with the Director-General.

Article VI: The Director-General was to submit an annual budget and supplementary budgets if required. The total budget as approved by the Council was to be allocated to member governments in proportions to be determined by the Council.

Article VII: In any area where hostilities were still proceeding the Administration was not to undertake activities without the consent of the military command in that area.

Article VIII: The Agreement might be amended by a two-thirds' vote in the Council, but amendments of Articles III and IV were to require among the votes constituting the majority the unanimous approval of the members of the Central Committee.

Article IX: The Agreement was to enter into force for each signatory on the date of signature.

Article X: Any government was to be entitled to give notice of withdrawal six months after the entry into force of the Agreement for that government and to effect withdrawal twelve months after giving notice.

(7) *The Provision of Funds*

The UNRRA Agreement created the organization to administer relief; the motive force for the organization was to be provided by the funds

voted by each member government 'in so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize'.

> In the war period during which UNRRA was planned . . . no one could prophesy what would be the extent of the needs of the liberated countries, or what resources the governments supplying relief would have at their disposal. There were many variables, and perhaps the only constant was that relief needs would outrun the means to meet them.[1]

The protracted discussions between the United States and British Governments about the way in which relief was to be financed brought to light

> some general principles which were recognized as essential to any financial plan to be adopted. The first was that the acceptance of relief should not result in a burden of indebtedness. After World War I relief had been financed largely through loans. . . . Theoretically these loans had to be repaid; in fact very few of them were, and they lingered on to cloud international relations. In the financial planning for UNRRA there was no question of long-term loans or credits. . . .
>
> The second principle accepted was that those countries which had financial resources should pay for their own relief. Liberated countries in need of relief could, in fact, be divided into two categories: those which, like Poland and Yugoslavia, would probably have no financial resources in foreign exchange and would therefore have to be provided for entirely through free contributions; and those which, like France and Belgium, were expected to have substantial resources at the end of the war. . . .
>
> The third principle was, from the aspect of international co-operation, an important one: all countries—those which had been overrun as well as those which had not—should contribute to the administrative expenses; in this way donor and recipient countries would all be shareholders in the organization, and all, whether giving or receiving, would be equally entitled to be heard in the councils of UNRRA.
>
> Finally, it was agreed that whatever financial plan was formulated, it must be one which would appeal to the United States Congress, since it was inevitable that the bulk of the resources would have to be provided by the United States.[2]

The British representatives (Richard Law and J. M. Keynes)[3] at the numerous discussions which took place were, on the whole, in favour of the insertion of the relief programme into the existing supply machinery. Such a plan would not involve the creation of a special relief fund. This type of arrangement made no great appeal, however, to the United States representatives. Finally, Harry D. White of the United States Treasury, who had come late into the discussions, put forward a suggestion for definite levies on all countries which had not been overrun by the enemy. Their contribution was to be 1 per cent. of one year's national income.

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 81.
[2] Ibid. pp. 81–83.
[3] See above, pp. 67–68.

This contribution would not be levied annually or for any stated period: it would be once for all, or until demonstrated needs made it necessary to ask for more. Of the funds contributed, White suggested that 90 per cent. should be in the form of a credit in local currency, to be made available by the contributing country, but that not less than 10 per cent. should be in the form of currency which could be expended in areas outside. Under this scheme the United States would contribute about $1,350 million; the United Kingdom about $320 million; Canada about $90 million.

The merits of this plan were immediately recognized. It would provide a pre-determined income for the Administration on an equitable and business-like basis which was likely to appeal to the United States Congress. In addition, it would provide a simple and convenient means of assessing the contributions from those countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada—in which the concept of national income was familiar and which were potentially the largest contributors. Accordingly, the financial plan was adopted at the first Council session.

Details of the plan, as adopted, reflected the pre-UNRRA decision that countries possessing the requisite means should pay for their relief. 'The Director General was required to seek "the advice of the appropriate committee or Subcommittee of the Council in determining whether a country was in a position to pay".'[1] A liberated country which wished to receive relief and rehabilitation supplies from UNRRA without payment submitted to the Subcommittee on Ability to Pay a document giving particulars of foreign exchange holdings, revenue from exports, and other relevant data from which its financial position could be determined.

The criteria for adjudgment of inability to pay were essentially the same in all cases. The Subcommittee concerned satisfied itself that, after making allowance for a certain minimum monetary reserve, the foreign exchange holdings of the country under consideration *plus* such foreign exchange revenue as the country might be expected to receive from exports and other sources, *minus* urgent requirements for nonrelief imports, would leave the country with insufficient foreign exchange to finance necessary relief imports over the coming six or twelve months. . . . UNRRA did not apply harshly the ability-to-pay principle: shipments were not withheld pending a determination on ability to pay. For instance, substantial supplies had moved into Poland before any decision on ability to pay was reached, since it was not clear whether the Polish case was to be presented by the Polish Government in London or by the Provisional Polish Government in Lublin. Further, the Central Committee decided that the Director General could undertake emergency relief in certain cases even though the Government of the area concerned had not applied to be adjudged unable to pay. This decision, taken in March 1945 in connexion with the provision of emergency relief for countries in North-west Europe, became

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 95.

a precedent for emergency relief programmes subsequently undertaken in Finland, Hungary, Korea, and the Philippines.[1]

Eventual and total contributions to UNRRA were as follows:[2]

Resources provided:

Commodities, services and cash (general resources) made available to UNRRA for the purpose of carrying out its operations in accordance with the policies defined by the member Governments:

Commodities and services contributed and commitments made		
	$	
By member governments	3,062,098,114	
By others	206,492,140	
		$3,268,590,254
Cash contributed		
By member governments	598,850,341	
By others	5,308,426	
		$604,158,767
Other cash received		
From governments and agencies for acquisition of commodities, &c.	40,734,212	
From interest and exchange (net)	559,733	
		$41,293,945
		$3,914,042,966
Cash contributed for restricted use in liberated and ex-enemy territory (local currency)		$54,349,759
Total resources provided (or at $4 = £1 about £992,098,181)		$3,968,392,725

The following were the outgoings of UNRRA:

Resources used		
Commodities, services, and cash disposed of and recorded under the following general classifications:	$	
Commodities distributed	3,683,582,239	
Administrative expenses including expenses of liquidation	46,751,255	
Operating expenses	135,469,568	
		$3,865,803,062

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 96–97.

[2] See Operating Statement taken from the Financial Report of UNRRA (Ninth and Final Financial Report, Washington, March 1949 (Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 498–9)). For statistical tables giving detailed figures see ibid. pp. 411–514. These tables cover (1) UNRRA personnel; (2) Displaced Persons Operations; (3) Distribution of supplies, country by country in great detail under the four categories (*a*) Food; (*b*) Clothing, textiles, and footwear; (*c*) Agricultural rehabilitation; (*d*) Industrial rehabilitation; (4) General balance sheet of UNRRA; (5) Contributions received from governments and from other sources; (6) Administrative expenses; (7) Operating expenses; (8) Contributions to successor organizations.

	$	
Contributions to successor organizations	48,239,904	
		$3,914,042,966
Local currency used	54,349,759	
Total resources used		$3,968,392,725

It will be observed that in the above tables the total of commodities distributed is given as $3,683,582,239 (i.e. about £920 million). In another table given in the Official History[1] the 'total shipments' are given as 24,106,891 gross long tons in weight and $2,903,412,900 (i.e. about £726 million) in value. Perhaps the apparent discrepancy arises from the inclusion of shipping charges in the former figure.

Thirty non-invaded member governments made operating contributions to UNRRA; eight invaded member governments made operating contributions in addition to their administrative contributions; all forty-eight member governments contributed to the administrative expenses; five non-member governments contributed (Argentina, Eire, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, and Italy); non-governmental contributions came from voluntary subscriptions and collections. The greater part of the voluntary collections was in the form of used clothing collected through clothing drives. The United States produced 75,000 tons of clothing in three great drives. Canada produced $17,310,174 worth of clothing; Australia, $4,830,973; New Zealand, $1,497,559. Many of these voluntary gifts were directed to specific countries, e.g. Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Siam.[2]

Contributions made by the United States, by the United Kingdom, and by Canada amounted to 94 per cent. of the total operating funds. The total amounts of the contributions undertaken by the three Governments were:

	1st Contribution (1944)	*2nd Contribution (1945)*	*Total*
	(million $ and £)		
United States	1,350 (£337)	1,350 (£337)	2,700 (£674)
United Kingdom	320 (£80)	300 (£75)	620 (£155)
Canada	77 (£19)	77 (£19)	154 (£38)

(Exchange rate taken at $4 = £1)[3]

[1] See Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 428–9.

[2] Ibid. i. 143: 'From the United States alone came voluntary contributions amounting to almost one dollar per head of the population. These contributions . . . were a tangible proof of the spontaneous recognition of people all over the world of the value of the work which UNRRA was doing.'

[3] These figures are taken from Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 113, 118–20. See ibid. iii. 500 for the amounts actually received (expressed in U.S. dollar equivalents) for the entire period of UNRRA operations, viz. $3,660,948,455 in all—of which $2,668,269,449 came from the United States; $617,370,219 from the United Kingdom; and $138,738,739 from Canada. Other (in amounts) substantial contributors were: Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.

As regards the 'outgoings' from UNRRA, the total value as shown above (including presumably shipping and other transport) of commodities distributed amounted to $3,683,582,239 or about £920 million. The administrative charges came to only 1·18 per cent. of the total expenditure—an effective answer to those critics who say that UNRRA was wastefully administered. These charges included the running of headquarters at Washington, of the European Regional Office (ERO) in London, of the Balkan Mission at Cairo, of the South-West Pacific Area Office in Sydney, of the sessions of the Council, of various purchasing missions, and other special missions. Most of the expense was for personal services. Operating expenses (3·41 per cent. of the total) cover the Missions to the Receiving Countries, the Displaced Persons Operations, certain other missions and liaison offices, other activities such as training, and expenses incurred on behalf of successor organizations. These organizations, who were the heirs of UNRRA, were United Nations' International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF, the principal legatee: $34 million), the Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs of the Republic of China (BOTRA: $5 million), World Health Organization (WHO: $4 million) International Refugee Organization (IRO: $3·6 million), and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO: $1·1 million).[1]

(*b*) The Council of UNRRA and its Work

(1) *The Inter-Allied Committee's Report of 30 June 1943 to the First Session of the Council*[2]

Among the documents submitted to the first Council session was the Report to the Allied Governments of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (Chairman: Sir F. Leith-Ross), dated 30 June 1943. The task of the Committee, established under the St. James's Palace Resolution of 24 September 1941,[3] had been to collect and co-ordinate estimates of post-war requirements and priorities for the Allied Governments and authorities. The Report covered a Minimum Imports programme for the first six months after liberation (45,855,000 metric tons in all, of which 23,485,000 metric tons would require shipping) for the urgent needs of Belgium-cum-Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

It was assumed that after reconquest there would be a short initial military period of emergency relief, to be determined by the decision of the inter-Allied military command. During this period requirements would be limited to essential minimum needs: mainly food, clothing,

[1] See Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 505 for the Administrative expenses, ibid. pp. 506–8 for the Operating expenses, and pp. 509–14 for Contributions to successor organizations.

[2] Held at Atlantic City, N.J., 10 November–1 December 1943 (ibid. pp. 24 seqq.).

[3] See above, p. 57.

shelter, fuel, and medical supplies, and full control and responsibility would rest with the military authorities. UNRRA would then take over from the military authorities; and the Committee's Report aimed at the preparation of estimates of what would be required in the six months following this take-over, in respect of foodstuffs, raw materials, and articles of prime necessity required by the eight countries above-mentioned after the restoration of national governments in the liberated territories. The calculations were based either on the consumption of rationed goods in the United Kingdom (e.g. foodstuffs and textiles) or on a percentage reduction on pre-war consumption, related to the proportion by which war-time civilian consumption had been reduced in the United Kingdom (e.g. edible fats, hides, and skins). The minimum rate of nutritional needs was taken to be an average of 2,000 calories a day per person.

The Report also drew attention to the absence of any indication as to arrangements for supplying the ascertained requirements (except in the case of the International Wheat Conference, which had set aside a Wheat Relief Pool of 100 million bushels for inter-governmental relief in war-stricken countries and the necessitous areas of the world); that future co-ordination of purchasing might be no less necessary than present; that a scarcity of shipping in the immediate post-war period might prove to be the limiting factor in relief; that the Committee had no competence in the highly important and delicate problem of the provision of finance, and so far had received no indication as to how it was to be settled; that grave difficulties would be encountered owing to the present lack of inland transport in Europe; and that, though various and complicated problems remained to be considered concerning the organization of field missions and services, it would also be necessary to provide employment as soon as possible in the industrial areas of the liberated territories. The Report and the annexed technical reports were submitted to the Allied Governments for their attention with special reference to the above questions. The Report was also referred to the first session of the Council of UNRRA where it was presented by Sir F. Leith-Ross himself.[1] It served, no doubt, as a basis for much of the subsequent preparatory work done by the Administration; but at its first appearance it ran into considerable criticism from the American representatives, who considered that the Allied Governments were exaggerating their needs.[2]

The Inter-Allied Committee also brought into its Report the problem of 'displaced populations', basing its calculations on a belief that there

[1] Woodbridge (*UNRRA*, i. 324) states: 'The recommendations made in the Leith-Ross Report were used extensively in the calculation of the UNRRA bases of relief and rehabilitation requirements but no recommendation was made at Atlantic City to this effect.' The resolution arising therefrom is No. 55 (ibid. iii. 90–134).

[2] The fact that Western Europe was excluded from UNRRA did not stultify the basis of the Committee's work. The estimates were used by the Allied Governments instead of by UNRRA.

were in Europe at least 16 million 'displaced persons', of whom perhaps one-half were still inside their own countries but were living away from their original homes under conditions that were abnormal and unsatisfactory; that the largest group, amounting to at least 6½ million, was in Germany, consisting principally of prisoners of war and of workers from occupied countries; that the largest national group was probably Polish, numbering perhaps as many as 2 million souls; and that there were over 1 million French prisoners of war and over 500,000 French civilian workers outside France.

The problem of the displaced persons developed along lines quite different from those expected. An account of this development will be found below.[1]

(2) *The Sessions of the Council, November 1943 to December 1946*

The first session of the Council of UNRRA followed immediately after the signing of the Agreement, and was held in Atlantic City from 10 November to 1 December 1943.[2] The following countries were represented: Canada, China, French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States: with 'alternatives and advisers' from Belgium, Australia, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Council worked through Committees on (1) Organization and Administration; (2) General Policy; (3) Finance and Supplies; (4) Relief and Rehabilitation Policies.

'The Council, at its First Session, completed the structure that had been partially created in the Agreement. It marked the active start of the first United Nations Organization and the first large operating international agency.'[3]

The First Council further defined the scope of UNRRA. It was to 'conduct operations in liberated areas (that is, in territories of the United Nations) and not in enemy territories, unless specifically authorized to do so by the Council'.[4]

It was to provide relief supplies (e.g. food, clothing, and medical supplies); relief services (e.g. health and welfare); rehabilitation supplies (e.g. materials necessary to manufacture and transport relief supplies within the liberated territory and to restore public utilities).

'The Administration, therefore, was not to engage in long-range reconstruction operations; it was to be a temporary organization devoted to relief and related operations'.[5]

It was to help people to help themselves. It was not to deplenish its

[1] See below, pp. 111–17.
[2] See Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 24 seqq.
[3] Ibid. p. 32.
[4] Ibid. p. 29.
[5] Ibid. p. 30.

resources by sending supplies to any country whose government was able to pay out of its own reserves of foreign exchange. Foreign governments were not, however, to be encouraged to run into debt in order to obtain foreign exchange for relief and rehabilitation.

Distribution of UNRRA supplies was to be so controlled that all classes of the population, whether rich or poor, would be able to obtain equitable shares; and there was to be no discrimination on account of race, creed, or political connexions. 'Thus relief supplies should at no time be used as a political weapon.'[1]

These general directives, which constituted the charter of the Administration, were embodied in forty-one resolutions adopted at the first Council session.[2]

It is important to note how much this session restricted the scope of UNRRA. Under the terms of the Agreement the Administration could undertake measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations.[3] This definition would have been broad enough to include assistance not only to the liberated countries but even to the United Kingdom, e.g. in respect of bombed-out people. This was the deliberate intention of the original drafting committee. The British Government decided, all the same, not to put in any request to UNRRA for assistance, and later they were debarred from making a claim by the decision of the first Council against UNRRA aid being given in any area 'the government of which is in a position to pay with suitable means of foreign exchange'.[4] But this latter provision had still wider effects, in consequence of its requiring any government that wanted assistance to pass a 'means test' and to satisfy the Administration that it was not in a position to pay. This decision ruled out all the continental Western European countries from getting any assistance from UNRRA. Owing to the 'freezing' of their assets overseas as a counter-measure to the occupation of these countries by the Germans, they had substantial resources in foreign exchange available abroad, and for reasons of prestige they would have been reluctant to ask the Director-General to investigate their resources. At the time it was not realized how inadequate these resources were compared with the cost of restoring and rehabilitating their countries. Later they all received very substantial assistance through Marshall Aid.

UNRRA had no operational responsibilities in the 'paying countries' except for (*a*) emergency relief supplies and (*b*) assistance to non-national displaced persons. Apart from this, UNRRA had to review the supply

[1] Ibid. p. 29.

[2] In the course of the six sessions of the Council (1943–6) 115 resolutions were passed. The text of all of them will be found in Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 33–174. They constitute (together with the Agreement) the Bible of UNRRA, the Book of the Law.

[3] Article I of the Agreement (see Cmd. 6491).

[4] Resolution 14, Section 16.

requirements of the paying countries and present its observations to the Combined Boards; but in fact the Combined Boards exercised so strict a control over supplies that UNRRA had little need to intervene. Britain's political interest was to get the Western countries on to their feet again, and, when it proved not to be possible for UNRRA to assist them, it would have been more appropriate for Britain to have assisted them directly (perhaps by means of credits wherewith to purchase such supplies as might have been available) rather than to have spent the same amount on charitable assistance to Eastern Europe. For, when once the Administration had been debarred from giving assistance to the countries of Western Europe, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway had no further effective interest in UNRRA, and the funds which, under the original conception, were intended to be used largely for Western Europe were, in fact, devoted mainly to the Russian satellites and to Italy, Austria, and Greece. Thus the financial decision, which looked reasonable enough at the time, changed all the plans of the Administration's work, and produced a situation in which UNRRA funds (largely subscribed by the United States, Britain, and Canada) were restoring the economies of countries that had already come to be potential enemies, while the West European friends of the English-speaking Powers, and Britain herself, were being kept waiting for the help which was eventually to come to them from the United States in the form of Marshall Aid.

At the first session of the Council, as stated above, the first forty-one resolutions were passed which were the first instalment of the statutes of the policy of UNRRA. The Council was to be convened twice a year by the Central Committee. As a matter of fact, it met six times in all:

Date	*Place*	*Chairman*
1. 10 November to 1 December 1943	Atlantic City, N.J.	Dean Acheson (U.S.A.)
2. 15–27 September 1944	Montreal	Lester Pearson (Canada)
3. 7–25 August 1945	London	Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai (India)
4. 15–30 March 1946	Atlantic City	Tingfu F. Tsiang (China)
and 9 May 1946	Washington	,, ,,
5. 5–17 August 1946	Geneva	Anders Frihagen (Norway)
6. 10–14 December 1946	Washington	Henrik Kauffmann (Denmark)

The provisional agenda were prepared by the Director-General; and although the Central Committee and individual members of the Council were empowered to submit items, they seldom did, though the General Committee would often alter the provisional agenda, changing the order of the items and deciding which of them were or were not to be included.

From the second session onwards, the Administration provided a Secretariat for the Council, and of this P. W. Kuo, Deputy Director-General, was in charge from August 1944 to July 1947. Most of the work of the Council was done in committee, rather than in plenary meetings.

'Men in positions of major responsibility in their own governments were usually chosen to attend the Council; and in the case of major supplying nations, staffs of qualified advisers accompanied them.'[1] In the later sessions, the chief representatives both of the United States and of Britain tended to devolve more and more of their work on to their subordinate staffs.

The work of the Council consisted in (1) the debate on the Director-General's Report; (2) formulation of new policy, expressed in a further series of resolutions.

'The seventy-four resolutions passed during the five regular sessions after the First Council ranged from such minor matters as the acceptance of the UNRRA seal to major decisions regarding the extension of UNRRA aid to some ex-enemy areas and the provision of a second contribution coupled with the suggestion of a time limit for UNRRA's work.'[2]

(3) *The Committees of the Council and their Work*

The Central Committee of the Council consisted at first of representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, with the Director-General, without a vote, presiding; Canada and France were added by the Third Council (August 1945); and Australia, Brazil, and Yugoslavia by the Fourth (March 1946).

The Central Committee first met on 11 November 1943 in order to nominate the first Director-General (Governor Herbert H. Lehman).[3] Its sixty-sixth and last meeting was held on 24 September 1948. It abolished the post of the Director-General (then Major-General Lowell W. Rooks) as from 30 September 1948; and that was the date of the official end of UNRRA as an operating organization.

The Central Committee met during the Sessions of the Council as under:

Session of Council	*Date*	*No. of members of Committee*	*Nos. of meetings of Committee*
Second	September 1944	4	1–8
Third	August 1945	4	9–16
Fourth	March 1946	6	17–27
Fifth	August 1946	9	28–35
Sixth	December 1946	9	36–42
Thereafter	September 1948	9	43–66[4]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 37.

[2] Ibid. p. 39. For an analysis of the work of the subsequent sessions, see ibid. pp. 39–51, and for the text of the resolutions (42–115) see ibid. iii. 86–174.

[3] See above, p. 65 and note 2.

[4] See Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 53.

The sessions of the Central Committee were held in private; they dealt with the whole range of UNRRA's activities. Its meetings were harmonious and usually its decisions were unanimous. But once (February 1946), when a United States resolution called for information regarding trade agreements, imports, and exports, the Soviet delegate voted against it, and the Chinese abstained from voting; and in the latter half of UNRRA's history, there was a tendency for the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and sometimes China to form a minority opposition. For the most part, however, the issues were not controversial.

The power and authority of the Central Committee increased with time. It had power to make emergency decisions, for subsequent review by the Council, but in fact such decisions were seldom, if ever, revised. The Council (at its Third Session, August 1945) made the Director-General's broad programme of operations—i.e. the allocation of relief funds to specific countries, which was the central point of the Administration—dependent on the approval of the Central Committee. Thus 'the Committee came to exercise both greater control of the formulation of policy and greater control over the operations of the Administration than had been provided in the Agreement'.[1]

The Director-General kept the Central Committee very closely informed about the details of his work by means of a series of monthly reports, which began early in 1945 and continued until June 1947. After that date the Central Committee assumed the powers of the Council—mainly for the purpose of liquidating UNRRA—and the monthly reports became bi-monthly.

Besides the Council (the supreme authority) and the Central Committee (the supreme authority in action), the government of UNRRA was to have been in the hands of a series of committees.

The First Council (1943) set up a regional committee for Europe and a regional committee for the Far East; also a Committee on Supplies, a Committee on Financial Control, and a Sub-committee of the Committee on Supplies on the ability of recipient countries to pay for relief. There was an Audit Sub-committee, a Programme Sub-committee, and five technical advisory committees: for agriculture, displaced persons, health, industrial rehabilitation, and welfare.[2] The technical committees were to advise the Council, the Central Committee, and the Director-General on matters within their competence; but they

> played, on the whole, a minor role in the development of the work.... The elaborate provisions made for the committees were more impressive than real. Hope that committees would be important instruments in building up the good will, participation, and support of member governments in the work of UNRRA

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 58.

[2] For an account of the work of these Committees, see ibid. pp. 52–80.

gave place to the fear that advisory bodies would delay action. UNRRA's work was to meet emergency needs promptly. Its life was short. Operations could not be postponed by long discussions in numerous committees leading to advice on policy. Because of this, the Administration discouraged committee meetings, and by the Second Council Session (i.e. 1944) member governments advised against their multiplication. The dissolution of many of the technical Committees by the Third Council (i.e. 1945) was welcomed by members and the Administration alike.[1]

The Committee of the Council for Europe and the Committee of the Council for the Far East had important functions. These were:

1. To recommend a basis or bases for over-all requirements and to advise on the fair and equitable apportionment of available supplies;
2. to receive and discuss periodic reports and advise on the organization of methods to assist displaced persons and on the co-ordination of national action in regard to medical and other relief and rehabilitation problems.

The Committee of the Council for Europe consisted of representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. Denmark, White Russia, the Ukraine, and Turkey were added later; and Italian and Austrian representatives (after 1946) were invited to attend, but without a right to vote.

The Committee held 38 meetings from November 1943 to March 1948; its successive chairmen—they were all British—were Colonel J. J. Llewellin (now Lord Llewellin), Minister of Food; Ernest Brown, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; Sir Frederick Leith-Ross; Kenneth P. Younger, M.P.

The Committee of the Council for the Far East was an influential and important body. Up to the first Nanking meeting (7 June 1946) its business was mainly to discuss bi-monthly reports from the Administration on current work, and the observations of official or specialists' missions. After its transfer to China it became

> a force in the determination of the Administration's Far Eastern policy . . . discussing particularly such problems . . . as the extent of the displaced persons operation, the need for more local currency, and the inequity in the distribution of supplies within the country. The year 1947 was the crucial one for the Committee, for the major disturbances to the UNRRA operation in China growing out of the spreading civil war, the difficulties of transport, and the ever-increasing currency inflation obliged the regional committee to go beyond its advisory responsibilities.[2]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 78, 79. The technical committees on agriculture and welfare and the technical sub-committees were dissolved; the committees on health, displaced persons, and industrial rehabilitation were retained.

[2] Ibid. p. 67.

(*c*) The Personnel and Organization of the Executive Staff of UNRRA

(1) *The Recruitment of the Staff*

At its peak in June 1946 the UNRRA staff comprised 12,889 Class I, 9,962 Class II, and 1,398 Class III personnel [i.e. in all nearly 25,000 persons]. Of the Class I staff 58 per cent. were men and 42 per cent. women; their nationality distribution was United States, 35 per cent., United Kingdom, 34 per cent., other European countries 22 per cent., British Dominions, 7 per cent., Central and South America, 1 per cent., and other countries 1 per cent. Of the total, 1,823 were employed at Headquarters, 1,601 at ERO, 1,214 in the China Office, 5,191 in Displaced Persons Operations, Germany, and 2,519 in the missions in the European region.[1]

A Class I employee was one 'liable to service within or without his home country, subject to the terms and conditions of international employment';[2] Class II employees were locally recruited, serving only in the country of recruitment and not subject to the Administration's terms and conditions of international employment; Class III were voluntary agency personnel, not paid by the Administration.

This personnel constituted an international civil service, pledged not to discriminate 'on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, or creed'. 'The recruitment of an international staff has probably been the most important and difficult single problem with which the Administration has been confronted.'[3] The war in Europe had been going on for four years before UNRRA staff began to be recruited; the United States had been for two years in the war. Suitable personnel had therefore mostly been already absorbed in government employment of some kind.

It was not until the achievement of victory in Europe in May 1945 that the situation developed more favourably: the start of demobilization speeded the release of men and women from the armed forces; war industries too began to release personnel, and the labor market generally became much easier. Fortunately, it was not until this period that the Administration began to experience its greatest need for personnel for the displaced persons operations in Europe, the UNRRA activity in which the largest number of staff were employed.[4]

Recruitment for UNRRA started in the United States, mainly from Government agencies. There were very many applications. 'The Administration's real problem was that, although it did not know exactly what it would be required to do and when, it did know that it would be required to act quickly when called upon. In many ways its position was similar to that of an army, but an army had unallocated reserves of trained man-power.'[5]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 244; see also iii. 411–21.
[2] Ibid. i. 240–1.
[3] From Governor Lehman's valedictory address to the Fourth Council (1946), see ibid. p. 247.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid. pp. 249–50.

The Administration hesitated to pile up man-power in reserve. It would have been extravagant; and, besides, men kept too long in reserve go stale. Meanwhile, ERO in London had been recruiting for the Displaced Persons Operations. This was considered wasteful, and recruitment was curtailed.

Thus the early history of recruitment by Headquarters provided a classic example of 'order, counter-order, disorder'. Apart from the administrative confusion which ensued and the great strain placed on the Personnel Division, that had an unhappy effect on the staff. It gave them every reason to doubt the efficiency of the Administration and gave rise to much discontent and subsequent dissatisfaction. As personnel recruited for unspecified posts in the so-called 'European Mission Personnel Reserve' were reassigned and shuffled about, they became convinced that the Administration did not know what it was doing, as indeed was temporarily the case! After the spring of 1945, however, recruitment proceeded at a more even tempo.[1]

'There is no doubt', says the Official History, 'that some of the good will with which UNRRA was endowed at first, and which was its due, was dissipated by the employment of a relatively small number of unsuitable individuals at the start.'[2] It points, with emphatic disapproval, to the UNRRA Balkan Mission, the Administration's first and most unhappy venture overseas. The Administration was judged 'by the attitudes and behaviour of its representatives. It was regrettable that these people were employed at all. It was even more to be regretted that they were sent abroad and allowed to catch the public eye.'[3]

Every enterprise, private or public, commercial or governmental, depends for its success on its directorate, its administration with regard to personnel, its technical efficiency, and (in many cases) its advertisement and publicity. This is true of an international enterprise like the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization, and UNRRA. At the beginning, there is always confusion; but, with time and experience, trial and error, the enterprise adjusts itself, if the directorate steers efficiently. So it was with UNRRA: by the time when it came to be liquidated, it had come to be a competent and well-staffed enterprise. But critics from outside are apt to remember the period of such an organization's growing pains rather than the years of its achievements.

Both its friends and its critics expected a great deal of UNRRA. It was the means—a temporary and improvised means—of succoring many millions of needy people. It was also the instrument for recharging the rundown economies of the countries overwhelmed by the tide of war. The burden of all this hope, responsibility, and plain hard work fell on the staff of UNRRA—the Administration. They had their faults and their shortcomings, they had their successes and their achievements, 'wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them'.[4]

[1] Ibid. p. 251. [2] Ibid. p. 256. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. pp. 269–70.

(2) *The Headquarters Office at Washington*

The Headquarters Office was located in Washington. This was 'predetermined by the presence of the Combined Boards and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the fact that the bulk of supply procurement had to be done through the national supply agencies of the United States'.[1]

The head of the Administration was the Director-General, assisted by a Senior Deputy Director-General. The successive Directors-General were Governor Herbert H. Lehman (American), 1943–6, Fiorello H. LaGuardia (American), 1946, Major-General Lowell W. Rooks (American), 1946–8. The Senior Deputy Directors-General were Sir Arthur Salter (British), 1944, Commander R. G. A. Jackson (Australian), 1944–7.

The original lay-out of offices and of major positions within them grew from conversations with government representatives, from plans drafted by former staff members of the OFRRO (notably Luther Gulick and Hugh Jackson), the Senior Deputy Director General, Sir Arthur Salter, and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, and from adjustments required to meet the special qualifications of available candidates for key posts or the conditions they exacted when accepting appointment. Salter's draft 'Note on UNRRA Organization', 9 March 1944, defined the major divisions of Headquarters and their jurisdiction in the light of these preliminary discussions and arrangements and became the unofficial basis for the initial structure.[2]

Under the Director-General were the Deputy Directors-General in charge of the administrative sections: Bureau of Supply; Bureau of Finance and Administration; Bureau of Areas; Secretariat; Office of Regional Liaison.[3] On the same level with these Deputy Directors-General were the three Directors in charge of the functional divisions of Health, Welfare, and Displaced Persons.

The defects in the Headquarters structure and particularly in the vague definition of duties became rapidly apparent. The Bureau of Supply had the lion's share of authority; the Bureau of Finance and Administration was a loose collection of many uncorrelated sections; the Bureau of Areas was weak and uncertain of its prerogatives; the functional divisions lacked the necessary control from above.[4]

This lop-sided and ill-adjusted machine had to provide motive power for the European Regional Office (ERO); the China Office of UNRRA; twenty-nine servicing offices and missions; sixteen missions to receiving countries; and the Displaced Persons Operations in Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Middle East.

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 149.
[2] Ibid. pp. 149–50.
[3] For the functions of these Bureaux see ibid. pp. 151–4.
[4] Ibid. pp. 154–5.

(3) *The European Regional Office (ERO)*

The European Regional Office (ERO) in London, by delegation of authority from the Director-General, had to administer and supervise all offices, missions, and Displaced Persons Operations in Europe and the Middle East, as well as the recruitment of personnel, and the procurement, but not the control, of supplies within its region. Naturally, ERO developed a high degree of independence from its parent body in Washington.[1] The struggle for independence caused a good deal of delay and a certain amount of friction; but in the end ERO won, and its semi-independence was recognized by the creation of the Office of the Director-General in London. As its head, the Senior Deputy Director-General, Commander R. G. A. Jackson, was in London as the Director-General's personal representative during the period of reorganization. He returned to Washington in October 1945, and left in London, as permanent 'Personal Representative of the Director-General', Lieut.-General Sir Humfrey Gale, who had been Administrative Officer in SHAEF.

The head of ERO held what amounted to full power, delegated to him by the Director-General. ERO had, in fact, emerged from the former Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war Requirements. After November 1943 it continued to function as an executive office under the instructions of the UNRRA Council. It was headed by a triumvirate consisting of a Deputy Director-General of Administration (United Kingdom, Sir F. Leith-Ross), a Deputy Director-General of Supply (U.S.S.R., Nicolai I. Feonov), and a Deputy Director-General of Areas (U.S.A., Lithgow Osborne). A three-headed organization is not an ideal form of executive control, but the triumvirate worked well together and there was remarkably little difference of opinion among them. These three heads were nominally under the single command of Governor Lehman, but they were at one in challenging the highly theoretical instructions sent from Washington. To complicate matters still further, 'functional directors' (for Health, Welfare, and Displaced Persons) were dispatched from headquarters with instructions that they were to report direct to the Director-General and not to anyone in ERO. This brought about the return to Washington of Lithgow Osborne and the fading out of his Department of Areas. By the end of 1944 'the organization of ERO is not of a pattern likely to reassure even the well-disposed. . . . Top direction of the office is, or may be, shared among as many as half a dozen people, each possessing executive functions and inevitably involving an overlap and blurring of responsibility. And as if this were not enough, there are several distinct channels of responsibility running back to a city over 2,000 miles away. The relief and rehabilitation of the dense and

[1] 'All signs in the summer of 1944 seemed to point to the emergence in London and Washington of "two headquarters and two main office organizations"' (ibid. p. 170, quoting Sir A. Salter's letter to Richard Law, of late June 1944).

socially advanced populations of the Continent of Europe after one of the cruellest wars in history cannot be achieved by a sort of sub-branch organization of a diffused type which would bring to disaster the business of a minor commercial company.'[1]

The establishment of an effective executive control was clearly a prime necessity.[2]

In 1945 the structure under the Administrative Council was simplified and the 'functional directors' were placed 'at least in theory' under its control.[3]

In the Director-General's directive of 3 May 1945 Governor Lehman laid it down that he, through his Headquarters Office, would retain responsibility for UNRRA policies and operations globally; and especially that the preliminary requests for supplies prepared within the receiving countries were to be submitted to Washington, where final determination could best be made on the basis of advice concerning commodities and shipping availabilities from the resident supply and shipping authorities,[4] the pool of information from all the missions, and Headquarters knowledge of the resources available to UNRRA.

Henceforth, the supply position was to dominate the operations of UNRRA; the central point for ascertaining the supply position was at Washington; UNRRA was to have one head (at Washington) and not two. ERO never claimed authority for the final determination of supplying requirements, but the Committee of the Council for Europe was by its terms of reference given authority to recommend the bases of requirements and ERO was carrying out the Council's wishes in urging certain supply arrangements.

ERO was made the focal point for the administration of all UNRRA operations in Europe and the Middle East including Ethiopia and the Middle East refugee camps. This delegation of authority included responsibility for planning, organization, and direction of all UNRRA missions, services, and activities in these regions, and the determination of the total administrative funds required, subject to Headquarters' approval, and their subsequent reallocation between the Missions. All mission chiefs in these regions were to report to ERO, which would review their requests for personnel, receive their regular and special reports, and approve visits to missions.[5]

[1] Memorandum on 'European Regional Office Organization' submitted to Governor Lehman by the three Assistant Directors-General of UNRRA, 5 December 1944 (quoted in Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 171).

[2] Ibid.

[3] 'This was a particularly pressing necessity, since the large-scale participation by UNRRA field personnel in Displaced Persons Operations in Germany had been developing with great rapidity under the energetic but largely un-coordinated leadership of the Headquarters Director of the Displaced Persons Division' (ibid.).

[4] i.e. the Combined Boards (ibid. p. 173).

[5] Ibid. p. 174.

Thus, by the middle of 1945, the relations between ERO and Headquarters had been clearly laid down, the task of ERO clearly defined, and its structure reorganized to meet its task.[1] This was only just in time; for Governor Lehman's directive was dated 3 May 1945 and Germany surrendered on 6 May. By that date UNRRA was already in operation in the Middle East, in Greece, in Yugoslavia, and in Albania.

(4) *The China Office*

ERO, in a way, ante-dated UNRRA, since it carried within its structure a survival of the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau. The other regional limb of UNRRA, the China Office, had no such independent origin. It was the operative organ of the Committee of the Council for the Far East (CCFE).

'The Administration . . . had no enthusiasm for another regional office where the same three-headed executive control which was proving to be the curse of the London Office would almost inevitably be required.'[2] Further, owing to the Japanese occupation, it was at first impossible to operate in China, though the Chinese member of CCFE kept pressing for the establishment of an office in unoccupied Chungking.

It was decided (sixth meeting of CCFE: 12 October 1944) to convene the Committee in Sydney as soon as possible, to transfer its headquarters to China as soon as the development of the war with Japan made this practicable, and immediately to open area offices in Sydney (S.W. Pacific Area Office) and in Chungking (China Office).

The operations of UNRRA in China developed differently from those in Europe, owing to the spread of civil war, the difficulties of transport, currency problems and the growth of inflation, the inequalities in the distribution of supplies, the question whether the Communist areas should receive supplies or not, and the use and control of funds from the sale of UNRRA cotton. CCFE was under the Council of UNRRA, and the China Office was subordinate to the Administration, but, owing to the specialization of its problems and owing to geographical conditions, the UNRRA representatives in China were given a very free hand.

(5) *The Servicing Offices and Missions*

The China Office 'constituted an area office of UNRRA only in the sense that the Shanghai headquarters eventually controlled fifteen regional

[1] 'The job proved to be well done, and no further major changes were subsequently necessary. . . . A certain amount of jealousy, operation out of channels, and honest misunderstanding were, of course, inevitable. Fortunately, as communications improved and the chain of command after the reorganization in 1945 became established, a sufficient degree of co-operation was developed to make these the exception rather than the rule' (ibid. pp. 178, 179).

[2] Ibid. p. 182.

offices scattered throughout an enormous country. The organization and duties were those of a standard UNRRA mission to a receiving country.'[1]

The S.W. Pacific Area Office provided liaison with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, with Allied military authorities, and with the China Office. It superintended the procurement of supplies in the South-West Pacific area and the recruitment of personnel. It also directed the UNRRA Mission to the Philippines until this was transferred to Washington in January 1946.

The Balkan Mission, set up in Cairo on 1 May 1944, 'approached the status of a regional office'.[2] It was established to organize the UNRRA missions to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania, until those countries were open for the reception of UNRRA personnel. In March 1945 the Balkan Mission was succeeded by the Middle East Office for carrying out the repatriation of displaced persons and the procurement of local supplies.

In West and North-West Europe there was no claim for UNRRA relief; these countries were thought to have adequate foreign exchange resources for obtaining their own supplies. But they received small liaison missions from UNRRA to give advice on health, welfare, and displaced persons. Such were the liaison missions in Luxembourg, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. Liaison officers were also stationed in Sweden and Switzerland. There were several liaison missions in Italy.

Procurement Offices were operating, by the middle of 1946, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba (covering also the Dominican Republic and Haiti), Mexico (covering also El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras), Uruguay (covering also Paraguay), and Venezuela (covering also Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama). Procurement offices were also set up in New Delhi (for India, Burma, and Malaya) and in Ankara. Offices for procurement of military surplus supplies were set up (in the winter of 1945–6) in Shanghai, Paris, New Delhi, Honolulu, Manila; also in Caserta—this office was later removed to Rome.

(6) *Relations with the 'Receiving' Countries*[3]

The UNRRA 'front' was in the receiving countries, and the work done here is the criterion by which the success or non-success of this vast project must be judged. All that stood behind the missions were the general headquarters, the local headquarters, and the local procurement agencies. The UNRRA staff in all these offices, engaged in the struggle to secure supplies and suitable personnel from scattered sources around the world, sometimes tended to concentrate on the means and to forget that the purpose of all these activities was to bring assistance to the nonpaying countries and displaced

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 182.
[2] Ibid. p. 181.
[3] See also below, pp. 102–10.

persons in Germany and the Middle East. It is to the credit of the senior officials in Headquarters and ERO that they laboured constantly to remind their staffs that the present existence and hopes for the future of the people in the receiving countries and the displaced persons camps depended on the arrival of supplies and expert services from all quarters of the globe—Peru, Iceland, the United States, South Africa—and this, in turn, on the diligence of a Secretary at Headquarters, the wisdom of a consultant on health in ERO, or the persistence of a procurement officer in Buenos Aires. They fully recognized, too, that the greatest burden rested on the UNRRA missions to the receiving countries and the displaced persons. When supplies or guidance from other parts of UNRRA failed to arrive, it was the mission staffs who had to cope with disappointment and confusion; when supplies and instructions were provided, it was they who must struggle to expedite creaking government machinery and interpret policies in order to insure the widest and wisest utilization of UNRRA assistance. *These country missions were the heart of UNRRA organization.* . . . Each mission chief was furnished with certain general guides: the UNRRA resolutions; the decisions of the Council and Central Committee; his specific directive from the Director General or the Personal Representative of the Director General, which followed a common form but included sections applying to the peculiar conditions in the country in which he was stationed; general policy directives from Headquarters and, in the case of the European missions, from ERO; and the terms of the UNRRA agreement with the government of the country.[1]

UNRRA assistance was not given to *all* liberated countries.[2] Ex-enemy countries were, of course, excluded by the terms of the UNRRA Agreement, though Italy and Austria (and to a much lesser extent Hungary and Finland) were admitted later. Countries applying for UNNRA aid had to prove their lack of adequate foreign exchange. This condition excluded all the countries of Western Europe, although in the end every one of them except Switzerland and Sweden (who had profited rather than suffered from the war) was compelled to ask for credits from abroad and to become a candidate for Marshall Aid; and the United States, Britain, and Canada had to provide substantial sums for relief outside UNRRA.

UNRRA's activities were concerned mainly with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.[3]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 187–8 (writer's italics). [2] See above, p. 77.

[3] 'These countries were in dire need of assistance, and the help given to them was fully justified. But, while gratitude was frequently expressed to UNRRA for its help, no similar acknowledgments were addressed to the United States, which bore the main cost of the operations, or to the United Kingdom, which, at even greater sacrifice, seconded the United States' contribution. On the contrary, many causes of friction arose between the Eastern European countries and their Anglo-Saxon benefactors, which made it more and more difficult for UNRRA's operations in those countries to be dispassionately assessed' (*The Times*, 4 July 1947). These words sum up the achievement and the tragedy of UNRRA. They also apply, and this with even greater force, to the Administration's efforts in China.

The receiving countries—each of which had its own UNRRA mission—were Finland, Poland, White Russia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, San Marino, Albania, Greece, the Dodecanese Islands, Ethiopia, China, Korea, and the Philippine Islands.

Regional offices were set up in provincial centers in seven of the receiving countries, viz. Austria, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia. Their small staffs were principally commissioned to observe and report on the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They advised local government officials on transport difficulties, warehouse congestion, and uneven allocations of supplies both as to areas and categories of recipients, and sometimes, when all else failed, took matters into their own hands. They traveled widely, making spot checks in their districts and incidentally serving to explain the work of UNRRA and to bring cases of need to the attention of local authorities. They reported regularly to the chief of mission, detailing not only the status of UNRRA supplies but also economic conditions in their districts and the degree of enforcement of price control and rationing. These reports not only supplied material for the monthly report of the chief of mission to Headquarters or ERO but also supplied bases for representations to the central government when it was evident that conditions could not be corrected at a local level. . . . Whatever the structural form employed, the effectiveness of each mission depended primarily on the co-operation, adaptability, and endurance of the staff. Often short-handed in one department or another, working in relative isolation in a strange country at the end of the chain of UNRRA command and subject to the endless vicissitudes befalling a global supply line, the missions were successful in achieving a satisfactory performance of their duties largely because they put forth an unusual amount of initiative and hard work.[1]

All UNRRA supplies had first to be estimated by the Administration itself, country by country (the 'programmes'). The Administration then had to submit its requirements to the appropriate Board, which was a rationing and licensing authority, for there were other claimants besides UNRRA, and most of the goods needed were in short supply. Having obtained leave to acquire what was probably less than its application, the Administration then had to buy what it could get from governmental or commercial sources. It had to obtain shipping space—no easy matter. The goods were then forwarded to the UNRRA authorities in the country concerned, and were handed over by them to the government of that country for disposal against payment by the consumers, under the general supervision of the representatives of UNRRA, who were supposed to see that there was no political or racial or religious favouritism in the distribution.[2]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 190, 192.

[2] In spite of the UNRRA principles and the efforts made to uphold them, such favouritism no doubt occurred. 'UNRRA . . . was based on the assumption that all the Allied countries could be linked together in an effort to restore a common European civilization. . . . But that common civilization has been disrupted not only by the war but by the violent political passions which

(*d*) The Administration of Supply

(1) *Policies for Estimating and Meeting Import Requirements*

'The development and fulfillment of the UNRRA supply operation passed through two phases. The first began in November 1943 and continued until August 1945. . . . There could be no certainty . . . in the flux of war conditions, what volume of supplies and shipping could ultimately be made available to UNRRA.' Much preparatory work was done, however:

> the bases of relief requirements for Europe were agreed upon and policies for the procurement of relief and rehabilitation supplies were worked out with the supplying governments.
>
> The second phase began in August 1945 and continued through September 1948. With the end of the war. . . the needs of the countries UNRRA was to aid were determined, and the resources made available to UNRRA were divided among them in accordance with a carefully developed broad program of operations.

By the end of that period, despite difficulties over both supplies and finance, 'UNRRA's full-scale supply responsibilities for ten countries and smaller programs for seven countries had been fulfilled to more than 90 per cent. of the deliveries planned in the program of operations'.[1]

Of the many estimates of post-war import needs of the liberated countries the most comprehensive were contained in the Report of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements of the Allied Governments (commonly known as the Leith-Ross Report) 'covering in detail the import requirements of nine European countries. . . . Under the UNRRA Agreement the Inter-Allied Committee was replaced by the Committee of the Council for Europe'.[2] The first task of the Committee of the Council for Europe, established at the First Session of the UNRRA Council, was to decide whether to adopt the Leith-Ross bases or to revise them. The second course was adopted, on the motion of John G. Winant, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom and United States delegate to the Council Session. He supported his argument in favour of revision on four grounds:

> (1) that further information on conditions in the liberated areas might have become available since the Report was drawn up; (2) that, because the Inter-Allied Committee had been unable to deal with the needs of the Soviet Union, modifications in some of the general principles on which the work of the Inter-Allied Committee had been based might prove necessary; (3) that the Report

have been released since. In these conditions, the principle of non-discrimination could no longer be maintained. So politics, which were excluded from the operations of the organization, crept in by the back door; and once again the work of relief has had to stop prematurely' (*The Times*, 4 July 1947).

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 323.

[2] Ibid. p. 324.

had been drawn up before the First Council Session had defined the scope of UNRRA; and (4) that . . . the United States and British military authorities were expecting shortly to advise the Administration on the supplies which they would make available during the military period of responsibility.[1]

Winant further recommended that two sub-committees should be set up, one an *ad hoc* Food Sub-committee and the other an *ad hoc* Textile Sub-committee. These sub-committees would be in addition to the three technical sub-committees already in existence—on Agriculture, on Industrial Rehabilitation, and on Health—which had worked on the compilation of the original Report.

This proposal was adopted and these five sub-committees began work in May 1944. Their recommendations were completed in July. Their task resolved itself into

> a re-examination of the bases previously recommended by the Inter-Allied Committee in order to limit them strictly to the scope of relief and rehabilitation as defined by the Council resolutions. . . .
>
> The main discussion [in the Food Sub-committee] turned on whether an attempt should be made to raise the liberated countries to a uniform minimum level, or to their various prewar levels. A compromise was adopted and the Subcommittee recommended both the bases on which requirements should be estimated and the principles to be used in allocating supplies if the bases could not be fully met. The basis adopted by the Subcommittee was 2,650 calories per capita per day, with a supplementary provision for special groups. . . . This calorie level was the same as that adopted by the Inter-Allied Committee . . . and was related to current wartime British consumption. . . . It was considered that the commodities to make up the 2,650-calorie level could be reached in consultation with the individual governments. . . .
>
> The recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Textile Subcommittee were also based on the current British rationing system. The Subcommittee recognized that the import requirements of different countries would vary, both in extent and in nature (i.e. raw materials or finished products), but it considered that the minimum standard . . . at which they should be maintained should broadly be the same. The standard proposed was 'the minimum required for health, warmth and working efficiency'. . . . Sample minimum wardrobe lists were compiled, showing the coupon value of individual articles. It was recommended that the Administration, in consultation with expert representatives of each of the Allied countries, should assess each country's needs of imported supplies by reference to the recommended standards. For maintenance, a level of 42 coupons per adult per year was adopted.

This level was related to the current rationing standard for clothing in the United Kingdom. The results were unexpected. 'By the time the clothing program was being carried out, the British clothing ration had been reduced, and the UNRRA standards were higher than those current in the United

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 326.

Kingdom, which was not only receiving no relief, but was contributing substantial amounts of raw materials and finished clothing to UNRRA.'

For footwear the minimum required was modestly assessed at one pair of wearable shoes or boots per person. The footwear requirements could be expressed in numbers of pairs of footwear, or in leather or substitute materials, or in raw materials, according to the needs of the individual country. . . . In drawing its recommendations in broad terms, providing for the import of raw materials rather than finished products, if more appropriate to the needs of individual countries, the Subcommittee was helping to carry into effect the Council's policy of rehabilitating industries engaged in the production of relief supplies.[1]

No 'bases of requirements' were proposed for medical supplies. The method by which requirements of medical supplies should be estimated was in principle identical to that used by the Inter-Allied Committee. Lists of medical requirements were to be compiled covering the essential medical needs for an average population of 100,000 persons living in a temperate climate. The requirements of these population units were then to be adjusted for individual countries, taking into account the population, the pre-war medical standard and the degree of destitution of the country concerned.[2]

The Technical Sub-committee for Agriculture covered a wider sphere than recommendations on bases, and included advice and general information on agriculture in Europe. Expert Panels were appointed to make recommendations on specific groups of commodities: crops (including seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides); agricultural machinery installations and food processing plants; livestock (including feeding stuffs and veterinary supplies); fisheries. The Panels drew extensively from the Inter-Allied Committee recommendations. . . . The guiding principle in the report to the Committee for Europe was that 'the basis of requirements of all supplies of materials for the rehabilitation of agriculture and fisheries in the first year of relief is the fulfillment of a program of optimum food production'. It was proposed that this should be achieved (i) by the provision of agricultural materials, such as seeds, fertilizers, machinery, feeding stuffs, breeding and utility livestock; (ii) by counteracting hoarding and illegal trading among farmers by offering them sufficient equipment and supplies in return for produce already held in reserve by them. . . .

In their efforts to achieve this relief purpose, not only rehabilitation was involved, but—in some fields of production—reconstruction, if reconstruction can be defined as activities which tend to change the economy rather than to bring it to the level at which it formerly stood. This tendency could be discerned in numerous cases, including the substitution of tractor for animal power; the introduction of artificial insemination methods into countries where they were not customary; and the use of chemical fertilizers in countries which had been accustomed to depend on animal manures. . . .[3]

[1] Ibid. pp. 327–31. [2] Ibid. p. 331. [3] Ibid. pp. 332–3.

In formulating bases of requirements the Subcommittee on Industrial Rehabilitation adopted no objective consumption criterion such as the calorie basis used for food, or the maximum food production program to which bases of requirements for agricultural rehabilitation could be related. The possible range in demand for materials and equipment was, moreover, on account of the varying degrees of devastation, probably wider than in any other field. . . .

The Subcommittee recommended that first priority should be given to the restoration of inland transport and communications, to public utilities and to services essential for general industrial maintenance and repair. For these activities the estimates of requirements were to be based on: (i) the prevention of further deterioration by the provision of necessary maintenance; (ii) the repair of damage to the extent necessary to enable the transport systems and public utilities and services to meet the urgent needs of the relief period. Second priority was accorded to consumer goods industries and to capital goods industries engaged in producing raw materials, equipment, and other supplies necessary for the production of essential goods, fuel, and services. Raw materials and equipment were to be provided for the production of such consumer goods as clothing, shoes, soap, medical and health supplies, and materials for emergency shelter, essential building repair, and basic household equipment. . . .

The recommendations of this Subcommittee were unique in one respect. It was here alone that members saw the problem with which they were concerned as affecting Europe as a unit, transcending national interests. The Subcommittee recommended that UNRRA should normally treat the problem of industrial rehabilitation as one large problem of the combined liberated territories. . . . Certain exceptions to this approach might be desirable if decentralization appeared to offer advantages, but 'the interest of the family of United Nations should always over-ride the national interest'. This recommendation . . . was included in the Subcommittee's report and accepted without comment by the Committee of the Council for Europe and by the Council. Buried in Resolution 55, it was never heard of again, and each individual country program, for industrial rehabilitation supplies, as well as for other supplies, was drawn up and vigorously defended on a strictly national basis.[1]

The bases of requirements for Europe, as recommended by the Subcommittee and approved by the Committee of the Council for Europe, were approved by the Council at its second session in September 1944.

No resolution was, however, adopted on bases of requirements for the Far East. The Chinese representative suggested that bases similar to those for Europe should be adopted. This was objected to on the ground that the Council had previously empowered the Committee of the Council for the Far East to propose what bases it should adopt. In the event, no bases of requirements comparable to those adopted for Europe were ever drawn up. The question was considered by the Committee of the Council for the Far East, and it was agreed that the establishment of uniform bases was impracticable for the Far Eastern countries. Individual countries drew up

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 335–8.

their own programmes and it was agreed that 'in order to arrive at an equitable allocation an attempt might have to be made to correlate the standards adopted by the various countries for items in critically short supply. These recommendations were adopted by the Council at its Third Session in August 1945'.[1]

The bases adopted for UNRRA were,

at the most, targets. Although they had at first been regarded as defining the minimums essential for relief and rehabilitation, they were, in the face of grim realities, seldom achieved. The resources of UNRRA were too limited and the amounts of supplies available were too small. As a result, the country requirements had to be planned to meet a lower level. The bases, however, provided a standard against which equitable reductions could be made.[2]

It was decided at the First Council that, in estimating and meeting the import requirements of the liberated territories, the following four stages would be necessary:

(1) agreement by the Committees of the Council for Europe and the Far East on the bases or standards of relief for their respective areas;
(2) submission of these recommendations to the Council;
(3) compilation, by the Administration, of over-all estimates of requirements for all areas in conformity with the bases approved by the Council;
(4) the presentation of these estimates to the Combined Boards for consideration, along with those of other applicants.

Logically, the establishment of bases of requirement ought to have preceded requests for allocation; but there was not the time for following the logical order. The first task of all was to get the stuff from wherever it could be got and to have it transported to where it was needed. The Director-General was required to 'consider it one of his first and most important tasks . . . to arrange for necessary allocations and procurement of supplies'.[3] In this case he could not wait for the preparation of detailed statistical tables.

In November 1943, when the Agreement was signed, the Combined Boards machinery had only recently been set up, and there was no specific undertaking in the Agreement that the Administration should work through it. Stocks within the sterling area were more or less under the control of the United Kingdom and so could be controlled by the British representatives on the Combined Boards. United States stocks could be similarly controlled by the United States representatives. But the Combined Boards were not in a position to control the South American, North African, or

[1] Ibid. p. 341.
[2] Ibid. pp. 341–2.
[3] First Council Meeting, Resolution 17—for text see ibid. iii. 63. See also ibid. ii. 325.

part of the Middle Eastern supplies. Such control as did exist here was due mainly to the blockade and the navicert system. Some of the Allied Governments were always straining at the leash and trying to build up stock-piles of their own, e.g. the Dutch and Norwegian Governments. It was thought that the Combined Boards system would be under severe strain if Europe were liberated and if the war with Germany came suddenly to an end. The Western European countries—and also the U.S.S.R.—had considerable reservations to make about the constitution of the Combined Boards. These represented the United States and Canada as the chief supplying countries and the United Kingdom which was in the main a consumer country, and there was considerable apprehension that the United Kingdom Government, through their position on the Combined Boards, would contrive to secure all that was required for the United Kingdom before agreeing to anything for the rest of Europe. As regards shipping also, Allied interests were likely to react against a continuance of control by the Combined Shipping Board. It was for this reason that the Inter-Allied Committee urged that a fuller representation of the other Allied countries should be allowed on the Boards.

(2) *The Development and Fulfilment of Supply Programmes*

In Washington, at the newly formed Headquarters Bureau of Supply, a 'rough appraisal' had been made by the beginning of 1944,

> comparing the resources prospectively available to the Administration and the requirements for relief and rehabilitation supplies which would have to be met. . . . In preparing this statement the Bureau of Supply gained its first experience in estimating conditions in the receiving countries which would affect the degree of need for UNRRA supplies—the amount of indigenous production and stocks, the efficiency of rationing and distribution controls, the effectiveness of European transport services, and the degree of destruction wrought by enemy action.

No attempt was made at this time to relate the estimates with the possible financial aspects of the UNRRA operation. The appraisal was, in fact, highly speculative, nor was it possible for it to be other than that.

Figures based on these estimates were submitted to the Combined Boards as preliminary bids for specified periods of 1944–45.

Among the countries covered in the preliminary statement of requirements were the six North-western European paying countries—Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Early in 1944, however, the governments of those countries began to submit to the Combined Boards on their own account estimates of supplies they would require on liberation, and it became clear that they would not call upon UNRRA for financial help. Their needs gradually ceased to concern the Administration directly.[1]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 343–5.

The next stage was a tentative attempt to assess the needs of individual countries. In July 1944 a questionnaire was addressed to all the continental European Governments inviting them to submit

> an estimate of essential relief and rehabilitation imports for the six months following the period of military responsibility and to indicate the extent to which they would require UNRRA's financial help in the procurement and shipment of these essential supplies. . . . Four of the governments—those of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia—indicated that they would need very substantial assistance.[1]

The programmes as submitted were far in excess of the total UNRRA resources at that time.

In spite of the potential deficiency in funds, the Council, at its second session, accepted two additional responsibilities: for a limited relief operation in Italy and for a programme for the Dodecanese.

In the light of the bases and policies for the calculation of import requirements adopted at the second Council session, the Administration adjusted the estimates submitted by member governments to the UNRRA bases; and this had the effect of reducing them in terms of dollars by about 46 per cent., and in terms of tonnage by about 50 per cent.

This preliminary exercise was followed by the 'development of country budgets based on a definite program of expenditure. Member governments had been pressing for information on what they might expect from UNRRA.'[2] The Administration had, however, been reluctant to make any commitment, since the absence of precise information on conditions in Europe meant that only the crudest estimates could be made.

> It was decided, however, that the member governments' need for information more than offset the risks inherent in providing it.

A tentative allocation of resources based on a $1,000 million budget was drawn up, 75 per cent. of which was to be disclosed to member governments in terms of quantities of supplies and the balance held in a contingency reserve. . . . No provision was made for China at this time, since the representatives of the Chinese Government thought it unlikely that any considerable operation in China would be possible before the latter part of 1945. The figure of $25,000,000 proposed for Italy was arbitrary. The budgets for Albania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia were achieved by the application of the 'equalization of deficiencies' technique, further refined in the autumn of 1945 when the first broad program of operations covering the whole UNRRA period was drawn up.

Since it was obvious that UNRRA lacked the resources necessary to bring all the receiving countries to the level of the bases adopted by the Council, the essential purpose of the 'equalization of deficiencies' technique was to bring each country to approximately the same level of deficit. The first component of a country's budget was the amount required in addition to its

[1] Ibid. pp. 345–6.

[2] Ibid. p. 347.

indigenous supplies to equalize its per capita deficiency in each major commodity with that of the country having the least deficiency. Once the budgets of the five countries were equalized, remaining supplies were distributed on a per capita basis.

In preparing the tentative commodity budgets for each country priorities were established in the following order: medical and sanitation supplies, food, agricultural rehabilitation, clothing and footwear, and industrial rehabilitation. . . .

The tentative programs for the first six months' period were conveyed to the receiving governments through Mission Guides to Import Requirements which were developed early in 1945. These represented an embryonic stage in the formulation of a program of operations in which the receiving governments began to have an active share.

Early in April 1945 UNRRA advanced from the preparatory phase to the beginning of the operational work . . . for which it had been created. . . . In sending relief supplies as the various receiving countries were opened up, the Administration adopted the policy of utilizing its available resources, as long as they should last, to meet as far as possible the needs of the liberated areas to which supplies could be shipped. . . . So long as pressing needs existed in areas first liberated, it appeared unwise to hold in idleness reserves of UNRRA resources to meet requirements of areas still to be liberated. . . . By the end of May 1945 shipments to European receiving countries for which UNRRA was responsible amounted to 262,653 tons.[1]

Out of this total Greece had received a far larger total than any other country. Indeed, her quantities were larger than the combined totals of Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The reason for this was that UNRRA's assumption of responsibility in Greece involved, not the initiation of relief operations, but the continuance and expansion of the already considerable Military Liaison procurement and shipping operation that had been carried on since the liberation of the country in October 1944. The Greek ports could receive upwards of 200,000 tons of cargo per month. On the other hand, at the date of UNRRA's assumption of supply responsibilities, only two ports in Yugoslavia were open for ocean shipping, with an estimated combined monthly capacity of 65,000–95,000 tons. The present extent of the facilities for inland clearance was also an important limiting factor.

'The circumstances which caused this disparity in UNRRA shipments were given little recognition by the Committee of the Council for Europe, and the discrepancies were much resented by representatives of those governments which had received only a small share of the total.'[2] This resentment was to have further repercussions in the Council.

'At the Third Council Session the Director General presented a program

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 347–50.
[2] Ibid. p. 351.

of operations covering the proposed activities of the Administration to 31 December 1945.' It was obvious that

> UNRRA's ability to continue toward the completion of the relief and rehabilitation task depended on whether it was given additional funds. . . . If additional funds were not forthcoming [it would be necessary to make] a substantial change in the program of operations for 1945, since a large proportion of the remaining resources would have to be diverted from Europe for operations in the Far East. This would inevitably result in a drastic lessening of assistance to Europe, although UNRRA's aid to China would still be grossly inadequate. . . . The result of the resolutions passed at the Third Council Session was a compromise. . . . The approximate termination date of UNRRA was forecast by the provision that shipments to Europe should cease by 31 December 1946 and to the Far East by 31 March 1947. The recommendation of a second contribution, equal in amount to the first, was coupled with the imposition of further supply responsibilities, including a program for Italy 'adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population', a program for Austria, and for Korea and Formosa . . . and programs for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR.[1]

As result of the decision of the third Council session, the Administration was able in the autumn of 1945 to develop for the first time a long-range programme of operations.

The Third Council also dealt with complaints about injustice in the distribution of supplies on the part of countries that eventually came to be known as those behind 'the Iron Curtain'. As a result a Programme Subcommittee of the Central Committee was set up.

> Since the country representation on the Program Subcommittee was the same as that on the Central Committee, control over the allocation of UNRRA supplies was maintained by the supplying countries and the ambitions of the receiving countries were largely negated. A secondary effect of the creation of the Program Subcommittee was that it weakened potentially the executive powers of the Administration over the allocation of UNRRA supplies. In practice, however—owing largely to the forcefulness and personality of David Weintraub (Deputy Chief, Bureau of Supply), who represented the Director General on the Program Subcommittee—the influence of the Subcommittee was not so strong as it might have been.[2]

As a result of the decisions of the Third Council, UNRRA was able for the first time 'to make estimates and inform each country of the total value of supplies, within each of the five commodity groups, which it could hope to receive'.[3]

Indigenous production of such goods as UNRRA would supply was

[1] Ibid. pp. 352–3. [2] Ibid. pp. 354–5. [3] Ibid. p. 355.

subtracted from the minimum consumption needs calculated according to the 'bases of requirement'. In the Far East the 'requirements', as calculated by the Chinese Government, were scaled down from about $1,000 million to $562,500,000.

The 'country programmes' in their final stage were thus drawn up by the Administration from estimates submitted by the receiving countries, and adjusted to the UNRRA 'bases of requirement' and to the amount of the funds available. The Administration's figures were then submitted to and discussed in the Programme Sub-committee, and by them laid before the Central Committee, who gave the final sanction for each programme. The Administration insisted, with success, on retaining freedom to make changes within categories, but this only up to 15 per cent. between categories without reference to the Central Committee.

By the end of the second quarter of 1947 the European programs as a group had reached 96·7 per cent. of completion and the China program 83·7 per cent. During this period and until 30 September 1947 when all new procurement stopped, every effort was made through additional procurement, diversions and funding arrangements to bring all receiving country budgets to the same percentage of fulfillment. By the time the Bureau of Supply issued its *Final Operational Report* in March 1948 it was clear that 99·8 per cent. of the total supply program would be fulfilled.[1]

The principal categories of UNRRA supplies for 'country programmes' were as follows:

	U.S. $ thousands	*Gross long tons*
Food	1,230,129	9,109,086
Clothing, textiles, footwear .	419,074	535,807
Medical and sanitation .	116,565	133,797
Agricultural rehabilitation .	320,549	2,313,957
Industrial rehabilitation .	677,032	11,282,686

These totals, supplemented by the take-over from military stores ($108,037,000 or 563,160 long tons), make up a sub-total for 'country programmes' of $2,871,387,000 or 23,983,493 long tons. To these sub-totals should be added the sub-totals for special programmes (displaced persons, clothing and food drives, MERRA African camps, North-West Europe emergency programme) of $32,025,000 or 168,398 long tons. The grand 'shipments summary' totals, then, are $2,903,412,000 or 24,106,891 long tons.[2]

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 374.

[2] See ibid. iii. 428–9 for general statistical summary: and ibid. pp. 430–97 for detailed statistical summaries country by country and category by category.

(*e*) Operations in the Field

(1) *UNRRA's Agreements with Military Authorities and with the Governments of 'Receiving' Countries*

The UNRRA Administration worked through a series of agreements negotiated with the military authorities in liberated or conquered territories, or with the governments of the countries concerned.[1]

The standard U.N.R.R.A. Agreement provided for the furnishing by the Administration of relief and rehabilitation supplies and services without requiring payment in foreign exchange; for the transfer of these supplies to the government of the country at the port of unloading or at the frontier; for the distribution of the supplies by the government in accordance with the policies of the U.N.R.R.A. Council (distribution according to need and non-discrimination); for the utilization of the proceeds of sale of the supplies that are sold for further relief and rehabilitation purposes within the country; for the establishment of an U.N.R.R.A. Mission to observe the distribution of supplies and discharge the Administration's other functions in implementation of the Agreement; for the granting to U.N.R.R.A. and U.N.R.R.A. personnel the facilities, privileges, and immunities recommended in the Resolutions of the Council; for the exchange of information, and for termination of the agreement.[2]

UNRRA Headquarters (i.e. Washington) were at first in charge of the negotiation of these agreements; but later ERO took charge; and, later again, the UNRRA Missions in the field. They were of three types:

(1) Agreements with military authorities during the period immediately following liberation, viz. the Cairo Agreement of 3 April 1944, governing UNRRA participation in the occupation of Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia—with a later 'interpretation' accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 11 October 1944; and a further 'Agreement as to the conditions of service in the Balkans' approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 18 November 1944.

(2) Agreements with military authorities relating to Displaced Persons Operations, viz. the UNRRA–SCAEF[3] Agreement of 25 November 1944 covering the three Western Zones of Germany; also subsequent agreements with individual zone commanders; also interim agreements with United States, British, and French commanders in Austria; also the Agreement of 15 July 1945 with SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean) for the transference to UNRRA of responsibility for eligible non-Italian displaced persons in Italy.

(3) Agreements with the governments of receiving countries, which

[1] For the texts of these Agreements see ibid. pp. 180–362.

[2] A. H. Robertson: 'Some Legal Problems of the U.N.R.R.A.' in *British Yearbook of International Law, 1946* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 148.

[3] SCAEF = Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

regulated all local UNRRA operations with regard to the receipts, handing over, distribution, and supervision of supplies, viz. with:

Albania	1 August 1945
Austria	5 April 1946
Byelorussian (White Russian) S.S.R.	18 December 1945
China	13 November 1945
Czechoslovakia	26 February 1945
Ethiopia	4 July 1946
Greece	1 March 1945
Italy—First Agreement	8 March 1945
„ Supplementary Agreement	19 January 1946
Poland	14 September 1945
San Marino	14 July 1945
Ukrainian S.S.R.	18 December 1945
Yugoslavia	24 March 1945

The agreements with Finland (18 December 1945–11 January 1946), Hungary (13 February–19 March 1946), and the Philippines (11–12 June 1946) were less formal in shape and consisted of exchanges of letters. In the case of the Dodecanese Islands an agreement was signed (1 August 1945) with the British War Office on behalf of the British Military Administration. In the case of Korea the agreements took the form of memoranda exchanged with the Soviet Military Command in North Korea (27 June 1946) and with the American Military Command in South Korea (3 July 1946).

The operations of UNRRA in occupied and in liberated countries were based on the agreements, and the agreements, in turn, were based on Resolution 1 of the First Council, which provided that the activities of UNRRA must be determined by the Director-General 'only after consultation with, and with the consent of, the government or authority (military or civil) which exercises administrative control in the area'. In their form and provisions the agreements were more or less uniform, and were modelled on a 'Master Agreement' prepared by the General Counsel's Office, Headquarters, in the autumn of 1944.[1]

(2) *The Relief and Rehabilitation of the 'Receiving' Countries*

The success of UNRRA must be judged by its effectiveness as an organ of international co-operation, and also by its beneficial influence in the countries concerned. Its effectiveness was as uneven as that of the seed in the parable of the Sower. Some of it fell on stony ground and withered away; some was choked by the weeds and tares of inefficiency and (though

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 5. A valuable commentary on the legal-diplomatic work of UNRRA will be found in A. H. Robertson's 'Some Legal Problems of the U.N.R.R.A.' (loc. cit. pp. 142–67).

less than people thought) of corruption; but much fell on good ground and bore fruit. In the view of the average inhabitant of Britain, too much importance was, perhaps, attached to the Displaced Persons Operation in Germany, and, on this view, UNRRA came to be specially identified with that part of its work. Its much greater task of feeding the starving, reviving transport, and warding off disease was going on in lands more distant from Britain and therefore less clearly seen from there.

In the Middle East UNRRA (31 January 1944) took over the work of the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA), a British organization, with refugee camps in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, which provided for many thousands of Greeks (from Greece, the Dodecanese, and Crete) fleeing before the German and Italian armies in 1942 and 1943; for Poles escaping by way of the U.S.S.R., Turkey, and Persia in 1942; and for Yugoslav partisans arriving via Italy in 1944.

Sir William Matthews, the head of MERRA, became Chief of the UNRRA Balkan Mission with headquarters in Cairo. The Cairo Agreement (3 April 1944) provided that, during the military period in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania, UNRRA would exercise immediate and full control over medical activities, relief supplies, and emergency rehabilitation.

This was the effective beginning of UNRRA in action. It started from Egypt—like the great military offensive which reconquered North-East Africa. The Balkan Mission was (1) to assist the military authorities during the military period by formulating plans of operation, and by estimating and co-ordinating supply requirements; (2) to operate the MERRA camps; (3) to conduct training programmes. Three quasi-independent missions (for Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania) were to operate under the supervision of the Balkan Mission, and this, in turn, was controlled by Headquarters, Washington. There was much confusion.

By November 1944 advance units of the Greek Mission had landed in Greece. Groups for Yugoslavia and Albania were mustering in Italy. By March 1945 the three country missions were detached from the Cairo Headquarters and were placed directly under ERO. The Balkan Mission was liquidated. The Middle East Office was set up in Cairo to administer the refugee camps and to repatriate their occupants[1] and to operate the local procurement of supplies for UNRRA, e.g. Egyptian cotton.[2]

This is how UNRRA was launched upon its three-year course of intense

[1] 'Quietly and efficiently it administered the camps and, as soon as the close of the war in Europe permitted, began the repatriation of their occupants. . . . In 1946 the responsibility for repatriating 33,000 Poles, and some special classes of displaced persons living outside camps in various parts of Africa, India and Palestine, was also accepted by UNRRA, and this work fell to the Middle East Office. By 30 June 1947 a total of 53,966, including refugees inside and outside camps, had been repatriated' (Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 92–93).

[2] The Egyptian cotton was for use in China as a stable basis for acquiring local Chinese currency and goods in a time of wild inflation (see pp. 109–10 below).

activity. The general shape and scheme of the UNRRA Missions in receiving countries have already been described.[1] The amount of aid distributed to the seventeen receiving countries was as follows:[2]

	U.S. $ thousands
Albania	26,250
Austria	135,513
Byelorussian (White Russian) S.S.R.	60,820
China	517,846
Czechoslovakia	261,337
Dodecanese Islands	3,900
Ethiopia	884
Finland	2,441
Greece	347,162
Hungary	4,386
Italy	418,222
Korea	943
Philippines	9,880
Poland	477,927
San Marino	30
Ukrainian S.S.R.	188,199
Yugoslavia	415,642

It will be seen that China, the largest country, was the largest beneficiary, and that Poland was the next largest. Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Czechoslovakia benefited very substantially from UNRRA supplies, and so, though to a lesser total figure, did the Ukraine, Austria, and White Russia.

It is no exaggeration to say that Greece (with the Dodecanese Islands) and Poland were saved by UNRRA. In both countries the immediate need was for food. Of the UNRRA supplies to Greece nearly 60 per cent. consisted of foodstuffs, of supplies to Poland just under 50 per cent. The Greek people were 'quite literally kept alive' by UNRRA.[3] 'Had it not been for the expert manner in which UNRRA has brought essential supplies to Greece, conditions in that country would be infinitely worse than they are to-day.'[4]

Besides feeding the Greeks, the UNRRA Mission introduced into the country certain permanent improvements, especially in the field of health, and gave a notable and not wholly ineffective example of the importance of working for the nation rather than for a political group. If Greece was rescued, in the end, from the scourge of civil war and from Communist domination, some of the credit for her salvation must be ascribed to UNRRA. In the Greek Dodecanese Islands, which had been under Italian rule, the UNRRA Mission, working in close agreement with the British

[1] See above, pp. 88–90.
[2] For detailed financial statistics see Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 428–97.
[3] Ibid. ii. 137.
[4] Ibid., quotation from letter from James F. Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State, to Governor Lehman, dated 22 March 1946.

Military Mission, not only saved the population from starvation, but taught the islanders to organize their own public works and welfare services, which they themselves were able to take over and continue after the UNRRA Mission had closed down in January 1947.

The UNRRA supplies to Poland constituted the largest in dollar value of all the European country programmes—16 per cent. of the grand total, and over one-fifth of the whole programme for Europe. Poland had been completely ravaged and destroyed during the war, and this desolation, in itself, would have compelled any Polish Government, when peace had come, to adopt some system of state-directed economy, 'with stress on modern mechanized agricultural methods and increased industrialization'.[1] Bad harvests followed in Poland in 1946 and 1947, and, twice over, the timely arrival of UNRRA supplies averted the threat of mass starvation. Next to foodstuffs UNRRA's most important gift to Poland consisted of agricultural machinery (e.g. tractors) and also seeds, livestock, fertilizers, fishing trawlers, nets, tackle, and canneries—everything, in fact, which could help to reconstitute the indigenous food supplies of Poland; and not only were the tractors supplied but the farmers had to be taught to use them, for this was the first large-scale introduction of agricultural machinery into Poland. In the field of health services, too, UNRRA not only supplied drugs and hospital equipment, but also met 'the burning desire demonstrated by all members of the medical profession in Poland to improve their services' by providing instruction in new methods that were now 'being incorporated into the medical practices of the country'.[2]

By the end of 1945 it was already clear that the year had not brought peace to Europe, but a new kind of conflict in which the Communist were opposed to the non-Communist states. It was also very clear that the Polish Government stood on the Communist side of the dividing line. Yet the United States, Britain, and Canada—for these were the principal contributors in men and in material—continued to lavish supplies and assistance on a formidable potential enemy, and to rebuild an economy which was to be one of the strongholds of Communist power in Eastern Europe, and which might at any time be mobilized against them. UNRRA's help to Poland was one of the most astonishing efforts of international magnanimity which history has ever had to record.

The assistance given to the White Russian and to the Ukrainian S.S.R., though smaller in amount, was part of the same effort. These two Soviet republics, which included within their frontiers the districts taken by the Soviet Union from Poland in 1939, as well as the White Russian and Ukrainian territories that had previously lain within the Soviet Union's frontiers, had suffered hardly less severely than Poland from German conquest and occupation and from the 'scorched earth'

[1] Ibid. p. 202.

[2] Ibid. p. 228.

policy practised by the Red Army in its retreat. Fifty per cent. of the total war damage in the U.S.S.R. had occurred in the industrial districts of the Ukraine. In economic terms, the two republics between them represented the striking power of the Soviet Union; and the statesmen in the Kremlin may have been surprised to see that their counterparts in the 'capitalist' countries did not reverse the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam and dictate their own terms in Moscow now that they had the Soviet Union economically at their mercy. Actually, so far from exploiting their opportunity, the United States, Britain, and Canada proceeded to staunch Russia's wounds with UNRRA aid. In August 1945 the U.S.S.R. applied for $700 million of relief and rehabilitation supplies. This application was not accepted, but in its place a programme of $250 million for the two republics was substituted. Fifty per cent. of these supplies consisted of foodstuffs, and these were distributed mainly in urban areas through the Russian 'UNRRA Supplies Administration' which was 'exceedingly hard-working and generally co-operative'.[1]

Moreover, Balkan Missions were dispatched not only to Greece but to Yugoslavia and Albania—both of them countries with Communist governments. The rehabilitation of Yugoslavia was one of UNRRA's major efforts. The head of the Mission was a Soviet citizen.[2] More than one-quarter of the supplies for Yugoslavia consisted of food, and about one-quarter was for 'industrial rehabilitation'. There was a suspicion that some of these supplies were being sold and distributed for the benefit of the Communist Party, to the exclusion of non-Communists, and also for the use of the Yugoslav army. A special Commission from UNRRA Headquarters visited Yugoslavia in October 1946, and found that there was little, if any, ground for these suspicions.[3]

The Albanian Mission was a small affair. Albania's needs were not great; her economy was simple; and the Mission 'was never able to overcome the Government's suspicions that it was simply a front for some nefarious Anglo-American purpose'.[4]

Czechoslovakia—a country which had suffered comparatively little material damage from the war—was not only a 'receiving' but was also a 'supplying' country. She supplied—as a gift—sugar, vegetables, and fruit, and she sold to UNRRA $8\frac{1}{2}$ million worth of lignite, coke, clover and vegetable seeds, potatoes, seed rye, seed wheat, and seed potatoes. In return she received from UNRRA $261 million worth of goods. As in

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 241.

[2] M. A. Sergeichic. 'He was somewhat handicapped by an almost complete lack of knowledge of English, but his ability at internal organization, his zeal in undertaking his work, and his competence in dealing with the Yugoslav authorities were from the beginning appreciated' (ibid. p. 144).

[3] For the Commission and its composition see ibid. pp. 168–9.

[4] Ibid. p. 174.

Yugoslavia, the UNRRA Mission was under a Soviet citizen, Peter I. Alekseev. The real work was done by the Czechs themselves, i.e. by the Czechoslovak Office of Relief and Rehabilitation (CORR) under Frantisek Nemec. The Mission's function was mainly advisory. 'When UNRRA ceased in the middle of 1947, Czechoslovakia was in a better economic condition than any of the other UNRRA-assisted countries.'[1]

Italy was the first and principal ex-enemy country to be helped by UNRRA. Italy's appeal did not at first recommend itself to the Soviet and Yugoslav representatives on the Council (second Council meeting, September 1944), nor even to the American and British members. The first estimate of $94,800,000 was cut down to $50 million. But by January 1946 Italy's services in the fight against Germany had been recognized, and, by the time when the Italian Government took over the work of UNRRA in 1947, $418,222,000 worth of UNRRA supplies and services had been given, and 'in terms of tonnage UNRRA's program for Italy was the largest to any receiving country'.[2] The Italian Government undertook to establish a fund in lire corresponding to the cost in foreign exchange for UNRRA supplies and services, and this fund was used to finance additional relief and rehabilitation programmes. Over one-half of the supplies were foodstuffs and over one-quarter were for 'industrial rehabilitation', including coal and liquid fuel. Hardly less important were the raw materials supplied for the textile industry.

Another special activity was the supply of homes for Italian displaced persons, known as the work of the Comitato Amministrativo Soccorsi ai Senzatetto (Administrative Committee for Assistance to the Homeless, or CASAS), work of repair rather than of new construction, concentrated in the devastated regions of Emilia, Tuscany, Latium, and the Abruzzi. In the spring of 1947, after less than a year of existence, this committee had rehoused 103,725 persons in the worst damaged regions of Italy. Much of the finance was found from the 'Lire Fund'.

The work of UNRRA in Italy played a most important part in the reconstruction of the country, in the restoration of orderly conditions, and in the mitigation of human suffering; and this was achieved with a minimum of waste and peculation through the intelligent co-operation of Italian and UNRRA representatives.

Similarly, in Austria, where food was the most urgent need, the services of UNRRA were invaluable in feeding the population, especially in Vienna and other cities, and in fortifying the morale of the people.[3]

The programmes for Hungary and Finland did not aim at more than

[1] Ibid. pp. 188–99.

[2] Ibid. p. 272.

[3] Brigadier Parminter, Chief of the UNRRA Mission to Austria, claimed, with some justification, that 'there is no possible shadow of doubt that the Austrian nation owes its survival to UNRRA aid' (ibid. p. 320).

emergency relief for the alleviation of immediate distress. In Ethiopia the activity of the UNRRA Missions (1944–5 and 1946–7) 'was concentrated on the development of training projects in health, welfare, and agricultural rehabilitation';[1] but it was not very fruitful owing to language difficulties and to the backwardness and the mistrustfulness of the people.

In the Far East UNRRA provided food and medical supplies and some clothing for the Philippine Islands; and UNRRA experts made some useful technical surveys of the islands. But the bulk of Philippine relief, which was badly needed, came direct from the United States.

Korea and Formosa were designated at the third Council meeting (August 1945) as 'liberated areas' within the scope of UNRRA aid. Formosa came under the China programme. A beginning was made in Korea, but UNRRA officers were not allowed to visit those areas in Northern Korea for which most of the UNRRA aid had been requested, nor were supplies allowed to move freely between the two zones. In December 1946 the Soviet member of the UNRRA Council put forward the claim of Korea, but the Director-General rejected it for the above reasons. This was one of the occasions on which there was direct conflict with the Soviet representatives over a major question within the scope of UNRRA. In February 1947 the Central Committee finally decided that there should be no full-scale programme for Korea.

The work of UNRRA in China was, in scope, the greatest of all its undertakings, and in many respects its greatest failure. The constitution of the Committee of the Council for the Far East (CCFE) and of its operating agency, the China Office, has already been described.[2] In September 1944 the Chinese Government had asked the Director-General of UNRRA for help to the extent of $945 million in supplies, together with the services of 2,200 foreign experts. The Administration did not accept quite so large a programme, but it did eventually provide China with $517,846,700 worth of supplies, of which well over one-quarter was for 'industrial rehabilitation' goods, just over one-quarter for 'food', and just under one-quarter for 'clothing, textiles, and footwear'. The total sum was about twice the amount demanded from China in 1901 as compensation for damage in the Boxer Rising (the notorious 'Boxer Indemnity'). But, whereas the average Chinese could understand the logic of a large sum demanded as a penalty, he apparently found it harder to appreciate the spirit in which a still larger sum was now distributed in charity. This was the element of tragedy in UNRRA's work in China. The work did much good to individuals, relieved much suffering, and saved many millions of lives, but it did not have any permanent influence on human feelings or on the trend of political events.

The China Office, which opened towards the end of 1944 with a small

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 334.

[2] See above, p. 87.

skeleton force, developed into a large headquarters organization in Shanghai, a capital liaison unit in Nanking, fifteen regional offices, and a number of special offices.[1] The Chinese Government set up the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Association (CNRRA) as the corresponding body, and the Communists set up their own Communist Liberated Areas Relief Administration (CLARA). The problem of supplies to the Communist areas was perhaps UNRRA's greatest difficulty in China. The next greatest difficulty arose over finance, and particularly over the ever-increasing inflation; and there was also the difficulty of dealing with supplies over so vast an area. Of the fifteen regional offices of UNRRA only two (Shanghai and Formosa) served areas with a population of less than 12 million. Five of these areas contained populations of 30 million and upwards (Hangchow, Chinkiang, Mukden, Tsingtao, and Peiping–Tientsin). Each regional task in China was thus commensurate with that for a European national state.

A great problem in China was that of inflation and the precipitate rise in prices. Taking January–June 1937 as 1, the index number of wholesale prices rose to 2 in December 1939; 11 in December 1940; 28 in December 1941; 57 in December 1942; 200 in December 1943; 549 in December 1944; and 1,795 in August 1945, the last month of the war with Japan. After that there was a temporary break in prices; but in December 1946 (the civil war had by then broken out in earnest) the index number (in Shanghai) reached 5,713; and in December 1947 it was still rising 'with no end in sight'.[2] The inflation made it impossible to finance UNRRA operations in China through sale of goods, as was done in Europe. They had to be financed through direct government appropriations or through government-guaranteed bank loans. 'CNRRA and other Government agencies were woefully short of money.'[3] Food was used instead of cash payments for workers engaged on UNRRA business and for labourers on work projects. Finally, in the early part of 1947, an allocation of UNRRA funds was

[1] The fifteen regional offices were located at Mukden (for Manchuria), Peiping and Tientsin (for Hopei, Chahar, and Jehol), Taiyuan (for Shansi and Suiyuan), Tsingtao (for Shantung), Kaifeng (for Honan), Chinkiang (for Kiangsu—except Shanghai), Shanghai (for the Shanghai municipal area), Wuhu (for Anhwei), Hankow (for Hupeh), Hangchow (for Chekiang and Fukien), Nanchang (for Kiangsi), Changsha (for Hunan), Taipei (for Formosa), Liuchow (for Kwangsi), Canton (for Kwantung and Hainan Island). The Directors of the China Office (all Americans) were Benjamin K. Kizer (1944–6), J. Franklin Ray (Acting Director 1946), Major General Glen E. Egerton (1946–7), and Harlan Cleveland (1947).

[2] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 394. These figures tell the story of the growing unpopularity of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Government, and give the main reason why the Communists, who restored stability of prices, were regarded as deliverers. Before the war Chinese $3 exchanged for U.S. $1. In January 1945 the U.S. dollar was worth Chinese $512. After that, the U.S. dollar rose in January 1946 (black market or real rate) to Chinese $1,457; in January 1947 to Chinese $6,790; in December 1947 (the last month of UNRRA operations) to Chinese $142,000 (approximately).

[3] Ibid. p. 395.

specially sanctioned for the purchase of $19 million of raw cotton. This was exchanged, in China, for cotton yarn. 'In this way, a saleable commodity with a reasonably constant real value could be retained . . . instead of an accumulation of local currency.'[1] UNRRA's work, though not the need for it, came to an end in December 1947. Its legacy of activities, its stores, and a fund of $5 million were then handed over to the Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs (BOTRA), a Chinese body (with foreign representation) of the highest competence and prestige, for the carrying out of long-term projects such as a farm-shops programme for the manufacture of farm implements, the development of the fishing industry and building of fishing boats, the continuance of conservancy work on the Yellow River, the manufacture of pharmaceutical supplies, and a central rehabilitation depot to handle supply, servicing, and sales operations.

The UNRRA Official History sums up the work of the China Office as follows:

> Two to three million destitute people were rescued from starvation, and at least eight to ten million more, including also a million refugees, returning by devious routes to their homes, were given some assistance with UNRRA food, clothing, and medical supplies. In addition, over two million, many of whom supported families, were given employment in UNRRA-supported work projects. Through these work projects, several thousand miles of highway and railway roadbeds were restored, extensive sanitation, dredging, and construction work was accomplished; numerous small local industries were revived; eight large and many small conservancy projects were carried out, restoring to production more than four million acres of land and affording added protection to about thirty million acres.[2]

The Official History proceeds to direct special attention to UNRRA work in China in connexion with medical and health institutions, the supply of technical and administrative personnel, emergency training given to 'several thousand young Chinese in the fields of relief, health, agriculture, transportation, and communications';[3] agricultural rehabilitation supplies, food production from land reclaimed, the restoration of power-plants and waterworks, an increase of coal production, equipment for the machine-shop industry, the revival of textile production, and the restoration of coastal and river shipping, of railroads, and of highway transport facilities. In terms of political advantage to the principal donors, the work was a waste of time and money and effort. But its record remains as a monument of genuine international charity.

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 398. In these circumstances, and especially in the prevailing Chinese atmosphere, it is remarkable t hat the Official History has not more to say about dishonesty and corruption.

[2] Ibid. pp. 451–2.

[3] Ibid. p. 452.

(3) *The Salvaging of 'Displaced Persons' in Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Middle East*

The basic Agreement of 9 November 1943 laid down, in its preamble, among the main objectives of the future UNRRA, that 'preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes'.[1] This directive was developed in Resolution 10, adopted by the first Council meeting during November 1943, with emphasis on 'the return to their homes of prisoners, exiles and other displaced persons'.[2] There were, of course, prisoners and exiles to be repatriated: but the hard core of the displaced persons problem was going to be found among those refugees—Poles, Balts, Yugoslavs, Ukrainians, Jews, and others—who had no wish to go back to the countries from which they had originally come.

It was assumed, however, that in liberated and enemy countries in Europe (and elsewhere) there would, at the end of the war, be millions of displaced persons whose first concern would be to return to their homes. It was assumed that UNRRA would undertake the co-ordination and the execution of this task. From the first Council meeting onwards, a great deal of the time of the higher direction of UNRRA was devoted to this problem, and notably to finding the answers to the two questions: what specifically was the role of UNRRA to be, and which displaced persons were to be eligible for help.

As already noticed,[3] UNRRA's first Displaced Persons Operation had been the taking over, early in 1944, from the British authorities of the MERRA camps in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The MERRA refugees were mostly Greeks and Yugoslavs awaiting repatriation, and most of these were, in fact, eventually repatriated.

On 30 May 1944 the Standing Technical Sub-committee on Displaced Persons for Europe held its first meeting in London.[4] On 6 June the invasion of Normandy started. Already on 2 June UNRRA had 'formally asked the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia, and the French Committee of National Liberation whether they desired UNRRA assistance in the care and repatriation of displaced persons during both the military and the postmilitary periods'.[5] The U.S.S.R. gave notice that she did not desire UNRRA help in Soviet-

[1] See text of UNRRA Agreement, Cmd. 6491.
[2] See text of the Resolutions (Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 50).
[3] See above, p. 103.
[4] 'It was one of the most active of UNRRA committees. In addition to the work done in the Subcommittee proper, it appointed six Expert Commissions to study certain specific aspects of displaced persons operations, such as supplies (including food and clothing), movement, policies and practices, services, currency and publicity' (Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 478). The Sub-committee held its twenty-fourth and final meeting on 31 July 1945.
[5] Ibid. ii. 478.

occupied territories. The other replies were rather vague. The Governments wished for help within their own countries in the form of supplies, and outside their countries in the form of help for their citizens. These replies opened the way for the formal agreements on operations that were eventually concluded between UNRRA and the military authorities.

On 25 November 1944 the Director-General of UNRRA, Lehman, and the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, signed the UNRRA–SCAEF Agreement,[1] which recognized UNRRA as the agency that would deal with the displaced persons problem in the post-military period. This Agreement definitely placed UNRRA in position as the agent of Allied policy for this purpose. It was immediately followed by a request for action. On 2 December 1944 the military authorities asked for 200 teams of thirteen members each[2]—the first twenty-five teams to be ready on 1 January and the last fifty on 1 April 1945. In this they were overtaxing even UNRRA's eagerness—especially as they demanded that the teams should be fully equipped with their own transport, at a time when almost all transport was controlled by the military authorities.

The teams were not made available by the dates proposed nor, on the other hand, did the Administration get the support it had requested. Not until March 1945 was a center made available at Granville, Normandy. It was neither adequate nor well located nor, on the Administration side, well run. The delays and the undoubted administrative inefficiencies there and elsewhere throughout the operation created some friction with the military authorities, brought disrepute on the Administration, and unquestionably imposed some unnecessary hardships on the field workers, who were frequently unpaid for weeks, ill equipped, without instructions and generally out of touch with the administration.[3]

In the summer and autumn of 1944 some UNRRA personnel had been attached to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and later to American and British army groups. Then came the SCAEF Agreement, and by the end of April, more than fifteen teams had gone into the field, and 322 teams by the end of June, 'to participate with Army officials in the practical work of caring for displaced persons'.[4] In July 1945 UNRRA headquarters for displaced persons was set up at Höchst near Frankfurt; in January 1946 it was moved to Arolsen. It was

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 180 seqq.

[2] 'The regulation team was made up of 13 members; director, deputy director and administrative officer (secretary), clerk-stenographer, administrative officer (supply), steward (messing officer), warehousing officer, welfare officer, assistant welfare officer, medical officer, nurse, cook, and two drivers.' They were supposed 'to be able to cope with any of the emergencies which might arise in handling large repatriation movements or to take over and run an assembly center for several thousand displaced persons. As the work with displaced persons became more and more the care of people in camps, the teams were customarily cut to three or four, displaced persons themselves performing the other duties' (ibid. i. 194).

[3] Ibid. ii. 484.

[4] Ibid.

placed under the command of the 'Chief of Operations, Germany', Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Morgan, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff of SHAEF.[1]

The UNRRA–SCAEF Agreement came to an end when in April 1945 the Soviet Government gave notice, through their representative on the European Advisory Council, that they did not propose to invite UNRRA to work in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The authority for the Displaced Persons Operations had therefore to be shifted on to a zonal basis. This change was approved at the third session of the Council of UNRRA (August 1945) after long debate,[2] and the zonal agreements were then negotiated and signed: the British Agreement on 27 November 1945, the French Agreement on 18 February 1946, the United States Agreement on 19 February 1946.[3] These Agreements apportioned responsibilities for displaced persons between UNRRA and the military authorities. In point of fact, UNRRA had been gradually taking on responsibility for administering the 'assembly centres' of displaced persons in Germany

[1] According to Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 196, Sir F. Morgan 'tended to pursue an independent policy which led to some conflict with ERO and Washington and ultimately to his removal in August 1946. He was succeeded by Myer Cohen, Director of the Headquarters Repatriation and Welfare Division'. Sir F. Morgan had publicly drawn attention to the Jewish organization in Central Europe for the promotion of the illegal migration of Jews into Palestine (see *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Middle East, 1945–50*, pp. 204–5). Later, matters came to a head at the fifth Council meeting of UNRRA held at Geneva in August 1946. Sir F. Morgan there stated that the displaced persons camps harboured many dubious claimants, including criminals and Russian spies, and called for stricter controls, presumably on the army's part (see *New York Herald Tribune*, 22 August 1946). The United States military authority, General Joseph McNarney, replied that the charges were exaggerated. On 20 August General Morgan was dismissed by the Director-General of UNRRA, LaGuardia, and, later, Cohen was appointed to succeed him. The *New York Herald Tribune* (loc. cit.) commented: 'The fact is inescapable that LaGuardia had Morgan removed rather than attempt to explore whether his charges had any merit or were as serious as the rank of the person making them might indicate.'

[2] See Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 486–7. 'The debate . . . gave rise to perhaps the first clear disagreement that emerged after the war between the Slav nations and the other United Nations. The sharp division of opinion on how most effectively to handle the problem was to be reiterated almost endlessly, not only in the deliberations of UNRRA Council sessions, committees, and the Administration, but also later in the discussions of many of the organs of the United Nations. In essence, this division, which was to occupy much time of many people connected with UNRRA and which certainly troubled both the displaced persons and the Administration field workers, was simple. On the one hand, the Slav nations believed that there were two classes of displaced persons: good and bad. The good should be helped; the bad should not. The test of whether an individual was good or bad was whether he wanted, actively and quickly, to return to his area of origin. The other nations, on the contrary, believed that there were three classes: good who wanted to return to their areas of origin; good who did not, for legitimate reasons, wish to return; and bad (collaborators, criminals, etc.). They were prepared to help both the first two groups; that is they were prepared to help some who did not wish to return home. To this, the Slav nations objected.'

The debate was continued at the fourth (March and May 1946) and fifth (August 1946) Council sessions. 'The Slav nations used UNRRA as a convenient means of attacking, with ill-supported evidence, the United States and United Kingdom Governments, but primarily the latter, as at the Fifth Session they were to use the same means with the same lack of supporting evidence for attacking the two Governments, but primarily the former' (ibid. p. 490).

[3] For the texts of these Agreements see ibid. iii. 185–206.

throughout the summer and autumn of 1945, and the Agreements merely recognized what was already in existence and in action. In each of the three zones there were district offices corresponding to the existing military organizations. The individual teams were brought under the control of these offices through the terms of the Agreements.

The work and activities of the teams were co-ordinated by field inspectors, working out of the district offices, and by directives, orders, and instructions, sometimes originating in Washington and percolating down through ERO, Central Headquarters, zone headquarters and district offices, and sometimes originating at some intermediary level. The actual field personnel reached its height in the autumn of 1945; the supervisory personnel, in the summer of 1946.[1]

On 1 October 1945 there was a total of 3,369 Class I UNRRA personnel (equivalent to about 260 teams of thirteen each) employed in assembly centres. There were about 210 centres (a year later there were many more). There were just over 600,000 displaced persons under UNRRA care in Germany. The task of the UNRRA teams was not merely to clothe and feed and house them, as the army might have done, but to teach them to organize themselves and to build up their interest in life and their sense of self-respect, and to provide and promote education facilities, medical attention, and care of children. This was a formidable task—although, as far as numbers were concerned, a less formidable one than had at first been imagined. Instead of having to cope with many millions of exiles in transit for home, UNRRA was faced with some hundreds of thousands of permanently displaced persons.

In all, 1,047,000 displaced persons were 'repatriated' by UNRRA: of these, about 700,000 came from Germany and about 200,000 from Austria. But the principal work of UNRRA in this connexion was the care and supervision of these unfortunates in camps and barracks and 'dwelling house camps' (i.e. clusters of villages and parts of towns). The camps or assembly centres varied in population from about 500 (New Palestine) to over 15,000 (Wildflecken). The average size was about 2,000–3,000. The total numbers of displaced persons cared for or supervised by UNRRA at peak periods amounted to 715,000 in Germany; 46,000 in Austria; 26,000 in Italy; 37,000 in the Middle East; 45,000 in China. In 1945 (December) fully one-half of these were Poles and Ukrainians from territories formerly under Polish rule, and the proportions were much the same in 1946 (September); but by 1947 (June) the number of the Poles was declining more steeply than the numbers of the next two most numerous groups, the Balts and the Jews. Other important groups were the Greeks (mostly in the Middle East) and the Yugoslavs. UNRRA teams also participated in the repatriation of Russians, French, Italians, North and South Americans,

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 194 and 196.

Chinese, and many others. UNRRA was not concerned with military prisoners of war, nor with ex-enemy subjects, nor with *Volksdeutsche* (Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and from former German territories now placed under Polish administration). 'Post-hostility refugees' and 'internal displacement' constituted phenomena which were not foreseen in November 1943 when the UNRRA Agreement was signed. 'After the end of the war large numbers of people left Poland and Yugoslavia: others fled from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. Most of them moved to Germany, Austria or Italy, and there claimed displaced person status. The great majority of these were Jews.'[1]

Eventually, it was decided by the UNRRA authorities that, if a person had been 'displaced' by the war, it was immaterial when external displacement took place: and that it was safe to presume that all Jews had been 'displaced' by the war. 'The Administration ruled that all Jews were automatically to be considered eligible [i.e. for UNRRA aid] under this ruling unless positive proof to the contrary was produced.'[2]

'Post-hostility refugees' had to produce concrete evidence of internal displacement caused by enemy persecution, except in the case of 'discriminatory Nazi legislation' (i.e. the Jews). In taking these decisions the Administration had had to meet criticism from Soviet representatives, protesting against the displaced persons camps being used as sanctuary for political pro-Fascist, anti-Soviet refugees; British protests that UNRRA was being used as a channel to promote illegal immigration into Palestine;[3] and the general protests that the camps were nests of Soviet spies.

When the rules of eligibility for UNRRA aid had been settled, they had to be applied; and the application, i.e. the 'screening' of the persons applying for such aid, depended not only on the UNRRA officers, but on the local military authorities in the respective zones.

UNRRA's public information staff were never able to make clear the limits of

[1] Ibid. ii. 510. [2] Ibid.

[3] The Official History itself admits that there were legitimate grounds for the British complaint; see ibid. p. 506: 'In practice, field representatives of the Administration had, long before this [i.e. December 1946], given minor assistance to resettlement activities by explaining immigration laws and requirements to individual displaced persons, by covertly aiding various Jewish organizations, particularly the American Joint Distribution Committee, to move people into Palestine, and by co-operating at all times with IGCR [the Intergovernmental Commission for Refugees].'

It is no wonder that the Jewish agencies took every advantage of this 'covert aid'—in some cases establishing their offices next door to the offices of UNRRA, so that they might appear to be acting with full UNRRA (i.e. international) authority; and it is no wonder that the 'covert aid' became a scandal in the eyes of British authorities, who were struggling to stave off an explosion of race conflict in Palestine by preventing illegal immigration of Jews. The scandal of the 'covert aid' led to the protests and eventual removal from office of General Morgan, the first Chief of Operations, i.e. local head of UNRRA operations in Germany, in August 1946—see above, p. 113, note 1.

UNRRA's responsibility for Displaced Persons Operations in Germany and Austria. Although it was not responsible for all displaced persons in Germany and Austria, UNRRA was criticized for conditions in camps over which it had no control. In the camps it did administer, UNRRA was not responsible for transport, shelter, or basic supplies—yet it was often criticized for the lack of all three. . . . It was blamed in the West for repatriating displaced persons to what was described as an uncertain fate in Eastern Europe; it was excoriated in Eastern Europe for caring for collaborationists and quislings.[1]

The fifth session of the Council of UNRRA decided[2] that the work of UNRRA in connexion with displaced persons must be handed over to the new (and not then constituted) International Refugee Organization (IRO) by 30 June 1947. In February 1947, in view of the coming changes, a Displaced Persons Headquarters was set up in Paris to control all Displaced Persons Operations in Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Middle East, and the central headquarters in Germany were then dissolved. On 29 June 1947 an Agreement[3] was signed by the Director-General of UNRRA and the executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO) by which PCIRO assumed responsibility for Displaced Persons Operations as from 1 July 1947 pending the establishment of IRO. Under this agreement the whole organization—staffs, camps, funds and all—was transferred to the new management.[4]

The Displaced Persons Operations, though provided for in the original UNRRA Agreement (9 November 1943), ran on separate lines from the main stream of UNRRA—the stream of relief and supplies. These operations undoubtedly performed two useful functions: (1) repatriation, which had been foreseen, and (2) care for those who could not be repatriated, which had been mainly unforeseen. Consequently there was a good deal of confusion, and there were some abuses.

In its other operations, UNRRA, as a kind of international Santa Claus, was almost above ordinary criticism. Gifts may provoke envy and jealousy, but they cannot in principle be rejected by extreme human need. In dealing with the displaced persons UNRRA was confronted with all kinds of psychological and political prepossessions. Further, this was the only part of its task which entailed the recruitment of large numbers of relief workers; and the personnel recruited was sometimes quite unsuitable. The displaced persons problem in Europe was an extremely difficult one, as the military authorities soon discovered. The Western armies did not allow UNRRA to land in France until March 1945, but they asked UNRRA to

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 292.
[2] See Resolution 99 of the UNRRA Council (ibid. iii. 161–4).
[3] For text see ibid. pp. 356–8.
[4] For details of the transfer see ibid. i. 311–15.

provide some hundreds of teams within a few months to look after more than 700,000 displaced persons. UNRRA actually managed to send 322 teams to the field by June 1945. They were half-trained, but they got to work and eventually managed the task reasonably well. But it was necessarily a hasty, improvised organization; and the fault lay largely with the military authorities who, first of all, were constantly changing their policies, inviting UNRRA to come in and then countermanding the request, and later, when they did want UNRRA, failing to secure for it the necessary support from the local commanders who controlled transport. At the same time they were always ready to blame UNRRA if anything went wrong and to complain of its inefficiency.

In fact, UNRRA saved the military authorities from much work and worry which they were less fitted than UNRRA to perform, but with which, for humanity's sake and for the preservation of order, they would have had to try to grapple if UNRRA had not been in the field.

The Displaced Persons Organization was the part of UNRRA's work which caught the public eye and aroused criticism; but it was not the main task of UNRRA, which was the provision of relief and rehabilitation supplies to the governments of the liberated countries.

(*f*) The Liquidation of UNRRA

The end of UNRRA's work was foreshadowed in Resolution 80[1] of the third Council session (August 1945). The closing date was then set at the end of 1946, and in the Far East at a date three months later. When the fifth Council session (August 1946) did not call for a third international contribution, this made the end of UNRRA certain and preparations for liquidation a matter of urgency.

Early in 1947 the Health Services of UNRRA were handed over to the World Health Organization, Interim Commission.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, on 11 December 1946, approved the setting up of the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). This body took over from UNRRA by the end of June 1947 the work of providing for the health, rehabilitation, and welfare of the least fortunate children in the former UNRRA countries—together with UNRRA staff and funds.

The Social Welfare Services faded out after 1947, as the United Nations Organization was unwilling to take them over, while receiving countries were unwilling or unable to continue them on a permanent basis.

Some of the Agricultural Rehabilitation functions[2] (with some of the

[1] See ibid. iii. 146–7.

[2] e.g. 'the holding of three international schools in Europe: on hybrid corn at Bergamo, on artificial insemination at Milan and for veterinary laboratory technicians at Weybridge; also the provision of twenty-seven technicians for the Chinese Government' (see ibid. i. 310–11).

UNRRA staff and funds) were passed on during 1947 to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Displaced Persons Operations, as already stated, were handed over as from 1 July 1947 to the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO).

'The rundown[1] of UNRRA was one of the most orderly administrative operations conducted by the Administration and in marked contrast to the fumbling and confusion of the build-up.'[2] The plans for the 'rundown' were worked out by the Special Committee on Reorganization sitting in Geneva during the fifth Council session in August 1946. They approved a bonus plan to prevent untimely resignations; and they made arrangements for the preparations of the Official History, the outplacement (i.e. transfer to other jobs) and repatriation of employees, and the disposal of administrative property.

By the middle of 1947 the personnel of ERO had been reduced to one-half of what it had been a year previously. The Office finally closed at the end of September 1948.

All the Far Eastern missions and offices were closed by the end of 1947 with the exception of New Delhi (closed 31 January 1948), Sydney (for South Pacific Area, closed 30 June 1948), and the China Office (closed in January 1948). The last of the South American offices (Rio de Janeiro) closed on 25 October 1948.

At headquarters in Washington, the Senior Deputy Director-General, Commander Jackson, left UNRRA in October 1947, and his post was abolished. On 30 September 1948 the Director-General, Major-General Rooks, laid down his office, and that was the end.

The Controller, Harry W. Howell, was appointed as Administrator for Liquidation to wind up what were left of the activities of UNRRA.

(*g*) An Appreciation of UNRRA's Performance

The idea of post-war relief and rehabilitation had first germinated in London, in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and it was developed by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, at that time Director-General of the Ministry.[3]

[1] 'Rundown' is the American term for the less correct English expression 'winding-up'.

[2] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 315.

[3] Sir Frederick Leith-Ross had been an eminent official of the British Treasury. Before the war he had been Economic Adviser to the British Government; after the war he was the last British Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, retiring in 1951; in 1953 he was Chairman of the Standard Bank of South Africa, and Deputy Chairman of the National Provincial Bank. R. F. Harrod writes (in his *Life of John Maynard Keynes* (London, Macmillan, 1951), p. 533): 'There were the early plans for relief work, which in due course crystallized in UNRRA. In September 1941 he [Keynes] wrote a long draft on this topic which was circulated as an official Treasury document. Relief became the special province of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, whose generous impulses made it congenial to him.' In fact, it had been his 'special province' since 1940. He himself, in a letter to the writer of this chapter on UNRRA, disclaims the reference to his generous impulses, and says that, like Keynes, he believed that it was a matter of enlightened

It was first publicly expressed in Churchill's speech of 21 August 1940.[1] It was one of the major contributions to policy during and immediately after the war. The idea was taken up in the United States with some hesitation at first, but eventually with characteristic enthusiasm, generosity, and lavishness. Leith-Ross's principal counterpart on the American side was Dean Acheson, later on to be Secretary of State. He was an old friend of Leith-Ross's; and the co-operation between these two—the two midwives who brought UNRRA into the world—was a fortunate one for the future health and growth of an infant who might well have turned out to be a problem child.

After the birth of UNRRA Acheson, while keeping a friendly eye on the child's teething troubles, ceased to be directly responsible for its development; but Leith-Ross continued to do valuable work for UNRRA as Deputy Director-General in charge of Finance and Administration in the European Regional Office.

UNRRA also owed much to the status and character of its three Directors-General—all of them Americans. Herbert H. Lehman was a well-known Democrat politician, Governor of the State of New York (1932–42), and an outstanding personality of senatorial calibre. He was elected Senator for New York in 1949 and he was a personal friend of President Roosevelt. His appointment indicated from the outset that the United States Government were preparing to give their best to UNRRA in men, money, and supplies. He retired owing to ill-health in March 1946, and was succeeded in April by the picturesque figure of Fiorello H. LaGuardia, the 'little flower' who, as Mayor of New York (1934–45), was perhaps even more famous than Lehman. LaGuardia served as Director-General for nine months only (April–December 1946), and, although some of his decisions might have been improved by more reflection, there can be no doubt that, during a difficult time, his personality was a stimulant and his departure was regretted. His great service to UNRRA and to Europe was the promptness and vigour with which he met the serious food crisis of the spring of 1946. His personal application to the Combined Food Board for increased supplies for starving Europe led to the formation of the International Emergency Food Committee, which superseded the Combined Board. LaGuardia was opposed to the continuance of UNRRA and suggested that arrangements should be made with the specialized agencies of the United Nations to carry on its work for displaced persons, health, and welfare. His attitude seems to have been decisive with the

self-interest to get the wheels of trade going again in Europe and to save the liberated countries from degenerating into centres of political infection. However, but for Leith-Ross's impulses and activities, it is doubtful whether UNRRA would ever have seen the light as an international body, and its failure to emerge would have affected unfavourably all subsequent international bodies, including the United Nations Organization itself.

[1] See above, p. 55.

State Department. His successor, Major-General Lowell W. Rooks (1947–8), had held an important war-time post (he had been Assistant Chief of Staff) in the United States army in Europe. To him fell the invidious task of winding up the activities of UNRRA and disposing of its staff and assets. This he carried through with military efficiency and at the cost of a minimum of discontent.

UNRRA was fortunate in its chiefs. It would be invidious to select for special praise any of the able men and women of many nations who served under the Directors-General—with the one exception of Commander R. G. A. Jackson, a young Australian naval officer who came to UNRRA from the Middle East Office in Cairo as Senior Deputy Director-General on the retirement of Sir Arthur Salter. He held the post from 1945 to 1947, i.e. during the period of greatest activity, and his special contribution was the reorganization of the European Regional Office and the clarification of its relations with Washington.

UNRRA was to a large extent an American affair, since the United States produced most of the finance and the supplies. The headquarters were in Washington. The form of operation was largely American, and so was a large proportion of the higher-ranking staff. The UNRRA Agreement was signed on 9 November 1943 by the representatives of forty-four nations (four more adhered later on); and UNRRA came into being as a Council, as a Central Committee, and as an Administration under a Director-General superintending a headquarters in Washington, a powerful European Regional Office in London, and a China Office, temporarily in Washington and eventually in the Far East.

December 1943 to January 1945 was a period of preparation and frustration, during which UNRRA appeared to be inactive. At this stage it was engaged in creating its own organization and in planning supply programmes, procurement, &c. There was the difficulty of recruiting good staff. There was lack of harmony with the military relief authorities, who were disposed to cold-shoulder UNRRA. The position of ERO was uneasy, and its relations with Washington were obscure.

In February 1945 Commander Jackson was appointed to be Senior Deputy Director-General. His influence, authority, and energy quickly produced a great improvement in Washington and in ERO. Leith-Ross was appointed to be Chairman of the European Committee; Lieut.-General Sir Humfrey Gale to be Deputy Director-General in charge of ERO; Lieut.-General Sir F. Morgan to be head of the Displaced Persons Operations. These men, and a number of able assistants, joined UNRRA just at the time when it began active operations. Their army connexions enabled them to establish better co-operation with the military authorities, and their executive experience was invaluable in putting the UNRRA machinery into full-speed working as soon as conditions permitted. Thus

UNRRA's period of frustration and floundering came to an end and was replaced by a steady and successful drive ahead.

Active operations began in the spring of 1944 with the taking over of the MERRA camps. The Cairo Agreement was signed on 3 April 1944. This and other agreements recognized UNRRA's position as part of the machinery of victory, reconquest, and liberation. But the MERRA camps were the only practical operations that UNRRA was allowed to undertake in 1944 and it was not until April 1945 that it was entrusted with the organization of relief to Greece and Yugoslavia, with the displaced persons, and with the priority groups in Italy.

In the years 1945 and 1946 UNRRA's activity reached its peak. 'During the greater part of 1946 UNRRA was the largest single exporter in the world. More than one million gross long tons were shipped in each of the eight months of that year from the Western Hemisphere; by the end of March 1947 a total of more than 22 million tons had been delivered from countries all over the world.'[1]

At the third Council session in August 1945 the second contribution was voted, and this enabled UNRRA to continue its work. It was then resolved that it should close down at the end of 1946; but it continued throughout most of 1947, which was the year of completion (of the programmes) and of liquidation. Its official date of demise was 30 September 1948.

Was the British Government right in sponsoring the international organization of relief? And, if so, was UNRRA the suitable body?

The organization, as originally planned by the British, was to have been a Relief Council, representing all the Allies, which was to scrutinize applications for relief and to allocate shipping and supplies. Procurement and the actual administration of relief were to have been the individual responsibility of each ally. The British conception did not envisage a large-scale international agency. It was based on the assumption of a sudden ending of the war and an immediate operation of post-war relief. This conception was invalidated by the long-drawn-out Italian campaign of 1943–4; and it then became clear that relief would have to be provided during hostilities, partly by the military and partly by the civil authorities.

During this period it was essential that the authority of the Combined Boards should continue in the allocation of food, raw materials, and manufactured goods. Under this system Britain, in virtue of being a principal belligerent, found herself in a favoured position; but the arrangement was not in consonance with the original British conception of an international council allocating supplies. UNRRA did not become the supreme allocating authority, and the countries of Western Europe, which could pay for their own supplies, had no further interest in it, their claims to supplies being dependent on the Combined Boards to which they were

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, i. 507.

given access. There was a contradiction, therefore, in the British Government's policy between their original idea of a Relief Council and their interest in the continuance of the Combined Boards.

The means test that differentiated the countries that could pay from those that could not disrupted the field of UNRRA's work and narrowed it down to the relief of Italy, China, and the liberated countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of Western Europe, though they all in the end required a great deal of help, had at the time of liberation sufficient resources to pay for their immediate needs and were excluded by the means test from the scope of UNRRA, which was not authorized to assist them (except on a very small scale, such as dealing with foreign displaced persons in their territories). This group of countries included the United Kingdom herself; for, though it was evident that she would require help in meeting her needs for several years after the end of hostilities, considerations of prestige made her reluctant to appear as a recipient of relief.

The United States had to carry by far the greatest burden in providing relief. To get money voted by Congress, the United States Government had to make sure that relief would be distributed effectively and without discrimination. This required a central control and an adequate staff to supervise distribution, which, under the principles laid down by the Council, was left entirely in the hands of the receiving governments; and this produced a further deviation from the original British plan.

The alternative to UNRRA would have been to have left relief in the hands of the military authorities until the civil governments had been restored and could have taken over full responsibility. The military authorities had the supplies, the transport, the organization, and the authority; and they could have obtained strategic priority from the Combined Boards. They might have been freer from the political influence in Washington and in London. But they would not have had adequate staff to deal with more than the primary problem of preventing starvation and they could not have done the work which UNRRA did without recruiting and training a special staff for that purpose. Besides, from the British point of view, this would have entailed an increase in military expenditure and therefore a heavy additional burden on the British exchequer, whereas, in the relief operations through UNRRA, the United States shouldered the greater part of the expense. Moreover, UNRRA had a stronger popular appeal than military relief could ever have had, and was far better equipped to deal with medical and child welfare programmes and with agricultural and industrial rehabilitation. As it was, UNRRA was dependent on extensive military support—particularly as regards transport—for many of its operations, and this dependence often led to friction in the earlier stages. Later on, however, the military authorities found

UNRRA a useful dumping-ground for problems—especially that of the displaced persons with which they found it impossible to cope. It is not surprising that, when called on suddenly to provide teams to care for 750,000 displaced persons, UNRRA should not have provided at the start a very efficient service.

After its demise in September 1948 the principal legacies of UNRRA were the Displaced Persons Operations (to IRO), help for poor children in the receiving countries (to UNICEF), the health services (to WHO), and certain agricultural technical projects (to FAO).

UNRRA had many troubles at the start but, one by one, it surmounted them and it has succeeded in carrying through, so far as its resources permitted, a great humanitarian task. In all, some £920,000,000 was contributed to finance its operations, and has been spent not only on food, clothing, and medical supplies, but on agricultural and industrial rehabilitation. As a result, famine and epidemics have been averted, transport has been restored, agricultural production has been greatly improved, industry has been restarted, and inflation kept under control in the countries most devastated by the enemy. It is a remarkable achievement to have organized international assistance on this scale. The condition of Europe is bad enough to-day; it is difficult to imagine what it would have been without UNRRA's assistance.[1]

UNRRA was not 100 per cent. successful in its struggle against misery, but its percentage of success must have been remarkably high. The facts set out in the foregoing pages show that, in certain countries, it was decisively effective—notably in Greece (and the Dodecanese Islands), Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Italy. Its most striking failure was in China, which was also the place where it made its greatest effort. But China was different from the other countries concerned. It was more like a continent than a country, and the depths of its immemorially old poverty were unfathomable. Moreover, UNRRA was operating in China in a period of civil war, and this a war which was about to develop in a direction unfavourable to UNRRA's efforts.

UNRRA was definitely intended to give help without political discrimination, and it was actively supported by all its members—Communist and non-Communist alike. If some people hoped that UNRRA might 'save' some countries from Communism by mitigating their misery, they were disappointed in the cases of China, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, though they might find comfort in the cases of Greece, Finland, Austria, Italy, and (with a difference) Yugoslavia. It is very doubtful whether UNRRA's action had any political effect. It is doubtful, too, whether misery 'creates' Communism. The effect of misery is to produce an apathy, in which a determined Communist minority can work marvels, especially if supported by the near presence of a great Red Army.

[1] *The Times*, 4 July 1947.

UNRRA has been criticized for incompetence and confusion, even for partiality and corruption.

The accusation of partiality has been dealt with above. There was admittedly a good deal of confusion in launching this immense enterprise at a time when its precise route could not be charted, although its general direction was clear. But mistakes were recognized and rectified in a way that shows few traces of incompetence. Many of the best brains of the time were in the service of UNRRA, as well as an immense head of energy. The smoothness of the 'rundown' at the end is evidence that efficiency had got the better of confusion.

> In the early uncertain days, especially in markedly overstaffed areas such as Cairo (overstaffed as a result of specific requests by the military authorities), morale was bad. Those employees who left the Administration with no further experience undoubtedly have unpleasant recollections. When operations really began the spirit of the organization was remarkably high.[1]

The Official History, which is frank and uninhibited, indignantly repudiates accusations of dishonesty.

And was UNRRA overstaffed? It was essentially an enormous supply organization, and it had to order goods of all kinds where they could be bought (with the consent of the Combined Boards), check their quality before accepting them, arrange transport, and deliver them to the Allied Governments. The distribution of supplies was the responsibility of the Allied Governments, and the UNRRA Missions had only a limited number of inspectors to keep a rough and ready check on distribution so as to prevent discrimination or misappropriation. In view of the fact that UNRRA spent $3,683 million on 'commodities distributed'[2] and was shipping, on an average, 2 million tons a month during its period of active life, criticism of its 'extravagant staff' and its 'enormous overheads' is not justified. Any international organization has to carry a certain amount of dead-weight to balance national jealousies in regard to staffing, and an international organization based on the United States paid American-scale salaries to too high a proportion of the staff. But the total cost of 'administration' was 1·18 per cent. of expenditure, and 'operating expenses' were 3·41 per cent. These proportions, in the circumstances, are not excessive; and the maximum staff was about 25,000,[3] of which 7,000[4] were relief workers employed in looking after the displaced persons camps (approximately one 'worker' per 100 displaced persons). There were about 3,500 persons in the central administration in Washington and London;[5] and the balance consisted of the thirty-odd missions or purchas-

[1] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 544.
[2] See above, p. 72; and Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, iii. 499.
[3] See ibid. p. 414.
[4] Ibid. p. 412.
[5] Ibid. p. 411.

ing agencies all over the world, China, with some 3,000, being the largest mission.[1]

If UNRRA had not existed each government would have had to create its own supply organization, and the total would have been much larger and the cost much higher, as they would have been bidding against one another.

'Charges have been made', the Official History states, 'that corrupt actions involved millions of dollars. It can be said without reservation that this is utter nonsense.'[2] The History proceeds to point out that the Administration itself handled a very small part of its own resources. The great spending programmes were, up to 90 per cent., in the hands of the contributing governments. Examinations made by outside auditors and by special committees showed that corruption and misappropriation of funds were negligible. 'Despite gossip (some of it certainly not entirely innocent) to the contrary, corruption and dishonesty within the Administration were negligible to the point of nonexistence.'[3] Extravagance there doubtless was. It was the extravagance of war-time, in tune with the current expenditure of the period, but incurred in UNRRA's case for beneficent ends. 'There can be little doubt', the Official History claims, 'that by any fair appraisal UNRRA—UNRRA the work, UNRRA the international organization, UNRRA the operating agency—did not fail.'[4]

UNRRA was essentially a United States–British Commonwealth enterprise: but it received warm and practical support from all members of the United Nations, and opposition from none. If Europe had fallen under a Nazi or a Fascist or a Communist predominance, it seems unlikely that anything even remotely resembling UNRRA would have emerged to help it in its sufferings. It is more probable that, in any of these events, economic materialism would have prevailed; the weaker victims would have succumbed; the politically heretical elements would have been left to perish or have been sent into gas ovens; epidemics would have spread; millions would have died; and the pressure of population in Europe would have been correspondingly diminished. Perhaps this would have been biologically desirable. The creation and the subsequent achievements of UNRRA are evidence that the victorious Allies were fighting for something more than national or factional or racial advantage. They are evidence of a power working for good in spite of evil. The story of UNRRA was a bright episode in human history; and, after its work was done, the record of it remained as an example and an encouragement for future generations.

[1] Ibid. p. 412. The figures quoted in this paragraph are those of the peak periods in 1946.
[2] Ibid. ii. 545. [3] Ibid. p. 546. [4] Ibid. p. 549.

PART II

EASTERN EUROPE

(i) Poland

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) Russo-Polish Relations, June 1941 to November 1943

(1) *Repercussions of the Nazi Invasion of Russia*

The hostility of the Polish Government in Exile, and of the underground forces operating in Poland in liaison with them, to the Soviet Union had been in large part a consequence of what they had regarded as an attack on the rear of the Polish forces on 17 September 1939, when the Soviet Government had co-operated with the Germans in making another partition of Poland;[1] but this hostility had been increased when decrees had been passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 1 and 2 November 1939 incorporating 'Western Byelorussia' and the 'Western Ukraine' (i.e. the eastern parts of inter-war Poland, in which a majority of the population consisted of White Russians and Ukrainians) in the two corresponding Republics of the Soviet Union.[2] Polish feeling had been further exacerbated by the large-scale deportation into the Soviet Union of inhabitants of the area under Soviet occupation, in addition to the many prisoners of war taken during the Russian invasion of the eastern part of inter-war Poland.[3]

Hitler's attack on 22 June 1941 against the Soviet Union had brought about a drastic change in the attitude of the Poles towards the Government of the U.S.S.R., as it had in the attitudes of the British and Americans; and the Polish Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, General Sikorski, expressed, in a broadcast speech on 23 June, his hope that Russia would declare null and void the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 28 September 1939.[4] The Soviet Government were reluctant at first to consider any alterations in the pact's territorial provisions; but German military successes during July, together with pressure from the British Government, pro-

[1] Details will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *Initial Triumph of the Axis.*

[2] See Great Britain, Foreign Office: *British and Foreign State Papers* (London, H.M.S.O., 1951), vol. 143, pp. 718–19, and also Poland: *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1943: Official Documents* (Washington, Polish Embassy [1945]) [hereafter cited as *P.S.R.*], pp. 7–10, and Documents 24 and 25, pp. 102–3.

[3] Details will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *Initial Triumph of the Axis.* See also *P.S.R.*, pp. 17–21, and Document 27, p. 105. For the hardships undergone by the Poles who were deported to the Soviet Union see *The Dark Side of the Moon*, anon. (London, Faber, 1946), and J. Czapski: *The Inhuman Land* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1951), *passim.*

[4] For the text see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry*, published jointly by the British Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., and London, H.M.S.O., 1954), series D, vol. viii, no. 157, pp. 164–5; cf. *Stalin and the Poles*, ed. B. Kusnierz (London, Hollis & Carter, 1949), p. 142.

duced an atmosphere more favourable for negotiations with the Poles.[1] After prolonged negotiations, in which representatives of the British Government took part, an agreement between the Polish and Soviet Governments was reached in London on 30 July, and was signed by Sikorski and the Soviet Ambassador, I. M. Maisky.

By this agreement the Soviet Government recognized that the Nazi-Soviet treaties of 1939 regarding territorial changes had 'lost their validity'. Diplomatic relations were restored between the two Governments, and Poland gave an assurance that she was not bound to any third Power in any agreement directed against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government also consented in the agreement 'to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under a Commander appointed by the Polish Government [in London] in agreement with the Soviet Government', this army to be subordinated to the Red Army Supreme Command, which was to include a representative of the Polish army. Details were to be settled in a subsequent agreement. A protocol to the agreement stated that the Soviet Government granted an amnesty 'to all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory, either as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds'.[2] A secret protocol added that claims of all kinds, both public and private, would be considered in further negotiations.[3]

[1] It was clear during the negotiations that the Russians continued to recognize the validity of the decrees of 1 and 2 November 1939. The pressure of events, however, produced an agreement which avoided the territorial issue.

As in the case of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States, the British Government had been hesitant to commit themselves on the events in the disputed territories in eastern inter-war Poland; and it was stated at the time that the Russians' propaganda arguments did not justify their entry up to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Line. On 26 October 1941, however, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, mentioned that the borders of the incorporated territories corresponded substantially with the boundary recommended at the time of Versailles by Lord Curzon. For one version of the British pressure on Sikorski and the British attitude in 1941 see Jan Ciechanowski: *Defeat in Victory* (New York, Doubleday, 1947), pp. 36–38. [This work is referred to hereafter as Ciechanowski. Quotations in later sections of this volume from *Defeat in Victory*, copyright 1947 by Jan Ciechanowski, are reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc.] During these negotiations a rift developed between Sikorski and the Polish Foreign Minister, Zaleski, over the Russian refusal to agree explicitly to return to the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Riga; and Zaleski finally resigned in protest. For the Curzon Line, and the Russo-Polish frontier agreed on in the Treaty of Riga (concluded in March 1921), see *H.P.C.*, vi. 275, 322, and map facing p. 282. See also *Survey* for 1920–3, p. 251; *Survey* for 1939–46: *The World in March 1939*, pp. 55, 241, and map on p. 207; further details will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *Initial Triumph of the Axis*. See also below, pp. 151, note 4, 190, 195, 196, note 3. For British views on Polish boundaries in July 1941 see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 46–48.

[2] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 144, p. 869, and *Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials*, tr. A. Rothstein, 2 vols. (London, Hutchinson [1946]) [referred to hereafter as Rothstein], i. 81–82. By the Decree of 12 August 1941 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet the amnesty was officially granted by the Soviet Government (*P.S.R.*, Document 33, p. 110). It was significant, in the light of later events, that the frontier question was not explicitly mentioned.

[3] Stanislaw Mikolajczyk: *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (London, Sampson Low, Marston, 1948), p. 289. [This work is referred to hereafter as Mikolajczyk.]

The Sikorski–Maisky agreement signified a fundamental change in the Polish position which was to make the course of Polish co-operation with the Allied Powers for the duration of the war complicated and contradictory. Underneath the violent struggle against Nazi Germany there raged a battle between new and old conceptions of Poland.[1] There were some Poles, notably army officers, who had been associated with the Poland of Pilsudski and Beck, who were still hoping to see Poland become strong enough to attempt to balance delicately between Prussia and Russia. This party's ideal was a nationalist Poland, which would perpetuate the country's traditional aristocratic social structure and would attempt to remain aloof from and uncompromising towards her neighbours. Such a Poland, they must have realized, could only be re-established if both their German and their Russian traditional enemies were prostrate. There were many others, however—those in favour of the ideas of Sikorski and the leaders of some of the former opposition parties—who were determined to prevent the resurrection of an autocratic or reactionary Poland, and who wanted Poland to emerge from the Second World War as a friend of the Soviet Union, but genuinely independent, and with a sound democratic foundation. There was another element in the political struggle, however, which was destined to exert the most profound influence. The leaders of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party conceived of a Poland quite unlike the state created by the Treaties of Versailles and Riga. It was remembered, as the Red Army entered Poland in 1944, that a Red Army had also entered Poland in 1920, with the aim of extending the Russian Revolution, and had even set up a Soviet Government at Bialystok, before Pilsudski, with Weygand's help, had been able to drive the Russian forces back.[2] At the same time, it was remembered that Polish sovereignty over the disputed eastern territories was based on the Treaty of Riga of 1921, and had later been identified somewhat vaguely by the Western Powers with the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. The Russians, however, considered that these territories had been wrested from them under duress, and by no means accepted the settlement as definitive. Furthermore, the exasperatingly complicated ethnographic geography of the disputed area presented a problem that had never been solved.[3]

On 31 October 1939, in a speech on Russian external relations before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Molotov made an apologia for the Russian invasion of Poland in September. Its object, he claimed, had been to liberate minorities—White Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews—which had been left to their fate by the collapse of Poland. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Agreement, partitioning Poland, was the end of the Polish State—'this ugly

[1] For the development of Poland and Eastern Europe before 1939 see *Survey* for 1939–46: *The World in March 1939*, pp. 206–93.

[2] See *H.P.C.*, vi. 321–2.

[3] See below, p. 137, note 6.

offspring of the Versailles Treaty which had existed by oppressing non-Polish nationalities'. It was 'absurd' for the British and French Governments 'to continue the present war' for 'the restoration of the former Polish State'.[1]

The Russians, then, objected to the 1921 Russo-Polish frontier, and the Poles, with their memories of five Partitions, the last as recent as 1939, were profoundly suspicious of the Russians; but, so long as Nazi Germany was in arms as their common enemy, it was expedient for both sides to put aside such issues and to work together in the common fight. Yet it was not difficult to foresee that differences as deeply rooted as these must be expected to appear once more with an alteration in the fortunes of war.

The Russo-Polish Pact signed in London on 30 July 1941 was followed on 14 August by a military agreement signed in Moscow by Generals Vasilevsky and Bohus-Sziszko, which put it on record that General Sikorski had appointed General Wladyslaw Anders as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army on the territory of the U.S.S.R., and that Anders had begun the formation of a Polish army there.[2]

On his appointment to the command of this army in August Anders was released from the Lubianka Prison in Moscow, in a state of emaciation, according to his own account, as a result of the eight wounds which he had received during the battle against the invaders of Poland in 1939 and the harsh treatment that he had received in Soviet prisons since then.[3] During the following months he was treated with deference by the Russians, while he endeavoured to organize an army from the multitude of Poles who had been deported to prisons and labour camps scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Anders was assisted by Stanislaw Kot, the new Ambassador from the Polish Government in London to the Soviet Government, and by the Polish military mission which had arrived from London under Bohus-Sziszko. At the outset, the Poles were transferred to Kuibyshev (Samara), and the initial assembly point for the army was located at Buzuluk nearby.[4] Between August and December Anders was able to collect many thousands of the Poles in the Soviet Union who, freed by the amnesty, were wandering in the general direction of Kuibyshev by any

[1] See V. Molotov: *Soviet Peace Policy*: *Four Speeches* (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1941), pp. 27–34.

[2] For the text see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 144, pp. 870–2. It also provided that Polish soldiers in Russia should receive the same pay, rations, and maintenance as soldiers of the Red Army, and that Russia, aided by Lend-Lease to Poland from the Americans, should equip and feed the Polish army in Russia.

[3] For Anders's experience during the invasion of Poland and in prison see Lieut.-General W. Anders: *An Army in Exile* (London, Macmillan, 1949), pp. 1–46. [This work is referred to hereafter as Anders.]

[4] Anders, pp. 47–54, 61, 76. The Polish Government stated that they had originally hoped to form in the U.S.S.R. a Polish army of about 300,000 men, this figure being based on published numbers of prisoners of war, conscripts to the Red Army, and an indeterminate number of Poles in the U.S.S.R. whom the Poles themselves desired to conscribe (*P.S.R.*, p. 26).

means of transport that they could find during the chaotic period of the German advance on Moscow.[1] Although it is doubtful whether the lot of the Poles was much worse than that of the Russians themselves during this period, conditions at Buzuluk were very severe, for the recruits arrived at the beginning of the Russian winter suffering from disease, malnutrition, and prolonged exposure to the weather. Anders had much trouble in procuring equipment, food, and clothing for his men to help them to face the intense cold. From the beginning both he and Kot were engaged in diplomatic battles with the Soviet authorities over the implementation of the amnesty and the release of Polish citizens.[2] According to Anders, during the initial period of organization the Poles were already troubled about the disappearance of several thousands of badly needed officers and non-commissioned officers who had been missing without trace since the spring of 1940. Their concern increased when inquiries addressed to the Soviet Government remained unanswered.[3] The subject was mentioned in December 1941 when Sikorski arrived in Moscow from London for a tour of inspection and a conference with the Soviet leaders. Anders accompanied him and presented in person to Stalin his account of his difficulties over securing the release of Poles from labour camps for his army and obtaining equipment and food for his men. Because of the cold, Anders also requested that his men should be transferred to a district farther south in the Soviet Union. During this conference it was suggested by Sikorski that the Poles should be transferred to the Middle East—perhaps to Persia, then jointly occupied by Britain and the U.S.S.R.—where they could receive Anglo-American supplies, and train in a warmer climate. When Stalin expressed his suspicion that this was a British manœuvre, Sikorski said that he was willing to demonstrate his good intentions by offering to leave the army in the U.S.S.R. if it could be properly supplied and equipped. Although the Poles remained dissatisfied on the subject of the missing officers, the conference was a success in improving Polish-Soviet relations, and Stalin seemed most co-operative in

[1] Anders, pp. 61–70. See also *The Dark Side of the Moon*, pp. 165–74. *P.S.R.* (p. 27) states that by the end of October 1941 the number of volunteers exceeded 46,000.

[2] For the exchanges of notes with the Soviet authorities see *P.S.R.*, Documents 34, 35, and 36, pp. 110–16. See also *The Dark Side of the Moon*, pp. 175–9. 'The position was that the Polish army in Russia could neither take in anything like the number of volunteers presenting themselves, feed or equip those who had been taken in, call up others, arm more than one division, or get news of thousands of others who had been known to be in Soviet hands and had now apparently vanished off the face of the earth' (ibid. p. 179).

[3] The missing officers had been traced to three camps, Ostashkov, Kozielsk, and Starobielsk, from which they disappeared in the spring of 1940 (Anders, p. 76). See also *P.S.R.* (pp. 38–45) which states that the number interned in these three camps was 15,490, including some 8,700 officers. On 13 October Kot presented a note to the Soviet Government inquiring about Poles who were missing or detained (ibid. Document 34, p. 110), and on 15 October Sikorski made an inquiry of Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government in London, who answered that the Poles had been set free (ibid. Documents 35, 36, pp. 115–16).

agreeing to grant most of the Polish requests.[1] An increase in the strength of the Polish army was agreed to, further efforts were promised to secure the release of those Poles who were being held against their will, and General Panfilov of the Red Army General Staff was ordered to see to the supply of rations and equipment for the Polish army on Soviet territory.[2] The conference ended with the signing on 4 December of the Stalin–Sikorski declaration of 'Friendship and Mutual Assistance', pledging co-operation in the war against Germany and in the peace to follow. Article Two stated that, in carrying out the Sikorski–Maisky Agreement of 30 July, 'the two Governments will lend one another complete military aid so long as the war lasts and the armed forces of the Polish Republic on the territories of the Soviet Union will fight against the German robbers side by side with the Soviet armies'.[3]

In accordance with a decision made by Stalin at this conference in Moscow, this Polish army was transferred at the beginning of 1942 from Buzuluk to Yangi-Yul, near Tashkent,[4] and two agreements negotiated by Kot, in December and January, provided for loans to the Poles from the Soviet Government for the maintenance of the greatly increased Polish army and for assistance to Polish citizens on Soviet territory.[5] The distribution of relief supplies, mostly from Lend-Lease stocks, to Poles who had been freed by the amnesty was being carried out under Kot's supervision, and an agreement signed on 23 December 1941 provided for the appointment of nineteen diplomatic delegates and their staffs on Soviet territory to facilitate this work.[6] Meanwhile, in spite of the more conciliatory atmosphere, the Soviet authorities had rearrested several Polish leaders early in December 1941, including two Jewish Socialist trade unionists named Ehrlich and Alter;[7] and there had been signs of the development of

[1] It has been argued that Sikorski missed a valuable opportunity for settling the frontier question at this conference. Stalin mentioned that he desired a slight change in the Polish-Soviet frontier, but said that in any case he would not insist on Lwów, which was ethnographically Polish. Sikorski, however, did not respond to the hint and refused to discuss the question of Polish-Soviet frontiers (see W. W. Kulski: 'The Lost Opportunity for Russian-Polish Friendship', *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, xxv. 677).

[2] Anders, pp. 83–91. See also Mikolajczyk, p. 24, and *The Dark Side of the Moon*, p. 180. *P.S.R.* (p. 27) states that during the conversations it was agreed to bring the total number of men in this Polish army to 96,000, and to evacuate 25,000 men to the Middle East and 2,000 to Britain as reinforcements. It also states that on 6 November Panfilov had declared to Anders that only 30,000 rations would be supplied to the Polish forces. See also the account of the conversations in Ciechanowski, pp. 65–75.

[3] See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 144, p. 873.

[4] Anders, p. 94.

[5] Rothstein, i. 113–14 and 126–7.

[6] For the conditions of the Poles in Russia and attempts to relieve them see *The Dark Side of the Moon*, pp. 166–70. See also Mikolajczyk, p. 26.

[7] Ehrlich and Alter, who had been born in Poland, had been released in September 1941 to organize in Moscow an 'International Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee'. They had spent a few months in freedom, but had then been rearrested by the Russians, who said that they were Soviet citizens. For further details see *P.S.R.*, Document 68, p. 178; Anders, pp. 77–78, for a description

another dispute with the Soviet authorities over the status of the non-Polish population from the former eastern territories of Poland.[1]

In the early part of 1942 Anders, after consulting Sikorski in London, refused a request from Red Army and NKVD[2] authorities to send individual divisions to the front to fight alongside the Red Army. (He said later that he did not want his physically exhausted, badly equipped, and half-trained troops to be sent in individual units to the front, where they would be quickly swallowed up and lose their effectiveness, but preferred to keep them together until they could fight as an organic whole.)[3] As Anders remarks, 'General Zhukov and General Panfilov received this answer with marked dissatisfaction'.[4] This event, indeed, foreshadowed the turning-point in Polish-Soviet relations, for Soviet leaders obviously suspected the Poles of holding back for other reasons.[5] The refusal was later interpreted by the Russians as being contrary to the spirit of the Stalin–Sikorski Declaration, and of Article Two in particular, by which the Poles had pledged themselves to fight 'side by side with Soviet forces'.[6] From this time onwards there was evident suspicion by Soviet officials of the intentions of the Polish army on Soviet territory. Moreover, the improvement in the Russians' military position made it less necessary for them to co-operate with the Poles on Soviet territory or with the Polish Government in London, and, according to Anders, the Russian authorities no longer concealed their efforts to obstruct the organization of his army.

In March 1942 the Poles were informed that their ration strength was to be reduced to 26,000 (although their numerical strength at the time was

of the Jewish situation in his army, and for his dealings with Ehrlich and Alter; Czapski: *The Inhuman Land*, pp. 92–97. See also below, p. 138.

[1] See below, pp. 136–8.

[2] NKVD = The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

[3] Anders, pp. 96–97.

[4] Ibid. p. 97.

[5] They had good reason for their suspicions. The Polish and Soviet attitudes at the time of the agreement of July 1941 were expressed by one expert as follows: 'The Poles did not insist on the express definition of their frontiers with the Soviet Union in the Treaty of 1941 because they shared the belief, prevailing not only in Germany but also in Britain and the United States, that Russia would be crushed by the German onslaught. They thought that time was working for them. The Russians probably believed that no agreements would matter if they were defeated by Germany, and that, if they were victorious, they would be able to impose their own solution' (Kulski: *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, xxv. 675–6). For the Russian version of the Polish intentions and activities see the Soviet statement to the British and American press of 6 May 1943 (Rothstein, i. 203–9).

[6] For a complete exposition of the Soviet point of view see the Soviet note of 31 October 1942 from Bogomolov to Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs (*P.S.R.*, Document 49, pp. 139–46). In a statement on 13 June 1942 the Poles emphasized that 'the Polish Government were unanimous in their desire that the Polish Army should remain in the U.S.S.R., and fight side by side with the Red Army' (ibid. p. 33). Anders, however, does not agree with this statement, since he urged the withdrawal of his army to Sikorski and Churchill in April, and to the Soviet leaders when he returned to the U.S.S.R. (Anders, pp. 105–9).

70,000). In reply to an appeal by Anders, Stalin sent a telegram in which he attributed this measure to the entry of the United States into the war and to the consequent reduction in grain supplies shipped to Russia by way of the Far East. It was necessary therefore, he said, to give priority to the fighting divisions 'at the expense of the non-combatant ones', but he invited Anders to come to Moscow to discuss the matter if he so desired.[1] Anders accepted this invitation, and on 18 March Stalin agreed to supply 44,000 rations to Polish soldiers in Russia, and to allow Anders to evacuate the rest of his army to Persia.[2] The Soviet authorities were energetic and efficient about carrying out this decision, and in March, after consultations with British officers, the first evacuation took place of approximately 40,000 soldiers and refugees through Krasnovodsk to Persia.[3] It was not until August, after protracted negotiations, including a visit by air to London[4] during which the plight of his men in Russia worsened,[5] that Anders succeeded in having 115,000 more Poles,[6] who included women and children, evacuated to Persia. Anders himself went to Tehrān.

At the time of the evacuation Anders was informed that Lieut.-Colonel Zygmunt Berling had deserted from his post at Krasnovodsk, taking with him all the documents in his possession. Berling had been among the Polish officers who had volunteered to join the Red Army during the

[1] Ibid. pp. 98–99. The account of these events in *The Dark Side of the Moon* (p. 188) differs considerably from Anders's version.

[2] Anders, p. 99.

[3] Ibid. pp. 100–3. This number included 10,000 civilians, since only 30,000 soldiers were evacuated. See also *P.S.R.*, p. 31. There was some friction at this time between Anders and Kot over the question of allowing large numbers of Polish civilians to be evacuated with the army. Anders states that he ignored the remonstrances of Kot and of the Polish Chief of Staff in London, and allowed the civilians to accompany the soldiers on his own responsibility (Anders, pp. 102–3). *The Dark Side of the Moon* (p. 189) states: 'Every army encampment was surrounded by whole nightmare settlements of famished, destitute and frantic civilians (women and children) squatting in the mud; unwilling to let the army out of sight and blindly looking to it for rescue, somehow, and for food'. For earlier disagreements between Anders and Kot see Anders, pp. 61, 62, 76.

[4] Ibid. pp. 104–6, 109, 111, 112. For conversations between Raczyński and Sir Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) on 2 and 4 July see *P.S.R.*, Document 47, p. 133. The Polish authorities in London were concerned primarily not with the war in Russia, but with getting assistance to Poles in the U.S.S.R.

[5] Anders, p. 108.

[6] Ibid. pp. 113–16. This number was only a small part of the ethnically Polish former inhabitants of Eastern Poland who were still scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet authorities had begun to restrict their activities in March 1942, Polish sources claim that relief activities of the diplomatic delegates continued until July, when they were arrested, their offices closed, and their supply stores sealed. Vyshinsky accused them of being engaged in intelligence work and activities harmful to the U.S.S.R. They were released in October, and with the new Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Romer, it was agreed that the system of relief should be reorganized. This was never put into effect because of the subsequent developments in Russo-Polish relations. For a description of the extensive Polish relief activities in the U.S.S.R. see *P.S.R.*, pp. 48–50. See also 'Report on Relief Accorded to Polish citizens by the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R.' (compiled in Tehrān, August 1943). For subsequent Polish and Russian notes in 1942 concerning the Polish army in the U.S.S.R. see *P.S.R.*, Documents 48–50, pp. 133–56.

period before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, when the Russians were in occupation of the disputed eastern territories of inter-war Poland. He had been transferred to Krasnovodsk early in 1942 for insubordination to his superior in Anders's army.[1] His desertion was to become significant when he appeared later on in the war as the commander of a Polish unit in the Red Army.[2]

(2) *Conflicts among Resistance Forces in Poland*

The reorganization and activities of the Polish Underground state and 'Home Army' after their formation in the autumn of 1939 have been described in another volume.[3] After Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 their activities were concentrated against the German authorities and armed forces in Poland, and were co-ordinated, through the Polish Government in London, from whom they received direction, with other underground organizations in occupied Europe; and they received supplies by air from the Western Allies.

But the Home Army and the Underground state were not the only factors in the secret fight against the Germans: there were smaller, unassimilable groups whose goals were of a different nature. There were Soviet partisan forces which developed into a 'People's Guard', under leaders parachuted in from Russia, which organized the 'Polska Partia Robotnicza' (PPR, Polish Workers' Party), a pseudonym for the Polish Communist Party, which was not a popular name in Poland in January 1942. This group was to collaborate later with splinter groups from some of the less conservative political parties in the Government in Exile and Underground. There were also the 'National Armed Forces' (NSZ)—the armed organization of the National Democratic Party—who were openly anti-Russian, and who in the latter part of the war opposed the Soviet partisans and the new workers' political parties.[4] In 1942 there was friction between the Home Army and the People's Guard, when neither would subordinate itself to the other, and the Communists accused the Home Army of pursuing a 'waiting' policy;[5] and Socialist and Peasant Party underground publications attacked the PPR as they had attacked Communism and Soviet political institutions in the past.[6] The conflict developed into a deadlock early in 1943, when the Polish Communist

[1] Anders, pp. 97–98. For the methods used to seduce Berling and others from their loyalty see Scaevola, pseud.: *A Study in Forgery* (London, J. Rolls Book Co. [1945]), pp. 30–31.

[2] See below, p. 148.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 561–5.

[4] Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski: *The Secret Army* (London, Gollancz, 1950), p. 170. [This work will be referred to hereafter as Bor.]

[5] Bor, p. 124.

[6] Quotations from Underground organs of the Polish Socialist and Peasant Parties which attempt to 'unmask' the PPR as the reconstitution of the Communist Party and to attack it unreservedly are given in Scaevola, op. cit. pp. 37–39.

leaders demanded, as a condition for co-operation, that the Home Army leaders should repudiate the Constitution of 1935, and initiate immediate open warfare against the Germans. General Rowecki (Commander of the Home Army) made a counter-demand that the leaders of the PPR and the People's Guard should recognize the Polish Government in London and subordinate themselves to the Polish authorities in Poland. He demanded further that the PPR leaders should state clearly that they were not subordinate to the Comintern, nor taking their instructions from a foreign Power.[1] There was no agreement to either set of demands.

The antipathy which existed between the Polish Underground and Soviet partisan forces dated back to older political and religious conflicts. It had roots in the struggle between the Socialist Parties of Poland and those of White Russia and the Ukraine, and in the ideological cleavage between the Second and the Third Internationals. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) had been established since 1892, and had participated in the 1905 Revolution in the Russian Empire. After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia it had become an enemy of Soviet Communism and had associated itself with the fight against the Bolsheviks under Pilsudski's leadership. Both the Socialist and the Peasant Parties had been strongly nationalist and anti-Russian, especially since anti-Russian (as well as anti-Prussian) feelings were closely associated with the ideal of Polish independence; and it was not surprising that many prominent Socialist leaders had been among those deported into the Soviet Union in 1940–1.[2] Communism, on the other hand, had for various reasons been very weak in Poland, and in 1937 the Polish Communist Party had been dissolved by the Comintern.[3] Several Communist leaders had reappeared in 1940–1 to work in the Soviet-occupied eastern territories of inter-war Poland, but had disappeared again with the German invasion. There was nothing surprising, then, in the bitterness which arose between the Polish Home Army and the Soviet partisans, for, in spite of their division into factions, the Socialist and Peasant Parties were the two most powerful parties in the Underground state and in the Polish Government in Exile; and, with the

[1] Bor, p. 124. The Constitution of 1935, dubious though its status may have been, formed the legal basis of the Polish Government in Exile, and its repudiation by the Home Army would have removed the basis of that Government's authority. An immediate rising against the Germans would have been crushed with a fearful loss of Polish lives. On the other hand, circumstances justified the uncertainty in the minds of the Soviet partisans regarding the aims and attitude of the Polish Underground.

[2] An incomplete list of the Socialist and trade-union leaders who were deported into the Soviet Union in 1940–1 may be found in Scaevola: *A Study in Forgery*, pp. 12–16. This ideological antipathy was also behind the deportation, release, and rearrest of the Jewish trade-union leaders, Ehrlich and Alter (see above, p. 131 and note 7).

For an account of the development of the PPS and its split with the Left and with the party of Rosa Luxemburg see Hugh Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution* (London, Methuen, 1950), p. 37.

[3] Ibid. pp. 37–38. The party was dissolved for 'Trotskyism'.

re-creation of the Polish Communist Party, as the PPR, by Soviet Underground forces in Poland, a propaganda battle began between the two organizations.

(3) *Early Signs of the Controversy over Borders and Citizenship*

Although Anders had found the Soviet leaders relatively co-operative during the first months after the conclusion of the agreement of 30 July 1941,[1] indications appeared as early as November 1941 that the Soviet Government regarded the incorporation in the U.S.S.R. in 1939 of 'Western Ukraine' and 'Western Byelorussia' as still in effect. The Poles, however, claimed that Poland's borders continued to be those which had existed in 1939, as determined by the Treaty of Riga.[2] These conflicting theses were at the root of most of the trouble which gradually arose during the course of the war.

The question was raised in diplomatic exchanges between the Polish and Soviet Governments in November 1941, after the Russian General Shcherbakov in Alma Ata had begun, on the orders of the 'Central Authorities', to conscribe former Polish nationals of Ukrainian, White Russian, and Jewish descent into the Red Army, instead of allowing them to enter the Polish army in the U.S.S.R.[3] When the Poles brought this fact to the attention of the Russians, the Soviet Government, in a note of 1 December 1941, referred to the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of 29 November 1939, which had made Soviet citizens of all those who 'found themselves' in the former Polish territories incorporated in the Soviet Union in November 1939.[4] The note stated that, although persons of Polish descent residing in those territories before the incorporation were recognized as Polish citizens, through Soviet 'good will and compliance', this did not apply to persons of Ukrainian, White Russian, or Jewish descent, since the Polish-Soviet frontiers were 'subject to settlement in the future'.[5] During Sikorski's meeting with Stalin in December Stalin strongly hinted that the Polish Government in Exile should concern themselves only with Poles, not with White Russians, Ukrainians, or Jews,[6] and, according to Anders,[7] when the Polish army was transferred to Yangi-Yul, instructions were issued by the Soviet authorities forbidding the enlistment in the Polish army of any citizens

[1] See above, p. 127. However, they had never committed themselves on the territorial question.
[2] See ibid. note 1.
[3] *P.S.R.*, Document 56 (Polish note of 10 November), p. 164.
[4] 'In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939, all citizens of Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S.S.R. who found themselves on the territory of the said districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, respectively, acquired the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938' (*P.S.R.*, Document 57 (Soviet note of 1 December 1941), p. 165).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Anders, pp. 88–89.
[7] Ibid. p. 96.

of the Polish state, within its inter-war frontiers, who were not Poles in the ethnic sense. Meanwhile, the Polish Government, in a note of 9 December, had stated the Polish position, which was that the introduction of the Soviet Citizenship Act during the period of Soviet occupation after September 1939 violated the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.[1] In replying on 5 January 1942 the Soviet Government denied that there had been any violation of the IVth Hague Convention in 1939, since there had been no Soviet occupation of the territories in question, but an attachment of them to the U.S.S.R. 'as the result of the freely expressed will of the population of those districts'.[2]

This controversy over citizenship continued through diplomatic channels during 1942, together with the disputes over the problem of the missing Polish officers and the implementation of the amnesty for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R.[3] The question took a radical turn when the Soviet Government, in a note of 16 January 1943, revoked the exception which they had made for persons of Polish descent in the note of 1 December, owing to the 'negative attitude' of the Polish Government.[4]

This new development had a depressing effect upon the morale of Polish forces on all Allied fronts, as well as of those in Poland. Anders describes its serious effect on his men, now training in 'Irāq, who were aware of what this would mean both to those who had been left behind in Russia[5] and also to the Polish element in the unuprooted majority of the population of the disputed eastern territories.[6]

The Soviet position was reinforced by an article appearing in *Radyanska Ukrainia* on 20 February 1943 by the Ukrainian Soviet writer Alexander Korneichuk, in which he attacked many members of the Polish Government in London for opposing the union of 'Western Ukraine' with the Soviet Ukraine.[7] The Polish Government issued a reply on 25 February declaring that they expected Russia to restore the eastern frontier of Poland as established by the Treaty of Riga.[8] Meanwhile the new Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Tadeusz Romer, after discussing with Molotov

[1] *P.S.R.*, Document 58, p. 166.
[2] Ibid. Document 59, p. 167.
[3] Ibid. Documents 60, 61, pp. 169–70; Documents 37, 38, pp. 116–18.
[4] Ibid. Document 62, p. 171.
[5] Anders, pp. 135–7. Anders includes letters which he wrote after this event to Sikorski and to the President of Poland.
[6] The figures resulting from the Polish census of 1931 would make the total population of the area annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 something between 11 million and 12 million, of whom about 4,800,000 would have been Polish-speaking and about 5,900,000 Ukrainian-speaking and White Russian-speaking. The reported 4,800,000 Polish-speakers probably included the 1,200,000 people in the area who were Jews by religion, as well as a considerable number of those White Russian-speakers who were Roman Catholics of the Latin rite. The number of Polish-speaking Roman Catholics of the Latin rite, i.e. Poles, may have been less than $3\frac{1}{2}$ million, while the combined number of White Russians and Ukrainians may have been considerably more than 6 million.
[7] *New York Times*, 21 February 1943.
[8] *P.S.R.*, Document 83, pp. 207–8.

on 20 February the reasons for the Soviet change in attitude,[1] secured an audience with Stalin on 26 February. In the conversation Stalin acknowledged that there was a distinct conflict of views between the two Governments.[2]

The conflict was intensified during February 1943 by the publication of a letter from the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinov, which said that the Polish trade-union leaders, Ehrlich and Alter, who had been rearrested in December 1941 had been condemned to death in 1942, and had since been executed.[3] A strong protest on 8 March by the Polish Foreign Minister, Raczyński,[4] was firmly rejected by the Soviet Government in a note of 31 March.[5] Simultaneously, the controversy over the eastern frontiers of Poland was carried further by a Soviet declaration on 1 March mentioning the Curzon Line as a satisfactory western frontier for the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia,[6] and by a Polish statement, issued through the Polish Telegraph Agency on 5 March, declaring once again that the plebiscite which had taken place in those areas during 1939 had been contrary to international law, and that Polish rights to the territory were 'indisputable'.[7]

(4) *The Katyn Incident*

(a) *The Breaking-off of Russo-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 26 April 1943*

The Western Allies were too much preoccupied in the spring of 1943 with the task of fighting the war to form considered judgement upon the reports of torture and massacre which came from areas where Teutons and Slavs had been killing each other for centuries; and much of the evidence was conflicting. It was felt, too, that anything which might prejudice Allied co-operation, already delicate enough to maintain, had better be shelved until the war was over. But a severe shock to Western sensibilities was given on 13 April 1943 by Radio Berlin, which revealed the discovery in Katyn forest, near Smolensk, of the mass graves of thousands of Polish officers who had been methodically and expertly executed by a pistol shot in the back of the head. This broadcast said that there were over 10,000 bodies in the graves, and that this was a typical example of 'Jewish-Bolshevik bestiality', the murders having been com-

[1] For excerpts from Romer's conversation with Molotov, 20 February 1943, see *P.S.R.*, Document 87, pp. 213–17.

[2] For excerpts from Romer's conversation with Stalin and Molotov, 26–27 February 1943, see ibid. pp. 217–25.

[3] For the text of the letter see *The Dark Side of the Moon*, pp. 187–8. For another version of the case of Ehrlich and Alter, and of the effect of their execution in the United States, see Ciechanowski, pp. 120–1. See also above, p. 131 and note 7.

[4] *P.S.R.*, Document 68, pp. 178–9.

[5] Ibid. Document 69, p. 180.

[6] Ibid. Document 84, p. 208.

[7] Ibid. Document 85, p. 210.

mitted by the NKVD in the spring of 1940.[1] This display of righteous wrath against the Russians by the Nazis, who had committed such atrocities in the Warsaw ghetto and elsewhere, was at first quite unconvincing to Western minds. But for the Poles the report had a special significance which it was difficult for others to appreciate. For those thousands who had been murdered in such a fashion were the Polish military and intellectual leaders who would have provided the dynamic element for the creation of a future independent Poland. Whoever might have committed the crime, Poland was now deprived for ever of the victims' talents.

At the beginning of April the news was given by the Germans in Warsaw to a group of Poles who had been specially summoned to hear it,[2] and similar meetings were held in Cracow and Lublin. A delegation of nine persons from the three areas had then been flown to the scene in Katyn forest, and had been brought back to confirm the story to their friends.[3] The Polish Underground sent reports of their observations to London, expressing the belief that the bodies were those of Polish officers, but that their numbers were considerably less than the German estimate of 'over 10,000'.[4] A few days later a second group of Poles, this time consisting mostly of members of the Polish Red Cross, was sent to see the graves, and some of them remained to take part in the exhumation and identification.[5] When, after the visit of this delegation, the Executive Council of the Polish Red Cross became convinced of the identity of the bodies, but refused to send representatives to German prisoner of war camps to spread the news, the Germans forcibly 'organized' groups of Polish prisoners of war to visit the scene.[6]

In their announcement of 13 April the Nazis were so exultant at the opportunity of staining the reputation of the Russians that their bulletin was filled with inaccuracies and exaggerations,[7] some of which they were forced to revise as the evidence accumulated;[8] and this naturally raised doubts whether there were any truth at all in the charges.

The Germans also organized an expedition of foreign journalists to

[1] *Facts and Documents Concerning Polish Prisoners of War, Captured by the U.S.S.R. during the 1939 Campaign*, compiled in 1944 by a special commission under the Council of Ministers of the Polish Government in Exile [hereafter cited as *Facts and Documents*], pp. 234–5.

[2] Ibid. p. 226. See also Bor, p. 127.

[3] Ibid. For a list of the delegation see *Facts and Documents*, pp. 227–8.

[4] Ibid. p. 229; Bor, p. 130.

[5] *Facts and Documents*, p. 229–30. While conducting the exhumations the Polish Red Cross gathered a large amount of evidence which eventually was handed to the Polish Government in Exile.

[6] Ibid. pp. 231–3.

[7] For instance, that there were over 10,000 bodies. In fact there were not more than 4,500 (see Joseph Mackiewicz: *The Katyn Wood Murders* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1951), p. 206). The Russians, for reasons of their own, confirmed the inflated figure (see below, pp. 145–6).

[8] *Facts and Documents*, pp. 234–6. See also *Völkischer Beobachter*, 15, 16 April 1943.

visit Katyn forest, and reports soon began to appear in the neutral and satellite press. One of them, written by Robert Broess, which was published by an Argentine daily on 13 April, was used in Axis broadcasts. These journalists seemed convinced—to judge by their reports—that the German version was correct.[1]

The soldiers in Anders's army did not know that Polish leaders, after their prolonged and fruitless inquiries to the Russians about the missing officers, had for some time past become reconciled to the belief that these officers were no longer alive,[2] and, when the German discovery was announced, anxiety and despondency spread through the army. Anders sent a message on 15 April to the Government in London summarizing the unsuccessful efforts made by himself and the officers under his command to obtain news of the officers in 1941 and 1942, and advised the government leaders to ask for an official Soviet explanation.[3] His message arrived at approximately the same time as a report from the Polish Underground which confirmed the identity of the bodies. Bor-Komorowski had conducted his own investigation, independently of the Polish Red Cross, by sending a member of his organization to the scene:[4] he soon arrived at a conclusion on the question where the guilt lay.

After a two days' silence the Russians published a communiqué on 15 April which accused the Germans of 'vile fabrications', and attributed the massacre to the Germans themselves. The prisoners, said the com-

[1] *Facts and Documents*, pp. 236–42. See also *El Pampero* (Buenos Aires), 13 April 1943.

[2] In October 1940, eight months before Germany invaded Russia, the Russians were considering raising a Polish army to fight the Germans if ever it should be necessary. In an interview with Beria and Merkulov, Berling (see above, pp. 133–4) said that there was a nucleus for this army in the Soviet prison camps of Starobielsk and Kozielsk, but this was denied by the two Russians (Czapski: *The Inhuman Land*, p. 163). In spite of his partiality for the Soviet system, Berling did not keep this to himself.

[3] *Facts and Documents*, pp. 243–4. Some of the official Polish requests for information about the missing officers may be found in *P.S.R.*, Documents 34–38, pp. 110–18. An account of inquiries conducted independently by Polish authorities, including the futile missions to NKVD officials made by Captain Joseph Czapski at the request of Anders, may be found in Kusnierz, ed.: *Stalin and the Poles*, pp. 110–12, and in greater detail in *Facts and Documents*, which gives in Part One the entire history of the prisoners until their disappearance in the spring of 1940. A detailed list of the diplomatic interventions is given in Part Two, including an *aide mémoire* on the subject submitted on 3 November 1941 to the Russian Government by the British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps (p. 173). In all, between September 1941 and August 1942, eight formal inquiries about the missing Polish officers were addressed by the Polish Government to the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; and the question was taken up personally with Stalin by Kot, Sikorski, Anders, and Cripps. It was never once hinted in reply that the officers had been captured by the Germans in 1941 (see G. F. Hudson: 'A Polish Challenge', *International Affairs*, April 1950, xxvi. 220).

[4] Bor's representative brought him some tangible evidence, including diaries from which Bor concluded that the men had died about the beginning of April 1940, when Katyn was in Russian hands: and that they had come from Kozielsk, about 190 miles to the east. Constant inquiries had been made in vain of the Russians about Poles known to have been in prison camps there and at Ostashkov and Starobielsk. Of those who had been at the last two places nothing was learned (see Bor, pp. 129–34).

muniqué, had been doing construction work west of Smolensk in 1941, and had fallen into German hands in the summer of that year, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. As far as the other graves in the area which the Germans had mentioned were concerned, the communiqué said that the village of Gnezdovaya, near the scene, was the site of an historic burial ground where archaeological excavations had been made.[1] Another communiqué, issued by the Soviet Information Bureau on 17 April, said that the Nazis had probably massacred the prisoners in 1941; it gave reasons why the bodies in the upper layers should be so well preserved, and attributed the documents found on the bodies to 'Gestapo archives'.[2]

In spite of their alarm the Poles were cautious at first. On 15 April an article in a Polish newspaper published in London expressed the hope that the German accusations against the Russians would 'turn out—as has so often been the case in the past—to be lies'.[3] Caution, however, was cast aside on 17 April, and a communiqué was issued by the Polish Minister of National Defence, Kukiel, describing the story of the missing officers and the long efforts by Polish authorities to get some information about them from the Russians. It said that no answer had ever been received, and that, although the Poles had become accustomed to the lies of German propaganda, in view of the information which had come to their attention the Polish Government had already approached the International Red Cross in order that the charges might be 'verified by a competent international body', and had requested that a delegation should be sent to the spot.[4] This intention was publicly confirmed on the same day by the Polish Government in London in a statement which also mentioned some of the atrocities that morally debarred the Nazis from making 'political capital' out of the affair.[5] Meanwhile in Switzerland the Polish Red Cross delegate was handing the Government's request to a representative of the International Red Cross. Less than an hour before, a similar request had been made by a German representative.[6]

As has been seen, Polish-Soviet relations had been strained for some time over various interrelated questions. Since the exodus of Anders's army from

[1] *Soviet War News*, 17 April 1943. The communiqué made no reference to the numerous inquiries made during 1941 and 1942 about the missing officers. During the entire period Soviet leaders had never mentioned either that the prisoners had been located near Smolensk, or that they had fallen into the hands of the Germans. There can be no doubt that the Russians would have known this (since over 14,000 prisoners were involved), and, if true, its disclosure would have reflected no discredit upon the Russians, but would rather have removed a sore spot from relations with the Poles, by placing all responsibility for the fate of the missing prisoners upon the shoulders of the Germans. An attempt is made to arrive at possible motives behind this apparent Soviet deception by G. F. Hudson in 'A Polish Challenge', *International Affairs*, April 1950, xxvi. 221.

[2] *Pravda*, 19 April 1943. See also *The Times*, 19 April 1943.

[3] *Dziennik Polski*, 15 April 1943.

[4] *P.S.R.*, Document 39, p. 119.

[5] Ibid. Document 40, p. 122.

[6] *Facts and Documents*, p. 255.

the U.S.S.R. a train of events had been set in motion which with each day widened the gap between the two Governments. It was not the Katyn incident alone, then, as it seemed at the time, which produced a violent turn for the worse in Polish-Soviet relations. But, when an editorial appeared in *Pravda* on 19 April entitled 'Hitler's Polish Collaborators', it was apparent that the turn had taken place. The article made a bitter attack against the Polish Government in Exile for supporting the 'vile provocation of the Hitlerites'. Drawing attention to the many atrocities known to have been perpetrated by the Germans, and to the attempts in this case to put the blame on 'Jewish Commissars', the article said that the Polish approach to the Red Cross (at the same time as the German approach) must be considered 'direct and obvious help to the Hitlerite provocateurs'. The Polish nation, it said, rejected these slanders and turned away with revulsion from these Polish collaborators with Hitler.[1]

The article caused an international sensation. The journalists of the Western Allied press, preoccupied as they were with the prosecution of the war and unaware of the background of Polish-Soviet exchanges, feared that this incident would create a crisis in Polish-Soviet relations. It seemed as if the Poles had chosen a particularly bad moment to aid the propaganda of the enemy and to make such drastic charges against a friendly ally. Western press comment, however, did not prevent the Polish Foreign Minister from officially demanding, on 20 April, an explanation of the fate of the missing officers.[2] On 20 April Tass confirmed that the *Pravda* editorial coincided with official Soviet views, and again attacked 'pro-Hitler elements' in the Polish Government in Exile for bringing about a deterioration in relations with the U.S.S.R.[3]

On 26 April the Polish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. was summoned to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and was handed a note by Molotov. The Polish Government, it said, without inquiring or requesting an explanation from the Soviet Government, had acted simultaneously with the Germans in asking for a Red Cross investigation 'behind the back of the Soviet Government' and in conducting a press campaign 'along the same lines'. Since they had thus 'sunk so low as to enter the path of accord with the Hitlerite Government', and had adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union, the Russians had 'decided to interrupt relations with the Polish Government'.[4]

[1] *Pravda*, 19 April 1943; see also *New York Times*, 20 April 1943, and *The Times*, 21 April 1943.
[2] *P.S.R.*, Document 41, p. 123.
[3] *Facts and Documents*, p. 263; also *New York Times*, 21 April 1943.
[4] Rothstein, i. 202. In view of the many official approaches to the Russians referred to above, and the Polish note of 20 April (*P.S.R.*, Document 41, p. 123), the same statement in this Soviet note that 'the Polish Government did not even find it necessary to address to the Soviet Government any enquiry or request for an explanation of this subject' was false. For text of *Pravda* editorial, backing up the Soviet note, see *New York Times*, 29 April 1943.

This turn of events alarmed the British and Americans, who showed themselves more anxious to close the rift than to come to a reasoned conclusion about who was guilty.[1] Much regret was expressed in the press that a breach had been caused between two members of the United Nations, and that the Polish Government had exercised such bad judgement as to make an issue of the German charges at this critical stage of the war, when Allied co-operation was essential.[2] The *New York Times* felt that both the Russians and the Poles had fallen into a Nazi trap. The Poles were criticized for raising the issue and the Russians for abruptly breaking off relations.[3] *The Times* confined itself to criticism of the Poles for contributing to this triumph for Goebbels.[4] Intensive efforts were initiated in diplomatic circles to close the breach. Conferences were held on 27 and 28 April between Sikorski, Churchill, Eden, and the U.S. Ambassador in London, Winant.[5] At the same time the Polish Cabinet in London agreed on the text of a declaration which was published on the following day, stating that the Polish Government still desired a friendly policy towards the Soviet Union 'on the basis of the integrity and full sovereignty of the Republic of Poland', and that the Poles had no need to defend themselves from any charge of collaboration with Hitler, having denied the Germans the right in an earlier communiqué (that of 17 April 1943) to abuse this tragedy for their 'own perfidious aims'.[6] On 30 April, after more pressure by the Allied Governments, the Poles issued a declaration stating that they considered their request to the International Red Cross as having lapsed, since it had been exploited by the Germans for propaganda purposes,[7] whereupon Churchill, in a letter to the Poles on their National Day on 3 May, praised them for their efforts in unison with the Allies against the Germans.[8] The affair was considered to have taken a turn for the better on 4 May, when Stalin, replying in a letter to questions from correspondents of *The Times* and the *New York Times*, declared that he desired a strong and independent Poland, and that he would like to establish post-war relations upon 'solid good neighbourly relations and mutual respect'.[9] Any illusions that diplomatic relations would be restored, however, were removed by Vyshinsky on 6 May. In a statement to the press he reviewed relations with the Poles in the U.S.S.R. since the pact of 30 July 1941, and concluded that, since the Poles had refused to fight alongside the Red Army, and had used the facilities for distributing relief to conduct espionage against the U.S.S.R., they had shown a hostile attitude which could not

[1] See Eden's statement to the House of Commons, 4 May 1943, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 389, coll. 30–31.

[2] The attitude of Sumner Welles is described in Ciechanowski, p. 159. See also *The Times*, 27 April 1943.

[3] *New York Times*, 27 April 1943.

[4] *The Times*, 28 April 1943.

[5] Ibid.

[6] *P.S.R.*, Document 90, p. 247.

[7] *The Times*, 1 May 1943.

[8] Ibid. 3 May 1943.

[9] Ibid. 6 May 1943.

'but serve as an obstacle to truly friendly and intimate Soviet-Polish relations'.[1]

In spite of a denial of these charges issued by the Poles on 7 May,[2] it was clear that the causes of the dispute went much deeper than had been apparent at the time of the rupture. The British and Americans, however, in their anxiety to see relations restored, drew encouragement from the Russian use, in their note of 26 April, of the phrase 'interrupt' rather than 'break off' relations.

(β) *Subsequent Developments*

When the International Red Cross refused to investigate the Katyn incident because the Russians would not agree to a neutral investigation, the German Government organized a 'neutral' European Commission which consisted mainly of medical experts from occupied and satellite countries, although there was one representative from neutral Switzerland. After three days spent at Katyn, 28–30 April 1943, during which time the experts were said to have interviewed witnesses, acquainted themselves with the work of exhumation and examination that had been going on, and performed several post-mortem examinations themselves, they signed a protocol of their visit, giving a medico-legal opinion. The protocol contained an extensive description of the graves, the condition of the bodies, and the articles found on the bodies, as well as a statement of their verdict, which was that the mass of evidence showed these men to have been shot, each in the same manner, during March and April 1940.[3] The Germans' attempt, in their propaganda, to present the investigation as being that of a 'neutral' group was unsuccessful, since most of the experts had come from German-dominated countries. The protocol, therefore, did not make much impression upon world opinion.

The Germans continued, however, to exploit the propaganda potentialities of the discovery. For the next few months visitors of all types were

[1] Rothstein, i. 203–9.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 10 May 1943.

[3] The text of the protocol was printed in *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 May 1943. To discredit the findings of the 'European Commission' the Russians, in July 1946, produced one of the experts, Dr. Markov of Bulgaria, as a witness before the Nuremberg Tribunal, where he denied his findings as a member of the Commission, and confirmed the Russian version (see *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1945–1946.* Proceedings and Documents in Evidence. 42 vols. (Nuremberg, International Military Tribunal, 1947–9), xvii. 332 seqq. [referred to hereafter as *I.M.T. Nuremberg*]). A quite different story centred round the Swiss expert, Professor Naville. In October 1946 the Swiss Communists introduced a motion that he should either be dismissed (from his Chair) or revoke his former report. After hearing another report from Naville the chairman of the Cantonal Government of Geneva, on 17 January 1947, stated on behalf of his Government that Naville's actions had been in accordance with the principles of honour and the ethics of his profession, and that his new report fully explained the conclusions which he had reached in 1943 (Kusnierz, ed.: *Stalin and the Poles*, p. 125).

encouraged to visit the graves. Excursions for people of varying occupations and professions were organized from all over occupied Europe. Groups of prisoners of war were taken to the scene.[1] Visitors were encouraged to talk to local inhabitants. Large groups of Axis and satellite officers and men were conducted on tours of the area, and were urged to send their impressions home by *Luftpost*. The Nazis even produced some 'NKVD records', which they attempted to use to substantiate their claim.

In mid-September 1943, before the Germans were driven out of the area by the Red Army, the German Information Centre in Berlin published an exhaustive summary of the evidence which had been accumulated. The volume is divided into three parts: the first part, which is of most interest, deals with the discovery of the graves, and contains a description of their contents. The other two parts were concerned with the appeal which had been made to the International Red Cross and the diplomatic handling of the case by the Allies.[2]

Soon after the publication of this German summary in September 1943 the area was retaken by the Russians. The subject faded from public view until January 1944, when a report was published in the Soviet press (at the time of the Russo-Polish border dispute) by a 'Special Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest'.[3] The Special Commission, consisting of academicians, educationalists, and various officials, after working for an undisclosed period of time with the help of various Soviet medico-legal experts, published their report for the purpose of substantiating the Soviet version of the Katyn affair.[4] According to the report the evidence proved the following account:

The Polish officer prisoners of war referred to in former Polish notes, who had been evacuated by the Russians from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov in the spring of 1940, had been sent to three 'special camps' in the Smolensk area, where they had been engaged in construction and

[1] *Facts and Documents*, pp. 291–7. In September 1950 the U.S. Department of Defence released a statement made by Lieut.-Col. Van Vliet, Jr., who was among the prisoners of war conducted by the Germans to the graves. On his repatriation in May 1945 he had reported his experience to an Intelligence Officer, and was ordered to say nothing about it. Another report was called for in April 1950, the first having been 'misplaced or lost'. In this Van Vliet said that, although he had hated the Germans and had thought at first that 'the whole thing was one . . . desperate lie by the Germans to split the Western Allies from Russia', he 'believed that the Russians did it', and so did the rest of his group (*New York Times*, 19 September 1950).

[2] It was a 350-page volume, entitled *Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn*. For extracts in German from this document which were used in Göring's defence see *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xl. 267–77 (Göring 60–61).

[3] The Russians then and afterwards referred to the commission by this description: a flagrant example of the assumption of what they wished to prove.

[4] For the text of the report in German see *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxix. 290–332 (U.S.S.R. 54). For an English translation see *Soviet War News*, 27–28 January 1944. For a summary of this report by the deputy Soviet prosecutor, Pokrovsky, at Nuremberg, see *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, vii. 425–8.

road repair work in 1940–1. At the time of the German invasion the prisoners could not be evacuated in time, so that they fell into German hands in July 1941.[1] During the autumn of that year the Germans had made an intensive round-up of Polish prisoners who had escaped in the area, and had transported them in small groups to Katyn forest (which, according to the report, had never been a restricted area under the Soviet régime).[2] There a group of special police masquerading as the '537th Engineering Battalion' had executed them.[3] They had been buried at that time, but when the winter of 1942–3 had produced a change in military fortunes, the Germans had decided to use the graves as a provocation. They thereupon began to intimidate local witnesses in order to obtain false testimony, and opened the graves in order to remove all documents bearing dates later than the spring of 1940 and to put new materials on the bodies. In March 1943, to increase the numbers for propaganda purposes, the Germans brought many bodies from elsewhere to the scene in lorries, and put them in the graves.[4] They used 500 Russians for labour, and afterwards executed them all. According to the report the shooting, which was typically German in its method, took place in the autumn of 1941, as proved by the medico-legal examination; and there had been 11,000 bodies in the graves.[5]

This account was supported, in the report of the Special Commission, by testimony from witnesses, reports from Soviet medico-legal experts, and references to 'documentary material' in the hands of the Soviet authorities. The Russians took the line that the report was sufficient proof of German guilt. By Western legal standards, however, it was not sufficient

[1] As G. F. Hudson states, here the burden of proof was on the Russians, for they had only to prove that the prisoners had been in those 'special camps' in 1941, and had fallen into the hands of the Germans. If that much were true, it could be assumed that the Germans had killed them. In the light of the previous exchanges between the Poles and the Russians over the missing officers, when no mention was ever made by the Russians about these camps, and no trace of the prisoners could be found by anyone, including Anders and his subordinates, Soviet proofs were far from convincing (see G. F. Hudson: 'A Polish Challenge', *International Affairs*, April 1950, xxvi. 214–21).

[2] The Germans had claimed that Katyn forest had been an execution ground for the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD for many years, and that local residents had been forbidden to trespass there.

[3] German witnesses at Nuremberg testified that this battalion was Signal Regiment 537, a normal technical army unit; whereupon the Soviet prosecutor changed his ground, stating that special security units from Smolensk must have carried out the massacre. For this change of ground by the Soviet prosecutor, noted by the Defence Counsel, Dr. Stahmer, see *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xvii. 309–10.

[4] In the Special Commission's report the witness Moskovskaya testified that she had learned on an evening in March 1943 of events which took place a month afterwards in April 1943.

[5] The Polish Government, with information supplied by representatives of the Polish Red Cross who had taken part in the exhumations, estimated the total number of bodies found at Katyn to have been between 4,000 and 4,850 (*Facts and Documents*, pp. 324–5). The figure of 11,000 might be held to account for the men who disappeared from Starobielsk and Ostashkov, who have never been found. (For a comparison of the identified bodies with the prisoners known to have been in the Kozielsk camp see ibid. pp. 433–7.)

proof, as became apparent during the Nuremberg Trials in 1946. The other justices at Nuremberg did not agree when the Soviet prosecutor, Rudenko, attempted to have the report accepted without discussion. This attempt, and the fact that Rudenko twice changed his ground when confronted with German testimony, were an eloquent testimonial to the weakness of the Soviet case; moreover, the large amount of material in the hands of the Polish Government in Exile was not admitted as evidence.[1] It was significant indeed that the Nuremberg verdict passed over the Katyn massacre in silence.[2]

The international importance of the Katyn affair in 1943, however, had very little to do with whether the German, the Russian, or the Polish version of the affair was correct. It was important, first, because the Poles were convinced from the beginning that the Russians were responsible—not only the Poles connected with the Polish Government in Exile, but especially those who had been evacuated from Russia with Anders; and secondly, because the British and American Governments, faced with a choice, took sides with the Soviet Government against the Polish Government in Exile. At the time and for several years thereafter the British and United States Governments made efforts to see that information in their possession, and in the possession of the Polish Government in Exile, about the Katyn affair was not exposed to public view. Accordingly, it was not until many years later that this evidence began to appear, bit by bit.[3] The Katyn affair, indeed, had given the final stimulus needed to complete the breach between the Russians and the Poles; and the Allied Powers, having sided with the Russians, were now faced with the need for patching up an irreconcilable dispute.

[1] For the unsuccessful attempt to introduce this Polish evidence, referred to here as *Facts and Documents*, see *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xvii. 383.

[2] For the proceedings at Nuremberg with regard to the Katyn affair see ibid. vii. 425–8; ix. 3–4; xv. 289–93; xvii. 271–371. For the judgement at Nuremberg, see ibid. i. 171–342.

[3] On 18 September 1951 a Select Committee of Congress was set up in Washington to investigate the Katyn affair. Invitations to provide factual evidence or information were sent out. The Polish Government in Warsaw refused. *Pravda* of 3 March 1952 quoted the curt reply given by the Soviet Government to the Committee's inquiry for any evidence 'about [the reply says] the killing of Polish officer prisoners of war who were butchered by Hitlerite criminals in Katyn Forest in 1941'. No new evidence is given by the Soviet note, which affirms that the matter was settled once and for all by the Special Commission of 1944 (see above, p. 145). *Pravda* reproduces the report of the Commission which fills fifteen columns. In *Pravda* of 5 March 1952 there was a long attack on 'the American slanderers'; and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of the same date tried to show that those Americans who were agitating for renewed investigation of the affair had been *personae gratae* to Nazi officials.

The report of the American Select Committee has been published in seven volumes (*Hearings before the Select Committee To Conduct An Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, And Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre* . . . (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1952); and the first paragraph of the Findings runs: 'This Committee unanimously agrees that evidence . . . proves conclusively and irrevocably the Soviet NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) committed the massacre of Polish Army officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, not later than the spring of 1940.'

(5) *Origins of a Soviet-Sponsored Government and Army*

Not long after the departure of Anders's army to the Middle East it could be seen that a series of new developments was taking place among Poles within the U.S.S.R. A newspaper entitled *New Horizons* had some time before resumed its publication which had been abruptly cut off in Lwów by the German invasion.[1] On 1 March 1943 the first issue appeared of the weekly periodical *Wolna Polska* (Free Poland), which was soon to announce itself as the organ of a group of people called the 'Union of Polish Patriots' (UPP). It was apparent from, for instance, a declaration in the issue of 13 May that the views of this group on post-war Poland were in harmony with those of the Soviet Government.[2] By this time it was becoming clear that the facilities and the position of authority over the Poles remaining in the U.S.S.R., which had come to an end with the departure of the Polish Embassy from Kuibyshev, would now be accorded to the Union of Polish Patriots. On 2 June the UPP held a congress in Moscow, and on 18 June the names of its members were made public when their signatures appeared on a telegram of thanks to Stalin.[3] Their leader was Wanda Wasilewska, the Polish Communist wife of a Minister in the Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The military leader was Berling (lately a deserter from the army of Anders),[4] who had for some time been a convert to the Soviet cause. The other members of the UPP were persons of Polish extraction with varying political tendencies, united in being not unsympathetic to Soviet views.[5]

In the issue of *New Horizons* for 20 January 1943 there appeared an article, signed by 'Tadeusz W.', in response to which a resolution was put forward and passed by the UPP, recommending the formation of a Polish army in the U.S.S.R., to fight 'shoulder to shoulder' with the Red Army.[6] The group then submitted the resolution to the Soviet Government, with a request for permission to begin conscription. A Tass communiqué of 9 May 1943 announced that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had approved the request, and had consented to the formation of a division named after the Polish patriot, Tadeusz Kosciuszko.[7] Berling

[1] Scaevola: *A Study in Forgery*, p. 29. The writer was able to consult, at the Polish Research Centre in London, all issues of *New Horizons*, both those published in Lwów before June 1941, and those published after May 1942 in the U.S.S.R.

[2] *Wolna Polska*, issues for 1–13 May 1943. The Polish Research Centre was also in possession of all issues of this publication. See also R. Umiastowski: *Poland, Russia, and Great Britain, 1941–1945, a study of evidence*. Written with the assistance of Joanna Mary Aldridge (London, Hollis & Carter, 1946), p. 155.

[3] Ibid. p. 154.

[4] See above, pp. 133–4.

[5] See Umiastowski, loc. cit., and Scaevola, op. cit. pp. 47–53. Wasilewska's husband was A. Korneichuk, author of the controversial article on the Ukraine and White Ruthenia (see above, p. 137).

[6] Scaevola, op. cit. pp. 53–56. Cf. Article Two of the Stalin–Sikorski Declaration of December 1941 (see above, p. 131).

[7] Scaevola, op. cit. p. 54.

was to be in command. On 25 May conscription began for this division through Soviet draft boards, and on 1 September the Red Army newspaper *Red Star* announced that the Kosciuszko Division had been sent to the front.[1]

Meanwhile, the organizers of the new Underground workers' parties in Poland had been active. The 'People's Guard' were consolidating under their leader 'Rola' (Zymierski),[2] and in July the name was changed to 'People's Army'.[3] The Comintern had been abolished by Stalin in May as a gesture towards Allied co-operation. The organizers of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), however, under the experienced Comintern agent Boleslaw Bierut, were politically active in Warsaw during the summer of 1943, exerting efforts to secure the co-operation of groups of the Left. These efforts achieved limited success in securing the co-operation of the RPPS (Polish Workers' Socialist Party) through their leader Osobka-Morawski, when this group left the Socialist Underground organization, the WRN, and decided to co-operate with the Communists because of their disapproval of Home Army and WRN policy toward the Soviet partisans.[4] Similar motives also secured for Bierut the co-operation of Left-wing factions of the Peasant Party and other political parties, and on 1 December 1943 there were reports that the first meeting had taken place in Warsaw of the 'Krajowa Rada Narodowa' (KRN, National Council of the Homeland), the Left-wing version of an Underground parliament, which was later to develop, together with the UPP, into the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL).[5]

The summer of 1943 brought devastating setbacks to the Home Army and the Polish Government in Exile. In June the Germans succeeded in capturing the commander of the Home Army, General 'Grot' (Rowecki), whereupon his deputy commander, 'Bor' (Komorowski), was appointed to take his place.[6] An even more severe blow came to the Poles on 4 July, with the death of Sikorski, the soldier Prime Minister whose leadership had inspired them, when his plane crashed into the sea off Gibraltar.[7] It had been his desire to see Polish forces which were fighting on the various Allied fronts advance into Poland as Polish legions had done in the past, while the authorities of the Secret State under the Polish Government in

[1] Umiastowski, op. cit. p. 158.

[2] The leaders of the Underground in Poland adopted *noms de guerre*, as had the leaders of the Russian Revolution (e.g. Lenin, Stalin, Molotov). The best known of them is Komorowski, who took the name 'Bor' (Forest). See also below, p. 179, note 2.

[3] Bor, p. 135.

[4] See 'R': 'The Fate of Polish Socialism', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1949, xxviii. 125–42.

[5] See below, p. 165. Cf. Bor, p. 135; see also H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 115. For the abolishing of the Comintern see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 277.

[6] Bor, pp. 139–42.

[7] Mikolajczyk, p. 44.

Exile would direct a co-ordinated rising against the Germans and undertake the political administration of a liberated Poland. In their sorrow the Poles must have been aware that Sikorski's political acumen would be difficult to replace, for he had been able to strike a balance and secure co-operation between the leaders of the moderate groups and the more conservative civil servants and professional army officers who supported the conservative political groups in the Government in Exile. Sikorski had also successfully initiated a friendly policy towards the Czechs, which had resulted in discussions between the Czech and Polish Governments in London with the aim of removing old animosities and making plans for closer political and economic association after the war. A joint announcement had been issued on 11 November 1940, and ensuing discussions had led to a joint Polish-Czechoslovak agreement, signed on 23 January 1942. This agreement was a significant step towards the widely desired goal of a post-war confederation in association with a projected Greek-Yugoslav confederation on the basis of the Greek-Yugoslav agreement of 15 January 1942.[1] It was only after Sikorski's death that these plans for a Central European federation were abandoned because of the attitude of the Russians, who had been opposed to them from the beginning. The emotion produced by the death of Sikorski was not limited to the Poles. On 6 July 1943 a moving tribute was paid to him by Churchill.[2]

His successor as Prime Minister, appointed on 14 July, was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, a leader of the Peasant Party, who shared Sikorski's desire for a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, however, General Sosnkowski—with many other officials and army officers of the Government in Exile—had been a supporter of Pilsudski and was a confirmed enemy both of the Russians and of Bolshevism. He was not to make the new Prime Minister's unfortunate position any less difficult.[3]

It was Mikolajczyk's strong desire, as well as that of the Allies, to see relations restored between the Russians and the Polish Government in Exile. In October 1943, when Eden was planning to leave for Moscow, he was asked by Mikolajczyk to use his influence to bring about a resumption of relations. Preparations were being made by the Home Army for extensive action behind the German lines, and it was hoped that it would be possible to co-ordinate activities with the Red Army advance. The

[1] For texts of the joint announcement of 11 November 1940 and the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement of 23 January 1942 see *Czechoslovak Sources and Documents* No. 2 (New York, Czechoslovak Information Service, March 1943), pp. 132–3, 135–8. For plans for Balkan federation see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 530, 560.

[2] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 390, coll. 1946–7. President Roosevelt also expressed his sympathy in a telegram to the President of the Polish Republic (Ciechanowski, p. 175).

[3] For the attitude of Sosnkowski, described by a sympathizer, see Bor, p. 181. Sosnkowski was once Pilsudski's Underground chief of staff.

reply of the Soviet leaders was explicit. A renewal of relations could only take place, Molotov stated, with a government 'favourably disposed to the Soviet Union'. The Government in London, and particularly Sosnkowski, did not meet this qualification. Moreover, Molotov again accused the Home Army of failing to fight the Germans, and of adopting a 'passive' policy.[1]

(6) *The Question of the Polish-Soviet Frontier at the Tehrān Conference*

Some account has already been given of the diplomatic exchanges between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government in Exile over the question of citizenship, which had made it clear that the Russians had no intention of allowing the White Russian and Ukrainian districts which they had occupied in 1939 to revert to Polish sovereignty.[2] The Russians' claim to the Curzon Line as their frontier with Poland had indeed been stated as early as December 1941, during Eden's visit to Moscow; and in 1942, when the British and the Russians were engaged in negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet Treaty that was eventually signed on 26 May of that year, it had required Churchill's resolute unwillingness, at this stage, to make any territorial concessions affecting Poland, backed up by energetic representations from Cordell Hull and Roosevelt, to prevail upon the Russians to drop their demand that the territory acquired through the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact should be recognized, in the treaty, as being part of the U.S.S.R.[3] At the Tehrān Conference at the end of 1943, Stalin said that, if Russia were to receive the warm-water port of Königsberg, he would agree to Churchill's proposal that Poland's eastern boundary should be the Curzon Line,[4] and that Poland should receive compensation

[1] Bor, p. 179.

[2] See above, pp. 136–8. For claims on ethnic grounds to eastern inter-war Poland and for Stalin's desire to unite the Ukrainian and White Russian populations see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 407, notes 1 & 3.

[3] See ibid. pp. 167–70 and 178–9; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1166–74. Cf. Ciechanowski, pp. 104–6.

[4] The Curzon Line was the line to which Lord Curzon had proposed to the Soviet Government that the Polish troops should retire in July 1920, when the fortunes of the Russo-Polish war after the First World War were momentarily in the Russians' favour. This Curzon Line followed, in ex-Russian territory between the southern frontier of East Prussia and the former northern frontier of Austria in Galicia, a line that had been recommended to the Supreme Council of the Allies by its Commission on Polish Affairs as a 'minimum' eastern frontier for Poland. Between the northern boundary of Galicia and the northern frontier of Czechoslovakia along the Carpathians, it followed the more westerly (Line 'A') of two alternative lines ('A' and 'B') that the Commission had subsequently recommended in this area. The northernmost section of the whole line, i.e. the section between East Prussia and the River Bug, corresponded closely to the ethnographic line of division between Poles to the west, and Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ukrainians to the east. The southernmost section of the part running through ex-Russian territory assigned to Poland the Kholm (Chelm) district, in which the Ukrainians were in a majority over the Poles. In the Galician section, Line 'A' corresponded closely to the ethnographic line of division between Poles to the west and Ukrainians to the east, whereas the area contained between lines 'A' and 'B' was inhabited by a mixed population with an Ukrainian majority. The city and immediate

at the expense of Germany for her territorial losses in the east. It was agreed provisionally that East Prussia (as defined) and the Oppeln district of Silesia should go to Poland, and that her western boundary should be the Oder. The question of the extension southwards from the Oder was left open.[1] Roosevelt did not take an active part in these discussions. He was known to favour Poland's retaining Lwów and the oilfields of Drohobycz and Stanislawow.[2] All three lay east of the Curzon Line; but the Curzon Line might perhaps have been interpreted as running to the east of Lwów and Drohobycz if it had been taken, in Galicia, to follow the Line 'B', instead of the Line 'A', suggested in the recommendation of the Supreme Council's Commission on Polish Affairs in 1919.[3] When the subject of relations with the Polish Government was mentioned, Molotov repeated his charges against the Government in Exile, Sosnkowski, and the Home Army; and Stalin mentioned that what was needed for successful relations was a Polish Paasikivi.[4]

neighbourhood of Lwów (Lviv) was an isolated enclave of Polish population in an Ukrainian countryside.

The British delegation on the Commission had held that Line 'A' ought to be the frontier in any event. A majority on the Commission had held that, if Poland were to include an autonomous Ukrainian state in Eastern Galicia, Line 'A' ought to be the boundary between this East Galician Ukrainian state and Poland Proper, but that, if Eastern Galicia were not to be associated with Poland, then Poland's eastern frontier ought to be drawn along Line 'B'.

The territory between lines 'A' and 'B' was valuable. Besides the city of Lwów, it contained the oilfield of Drohobycz.

At Tehrān, Stalin did not waive his claim to Lwów, and Churchill did not press for the retention of Lwów by Poland.

[1] Churchill, v. 319–20, 348–51, 356–7; U.S. edition, v. 361–2, 394–7, 403. (The Union of Polish Patriots had been advocating a similar territorial arrangement for Poland in *Wolna Polska* since May 1943.) Churchill says (ibid. pp. 356, note, and 403, note, respectively) that no question as to whether the rest of the boundary should be the Eastern or Western Neisse had yet arisen. His description of the two rivers (pp. 359 and 406 respectively) is misleading. The Eastern (Glatzer) and Western (Görlitzer or Lausitzer) Neisse Rivers are quite distinct, though they both flow in a roughly northernly direction between the Czechoslovak frontier and the Oder. The Eastern Neisse joins the Oder in 50° 47′ N. 17° 40′ E.: a boundary from Stettin along the Oder and this river would give Poland German Upper Silesia. The Western Neisse joins the Oder in 52° 5′ N. 14° 46′ E.: a boundary from Stettin along the Oder and this river gives Poland the whole of Silesia. The difference is about 7,600 square miles. The distinction was made at Yalta (February 1945) (see Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.: *Roosevelt and the Russians*: *The Yalta Conference* (London, Cape, 1950), p. 166). [This work is referred to hereafter as Stettinius. Quotations in later sections of this volume from *Roosevelt and the Russians* are made by permission of Jonathan Cape Ltd., and (in the case of the American edition, copyright 1949 by The Stettinius Fund, Inc.) by permission of Doubleday & Company Inc., New York.] At the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945) it was agreed (see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, Berlin, 2nd August, 1945*, Cmd. 7087 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 7087]) that, pending final determination at the peace settlement it should be the Western Neisse that should form part of Poland's western frontier.

[2] See James F. Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly* (New York, Harper, 1947), p. 29. See also Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1266.

[3] See above, p. 151, note 4.

[4] Ciechanowski, p. 248. Cf. Churchill, v. 349; U.S. edition, v. 394–5; for Paasikivi's success in negotiations with the Russians see below, pp. 274–5 and note 1. For the Tehrān Conference see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 348 seqq.

(*b*) The Red Army in Poland

(1) *The Entry of the Red Army, January 1944*

As it became obvious towards the end of 1943 that the Red Army would soon cross the pre-1939 eastern border of Poland, the Poles were forced to consider what relation the underground Home Army should have with Russian military operations. Until then they had entertained strong hopes that British and American forces would be the first to enter Poland, and that the Home Army would be able to stage an armed insurrection with their support.[1] When it could no longer be doubted that the Russians would enter first, the Poles reluctantly began to adjust their operational plans to the new circumstances: the pace of their adjustment, however, did not conform to the speed of events.

Reports reached the Polish Government in Exile on 4 January 1944 that the Red Army had crossed the inter-war frontier into Volhynia; and on the following day they published a note in which they drew attention to their record of never having produced a quisling, to the activities carried on by the Underground, and to the efforts made by Polish forces on all the Allied fronts in the common cause; all of which entitled the Poles to expect just treatment after liberation. The first condition of such justice, the note declared, was the right to establish a Polish sovereign administration; and the Polish Government, being 'responsible for the fate of the nation', had an 'indestructible' right to independence. They therefore expected the Soviet Government to respect these rights, since the Poles would not, they said, recognize solutions imposed by force. While they desired an agreement with the Russians which would enable the Poles to co-ordinate Underground activities with the Red Army, they had given instructions to the Underground on 27 October 1943 directing the Home Army to intensify resistance against the Germans, to avoid conflicts with the Red Army, and to co-operate with Soviet commanders *in the event* of the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations.

The instructions mentioned in the Polish note, however, were only a part of Sosnkowski's order of 27 October, which was designed to cover several possible eventualities. If the general insurrection with Western aid were not feasible, the Home Army was to launch intensified sabotage and diversionary attacks behind the German lines in Poland. This operation had been given the code name *Burza* (Tempest). If the efforts of Mikolajczyk, the Prime Minister, to secure a resumption of relations were successful, *Burza* was to be undertaken in co-operation with the Russians. If relations remained severed, however, *Burza* was to be carried out independently, and both administrative authorities and armed forces were to remain underground.[2]

[1] Bor, p. 174.

[2] Ibid. pp. 174–6.

Sosnkowski had issued these instructions in answer to a request from Bor for a clarification of the attitude which was to be taken towards the advancing Russians.[1] Bor states that in spite of this he did not follow the instructions of his Commander-in-Chief, and that in this Jankowski supported him. Bor issued an order on 20 November 1943, following the suggestions regarding *Burza* action, but directing local commanders to come out into the open and to present themselves to Red Army authorities. He ordered them to avoid conflict with Soviet partisans and the Red Army, to fight in self-defence, but to resist any attempts to conscribe Home Army units into the Red Army.[2] In defence of his decision not to carry out his instructions, Bor stated that it was not possible to fight the Germans and remain underground. He pointed out that such action would have confirmed Soviet suspicions against the Home Army, and further that the NKVD was well aware of the Home Army leadership.[3] He 'had no illusions whatsoever' about the Soviet Union.[4] He was aware of the significance of the friction that his soldiers were having with the 'People's Army' units, of the Russian steps to establish a rival Polish Government and army, and of the demand for the acceptance of the Curzon Line. He must have known, therefore, what to expect from the Russians when he gave his orders to his subordinate commander to emerge from the Underground (although he said explicitly that there was no indication of the Russian attitude);[5] but he decided to pin his faith on the ability of the Western Powers to protect the Home Army and administrative authorities of the Underground State—a faith which Sosnkowski in London did not share.

Political activity in Poland at this time was not limited to the Home Army. The establishment in Warsaw in December of the KRN (National Council of the Homeland) by the PPR (Polish Communists) caused violent feelings among members of the Polish Underground. It was accordingly followed on 9 January by a decision of the Polish Government in Exile to enlarge the 'political representation' from the four representatives of the main political parties to 15–18 members of a 'Council of National Unity'. On 30 January 1944 the Soviet-controlled Kosciuszko Station's announcement that the National Council of the Homeland was composed not only of members of the PPR but also of members of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and Polish Socialist Party (PPS) provoked a strong denial wherein the London Poles described the KRN as a 'fictitious institution'.[6]

On 11 January 1944, in their reply to the Polish note of 5 January, the

[1] Bor, p. 174.
[2] Ibid. pp. 177–8.
[3] Ibid. pp. 176–81.
[4] Ibid. p. 181.
[5] Ibid. For an unmistakable indication, in the form of a note from the Russians to Soviet partisans intercepted by the Home Army, see the Polish Government's note to Great Britain of 16 January 1944 (Mikolajczyk, pp. 309–12).
[6] *Dziennik Polski*, 29 February 1944.

Russians set forth in explicit terms the Soviet plans for Poland. Referring to the definition of the Soviet-Polish frontier which had appeared in the Soviet Constitution after the 'will of the population' had been expressed in the plebiscite of 1939, the note stated that the 'injustice permitted by the Riga Treaty of 1921' had been rectified. The entry of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union thus did not infringe Polish interests, but instead created a reliable basis for solid and permanent friendship. Repeating the declared Soviet desire for a strong and independent Poland, the note stated that the Russians were even in favour of an alliance, and suggested that this might be promoted by the adherence of Poland to the recent Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty.[1] The note praised the efforts of the Union of Polish Patriots, and the Polish Army Corps 'formed by it' in the common struggle, and said that Poland must be reconstituted not by the seizure of Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands, but by the restoration of ancient Polish lands which had been 'wrested' from her by the Germans. The eastern frontier was not 'immutable', but modifications might be introduced in areas with a preponderance of Poles. In such an event the frontier would approximate to the Curzon Line. The note repeated Soviet charges that the Polish Government in Exile had been proved incapable either of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union or of organizing an active struggle against the Germans. It reminded the Poles, however, that it was 'in the interests' of both countries to establish friendly relations and to unite in the common cause.[2]

The Polish Government replied in a communiqué of 14 January, stating their desire that in the interests of Allied solidarity the questions raised in the Soviet note should not be publicly discussed at this time. They wanted an agreement which would be just and acceptable to both sides, but the Poles would not recognize 'unilateral decisions or accomplished facts'. They were now approaching the British and United States Governments in the hope of securing through their mediation a Polish-Soviet discussion (with the participation of British and American representatives) of all outstanding questions.

The Soviet answer on 17 January left little doubt that the Polish initiative would have no effect. Since the Poles had ignored the frontier question in their note, it was considered by the Soviet Government that they had rejected the Curzon Line. The Polish proposal to open official negotiations, moreover, was meaningless, because negotiations could not be opened

[1] For the text of the Soviet-Czechoslovak 'Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration', concluded on 12 December 1943, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 145, pp. 238–40.

[2] Tass communiqué printed in Rothstein, ii. 39. See also note on the Curzon Line, ibid. p. 40. For the Polish point of view on this question see Mikolajczyk's note to Churchill of 16 November 1943 (Mikolajczyk, pp. 300–3).

while diplomatic relations were suspended. In the Soviet view this Polish move was another demonstration that the Polish Government did not wish to establish good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.

The Poles had submitted a note to the British Government on 16 January requesting their mediation with the object of bringing about such a discussion as was envisaged in the Polish communiqué of 14 January. The need was pressing, they said, for an agreement between the Russians and the Home Army. Further they asked that Polish, British, and American troops should enter Poland, at the same time as Soviet troops, to guarantee Polish security.[1] On 20 January 1944 Mikolajczyk met Churchill in London and was told in clear and unmistakable terms that it was the British view that Poland should extend from the Curzon Line to the Oder, and that there should be a suitable transfer of populations, Polish, Ukrainian, White Russian, and German. When Mikolajczyk objected Churchill said that Great Britain had not gone to war to defend Poland's eastern frontier, and that neither she nor the United States would do so in future. If such an agreement as he had suggested were reached now, he said, it could be guaranteed by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union, although Roosevelt, under the American Constitution, could not guarantee the borders of any foreign country. Churchill then advised Mikolajczyk to agree to the Curzon Line at least in principle. Considerations such as Stalin's demand for the removal of Sosnkowski (which Churchill considered interference in Polish internal affairs) might be overridden if Mikolajczyk would rise to the occasion. But Mikolajczyk said that he could not agree because the Russian demand for recognition of the Curzon Line as the frontier was but a preliminary step in Russia's aim to take not only the whole of Poland, but the whole of Europe. He would, however, take the matter up with the Government and Underground, and give Churchill an answer as soon as possible.[2]

In reply to a note submitted on 23 January 1944 by the Polish Government, intended mainly to ascertain the specific degree of guarantee which the British Government would be prepared to accord to Churchill's proposals,[3] Eden said that the views of other governments must first be elicited.[4] In spite of what Churchill had said, Mikolajczyk sent another set of questions to Roosevelt, asking the attitude of the United States Government towards war-time territorial settlements, towards the question of guaranteeing borders, and towards Churchill's proposals.[5] The President consulted the Secretary of State[6] and gave his answer on 1 February, to the effect that the United States Government could not guarantee frontiers. Dropping a hint to the Poles that they should themselves try to reach a

[1] For text see Mikolajczyk, pp. 309–12.
[2] Ibid. pp. 56–58.
[3] Text, ibid. pp. 312–14.
[4] Ibid. p. 58.
[5] Ciechanowski, p. 270.
[6] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1438–9.

solution without delay, in view of the recent developments, he said that the United States Government were prepared to support Churchill's endeavours to bring about a re-establishment of Polish-Soviet relations.[1]

Mikolajczyk had also sent Churchill's proposals to Polish Underground leaders, enclosing with them the Soviet demand for the removal of Sosnkowski and Kukiel from their posts.[2] After consultations the Council of National Unity passed a resolution, sent to London on 15 February 1944, which stated that they agreed to the proposed western boundary on the Oder, but not to the proposed eastern boundary, since the gain in the west would be no equivalent for the loss in the east. They regarded the Treaty of Riga as inviolable and not open to discussion; but they hoped that relations with the Russians would be resumed with the aid of the Western Allies, on condition that full Polish sovereign rights were respected, and that there would be no 'meddling in our internal affairs'. In view of the great sacrifices made by the Poles, they said, they deserved Allied support, but in any case the 'Polish nation was determined to fight the new Soviet aggression' and would never submit to force.[3]

This resolution symbolized a stubborn attitude which showed a characteristically Polish lack of political sense in spite of repeated cautions from the Allied leaders. Whether it expressed collective Polish opinion (which is doubtful, for how could such an opinion be established?) or only that of the leaders of the Polish Underground, it tied the hands of their Government, who in the face of it could not accept the Russian demands, even had they been able to agree among themselves on such a course. The Underground leaders were not only taking a proud but foolish stand which they could not maintain against both the ethnographic facts in the eastern parts of inter-war Poland and the pressing reality of Russian plans for Poland; they were also sealing the fate of their organization and of the Government in Exile.

Even more unfortunate was Bor's plan for the Home Army in the face of the dilemma brought about by the advance of the Russians. Regardless of his expressed hostility towards Soviet Russia and the friction already experienced with Soviet partisans, he still hoped that the Russians would allow Home Army units who came out into the open to remain under the command of Warsaw and London; and that they would allow Underground leaders to take over the administration of Polish territory in the rear of the Red Army's advance towards Berlin, despite the Home Army instructions to oppose Soviet demands for disbandment or incorporation

[1] Ibid. For text of Roosevelt's reply see Mikolajczyk, pp. 314–15.

[2] Bor, p. 184. The Russians had demanded the dismissal of Kukiel, the Minister for National Defence, presumably because it had been he who had announced on 17 April 1943 the Polish Government's intention to appeal, over the Katyn affair, to some such body as the International Red Cross.

[3] For text of resolution see ibid. pp. 185–6.

in the Red Army. Together with other Polish military leaders he hoped alternatively that the Red Army, as a result of American and British intervention, would stop pursuing the Germans after defeating them in Poland, and would let the Polish Government in Exile take over the administration. He seemed to disregard the military axiom that the commander of any army would not allow potentially hostile units to remain organized in his rear if he could possibly prevent it. Sosnkowski finally came to share the point of view of Bor and Jankowski, and on 18 February 1944 a message similar to Bor's November order was sent to the Polish Underground from London, amending the instructions of 27 October 1943. Home Army leaders were now officially directed to present themselves to Soviet commanders with a declaration stating that on behalf of the administration of the Government of the Polish Republic they proposed co-operation with the Red Army against the Germans. The message added that Home Army commanders were to emphasize that, as part of the Polish armed forces, they remained under the command of the Polish Commander-in-Chief and of the Polish Government in Exile.[1]

Meanwhile, on 15 February, the Polish Government in Exile had finally presented their answer to Churchill's proposals. This stated that they were ready to begin conversations with the Russians (with the co-operation of the British and Americans), and that they did not 'exclude' talks on frontier questions, but that they could not accept the 'dictatorial demand' of the Russians for the Curzon Line. Such questions, they said, could only be settled at the end of the war. They did present, however, an alternative proposal for a *temporary* demarcation line running east of Lwów and Vilna. The administration of the territory east of the line, they suggested, should be conducted jointly by the Western Allies and Soviet Russia. The territory west of the line, however, should be taken over by the Polish Government. The Poles objected to the Russian intention of incorporating part of East Prussia in the Soviet Union, saying that this would restrict Poland's free access to the sea. On the question of the Russian demand for the removal of Sosnkowski and Kukiel, the Polish note insisted that no foreign Power could dictate changes in the Polish Government.[2]

Churchill, 'infuriated',[3] said that there would be no restoration of Polish-Soviet relations unless the Russian territorial demands were agreed to; and when Mikolajczyk declared that he was not empowered to give away half his country Churchill said that he would soon make a public statement on the matter. The Polish answer, however, was sent on by Churchill to the Soviet Government, and was abruptly rejected by Stalin.[4]

In his speech to the House of Commons on 22 February 1944 Churchill

[1] Bor, p. 177.
[2] Text in Mikolajczyk, pp. 315–16.
[3] Ibid. p. 59.
[4] Ibid.

mentioned that Stalin had indicated to him at their recent meeting at Tehrān that he was in favour of a strong and independent Poland. Britain had never guaranteed a particular frontier line to Poland, he said, and in 1919 the British view of what the equitable frontier would be had been expressed in the Curzon Line. Although he still felt that territorial issues should be settled after the war, the Russian advance had made it necessary that a working agreement should be reached among all anti-Hitlerite forces. He mentioned the recent efforts made by the British with the Polish Government in Exile toward this end, and said that, although he felt great sympathy for the Poles, he also appreciated the Russians' point of view. They had a right to reassurance against further attacks by Germany, and for this purpose they had, in addition to their own might, complete British support and the 'approval and assent of the United Nations'. He mentioned the proposed territorial compensation for Poland in the west, and added that he could not feel that Russia's demand for reassurance on her western flank went 'beyond the limits of what is reasonable and just'.[1]

This public statement of British support for the Russian demands against Poland aroused a storm of protest from the Poles. Anders, now in Italy with his reorganized Polish army corps, sent a message to Sosnkowski, stating that his Polish army, although fighting the Germans, would also consider the Bolsheviks as enemies.[2] Romer, the Foreign Minister, sent an official protest on 24 February to the British Foreign Office, which pointed out that Poland's eastern frontiers, as settled by the Treaty of Riga, had been approved by the Council of Ambassadors in 1923, and that Lord Curzon (then Foreign Secretary) had taken a prominent role in that approval.[3]

(2) *First Contacts between Home Army Units and the Red Army*

The first operational contact between the Red Army and Home Army units occurred in Volhynia in March 1944. As a result of successful co-operation in specific actions against the Germans, the commander of the 27th Division of the Home Army established direct contact with the Red Army commander in the Kowel sector. He was informed that the Red Army would be glad to co-operate with the Home Army upon certain conditions. The 27th Division could retain full contact with its authorities, and be acknowledged as a division of the Polish armed forces with authority from Warsaw and London; but they must accept full operational subordination to the Red Army, on either side of the River Bug.[4] They must reorganize

[1] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 397, coll. 697–8.
[2] Anders, pp. 159–60.
[3] Mikolajczyk, p. 60.
[4] The Russians differentiated between their policies on either side of the Bug, which coincided with the Curzon Line.

from a partisan unit into a normal infantry division, since the Soviet command would not permit partisans in their rear. This division would receive full equipment, transport, and supplies. Bor agreed in principle, with the reservation that tactical subordination was to be temporary; and he instructed the local commander, Colonel 'Oliwa', to inform the Russians that the 27th Division was the first of many units that the Red Army would meet in its progress through Poland, and that for concerted action a general agreement was desirable on a higher level.[1]

There was a period of successful co-operative action against the Germans in the Kowel area, but on 9 April the commander of this division received a proposal from a representative of the NKVD to join the army commanded by General (formerly Lieut.-Colonel) Berling.[2] Bor states that reports from other parts of eastern Poland were coming to his headquarters by this time which showed that the Russians were co-operating fully with Home Army units while fighting the Germans, but were pursuing a different policy behind the front lines. After the occupation of a district, the local Home Army unit would be disarmed, and its leaders arrested and in some cases shot; after which the Russians would begin the conscription of all able-bodied men into the Red Army.[3] As early as 4 March 1944 Mikolajczyk had expressed anxiety over such incidents, and had appealed to the British to intervene.[4] On 4 April the Polish Government again expressed their concern, this time by a public statement.[5]

Meanwhile Soviet articles and reports, circulated in London after Churchill's statement of 22 February, were stating that there would be no co-operation with the Poles unless they agreed to accept the Curzon Line and to remove several unfriendly persons from the Polish Government in Exile: Sosnkowski and Kukiel,[6] and Kot, who was publicly disputing the Russian right to a frontier along the Curzon Line.[7] A propaganda campaign against the Home Army, which failed to mention its achievements in co-operation with the Red Army, was attaining some results in March, for American and British leaders began to express doubts to the Poles whether the Home Army command and the Government in Exile were actually in control of the entire Polish Underground. As a result of these misgivings, Sosnkowski and Bor instituted 'Operation Jula'. An area was selected in south-eastern Poland, and on 6 April three separate sections of railway line in that sector were put out of commission by Polish Underground forces (according to Bor) for from thirty-three to forty-eight hours. A letter to Sosnkowski from Lord Selborne, British Minister

[1] Bor, pp. 186–7.
[2] See above, pp. 133–4, 148.
[3] Bor, p. 188.
[4] Mikolajczyk, pp. 61–62.
[5] Ibid. p. 73.
[6] See above, p. 157, note 2.
[7] *New York Times*, 6 March, *The Times*, 8 March 1944.

of Economic Warfare, on 3 May, expressed the admiration of the British General Staff for the exploit, and for the other activities of the Polish Secret Army.[1]

During the early months of 1944 changes took place in the Underground leadership in Poland. The establishment in January of a Council of National Unity[2] was followed on 26 April by the appointment of Jankowski as Deputy Prime Minister; and on 3 May he nominated representatives of the three main political parties to act as a Council of Ministers.

The month of May brought heartening news to the Poles. The army of General Anders, now reorganized and expanded into the Second Polish Corps, was fighting in Italy under British Eighth Army Command. For their first test in organized battle against the Germans they had been assigned the capture of the Abbey at Monte Cassino, which had become a German fortress blocking the road to Rome. Their attack was launched on 11 May, and one week later (18 May) Anders was able to report that it had been successful. The Second Polish Corps received commendations from Allied military leaders and the leaders of the Polish Government for 'covering themselves with glory' in the battle, and on 25 May General Alexander conferred upon General Anders the Companionship of the Order of the Bath.[3]

For the occasion of the Allied cross-Channel invasion of Europe Mikolajczyk recorded a speech on 3 June to be broadcast on D-Day to the Polish Underground in France calling on them to rise with the Maquis in aid of the invading forces. He also appealed to Poles who had been forcibly conscribed into the German army to desert to the Allies. The Polish Government had recently recognized the French Committee of Liberation under de Gaulle, and arrangements had been made for the co-operation of the Maquis and the Polish Underground in France.[4]

After recording this speech Mikolajczyk flew to Washington accompanied by 'Tabor', Deputy Commander of the Home Army. Mikolajczyk had wanted for some time past to visit the United States, in order to find out how far the Poles could depend on President Roosevelt's support now that the British Government had made it clear that they were not prepared to back Poland in rejecting Russian demands.[5] The Poles could not expect

[1] For the text of Lord Selborne's letter and a description of 'Operation Jula' see Bor, pp. 189–91.

[2] See above, p. 154.

[3] For the background and details of the battle see Anders, chapters xvii and xviii.

[4] Mikolajczyk, pp. 64, 68.

[5] Early in April 1944 Mikolajczyk took part in a meeting at Chequers with Churchill, the American Ambassador (Winant), and the Director of Lend-Lease (Stettinius). Churchill jocularly advised Mikolajczyk to state Poland's case to the Americans, who were 'better friends of Poland' than he was. He told Mikolajczyk that he still believed in the Curzon Line, but that in March he had stopped exchanging telegrams with Stalin about Poland, since Stalin's last reply had been so rude (ibid. pp. 63–64).

Roosevelt, in a Presidential election year, to commit himself definitely to support of their cause, but they hoped that his sensitiveness to the domestic political pulse would make him show them signs of favour in order not to alienate the 6 million Americans of Polish descent.[1] Mikolajczyk's projected visit had, however, been postponed several times, on American initiative, and a further postponement was the only response to a detailed statement of Polish views on relations with Russia which was dated 18 March 1944. This statement was reinforced by evidence (supplied by the Underground movement) of the feelings of the Polish people and by an appeal to Roosevelt to intercede with the Russians in order to safeguard the Home Army and the Underground political administration.[2] Conferences between Mikolajczyk and Roosevelt, Hull, Stettinius (now Under-Secretary of State), and other civil and military officials were finally arranged to take place early in June. Mikolajczyk and 'Tabor' arrived in Washington on 6 June and had several conversations with the President. Roosevelt impressed the Polish leaders by his knowledge of Polish history and his appreciation of the plight of Poland. With reference to the Big Three conference at Tehrān, he said that he was himself opposed to the Curzon Line as a final settlement, and that neither he nor Stalin had mentioned it until Churchill brought the subject up. Then, he said, Stalin had taken complete advantage of his opportunity. Roosevelt made it very clear to Mikolajczyk that he could not commit himself on the subject of Poland during an election year. He hoped, however, that in an 'easier' atmosphere he would be able to prevail upon Stalin to let Poland have Lwów, Stanislawow, and the oilfields of Drohobycz, though possibly not Vilna. He thought that Poland ought to receive Silesia and East Prussia, and that Stalin would not insist on having Königsberg. The destruction of Poland, he said, was not desired by Stalin, and it would be out of the question in any case because Poland had the moral support of the people of the United States. He thought Stalin would make a 'gesture' to the Poles when he realized the size and influence of the Home Army.

The President strongly advised that, in order to produce the 'easier' atmosphere, the Poles should make an attempt to resolve their differences with the Russians. He suggested that Mikolajczyk should pay a visit to Stalin and discuss with him 'not the problems that divide you, but the interests common to you both'.[3] He emphasized, as did Hull, that Mikolajczyk should be prepared to make concessions for the sake of friendly relations. They should certainly try to avoid any *final* settlement of terri-

[1] One Polish view of the American scene at this time is expressed in Ciechanowski, chapters xxix and xxxi.

[2] Texts of Mikolajczyk's letter of 18 March and of Roosevelt's reply in Mikolajczyk, pp. 316–26.

[3] Ciechanowski, p. 300.

torial matters, but it might be advisable for the Poles to consent to make changes in their Government. Subject to the conditions and suggestions that he had mentioned, he would support, as he had in the past, a strong and independent Poland.[1] The necessity for making concessions was unavoidable, and therefore they should adapt themselves to it, as he would do if he were in their position. Britain and the United States, he said, would not go to war against Russia because of Poland, and the Poles should remember that the Russians were far more numerous than the Poles. As a pointed example to Mikolajczyk, he referred to the case of de Gaulle, who 'was obstinate and politically-minded at a time when military considerations were of paramount importance'.[2] Mikolajczyk made, in reply, the point that it would be difficult to obtain a mandate from the Polish people for concessions to the Russians. Roosevelt was given an account by 'Tabor' of the activities of the Home Army, of which he had already heard from the Underground courier Jan Karski, who had been sent to Washington to describe to the President the extent of the organization in the summer of 1943.[3] 'Tabor's' talks in Washington with military and civil officials resulted in an improvement in Polish-American co-operation and evoked a promise by the Americans to send more supplies to the Home Army.

Mikolajczyk was also persuaded to have a conversation with Professor Oscar Lange, a United States citizen of Polish origin, who had just returned (as had another Polish-American citizen, the Rev. S. Orlemanski)[4] from a visit to Stalin. It was Lange's impression, too, that Stalin would not insist on his demand for Königsberg.

After the talks Roosevelt sent a telegram to Stalin informing him that Mikolajczyk was willing to go to Moscow to make a sincere effort to re-establish relations with the Soviet Government. He indicated his 'interest' that Stalin should receive Mikolajczyk.[5] On 23 June Lebedev, the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, having learnt from Mikolajczyk that this Government were willing to co-operate, presented Russian proposals that Raczkiewicz, Sosnkowski, Kukiel, and Kot should be replaced by Poles from Britain and the United States, and that the Government should then denounce their action in appealing to the

[1] Mikolajczyk, pp. 64–71. A more detailed account of these conversations will be found in Ciechanowski, chapters xxxii and xxxiii. In spite of Roosevelt's repeated advice to the Poles and his statement that it would not be possible to get Vilna back, both Mikolajczyk and Ciechanowski at a later date interpreted Roosevelt's assurances as support for the Polish demand for the restoration of inter-war Poland up to the eastern frontier laid down in the Treaty of Riga.

[2] Ciechanowski, pp. 307–8.

[3] Ibid. chapter xx.

[4] For the antecedents of Orlemanski's journey see Isaac Deutscher: *Stalin, A Political Biography* (London, Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 519–20. See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 419.

[5] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1445.

International Red Cross in 1943 about the Katyn murders. Mikolajczyk did not hesitate to refuse these terms.[1] In his answer to Roosevelt's telegram Stalin said that co-operation between the Home Army and the Red Army was 'an essential matter', but that it could take place only if the 'émigré' Polish Government were reorganized to provide for the participation of 'Polish statesmen' from the United States, England, and the U.S.S.R., and especially from Poland itself. Further, the Polish Government must recognize the Curzon Line. Since Mikolajczyk's stated views did not indicate any 'step forward', it was difficult for Stalin to offer any suggestion about a visit to Moscow.[2] However, as a result, apparently, of a strongly worded note sent to Stalin by Churchill, Mikolajczyk was invited to visit Moscow during the first week in August.[3] (The Red Army was, by now, only a short distance from Warsaw.)

During the month of July it was reported to Poles in Warsaw, and from there to London, that the pattern that had been established in Volhynia was being followed in Vilna and Lwów, and, towards the end of July, in Lublin. The Russians were assuming that this territory was part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, they were being careful to forestall the formation of an anti-Soviet Underground in this area, such as had been established in 1939–40.

At the beginning of the Red Army offensive in July 1944 the Polish Home Army was ordered to consider the Russians as co-combatants against the Germans. On the other hand, since the Russians regarded the eastern territories as part of the Soviet Union and since diplomatic relations had not been re-established, they were also to be considered a threat to Polish independence. Therefore Home Army units were to co-operate only within limits. They were to operate independently if possible, to supply information about the Germans if requested, and to establish liaison with Soviet staffs only in case of 'acute tactical necessity'. Co-operation in fighting was to take place in specified localities; but any attempts to incorporate Home Army units in the Red Army or in the army commanded by Berling were to be resisted.[4]

What happened was that, in the territory east of the Vistula, organized Home Army units established liaison and co-operated with the attacking Red Army. (After the battle for Vilna their help was formally acknowledged by the Russian Commander.)[5] But as soon as each objective was

[1] Mikolajczyk, pp. 71–72.

[2] For the text of Stalin's reply see ibid. p. 71.

[3] Ibid. p. 72. The proposals presented by Lebedev and the invitation to Mikolajczyk to visit Moscow (no Russian account of the negotiations had been published when the present chapter went to press) were the last efforts which the Russians made to come to terms with the Polish Government in Exile and their organization within Poland. Cf. *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 429–33.

[4] Bor, pp. 193–4.

[5] Ibid. p. 195.

secured by the Russians the Polish units were offered the choice between incorporation in Berling's army and disbandment. When they refused the first alternative their leaders were arrested or abducted and the units were surrounded and disarmed, and even interned.[1]

The Polish Government in London were greatly alarmed about these events, and in the latter part of July Mikolajczyk sent a personal letter to Roosevelt, describing the developments in detail, and urging him to send American officers to the Soviet front, whose presence might influence the Russians to cease their violence against the Home Army.[2] Moreover, in July the Russians crossed the Curzon Line, which in its central sector coincided with the River Bug; and, since, in their own view, this meant that they were now entering Polish territory, it was necessary that the Soviet policy towards Poland should be clarified.

In May it had been announced in the Soviet press that a delegation from the National Council of the Homeland (KRN)[3] had come to Moscow to become acquainted with the activities of the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP),[4] and had been received by Stalin.[5] At this time the details of the structure of the KRN had been made public, and it was seen to base its authority upon a hierarchy of 'People's Councils', analogous in make-up to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. On 23 June the UPP had recognized the KRN as being representative of the Polish people. By decrees of 20 and 21 July the KRN assumed authority over the UPP and the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. (commanded by Berling). By another decree on the following day the KRN appointed a Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL), as a 'provisional executive authority', which was to establish temporary headquarters on liberated territory. This committee consisted of twenty members, ten of whom came from the UPP, and ten from 'leaders of the underground movement'. Only five of the latter group were identified, for the others were still underground. The chairman of the PCNL was E. Osobka-Morawski, leader of the Left-wing Socialist group in the KRN.

On 21 July the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. was combined with the 'People's Army' in Poland, to form a single 'Polish Army' (*Wojsko Polskie*), and on 22 July the KRN appointed Zymierski (previously known as 'Rola', commander of the 'People's Army') as Commander-in-Chief, and at the same time Berling was made second-in-command. It was understood that for operational purposes the 'Polish Army' was to be subordinated to the Red Army. On the same day, when the Red Army entered Chelm, the PCNL published a 'Manifesto to the Polish People', which was announced over Radio Moscow three days later. The manifesto

[1] For details of what happened at Vilna, Lwów, and Lublin see ibid. pp. 194–8.
[2] Ciechanowski, p. 317.
[3] See above, p. 149.
[4] See Bor, p. 123.
[5] Rothstein, ii. 83.

announced the changes that had taken place by decree of the KRN, and the plans of the PCNL to administer liberated Poland. It said that the legal basis of the PCNL and KRN was the 'lawful' Constitution of March 1921, not the 'unlawful' Constitution of 1935, which was the basis of the 'émigré' Government in London. The provisions of the 1921 Constitution were to remain valid until the election of a Constituent Diet, which would then create a new Constitution. The manifesto called upon the Poles to rise against the Germans and to co-operate with the Red Army. An historical turn had taken place, it announced, in the relations between the Poles and their neighbours to the east; hitherto they had constantly fought one another, but now they would have a solid basis for brotherly co-operation.

On 26 July the Soviet Government announced their intentions, now that the Red Army had reached 'the State frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland'. The Poles, they said, would be allowed to administer themselves; the Russians had no designs on Poland or on its social order, and the presence of the Red Army was dictated 'solely by military necessity'. For this reason they had decided to conclude an agreement with the PCNL on relations between the Red Army command and the Polish administration.[1] On the same day, therefore, an agreement was signed, by which it was recognized that the PCNL should set up administrative authority on liberated Polish territory. It would give support to measures for the building up of the 'Polish Army', and would co-operate and establish effective liaison with the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, who would exercise supreme command during the period which should be necessary for military operations in Poland. After that, Polish administration was to be in the hands of the PCNL.[2]

A Tass communiqué on 2 August announced that envoys were to be exchanged between the Soviet Government and the PCNL. Colonel-General Nikolai Bulganin was appointed as the Soviet representative with the Polish Administration, and W. Rzymowski was to represent the Committee in Moscow. A broadcast by the UPP on 3 August announced that representatives of the PCNL had arrived in Lublin. Twelve days later, on 15 August 1944, the KRN and the PCNL held a joint meeting and declared the site of their meeting, Lublin, to be the temporary capital of Poland.

(*c*) The Warsaw Rising, 1 August to 3 October 1944

(1) *The Rising Begins*

When Mikolajczyk left London at the end of July 1944 on his flight to Moscow he was cut off from immediate contact with events in Poland. When he arrived at Cairo he learnt that the Soviet Government had

[1] Rothstein, ii. 93. [2] Ibid. pp. 93–96.

signed an agreement with the PCNL (this made him consider returning to London without completing his journey);[1] and only several days later was he informed that, with the approach of the Red Army to the Vistula, the Home Army in Warsaw, supported by most of the population of the city, had risen and attacked the Germans.

In the weeks before the rising began there had been a great deal of confusion and conflict of opinion among the political and military leaders of the Polish Government in Exile and in the Home Army over the form which Resistance activity should take in Poland. Mikolajczyk and other political leaders were apparently in favour of a general insurrection throughout Poland,[2] but Sosnkowski was opposed to this without British and American support, especially after the recent developments in eastern Poland, and recommended the continuation of *Burza* (sabotage and diversionary) activities in the German rear.[3] Originally the plan for *Burza* activity did not include armed action within cities and towns, but in July 1944 Home Army officers modified the *Burza* plan to include an insurrection inside the city of Warsaw. The actual plans for the Warsaw insurrection, however, had been in existence for several years, as a part of the plans for a general rising which was to take place either if it should be supported by the Western Allies or in the event of a German collapse.[4] The situation was complicated by the absence of both Mikolajczyk and Sosnkowski from London on official duties; and, by a Polish Government resolution and an order of Mikolajczyk,[5] the unsettled question of an insurrection had been left to the discretion of the Deputy Minister, Jankowski, in Warsaw.

Although Bor claims that he agreed with Sosnkowski, he carefully sets forth the reasons why he was in favour of an independent rising in Warsaw.[6] The rising must be staged, he said, not only to show the world the defiant attitude of the Home Army to the Germans, and to refute the Russian propaganda argument that the Home Army was conducting a 'waiting' policy and thus silently aiding the Germans, but also to prevent the people of Warsaw, who were impatiently waiting to rise against the Germans, from accepting the leadership of the 'People's Army' (now merged with the Polish units fighting 'alongside' the Red Army), and later of the PCNL. It was Bor's desire, therefore, supported unanimously by the Council of National Unity, that the Home Army should liberate Warsaw completely and seize control of the administration at least twelve hours before the entry of the Red Army. If this plan were successful the Russians would be obliged to take measures against the Home Army, not

[1] Mikolajczyk, pp. 77–78; see also Ciechanowski, pp. 319–20.
[2] Ibid. p. 321; cf. Mikolajczyk, pp. 73–74, and Anders, pp. 201–2.
[3] Ibid. p. 201; cf. Bor, p. 203.
[4] Ibid. pp. 174–6.
[5] Ibid. p. 204; cf. Anders, p. 202.
[6] Bor, pp. 201–3.

in secret as in eastern Poland, but by open force, and the Underground leaders hoped that this would arouse world opinion.[1] Since it was thus the Home Army's plan to achieve the liberation of Warsaw independently, it was clearly in Bor's interest to prevent attempts at co-ordination with Red Army commanders, and he had in fact issued instructions to local Home Army commanders in July to conduct operations against the Germans independently, if possible, of the Russians.

The Russians, who apparently expected the Red Army to enter Warsaw in the early part of August,[2] wished a rising to take place in the city, but they wanted its leadership to be in the hands of the underground 'People's Army', which would co-ordinate the rising with the Red Army. The Polish unit commanded by Berling would then march to the aid of the Polish capital, and the new 'Polish Army' would hand the administration of the city over to the PCNL. These plans were frustrated by the rising led by the Home Army, and it was in the interest of the Russians to see that 'Bor's Uprising' or *coup d'état*, as it was called by them thereafter, should fail. Accordingly, in the first days of the rising, members of the PCNL sent messages to their associates in the city that the Warsaw rising could not count on help from the Russians, and that they should attempt to save as much human life as possible.[3]

In the latter part of July the German retreat before the Russian offensive seemed to be turning into a rout. The bridges across the Vistula in Warsaw were clogged with vehicles and with German troops and civilians. The German civil administration of Warsaw left the city for a time, and the atmosphere became one of tense expectancy. Bor was receiving many reports in his headquarters of the collapse of German units in the east,[4] of Russian units approaching the outskirts of Warsaw, and of the apparent inadequacy of German reserves in the area round Warsaw on the west side of the Vistula. The regular messages broadcast over Radio Moscow and the station sponsored by the former Union of Polish Patriots were calling upon the Poles to rise against the Germans, and towards the end of July the messages seemed to increase in intensity. On 26 July Bor sent a message to London that he would inform the Polish Government of the date and the hour of the rising. In the absence of the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief, a Cabinet Minister, Kwapinski, sent a message in reply which apparently did not arrive until too late, saying that if Bor called a rising it must be on his own responsibility, in view of Sosnkowski's advice to avoid an open insurrection.[5]

[1] Bor, pp. 201–2, 205. [2] Ibid. pp. 259, 261; cf. Mikolajczyk, pp. 78, 82.

[3] Bor (p. 361) quotes the Warsaw *Robotnik* of 1 August 1946, which printed a statement by Osobka-Morawski.

[4] A confirmation of this appreciation was subsequently given by General Guderian in his evidence at the Nuremberg Trials (see Churchill, vi. 114; U.S. edition, vi. 129).

[5] Bor, pp. 206–8.

In spite of the vigilance of the Gestapo and SS units in Warsaw, the Home Army system of communications was so well organized that it was possible to mobilize 40,000 men and 4,200 women at twenty-four hours' notice. The necessity for action became apparent when the German Governor, Fischer, returned to Warsaw on 27 July and took measures to mobilize the population to build fortifications. 'People's Army' leaders were posting notices calling upon the population of Warsaw to rise under their leadership. On 31 July reports were reaching Bor's headquarters that Red Army units had taken many places in the suburbs of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula; and, after hearing that Soviet forces had penetrated the German defences before Praga, Bor decided that the moment for action had arrived. A consultation was held with the Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Army staff, and, when Jankowski approved Bor's decision, the order was given that the rising should begin on the following day, 1 August, at five o'clock in the afternoon. A request had already been sent to London that combatant status might be secured officially for the Home Army, and that the Polish Parachute Brigade should be sent to the support of Warsaw, together with supplies of ammunition and arms.[1]

Much criticism was directed against Bor at a later stage over the timing of the rising. Poles of the PCNL and the new 'Polish Army' argued, not without justice, against the wisdom of Bor's strategy. It was revealed later (and Bor quotes the statement of the German General Guderian in confirmation) that, although the Germans seemed to be retreating in chaos, they were in fact retiring to the line of the Vistula, along which they had prepared very strong defences, and that they also intended to defend Praga as a bridge-head on the eastern side of the river. It was claimed that the Russians, realizing this, planned to take Warsaw, not by frontal assault, but by an encircling movement, which would need time and preparation. Further, the Red Army's July offensive in Poland had over-extended their lines of communication, and it was only natural that they should pause at the natural barrier of the Vistula to consolidate their gains.[2] Russian publicity could argue effectually that Bor had not attempted to co-ordinate the rising with the operations of the Red Army, since by his own admission he wanted the rising to be independent of Russian support. Bor's estimate of the inadequacy of German reserves in the area seemed inaccurate in the light of later developments; he himself mentions that on 30 July the Hermann Göring Panzer Division marched into the city to supplement the German 73rd Infantry Division which had

[1] Bor, pp. 208–14. Cf. Anders (pp. 202–4), who states that Sir Alan Brooke refused to send the Polish Parachute Brigade 'in view of the shortage of transport aircraft'.

[2] Bor, p. 208. For the pro-Communist version cf. Anne Louise Strong: *I Saw the New Poland* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1946), pp. 154–6. Cf. 'The Truth About the Warsaw Rising', *Soviet War News*, 13 November 1944.

been defending Praga.[1] Probably the slackening in the Russian offensive helped the Germans to bring up reserves, for later in the rising the 'Totenkopf' and SS 'Viking' Divisions were added to the forces of SS *Obergruppenführer* von dem Bach, who was entrusted with the task of crushing the Warsaw rising.

At the beginning of the rising both the Home Army and the people of the city were filled with patriotic enthusiasm and exhilarated by the release of a five-years' accumulation of feelings of hatred against the Germans. In the first twenty hours of offensive action the Poles seized approximately two-thirds of Warsaw on the west bank of the Vistula. The flag of the Polish Republic floated once again over Warsaw: the Home Army newspaper, *Information Bulletin*, published daily accounts of the fighting and exhortations from Home Army leaders; and the strains of the old revolutionary song *Warsawianka* could be heard occasionally in the streets.[2] The Germans, however, quickly crushed the rising across the river in Praga, and held fast to their defences on the bridge-head there. Railway communications through Warsaw were stopped for the duration of the rising, and road traffic was diverted to pontoon bridges erected to the north of the city. The fighting was savage, for the Germans treated the Poles as 'bandits', and in some cases used civilians as shields. In the excitement of the first days the Polish leaders could not prevent a great wastage of ammunition, and Bor was soon forced to order conservation in its expenditure. The force of Polish offensive action was thereby diminished.[3] Considering the comparative lack of arms, the civilians achieved remarkable successes against the German Panzer units, seizing several tanks and large amounts of equipment, and Bor received reports on 4 August that fifty tanks had been destroyed.[4] The most effective weapon for this purpose was the makeshift 'Molotov cocktail' made with a bottle of petrol.

There is no doubt that Bor secured the unquestioned leadership of the people of Warsaw during the rising, for even the Communist PPR and 'People's Army' units fought alongside the Home Army and the people of Warsaw.[5] On 4 August, however, the Germans began organized offensive action with the aid of dive-bombers and heavy artillery, concentrating on Ochota and Wola. On 7 August Bor was forced to change his headquarters from Wola to Stare Miasto, and by 10 August the Germans had been able to isolate the sectors of Stare Miasto, the centre of the city, Zoliborz, Mokotow, Powisle, and Czerniakow.[6] Von dem Bach, a specialist in the

[1] Bor, pp. 213–14; cf. Judith Listowel: 'The Warsaw Rising', *Free Europe*, 22 September 1944.
[2] Bor, pp. 215–34.
[3] Ibid. pp. 234–9.
[4] Ibid. p. 241.
[5] Ibid. p. 242. Bor's picture of the activity of the Communist 'People's Army' groups is confusing. At first he says that no units appeared, but later mentions their fighting in Stare Miasto.
[6] Ibid. pp. 240–57.

suppression of risings, arrived about the first week of August to take charge of the offensive.[1]

After 10 August a more or less stable pattern established itself. Defence lines were discernible, and territory lost to German attacks was regularly regained by Polish counter-attacks. Communications between the isolated areas were established through the network of sewers beneath the city. After a preliminary flight on 4 August of two Halifax bombers, supply-drops of food, weapons, and ammunition were made in the evenings from 11 to 16 August by R.A.F. planes from bases in Italy, using British, South African, and Polish crews; but heavy losses in aircraft made it necessary to change the destination of these drops to reception-points outside the city.[2] Moscow Radio was at first silent about the rising although the B.B.C. announced its outbreak on 2 August. The Poles had been able to hear the sound of Russian artillery across the Vistula in the latter part of July and during the first days of the struggle, and had seen Russian fighters engaging the Germans above the city; but on 4 August artillery fire ceased abruptly, Russian aircraft disappeared from the sky over Warsaw, and by 10 August it had become clear that the Russian advance towards the city had been brought to a halt.[3]

Meanwhile Mikolajczyk had decided to resume his journey from Cairo to Moscow.[4] At Tehrān he received copies of telegrams sent by Roosevelt and Churchill to Moscow, asking Stalin to give him a cordial reception and to change his (Stalin's) attitude toward the Polish Government.[5] Mikolajczyk reached Moscow on 30 July, accompanied by his colleagues Grabski and Romer. Their reception at the airport was bleak, and was not brightened by the news that members of the PCNL had also arrived in Moscow and had signed an agreement with the Russians for the exchange of envoys.[6] When Molotov asked Mikolajczyk frigidly on the next day why he had come, Mikolajczyk replied that he wanted to see Stalin in order to discuss collaboration against the Germans and Polish-Soviet relations, and refused Molotov's suggestion that he should see the PCNL first.[7] In the following forty-eight hours Mikolajczyk learned, through British channels, for the first time, of the outbreak of the rising in Warsaw, which prepared him for his first interview with Stalin, on 3 August at 9.30 p.m.

In answer to Mikolajczyk's inquiries about collaboration against the Germans, Stalin suggested that the Polish Home Army did not want to

[1] Bor, p. 257.

[2] Ibid. pp. 240, 263–6; cf. Anders, p. 205. Anders says (p. 218) that, out of 71 deliveries of supplies to Warsaw from 1–27 August, 50 were acknowledged as received by the Underground Army. See also below, p. 174.

[3] Bor, pp. 227, 236, 247, 258.

[4] Ciechanowski, p. 320.

[5] Mikolajczyk, p. 78.

[6] Ibid. pp. 77–78. For the Soviet agreement with the PCNL see above, p. 166.

[7] Mikolajczyk, pp. 78–79.

fight them (the Russians always suspected, with reason, that the hostile feelings of the Polish Resistance Movement were at bottom directed at least as much against themselves as against the Germans); and, when Mikolajczyk drew his attention to the Home Army's record of resistance and sabotage under the German occupation, to acknowledgments of its help from the Red Army, and to Sikorski's attempts to get aid for it from the Russians (when Stalin had said that it was 'too early'), Stalin said that he doubted whether the Home Army could gain command over Warsaw without artillery and tanks. Mikolajczyk asked whether the necessary support would be supplied by the Red Army; and Stalin then expressed his mistrust of the Polish Government in Exile who, he said, suspected him of wanting to occupy Poland. He reminded Mikolajczyk of the Soviet agreement with the PCNL (which had been concluded after Mikolajczyk left London), and insisted that there were new forces and new authorities in Poland. Poland must, he declared, recognize the Curzon Line, and she would receive Silesia and East Prussia, except for Königsberg. When Mikolajczyk objected that this was a violation of the Atlantic Charter and of former Polish-Soviet pacts, Stalin said that changes might be made in the Curzon Line for the benefit of the Poles. The Polish Government in Exile, however, must first reach an agreement with the PCNL, for henceforward Stalin intended to deal with one Polish Government, not with two.[1] He added that he could not help the Home Army, since there was no communication established between them and the Russians, but that he would be glad to drop communication officers for that purpose.[2]

Mikolajczyk finally agreed to meet members of the PCNL, and a joint conference was held on 6 August, in which the three members of the Polish Government in Exile met the PCNL leaders Wanda Wasilewska, Osobka-Morawski, Andrej Witos, and General 'Rola'-Zymierski. Mikolajczyk again refused to accept the Curzon Line and rejected the proposal to renounce the 1935 Constitution in favour of that of 1921, and the meeting ended in an impasse. But he made an impassioned appeal to the PCNL leaders to help the people of Warsaw, which apparently made an impression upon them, although Wanda Wasilewska insisted that no fighting was taking place in Warsaw. (During the course of Mikolajczyk's visit, doubts were continually expressed, both by the Russians and by members of the PCNL, whether any fighting was taking place in Warsaw; Mikolajczyk supplied evidence in the form of messages from Bor.) Zymierski expressed a desire to send assistance to the defenders of the city, and asked for more specific information about their location.[3] The next day Mikolajczyk met the most authoritative member of the PCNL, Boleslaw Bierut, Communist leader of the PPR, who had recently returned from

[1] Mikolajczyk, pp. 79–81.
[2] Ibid. p. 82; cf. Bor, p. 260.
[3] Ibid.; cf. Mikolajczyk, pp. 82–84, and Ciechanowski, p. 326.

Warsaw. Bierut was unresponsive to Mikolajczyk's appeals that he should assist the people of Warsaw, should help in protecting Polish sovereignty, and should prevent the arrest by the Russians of members of the Home Army. He said that he considered relations with the U.S.S.R. to be more important than frontiers. He was, however, prepared to make a concrete proposal. If Mikolajczyk would recognize him (Bierut) as President of a new Polish Government, Mikolajczyk could return to Poland as his Prime Minister, and three additional portfolios in the Cabinet of eighteen would be given to Mikolajczyk's colleagues in London. Mikolajczyk refused, stating that he would return only if an agreement (with the PCNL) were 'constitutional' and in the 'best interests' of Poland. The meeting ended in an unfriendly atmosphere, for Bierut told Mikolajczyk that, while the PCNL would accept him if he went to Poland as their friend, they would arrest him if he attempted to return as the Prime Minister of a Government no longer recognized by the U.S.S.R.[1] The next day Molotov attended a conference between the PCNL leaders and Mikolajczyk, in order to hear for himself the results of the previous meetings. It soon became clear that Mikolajczyk would continue to refuse to accept the Communist proposals, and there seemed little likelihood that an agreement could be reached between them during this visit.[2]

Mikolajczyk's second interview with Stalin, on 9 August, was less cordial than the first. When Stalin asked whether there was fighting in Warsaw, Mikolajczyk produced a message to Stalin from Kalugin (who had appeared at Bor's headquarters not long after the outbreak of the rising, identifying himself as a Red Army intelligence officer), appealing to Stalin for aid, and specifically listing the needs of Warsaw's defenders. Stalin told Mikolajczyk that he had expected the Red Army to be in Warsaw on 5 or 6 August, but that the strong German defences had made a 'small delay' inevitable. He said that the two Red Army communication officers who had been sent into the city since the first interview had been killed as they were landing by parachute,[3] but that he would inquire about this Kalugin, and that, if these messages and appeals had foundation, he would send a Soviet liaison officer, and do his best to help the people of Warsaw.[4]

Mikolajczyk left Moscow on 10 August and returned to London after his unsuccessful visit.

[1] Mikolajczyk, pp. 84–85. In connexion with Bierut's offer to Mikolajczyk, for examples of Communist co-operative policy during this period with political groups, mainly 'leftist', in other countries cf. below, pp. 302, 429–33, 489–92.

[2] Mikolajczyk, p. 85.

[3] This was not true. They reached the headquarters of the commander of the Warsaw Home Army, and sent a number of messages to Moscow (ibid. p. 86).

[4] For this interview see ibid. pp. 85–87; cf. Ciechanowski, pp. 325–6, and Bor, pp. 259–61. For Captain Kalugin's activities in Warsaw see ibid. pp. 243–5.

The Russian theme of denying or belittling[1] the rising was continued by the Communist Press, which said that the 'emigré' Government was only imagining that there was any fighting in Warsaw,[2] and accused the Home Army of collaborating with the Germans. Moscow Radio was silent on the subject till 8 August, when it acknowledged the fact of the rising, praised the heroism of the 'People's Army', and denied the Home Army's accusations that the Red Army offensive had stopped on the outskirts of Warsaw.[3] A Tass communiqué of 13 August, broadcast on both Moscow Radio and the B.B.C., said that, since contact had never been established between the Soviet High Command and the rising, the only people responsible for the events in Warsaw were 'émigré circles' in London.[4]

(2) *The Siege of Stare Miasto*

The Germans possessed complete freedom of the skies above Warsaw; they had brought up heavy siege weapons, and they used gunboats on the Vistula, armoured trains, mortars, and small explosive 'Goliath' tanks, in addition to the usual equipment of tank and infantry units with artillery support.[5] Nevertheless, the Poles maintained their passionate defiance. Each isolated sector published its daily newspaper, giving accounts of the fighting. The wireless station of the defenders, *Blyskawica*, made regular broadcasts throughout the rising to Warsaw, to Poland, and to the outside world. Loudspeakers in the Polish areas shouted pathetically insolent demands to the Germans to surrender. Regardless of the bombardment, underground arms plants continued to turn out small arms and ammunition.[6] The R.A.F. supply-drops had brought only limited relief, and food began to be scarce. With the co-operation of peasants outside Warsaw some of the districts of the city were able to add to their reserves from food smuggled in to them.[7] In desperation, however, over the supply situation Bor issued an order through London on 14 August for available Home Army units in eastern Poland to march to the help of Warsaw, hoping that this measure would help the morale of the city's population, and that more arms and supplies might be smuggled through the German lines.[8] From 16 August[9] until 27 August supplies were dropped into Kampinos Forest, an assembly point outside Warsaw and the place of concealment of a Home Army partisan force of several thousand men; and from there they were conveyed into Zoliborz and, through the sewers underneath the German positions, to Stare Miasto.[10]

[1] Mikolajczyk, p. 87.
[2] *Daily Worker* (London), 7 August 1944; cf. Bor, pp. 227, 236–7, 258.
[3] Ibid. pp. 258–9.
[4] Ibid. p. 267; cf. Mikolajczyk, pp. 88–89.
[5] Bor, pp. 253–5, 268.
[6] Ibid. pp. 268–73.
[7] Ibid. pp. 269–71.
[8] Ibid. pp. 279–80.
[9] See above, p. 171.
[10] Bor, pp. 280–5.

On 17 August von dem Bach sent envoys with proposals to the Poles. If they would surrender, soldiers of the Home Army would be granted combatant status according to the Geneva Convention and would thus be treated as normal prisoners of war. If they refused, the city and its inhabitants would be annihilated. Bor says that he ordered that the proposals should be ignored, and that he answered them indirectly by a limited offensive in the centre of the city, in which the Home Army managed to seize several buildings and small areas from the Germans.[1]

On 19 August the Germans began a concentrated attack on Stare Miasto, using about 40,000 men against 5,000 of the Home Army. In this area, half a mile square, there were also 200,000 civilians. The Germans attacked daily, with precision bombing, heavy artillery and mortar barrages, and 'Goliath' tanks directed against the barricades, followed by tank and infantry attacks.[2] Home Army soldiers, though desperately short of ammunition, managed to hold most of their positions, while supply forces and civilians established highly organized communication lines with Zoliborz and the centre of the city through the network of sewers. After the Germans had discovered these activities at the beginning of September they began to block up sewers, to drop grenades and gas bombs, and in some cases to pour burning petrol into the sewers, which were crammed with people carrying supplies or messages or simply moving from place to place.[3]

When the danger of the severance of wireless communication with the outside world became acute on 27 August, Bor transferred his headquarters from Stare Miasto, making his way by night with the Deputy Prime Minister (Jankowski) and his staff through 1,700 yards of sewer underneath the German lines to the centre of the city.[4] Together with 'Monter', the local Home Army commander, he then made plans to rescue the 1,500 soldiers who continued to defend Stare Miasto. A co-ordinated attack, launched on 30 August, was beaten back by the heavy German fire-power, and on 1 September the order was given to evacuate the 1,500 Home Army defenders through the sewers. With them came 500 civilians and 100 German prisoners.[5] On 29 August the news was received that the British and American Governments had officially accorded combatant status to the Home Army,[6] but this was scant comfort to the civilians who were left without means of defence in Stare Miasto, which was then occupied by the Germans.

The Home Army units in eastern Poland who attempted at Bor's order

[1] Bor, pp. 274–8.
[2] Ibid. pp. 285–8.
[3] Ibid. pp. 289–90, 296–303; cf. T. Bor-Komorowski: 'Sewer warfare in the Warsaw Rising', *Nineteenth Century*, July 1950.
[4] Bor, pp. 305–9.
[5] Ibid. pp. 309–17.
[6] Ibid. p. 318.

to march to the help of Warsaw from behind the Russian lines were surrounded *en route* by the Russians and were disarmed.[1]

After his return to London from his 'sleeveless errand' to Moscow, Mikolajczyk sent appeals to Stalin on 13 and 14 August to send aid to Warsaw.[2] Stalin answered after several days that, although attempts had been made to send help, yet, 'after a closer study of the matter', he was convinced that the action in Warsaw, undertaken without the knowledge of the Red Army Command, was a 'thoughtless adventure causing unnecessary losses among the inhabitants'. Moreover, the Polish Government in London had started a 'calumnious campaign' to present the 'illusion that the Soviet Command deceived the Warsaw population'. In view of this the Soviet command was disinteresting itself in the rising.[3]

In the meantime, Churchill and Roosevelt had been pressing Stalin to help the Poles in Warsaw—or, short of that, at least to help the Western Allies to help them—and had obtained nothing beyond the forbiddingly negative response that Stalin had been giving to Mikolajczyk. As early as 4 August Churchill telegraphed to Stalin that the R.A.F. was dropping equipment and ammunition for the Polish Underground army in Warsaw, and used words which took it for granted that the Russians, too, would be coming to the Poles' assistance. But Stalin replied on the 5th on a note of scepticism about the seriousness of the Poles' efforts.

Stalin refused outright a request from the Americans to be allowed to use bases behind the Russian lines to supply Warsaw on the shuttle-bombing principle, on the ground that, although he had promised Mikolajczyk that he would help, he had concluded by 12 August, from the statements of the London Poles, that the rising was inspired by men antagonistic to the Soviet Union. On 16 August Vyshinsky told the United States Ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet Government 'decidely object to American or British aircraft, after dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, landing on Soviet territory, since the Soviet Government do not wish to associate themselves either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw'.[4] Stalin also refused a joint appeal by Churchill and Roosevelt, addressed to him on 20 August, in which, with a reference to world opinion, they expressed their hope that the Russians themselves would either drop arms and supplies to the Poles or agree to assist British and American planes in doing so.[5] On 25 August Churchill suggested to

[1] Bor, pp. 293–4. Bor quotes an order from a subordinate Red Army commander to stop at all costs the infiltration of Home Army units who were attempting to get to Warsaw at the order of the 'Commander of the Polish Nationalist Army', supported by the 'emigré Government'.

[2] Ibid. p. 295.

[3] See Mikolajczyk, p. 90, which includes the text of Stalin's reply.

[4] Churchill, vi. 118; U.S. edition, vi. 133; cf. Bor, p. 295; Anders, pp. 204–5; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1445–7.

[5] Ibid. p. 1447; see also Churchill, vi. 119–20; U.S. edition, vi. 135–6.

Roosevelt that, if Stalin refused another joint Anglo-American appeal to him to allow British and American planes sent to drop supplies for the Poles on Warsaw to land and refuel behind the Russian lines, then British and American planes should be instructed to make the landings without leave. The Russians, he said, would not dare to shoot at them.[1] Roosevelt, however, did not agree.[2] Churchill told Mikolajczyk about this proposal of his on 1 September.[3] He sent a stronger message to Moscow on 4 September, asking the Russians to reconsider their refusals to send aid to Warsaw themselves and to allow American planes to land on Russian bases for this purpose, and suggesting that these refusals were 'at variance with the spirit of Allied co-operation' and might have an adverse effect on future relations between Britain and Soviet Russia.[4] Even this note had no effect upon Stalin. He continued to refuse to change his stand. On the same day Churchill sent a second appeal to Roosevelt to order American landings without leave, but again without avail.[5]

(3) *Mikolajczyk's Unsuccessful Political Plan*

On 30 August 1944 Mikolajczyk sent to the British, United States, and Russian Governments[6] copies of a plan for the formation of a government to administer liberated Poland, which he thought might be acceptable to the PCNL, whose proposals he had refused,[7] and to the Russians. (He had hoped that it might be approved by his own Government and by the Underground in Poland; but in London the Polish Socialist and Nationalist Parties had opposed it, and the Socialists had drafted a plan of their own, while the Underground parliament or Council of National Unity, which had accepted it unanimously, had done so only under 'pressure of circumstances', since it represented a complete departure from previous policy, and against Bor's strenuous objections.)[8]

The Polish Government's lack of cohesion was etched in clear lines by the debate on this plan. As we have seen, it had been evident for a long time that the Russians considered the territories east of the Curzon Line to be part of the Soviet Union and demanded (*a*) acceptance of the Curzon Line, (*b*) removal of Sosnkowski and other obviously anti-Russian leaders from the Polish Government in London, (*c*) some guarantee that the

[1] For text of Churchill's telegram see Churchill, vi. 123; U.S. edition, vi. 139–40.
[2] For text of Roosevelt's telegram see ibid. pp. 123–4 and 140 respectively.
[3] Mikolajczyk, p. 91.
[4] Text in Churchill, vi. 125–6; U.S. edition, vi. 142–3.
[5] For texts of telegrams see ibid. pp. 125, 126 and 141–2, 143–4 respectively.
[6] Mikolajczyk, p. 102.
[7] See above, pp. 172–3. Roosevelt had urged him in a letter of 24 August to present 'reasonable proposals' to the PCNL (for text see Mikolajczyk, p. 327).
[8] Bor, pp. 321–6.

pre-1939 dictatorship would not be reimposed. Yet the members of the Polish Government in Exile, while no doubt aware of this situation and of the chaos in their homeland, could not even bring themselves to agree to Mikolajczyk's plan, which itself did not go far enough to be acceptable to the Russians.

The first part of the plan provided for equal representation, in a future Polish government which was to administer liberated Poland, of the four main political parties represented in the Polish Government in Exile with the addition of the Communist PPR. This new government, formed in Warsaw, would establish friendly relations with the Soviet Government, and would sign an agreement with the Red Army regarding military action on Polish territory, to ensure that order would be kept behind the Russian lines. After the end of hostilities all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Poland, and free elections were to take place for a Constituent Diet which was to produce a new Constitution. The new government would also dedicate itself to immediate reforms, principally land reform, would make alliances with Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, and would maintain 'the closest ties of friendship' with the United States.

If this much of the plan might have been acceptable to the Russians, the latter part certainly was not. It declared that Poland, considering her war record, could not be allowed to emerge from the war with any loss of territory, and that Polish centres of culture and essential sources of raw materials must remain inside Poland. Vilna and Lwów were centres of Polish culture, and the Poles considered the rest of the territory west of the Treaty of Riga boundary to be an essential source of raw materials for Poland; so the new formula did not indicate any appreciable change from their previous statement that the Treaty of Riga borders were inviolable. Further, with regard to the repatriation of citizens, the plan mentioned former Polish citizens who had been deported to the U.S.S.R., and under the plan these were to be returned to Poland (though this subject, which had caused trouble as early as the latter part of 1941, was considered by the Russians to be already closed).[1] The plan also provided for the creation of a War Cabinet which was to exercise control over all the Polish armed forces, although those in the east of Poland were to remain temporarily under Red Army operational control.[2] It may be suspected that Mikolajczyk knew, when he sent this plan to Moscow, that, though it might represent the greatest measure of agreement attainable among his own people, it was most unlikely, in the light of previous conversations, that it would meet with Russian approval.[3]

[1] See above, pp. 136–7.

[2] For the text of Mikolajczyk's plan see Mikolajczyk, p. 328.

[3] One thing that would alarm the Russians would be the prospect of the Polish armed forces, now fighting in Italy and France, returning to Poland under their present leaders.

(4) *The End of the Rising*

At the beginning of September 1944 Bor, although aware of his fate if he were captured by the Russians, had decided to reveal to them his own identity, together with those of his deputy commander and his chief of staff. The names of the Deputy Prime Minister (Jankowski), of the speaker of the Underground parliament, and of Okulicki, Bor's new chief of staff,[1] were not revealed.[2]

After the fall of Stare Miasto the Germans took Powisle on 6 September. On the day before, the Germans had sent envoys to negotiate for the evacuation of civilians from the besieged area, and to present once more surrender proposals, similar to those that had been made previously: if the Poles agreed to lay down their arms and surrender, Home Army soldiers would be awarded combatant status; otherwise, the remainder of the city with its defenders would be annihilated. Bor delayed his answer for several days, hoping that the Russians would attack and come to the aid of Warsaw.[3]

After the fall of Powisle the German forces began to concentrate their attack upon Czerniakow, next to the Vistula. Suddenly, on 10 September, the long silence across the river was broken by the roar of Russian artillery fire. At the same time Soviet fighter aircraft appeared again over the city.[4] The Red Army had begun an attack against Praga, and on the same day the United States Government were notified that the Russians consented to the use of an air base for a shuttle-operation to supply Warsaw, although they requested a short delay because of 'technical difficulties'.[5] Bor could watch the German attack upon Czerniakow taking place in the foreground of the Red Army attack on Praga across the river.[6] On 12 September the Red Army occupied Praga, and it was announced that the occupying unit was the First Kosciuszko Division of the 'Polish Army', under the command of Berling.[7] On the following day a radio message was broadcast by the station sponsored by the PCNL, formally announcing that the First Polish Division was in Praga 'fighting side by side with the Red Army', and appealing to the Warsaw defenders to hold on and continue fighting. 'Whatever the motives of those who started the rising prematurely, without agreement with the Red Army', help was to come at last to the people of Warsaw.[8]

On the evening of 13 September a number of Russian aircraft made a

[1] Okulicki, who had been with Anders, had recently been parachuted into Warsaw, and had relieved 'Grzegorz', who had been wounded (Bor, pp. 327–30).

[2] Ibid. p. 352. Besides his own name, Tadeusz Komorowski, Bor revealed the names of 'Nurt' (Chrusciel), 'Wachnowski' (Ziemski), 'Zywichiel' (Niedzielski), 'Karol' (Rokicki), and 'Radwan' (Pfeifer) (cf. above, p. 149, note 2). See *Free Europe*, 6 October 1944.

[3] Bor, pp. 330–8.

[4] Ibid. p. 338.

[5] Mikolajczyk, p. 93.

[6] Bor, p. 342.

[7] Ibid. pp. 338–41.

[8] Ibid. p. 343.

trial drop of supplies and arms, and from 14 September onwards the Red air force made nightly supply-drops to Warsaw. While the R.A.F. supply-drops had usually been made once a night, the Russians, using planes with smaller capacity, made several drops a night, all from a low altitude and without parachutes. Although many of the supplies were consequently destroyed, Bor says that his defenders received useful and substantial aid, both in supplies and morale, from these Russian drops.[1]

By 15 September the whole of Praga was in Soviet hands. In spite of many attempts made by Bor through London and by messenger across the Vistula to secure assistance and to co-ordinate action with the Red Army,[2] there was no success in establishing communications until 20 September, when two Soviet parachutists were dropped into Warsaw and Bor's deputy, 'Monter', established communication through them by wireless with Marshal Rokossovsky at the Russian headquarters.[3]

After long and exasperating delays, the American air force supply-fleet which had been waiting in Italy finally flew high over Warsaw on 18 September. Although many of the containers dropped by parachute were carried by the wind to the Germans, the Poles still managed to secure a large number of them. Moreover, the material benefit was outweighed by the strengthening it brought to the morale of the defenders, for it symbolized the support of the Western Allies for the Warsaw rising.[4]

After the Soviet occupation of Praga the Germans resumed their attack on Czerniakow and Zoliborz (the two areas alongside the Vistula). In reply to appeals for assistance and offers of co-operation from 'Monter' and from the commander at Czerniakow, two battalions of the Kosciuszko Division were sent to Czerniakow and Zoliborz.[5] Although men of the Home Army and the People's Army fought together pretty well, Czerniakow could not be held. Some men of both units escaped through the sewers to Mokotow; some of the Kosciuszko Division retired across the Vistula, and most of the 'Zoska' battalion of the Home Army was wiped out while trying to escape through the German lines. Czerniakow finally fell on 23 September.[6] Mokotow fell on 27 September, after having suffered losses of 70 per cent.[7] At Zoliborz, when it became obvious that resistance could no longer be maintained, the remainder of the Kosciuszko Division, with some elements of the 'People's Army', withdrew across the Vistula under cover of a Russian artillery barrrage, but the local commander, 'Zywichiel', and his Home Army soldiers followed Bor's orders

[1] Bor, pp. 342–4. Cf. *Free Europe*, 6 October 1944, which includes Mikolajczyk's acknowledgment to the Russians.

[2] Bor, pp. 205, 243–5, 339–40; cf. Mikolajczyk, pp. 83, 86.

[3] Bor, pp. 345–6.

[4] Ibid. pp. 349–50; cf. Anders, pp. 204–5; and Mikolajczyk, pp. 93–94, who states that the mission's strength was 104 bombers, escorted part of the way by 200 fighters.

[5] Bor, pp. 346–8. [6] Ibid. pp. 352–6. [7] Ibid. p. 359.

and stopped fighting.[1] Bor sent a message to London on 28 September reporting the fall of Mokotow and stating that, if the Red Army did not launch an attack by 1 October, lack of food would compel him to cease the struggle.[2] He also sent one last appeal by wireless to Rokossovsky to the same effect. On 29 September, having received no reply, he sent envoys to the Germans with the message that the Home Army was willing to discuss terms for an armistice, and on the same day an agreement was signed with the Germans for the evacuation of the civilian population, though this met with little response from the people of Warsaw.[3]

On 30 September Bor received word that he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of Polish forces[4] in succession to Sosnkowski.[5] Since he was determined to share the fate of his men, he appointed Okulicki (whose identity had not been divulged)[6] his successor as Commander of the Home Army in Poland, and on 30 September ordered him to leave Warsaw and resume the struggle, taking with him a capable and reliable staff.[7] On 2 October the Home Army delegation met the Germans and signed the terms of agreement for an armistice, which bestowed treatment as prisoners of war, according to the Geneva Convention of 27 August 1929, upon all soldiers of the Home Army and their women auxiliaries, although it made no provision for those in the 'People's Army' or the PPR. Home Army soldiers in Warsaw were not to be held responsible for actions committed before the beginning of the rising, nor for holding office in the Underground; and the principle of collective responsibility was not to be applied against the people of Warsaw for actions before or during the rising. The population was to be evacuated by means which would confine their suffering to a minimum, and agreements were included concerning the return of German prisoners of war, and the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers.[8] Final arrangements were made between Bor and von dem Bach on the following day.[9]

[1] Bor, pp. 362–3; cf. Strong: *I Saw the New Poland*, pp. 169–78, and 'The Truth About the Warsaw Rising', *Soviet War News*, 13 November 1944.

[2] Bor, p. 362.

[3] Ibid. pp. 362–4.

[4] Ibid. p. 364.

[5] Sosnkowski had issued on 1 September an embittered and undignified Order of the Day, complaining that, in spite of the valour that the Poles had shown, the Allies had abandoned the defenders of Warsaw. Mikolajczyk had had continual difficulties with the anti-Russian Sosnkowski, and President Raczkiewicz dismissed him on the unanimous recommendation of his Cabinet (parts of Sosnkowski's Order of the Day may be found in Anders, pp. 220–1; see also ibid. pp. 230–2). Churchill reviewed the efforts of the Allies to help Warsaw in the House of Commons on 26 September 1944 (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 403, coll. 26–27).

[6] See above, p. 179.

[7] Bor, p. 365. The Speaker of the Underground Parliament, Kazimierz Puzak, and the Government Delegate, Jankowski, also left Warsaw, apparently about this time, for they were not taken prisoner by the Germans, and were later arrested and tried by the Russians: see below, pp. 215, 223–5.

[8] Bor, pp. 366–70. Bor includes 'the most important points' of the agreement on p. 370. He states (p. 365) that he wanted to secure combatant rights for the 'People's Army' as well. He does not mention the matter further, however, although the agreement included Home Army soldiers only.

[9] Ibid. pp. 373–6.

For sixty-three days Bor's soldiers had held a tiny area which to them symbolized Polish independence. They suffered losses of 15,000 killed (compared to German losses of 10,000 killed, 7,000 missing, and 9,000 wounded), and the losses among the civilian population were even more terrible.[1] Bor realized the probable fate that awaited him and many of his men if they fell into the hands of the Russians, and it was perhaps logical that he should sign a surrender agreement with the Germans on honourable terms. The personal courage of the defenders of Warsaw and the deep emotion felt by the Poles everywhere were reflected in the last messages exchanged with London, and especially Bor's last report: 'The conduct of our troops is magnificent. It arouses the admiration of the enemy.'[2]

General Bor-Komorowski appeared on the last day, wearing civilian dress, as did his men and the rest of the people who had shared in the glorious two months, and as a last gesture to Warsaw—the pile of rubble that had been the capital of the Polish Republic—and as a symbolic reminder to the waiting Germans of the timeless courage of the Poles, he began to sing a song which was gradually taken up by the remaining defenders of Warsaw—*Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła* (Poland is not yet lost).[3]

(*d*) From the Warsaw Rising to the Yalta Conference

(1) *The October Conference in Moscow*

The Russian advance into the Balkans and the recent developments in Poland made it urgently necessary that there should be conversations between the British and Americans and the Russians for the purposes of co-ordinating action in the war against Germany, of trying to reach a working arrangement in the Balkans, and of making another attempt to settle the problem of Poland. Accordingly, early in October 1944, Churchill and Eden made a sudden trip to Moscow.[4] Mikolajczyk received a letter from Churchill soon after his arrival there, expressing the hope that Mikolajczyk would be prepared to fly with some of his colleagues to Moscow if Churchill was able to arrange for a resumption of the Russo-Polish conversations that had been broken off in August.[5] Mikolajczyk

[1] Bor, pp. 377–8. Both the Germans and the Russians put the number of civilian casualties at 200,000, but Bor says he considers this estimate exaggerated.

[2] Ibid. p. 377; cf. Mikolajczyk, pp. 94–100.

[3] Bor, pp. 378–9.

[4] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 493–501. Churchill said that the Russians would not wait for the American election returns, and suggested that he and Eden should go to agree on 'spheres of influence' (Robert E. Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* (New York, Harper, 1948), p. 832; Eng. edition in 2 vols. with title *The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins* (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949), ii. 824). [These two editions will be referred to hereafter as Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, and Eng. edition.]

[5] Mikolajczyk, p. 103. For Mikolajczyk's trip to Moscow in August see above, pp. 171–3.

had been informed that the British and United States Governments endorsed his plan (submitted to the Big Three on 30 August) but that the Russians had referred it to the PCNL.[1]

He was now assured by telegram from Eden that Churchill and he would be present for a discussion between Polish and Soviet leaders, and would support the Polish plan—on which Mikolajczyk insisted as a basis for discussion[2]—and that, if this meeting were successful, all the parties would meet leaders of the PCNL. Eden said that this was the last chance for agreement, and that the London Poles must take advantage of the friendly atmosphere in Moscow.[3] Mikolajczyk then left London immediately and arrived in Moscow on 12 October.

The first discussion between the Russian, British, and London Polish leaders was held on 13 October; the Americans were represented by Harriman, their Ambassador, who was attending in the capacity of an observer. Mikolajczyk opened the conversations by a defence of the Polish Government's plan of 30 August;[4] and, when he said in answer to Churchill that security for the Russian lines of communication in Poland would be provided by the Poles, criticism centred on the omission from the plan of any mention of the PCNL[5] and on its ignoring of the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland. Stalin said that there could be no relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments without acceptance of the Curzon Line 'as a basic principle'.[6] Mikolajczyk said that he had no authority to relinquish 'forty-eight per cent. of our country';[7] and, when Stalin called him an imperialist, he added that, even if the Line were accepted, there would be no guarantee for the independence of what remained of Poland, which provoked Stalin into asking angrily if he meant that the Soviet Union was threatening Polish independence.

Molotov then referred to the Tehrān Conference. He asked the 'witnesses' present to correct him if he made a misquotation, and said that he remembered Roosevelt's saying at Tehrān that he 'entirely accepted' the Curzon Line, considering it to be a just frontier between Russia and Poland, but that he had asked that this opinion should not be made public 'for the time being'. Thus, said Molotov, the Curzon Line was in accordance with the point of view of all three Powers. There was apparently an awkward silence after this, and Molotov's statement received no correction from Harriman, who was adhering strictly to his status as an

[1] Mikolajczyk, loc. cit.

[2] Ibid. pp. 104, 328. For the genesis of the plan see above, pp. 177–8.

[3] Mikolajczyk, p. 104.

[4] For the names of those who attended the conference see Ciechanowski, pp. 328–9.

[5] Mikolajczyk, p. 105. Churchill, who said that the 'Lublin Committee' ought to have a larger share in the post-war Polish Government than was provided by the plan, was here at variance with his Government's previous endorsement of the plan.

[6] For a verbatim account of Stalin's statement see Anders, p. 237.

[7] Mikolajczyk, pp. 106–7.

observer.[1] Molotov then said that it had also been considered just that the western boundary should extend to the Oder, and this time he was supported by Eden, who said that the Oder had been agreed upon 'as the Poles would wish it'. Churchill described the new lands which were to be given to Poland extending to the west and south of Königsberg, and asked if the 'new united' Polish Government would be able to accept the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, with the reservation that the matter should be finally settled at the peace conference.[2] Mikolajczyk continued to refuse, even when Stalin and Churchill mentioned that Stettin would be included as well. Churchill then summarized the points of controversy, which had been narrowed down to two. The first, he said, was the *de facto* acceptance of the Curzon Line, subject to the Poles retaining a right to raise the question at the peace conference. The second was the attainment of a friendly understanding between the Polish Government in London and the PCNL, which would lead to a new government by the fusion of these two bodies. At this point Stalin rose and said firmly that the Russians could not agree to Churchill's formula for a *de facto* acceptance.[3] In the final delimitation of the frontier, Stalin said, there might be a slight alteration to the extent of three to seven kilometres east or west, but 'the Curzon Line must be accepted as the basis of the future Soviet-Polish frontier'.[4]

On 14 October Churchill and Eden, who had consulted some of the PCNL leaders on the evening of the 13th,[5] met Mikolajczyk to try to find

[1] The verbatim account of Molotov's statement may be found in Anders, pp. 237–8. Harriman's silence not only was interpreted by Mikolajczyk as agreement with Molotov's statement, but caused serious misinterpretation by the Poles of Roosevelt's integrity, aims, and purposes. On 16 October Mikolajczyk wrote to Harriman reminding him of the statement of intentions regarding Poland which Roosevelt had made during Mikolajczyk's visit to Washington in June (see above, pp. 161–4) and asking for clarification. Harriman replied that Molotov's statement was not correct and that his impression was that Roosevelt had made no binding declaration at Tehrān on this matter, and had only listened to the discussion between Stalin and Churchill (Anders, pp. 239, 243). This impression coincides with other accounts of the Tehrān proceedings (see Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 29). Admiral Leahy says that Roosevelt made no specific commitment on Poland's eastern frontier at Tehrān (*I Was There*, p. 249). Harriman, in explaining to Mikolajczyk his role of observer, from which he had been instructed not to depart, said that if he had corrected Molotov's statement during the conference it might have caused a crisis in Soviet-American relations, and this would have been undesirable during the presidential campaign, which was then at its height (Ciechanowski, p. 338). See also Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 833–4; Eng. edition, ii. 825–8. Mikolajczyk's quotation of Churchill as confirming Molotov's statement (Mikolajczyk, p. 108) conflicts with the record of the proceedings given by Anders, which shows that Churchill said only that Roosevelt had signified his consent to the Oder's becoming the western boundary of Poland (Anders, p. 238).

[2] This was a new element, for heretofore Churchill had made no reservation in his support of the Russian right to the lands east of the Curzon Line. He added that he had 'not had time to agree with the Soviet Government about this' (ibid. p. 238).

[3] Ciechanowski, pp. 331–2.

[4] Anders, p. 237.

[5] Churchill, vi. 205; U.S. edition, vi. 235. Churchill and Eden realized at once that the PCNL were pawns of the Soviet Government.

the basis for a compromise proposal. Churchill said that this was the crisis of the fortunes of Poland, and tried determinedly to persuade Mikolajczyk not to be afraid of 'some of the Poles', but to take the responsibility for accepting the Curzon Line. If the Polish leaders had done so when he advised it in January 1944, as he reminded them, there would have been no PCNL—which now might even cause civil war in Poland, with the backing of the Russians—and in all likelihood diplomatic relations with Russia would have been resumed.[1] As he had said before,[2] if Mikolajczyk would agree to the Curzon Line, the Russians would not continue to support the PCNL, for Stalin himself had expressed criticism of its members to Churchill. Further, if an agreement were reached now, it would receive British and American support. Mikolajczyk, however, was brooding about Molotov's statement regarding Roosevelt's Tehrān commitment, and denied that there would be any guarantee for Poland.

At this, Churchill, according to Polish accounts, upbraided the Polish leaders for not seeing what was at stake, and said that he would not 'wreck the peace of Europe' because of quarrels among the Poles, or because they insisted on applying their *Liberum Veto*;[3] and that if they persisted in their obstinacy the British Government would 'give the whole business up'. He reminded Mikolajczyk that Britain had helped to reconstitute Poland twenty-five years before. She was trying again, but Mikolajczyk 'would not play the game'. Mikolajczyk continued to complain of Molotov's statement, saying that the fate of Poland had been sealed at Tehrān. Churchill answered that Poland had been saved at Tehrān. He went on to say that it would mean the annihilation of Poland if the Polish leaders continued to be obstinate. According to the same Polish accounts Eden then intervened, but this did not prevent Mikolajczyk from making the dramatic gesture of asking Churchill's permission to parachute into Poland because he preferred to die now, 'rather than be hanged later by the Russians in full view of your British Ambassador'.[4]

Churchill said that he would in any case draw up a compromise to present to Stalin that evening. When asked if he would agree to a cession of British territory if he were in the position of the Poles, Churchill

[1] The frontier issue had been the core of the Polish-Russian difficulty since 1941. It had been argued (see above, p. 131, note 1) that, if Sikorski had discussed and settled the frontier issue when he was in Moscow in December 1941, subsequent Polish-Soviet relations would have been entirely different. Moreover, the Poles might have secured a more favourable line than they were now offered if they had had sufficient political sense to take the opening for discussion offered them during Sikorski's meeting with Stalin.

[2] See above, p. 156.

[3] A principle which obtained for centuries in the Polish Constitution, whereby a single adverse vote defeated the proposed measure and caused the whole Diet to break up, so that all measures previously accepted became inoperative (see also below, p. 190).

[4] Ciechanowski, pp. 333–4; Mikolajczyk, pp. 109–11.

replied yes, 'and be blessed by future generations'. To a remark that no British parliament would accept such a solution, Churchill replied that there would be nothing to prevent the Poles, after having lost the support of the Allied Powers, from declaring war on Russia.[1]

Discussions continued between the British, the Russians, and the Poles until 19 October, and points of view were partially clarified at a meeting between Churchill and Stalin. Stalin insisted that the Curzon Line must be accepted as a definitive frontier—not as a 'line of demarcation', as Churchill suggested. He would not agree to Lwów and the Galician oilfields remaining in Poland[2]—and he refused Churchill's proposal that a 'Polish Government of National Unity' should be formed in Poland with Mikolajczyk as Prime Minister. He said that the London Poles must recognize the PCNL,[3] and that a Polish Government must be set up in agreement with both. At a final meeting in 'a very friendly atmosphere' on 19 October it was decided that the Polish Government in Exile should remain 'on speaking terms' with the Russians, and that Mikolajczyk should return to London to urge his colleagues there to accept the Curzon Line, explicitly ceding Lwów to the Soviet Union,[4] after which further efforts were to be made to 'find some way out'.[5]

On 24 and 27 October Mikolajczyk reported the Russian terms to the Cabinet and National Council of the Polish Government in Exile. He said that they were faced with an 'Anglo-Soviet front' on the question of the eastern frontier. He described the territories in East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia which the Russians and the British promised to Poland if the Curzon Line were accepted. If a new government were agreed upon in Poland they would be able to assume the administration of Poland with a guarantee from the Russians not to intervene; and they would also be able to conclude a comprehensive treaty with the Russians which would settle all outstanding questions, as well as an extension for twenty years of the Anglo-Polish agreement of 23 August 1939. It was important, he added, that the Government should reach decisions on these matters immediately, 'before the rest of the Polish territory had been liberated'.[6]

[1] Ciechanowski, p. 335. He asked them: 'What are you fighting for, the right to be crushed?'

[2] This was the solution which Roosevelt had indicated to Mikolajczyk that he would support (see above, p. 162), and Churchill now persuaded Mikolajczyk to agree that he should propose it.

[3] Ciechanowski, pp. 336–8; cf. Mikolajczyk, p. 111.

[4] Churchill, vi. 210; U.S. edition, vi. 241. Churchill gives no account of this preceding discussion with Mikolajczyk; and the account given here, which is derived entirely from Polish sources, ought, no doubt, to be taken *cum grano salis*.

[5] Ciechanowski, p. 337. Stalin hinted to Mikolajczyk that if he reached agreement with the Poles in London, he could return to Poland to take part in a new Government in understanding with the PCNL.

[6] Anders, pp. 240–1.

Churchill reported to the House of Commons on 27 October. He described the issues at stake on the Polish question, and said that, although he regretted that a solution had not been reached, he felt that one was much nearer than before. He hoped that Mikolajczyk would return to Moscow to resume the discussions, and that 'a good arrangement' would be made for Mikolajczyk to form in Poland a new government that would be recognized by all the governments that had recognized the Polish Government in Exile. It would be a great pity if the Poles were to waste time. Their earlier refusal to take British advice had resulted in the formation of the PCNL, and any further delay would only increase the divisions among the Poles in Poland and hamper common action by the Allies.[1]

On 26 October, before his second meeting with his Cabinet, Mikolajczyk had sent a telegram to Roosevelt, explaining the Polish reasons for not giving in to the pressure to accept the Curzon Line, and setting out the Polish arguments for the retention of Lwów and the oil- and potash-fields of that area. Recalling that the President had agreed to intercede at the appropriate time for the Polish retention of Lwów, he asked Roosevelt to clarify the American attitude, hoping that he would exert his 'authority and influence in the matter'.[2] (Mikolajczyk was not deterred from sending this telegram by his conviction, borne in upon him during his visit to Washington in June, that, pending the Presidential election, Roosevelt would find himself unable to take a direct part in the settlement of the Polish-Soviet problem.)[3]

During the autumn of 1944 both Roosevelt's Democratic and Dewey's Republican national committees were considering all possible factors in the domestic political struggle in the United States, including the substantial 'Polish vote', which, on both sides, was regarded as a factor that might be decisive. After Dewey had made a speech on 8 October to a group of Polish-Americans in New York, Roosevelt on 11 October received the leaders of the Polish-American Congress at the White House.[4] During his campaign tour Roosevelt granted an interview in Chicago on 26 October to Charles Rozmarek of the Polish-American Congress, and his campaign managers used the occasion for election publicity.[5] While Roosevelt was away from Washington the Polish Ambassador delivered Mikolajczyk's telegram to the State Department. It was sent on to the

[1] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 404, coll. 493–5.

[2] For text see Mikolajczyk, p. 331.

[3] Ciechanowski, p. 327.

[4] Roosevelt made an unfortunate mistake in allowing himself to be photographed under a large map of inter-war Poland. This was interpreted by the Polish-Americans as his endorsement of the Polish eastern frontier as established by the Treaty of Riga. For the photograph see Arthur Bliss Lane: *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1948), p. 96 [referred to hereafter as Lane].

[5] Ibid. pp. 58–62.

President in Chicago, but at the same time Ciechanowski was told that it was most unfortunate that the necessity for asking for Roosevelt's intervention 'had arisen a few days before the date of the elections'.[1]

In London the Polish Cabinet began their deliberations on 30 October, and on the next day Romer submitted several questions to the British Government.[2] The British reply of 2 November said that the British Government were in favour of extending the western frontier of Poland to the Oder, to include Stettin, and that they would continue to support this proposal regardless of what the United States Government might do. They were prepared to undertake a joint Anglo-Soviet guarantee of the new Poland, which would remain valid until superseded by a general guarantee from the 'projected world organization'. It was more important, the reply said, that agreement should be reached on the frontier question than that it should be reached on the reformation of the Polish Government; for the Polish Government would be in a better position if negotiations broke down on the second issue (on which the British and Americans would support them) than if they broke down on the first.[3]

That evening Churchill met Mikolajczyk and other Polish leaders and asked them for an immediate reply. On the following day (3 November) the Cabinet of the Polish Government in Exile finally arrived at their decision. They unanimously resolved to refuse the 'conditions set out at the Moscow Conference', and requested a reconsideration of the entire problem with the participation of the Polish Government in Exile.[4] Their decision was communicated to the British Government that evening, but, after a conference between Polish leaders and Eden, it was decided to await a reply from Roosevelt.[5] In addition to his telegram to Roosevelt of 26 October Mikolajczyk had sent an inquiry to the State Department, requesting an elucidation of the American attitude regarding Poland.[6]

Roosevelt was re-elected for his fourth term on 7 November, but it was not until 21 November that Harriman, passing through London on his way to Moscow, handed to Mikolajczyk a reply from the President, dated 17 November. In this communication Roosevelt said that he would have preferred to postpone the entire question of his Government's attitude until the post-war settlement. However, since the Poles desired it, he was setting out the American position in broad outline. Repeating his previous desire for a 'strong, free, and independent Polish state with the untram-

[1] Ciechanowski, p. 340.
[2] Mikolajczyk, p. 114.
[3] For the text of the British note see ibid. pp. 115–16.
[4] Anders, p. 241.
[5] Ibid. p. 242.
[6] He asked for a statement of the American position on (*a*) the exact definition of the western frontier; (*b*) the time when the German lands would be given to Poland; (*c*) the possibility of a joint guarantee by the Big Three of the post-war independence of Poland; and (*d*) the possibility of a loan from the Government of the United States to rehabilitate the new Poland (Mikolajczyk, p. 116).

melled right of the Polish people' to govern themselves, he said that, if agreement on Polish frontiers were reached among the Polish, Soviet, and British Governments, his Government would not object. In accordance with their traditional policy, his Government would not guarantee specific frontiers, but, as Mikolajczyk knew, they were working towards a world organization which would 'assume responsibility for general security', including that of frontiers. With regard to the new frontiers of Poland, he said that, if the Polish people so desired, the United States Government would be prepared to help with transfers of national minorities. Subject to legislative authority, his Government were also prepared to assist in the post-war reconstruction of the Polish state.[1] Harriman told Mikolajczyk that the President wanted to express the concern that he felt for the Polish Government in the situation in which they found themselves since the Moscow conversations, and that he confirmed his promise of support 'within the limits of his present possibilities'. He suggested that, if Mikolajczyk so desired, Harriman should take up with Stalin the question of Lwów and the Polish oilfields.[2] In another conversation, on 23 November, Mikolajczyk told Harriman that he had consulted the leaders of the Polish political parties and had found that, except for his own Peasant Party, they were all opposed to the President's suggestion.[3] If they accepted [American] intervention only in the matter of Lwów and the potash- and oilfields, they would be automatically accepting the Curzon Line in all other points.[4] Faced on the one hand with the opposition of his Government to any further compromise with the Russians, and on the other with Churchill's growing impatience, Mikolajczyk resigned on 24 November,[5] to be followed shortly afterwards by Ministers who were members of the Polish Peasant Party. The new Cabinet, formed on 29 November, consisted of members of the other political parties, and Mikolajczyk's successor as Prime Minister was the Socialist leader, Tomasz Arciszewski, who had been in Poland during the greater part of the war.[6]

On 15 December a long debate took place in the House of Commons on the Polish question.[7] Churchill and Eden were forced by increasing symptoms of uneasiness in Britain to engage in an exhaustive defence of their Government's policy towards Poland. Churchill began the debate

[1] For the text of Roosevelt's letter see Mikolajczyk, loc. cit. and Ciechanowski, p. 341.

[2] Ciechanowski, p. 342.

[3] Mikolajczyk's approval of Churchill's proposal at Moscow that Poland should agree to the Curzon Line subject to the retention of Lwów thus represented only his own view and that of the Polish Peasant Party. Romer asked about Roosevelt's commitment at Tehrān, and Harriman replied that his impression was that the President had made no specific agreement (see above, p. 184, note 1; Anders, p. 243).

[4] Mikolajczyk, p. 117.

[5] Ciechanowski, pp. 342–3.

[6] Ibid. p. 345; see also Mikolajczyk, pp. 118–19, and Anders, pp. 243–4.

[7] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 406, coll. 1478–1578.

by referring to his speeches of 22 February and 27 October.[1] He criticized the Poles for having missed their opportunity, and for having 'utterly failed to obtain agreement'. He compared them to Tarquinius Superbus in the tale of the Sibylline Books. The procrastination had forced them in the end to consider a problem that should have been considered much earlier; and, meanwhile, the chances of settlement had become much less favourable in consequence of the delay. He defended the efforts of Mikolajczyk to reach an agreement, and pointed out that he had decided to resign because he was 'confronted with the obstinate and inflexible resistance of his London colleagues, whose veto was like the former *Liberum Veto*, which played so great a part in the ruin of Poland'. He foresaw that, because of the failure of the Polish Government, troubles would arise between the Russians and the Polish Underground as the Red Army advanced through Poland. Since Mikolajczyk's resignation, the Polish Government had, he said, 'been almost entirely reconstituted in a form which in some respects I certainly am not able to applaud. Mikolajczyk and his friends remain, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the only light which burns for Poland in the immediate future.' He went on to defend the new arrangements for Poland which had been proposed and discussed at Tehrān. He described the new territories along the Baltic coast that were to be given to Poland, and added that the Poles were 'free, so far as Russia and Great Britain are concerned, to extend their territory, at the expense of Germany, to the West'. The British had long felt that the best way towards a solution of the problem created by the intermingling of populations in this part of Europe would be a transfer of populations according to the method which had been so successful in the Graeco-Turkish exchange of populations after the First World War. The best solution in the German territories that were to be assigned to Poland would therefore, he said, be the expulsion of their German inhabitants. When, later in the debate, his Government were strongly criticized for acquiescing in the loss, by Poland, of the eastern territories of inter-war Poland between the Treaty of Riga frontier and the Curzon Line, Churchill said that the Poles would receive more than adequate compensation in the new territories that they were to receive in the west. He also defended the British Government's support of the Soviet claim to the Curzon Line, including the claim that the territory of Lwów should be assigned to the Soviet Union.[2]

The Prime Minister then expressed his regret that various factors in the domestic situation in the United States had made it impossible for the position of that Government to be stated with precision. He referred

[1] For speech of 22 February see above, pp. 158–9; for speech of 27 October see above, p. 187. Churchill said that what he had said in these speeches was still applicable.

[2] See above, p. 151, note 4.

to his earlier statements that territorial settlements were to be postponed until the peace settlement, but made the point that the case of Poland ought to be treated as exceptional because of the urgency of events there, and he added that the Atlantic Charter provided for such exceptions by the expression 'changes mutually agreed'.[1] Churchill indicated that he expected a strong statement from the United States Government, and he advocated caution, pointing out the danger of a quarrel among the members of the Grand Alliance. It should be remembered, he said, that it would be necessary for them to work together in order to make a success of the contemplated world organization, but he emphasized that nevertheless His Majesty's Government would continue to adhere to the lines of policy in regard to Poland which he delineated.[2]

Churchill's criticism of the American hesitation to make a commitment, and his expressed expectation that a statement would be made, produced a sufficient effect in the United States to make it impossible for the Government at Washington to maintain their silence. As a result, on 18 December, the Secretary of State, Stettinius, issued a statement that corresponded in most respects with Roosevelt's reply to Mikolajczyk of 17 November. There was, however, one important difference. In agreement with Churchill's suggestion to make an exception in the case of Poland, the statement announced that, if mutual agreement were reached by the 'United Nations directly concerned', the United States Government would raise no objection to the settlement of Poland's frontiers before the ending of hostilities.[3]

(2) *The Transformation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation into a Provisional Government of Poland at Lublin*

It has already been mentioned that in July 1944 the National Council of the Homeland (KRN) passed decrees establishing the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL) as a 'provisional executive authority', and amalgamating the 'People's Army' in Poland with the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. into a new 'Polish Army'. The Soviet Government, on 26 July, had given *de facto* recognition to the Committee's authority by signing with them a military agreement, and by exchanging diplomatic representatives.

In their manifesto of 22 July the PCNL had declared that the legal basis of the KRN and PCNL was the Constitution of 1921, and not that

[1] This reference to the Atlantic Charter by Churchill was incorrect, and was afterwards corrected by Eden. This statement caused an uproar in the United States, and the old suspicions of 'secret diplomacy' revived (see Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 842; Eng. edition, ii. 834).

[2] During the debate, both Churchill and Eden emphasized their urgent desire for a meeting of the Big Three. Churchill was aware of Roosevelt's support for the Polish retention of Lwów, and thus had reason for expecting a strong statement from the United States Government.

[3] This was certainly not the strong reply that Churchill had expected.

of 1935, which was the basis of the Polish Government in Exile. On 21 September the chairman of the KRN, Boleslaw Bierut, stated that the PCNL and KRN had taken as an example the democratic principles upon which the 1921 Constitution was based. The KRN was assuming the functions of a parliament, and by decrees had bestowed upon itself the prerogatives of the former Sejm (Diet) and Senate. It had, he said, a democratic and representative basis, since it was based upon the authority of 'People's Councils' established in liberated Poland; and it would call into being the future provisional government in Warsaw.

Two days after Mikolajczyk's resignation in November it was announced in the Soviet press that the inhabitants of Warsaw had passed a resolution in favour of the transformation of the PCNL into a Provisional Government. This was the beginning of a series of similar resolutions that were announced during the month of December as having been passed by 'local organizations' and workers' mass meetings.[1] The series approached a climax on 31 December, when, at a plenary session in Lublin of the KRN, the four 'democratic' parties composing the PCNL—'Polish Workers' (Communists), and the Left-wing splinter groups of the Peasant, Socialist, and Democratic Parties—presented an appeal for such a transformation, which was accompanied by similar resolutions passed by 'peasant' and 'trade union' organizations. Bierut then submitted a draft bill on the transformation of the PCNL into a Provisional Government, and this was then passed 'unanimously' by the 105 members attending the plenary session. At the same meeting other bills were passed 'unanimously', changing Bierut's position as chairman of the KRN to that of 'President', and extending the powers of the presidium of the KRN to act when the KRN was not in session. 'President' Bierut then appointed Osobka-Morawski as Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, and entrusted him with the formation of a 'Cabinet'.[2] One of the first acts of the new Government was the repudiation of the debts incurred by the Polish Government in Exile, and Osobka-Morawski made it clear that there was no chance of a reconciliation with the Polish Government in London, and that, as constituted after Mikolajczyk's resignation, it was still less acceptable than before. Moreover Mikolajczyk himself was put under a ban because, it was alleged, he had knowledge of terrorist activities which

[1] During the first week in December the chairman of the PCNL, Osobka-Morawski, and the chairman of the KRN, Bierut, were visiting Moscow.

[2] The preamble of the 'Law on the setting up of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic' stated that its enactment took place by virtue of Article 27 of the Law of 11 September 1944 on the Organization and Powers of People's Councils. Article I stated that the KRN had brought about the replacement of the PCNL by the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, in accordance with the principles expressed in the manifesto of the PCNL of July 1944. For the account by the Tass Agency of the KRN meeting of 31 December and the establishment from the PCNL of a Provisional Government see *Soviet War News*, 2 January 1945. For list of Ministers see ibid. 3 January 1945.

had been committed by the Home Army during and after his October visit to Moscow. Before adjourning, the KRN passed a resolution on 3 January 1945 declaring that Warsaw remained the capital of Poland.[1]

The trend of events had been causing concern to Roosevelt, and on 16 December he sent a personal message to Stalin requesting that the Russians should refrain from recognizing the 'Lublin Committee' (PCNL) as the Provisional Government of Poland until after the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three, which, he hoped, would take place after his inauguration on 20 January 1945. Stalin replied on 27 December by declaring that, if the Lublin Committee transformed itself into a Provisional Government, the Soviet Government would 'not have any serious ground for postponing the question of recognition'. He said that Mikolajczyk's visits to Moscow to consult with the Lublin representatives had served as a summons for sabotage against the Red Army in Poland; and that the formation of Arciszewski's government in London had 'created a gulf between Poland and the Government in Exile'.[2] The Lublin Committee, he said, had enhanced their power and prestige in Poland by their administrative measures, and furthermore had recognized the Red Army's need for a peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland. The 'émigré Government', on the other hand, was, he said, creating a threat of civil war there. He suggested, therefore, that the Allies should agree on an immediate exchange of diplomatic representatives with the PCNL with a view to its being recognized eventually as the legal government of Poland.

Roosevelt answered on 30 December by expressing keen disappointment. There was no prospect of American recognition of the PCNL, he said, since it was doubtful whether it represented the people of Poland, and in any event that could not be determined before Poland was liberated. He said that he found it difficult to believe Stalin's allegations against Mikolajczyk, for he considered him to be one of the few Polish leaders with whom a settlement of the Polish question would be possible. 'No serious inconvenience' would have been caused to the Russians if they had postponed recognition of the 'Lublin Government' until after the Big Three conference. He again urged Stalin to await the scheduled meeting before recognizing the 'Lublin Government', for he was convinced that the Big Three could reach a solution of the Polish problem when they met.[3]

[1] See below, p. 231. The most conspicuous omissions from the new Government were Andrej Witos (who had had trouble with land reform), and Berling, who had not been in evidence since his Kosciuszko Division's unsuccessful actions across the Vistula during the Warsaw rising. At a meeting on 2 January Osobka-Morawski read the programme of the 'Provisional Government of the Republic, formed on liberated Polish soil in conformity with the principles of the legitimate Constitution of 1921'. For the Government's programme see *Soviet War News*, 4 January 1945.

[2] In view of the previous developments in the east of inter-war Poland (see above, pp. 160, 164–5, 166) it was not surprising that remnants of the Home Army units in the liberated areas should now be engaged in resistance activities against the Russians.

[3] For a résumé of the exchange of telegrams between Roosevelt and Stalin see Lane, pp. 73–

A Soviet broadcast on 5 January 1945 announced that the PCNL had officially notified the Soviet Government on 4 January of the transformation of the PCNL into a 'Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic', and that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had decided to recognize the Provisional Government and to exchange Ambassadors, and had appointed V. Z. Lebedev as the Soviet Ambassador to Poland.[1] An editorial in *Pravda* explained that the demand for the transformation of the PCNL into a Provisional Government had come from the mass of the people themselves, and it praised the achievements of the PCNL since its formation in July 1944, both in the fight against Germany and in its measures of agrarian reform. *Pravda* declared that the 'émigré Government' had devoted 'all its efforts to criminal political intrigues undermining the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition'. It added that 'the formation, by the will of the people, on territory liberated from the German invaders, of a Provisional Government, based on the democratic 1921 Constitution and representing the broadest democratic circles', would be justly regarded as an event of great political importance.[2]

In an Order of the Day of 17 January Stalin announced that the Red Army, together with the First Polish Army, had liberated Warsaw,[3] and on the following day, 18 January, members of the 'Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic' entered the city to establish themselves upon the ashes and rubble to which it had been reduced since the rising of August and September 1944.

(*e*) The Polish Question at the Yalta Conference, 4–11 February 1945

(1) *The Respective Attitudes of the Big Three*

The discussion of the Polish question at Yalta pivoted round two points: the frontiers of Poland, eastern and western, and the reorganization of the Polish Government. After the Soviet Government had recognized the transformed Provisional Government of Poland in January 1945, Stettinius announced that his Government would continue to recognize the Polish Government in Exile. Spokesmen for the British Government referred to the recent criticisms of the Polish Government in London by the Prime Minister during the December debate on Poland;[4] but at the

74. Texts in Churchill, vi. 290–3; U.S. edition, vi. 332–6. Roosevelt emphasized his concern with the effect which would be produced upon world opinion if one of the Big Three recognized one Government while the other two recognized the Polish Government in Exile.

[1] The Soviet Government had exchanged diplomatic representatives with the PCNL in August 1944. Lebedev now replaced Colonel-General Bulganin, who had been the Soviet representative with the PCNL, and Zygmunt Modzelewski replaced Rzymowski and became the Polish Ambassador in Moscow. On 27 December the French Provisional Government had established diplomatic relations with the PCNL for the exchange of prisoners.

[2] *Soviet War News*, 8 January 1945.

[3] Ibid. 19 January 1945.

[4] See above, pp. 189–91.

same time the British continued to maintain diplomatic relations with that Government.

Roosevelt was still in favour (as were his advisers in the State Department) of Poland's retaining Lwów and the Drohobycz oilfields. The American policy, before the Yalta Conference, in regard to the eastern frontier of Poland was to accept the Curzon Line in ex-Russian territory, but in ex-Austrian territory to opt for Line 'B', which would leave Lwów and the surrounding area, including Drohobycz, within Poland.[1] The British Government, however, as Churchill had said on 15 December 1944,[2] supported the Russian demand for the Curzon Line with a southward extension to the west of Lwów (Curzon Line 'A').

Stettinius and Eden had agreed when they met in Malta before the Yalta Conference that they would not recognize the new Provisional Government. They agreed also that Poland should receive East Prussia south of Königsberg and also parts of Pomerania and Silesia. The advisers of Stettinius were opposed to any attempts to amalgamate the Provisional Government in Poland and the Polish Government in Exile. They were in favour, instead, of a plan, similar to that submitted by Mikolajczyk in October 1944, for the formation of a government of 'national unity', to be composed of members of the five political parties (including the Communists) with the inclusion of 'representative' Poles from the Provisional Government and 'moderate' Poles (such as Mikolajczyk) from London.[3]

The Russians, on the other hand, had stated many times, both officially and unofficially, that their views about Poland coincided with those which had been expressed in the programme of the Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic. In their view Poland's frontiers ought to be the Curzon Line on the east and the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers on the west, and should embrace the port of Stettin.[4]

(2) *The Discussions on Poland at Yalta*

The consideration of the Polish question began at the third plenary session of the Yalta Conference on 6 February.[5] Roosevelt said that his Government were inclined to accept the Curzon Line, but he suggested that it would have a salutary effect on American public opinion if the Russians would consider leaving Lwów and the oilfields of that province within Poland: i.e. would accept Curzon Line 'B'. As far as a Polish government was concerned, he desired to see the creation of a representative

[1] See above, p. 151, note 4.
[2] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 406, col. 1480.
[3] Stettinius, pp. 46–47, 66–67, 85–86.
[4] *Soviet War News*, 4 January 1945, does not mention the Curzon Line or Stettin and does not distinguish between the Eastern and the Western Neisse rivers.
[5] For a general account of the Yalta Conference see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 531–66.

government which would have the support of the Great Powers. Perhaps this could be achieved by the formation of a 'Presidential Council' of Polish leaders, which would form a government from the five political parties. It must be made certain that Poland should remain friendly and co-operative towards the Soviet Union. After Stalin had interjected that Poland ought also to remain friendly with the other Allies,[1] Roosevelt went on to say that he did not know either the Polish leaders in Warsaw or those in London, but that he had been impressed by Mikolajczyk as being a sincere and honest man.

Churchill then stated the British position, defending his previous statements on Poland and arguing in support of the Russian right to the Curzon Line, including the retention of Lwów (Curzon Line 'A'), in view of the burdens which Russia had borne in the war. He said, however, that it would be an act of magnanimity, which would be admired and acclaimed by Britain, if Russia were to relinquish Lwów to Poland.[2] But he was more interested in the sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier question; for it was a question of honour for Britain that Poland should be established as a free and independent state, and that she should be mistress in her own house and 'captain of her own soul'. He asked that the three Allied leaders should agree at Yalta on the formation of a Polish Government which would include Mikolajczyk, Romer, and Grabski, whom he considered to be reliable and honest men; and he was interested in Roosevelt's suggestion for an interim government.

Stalin said that, for the Russians, Poland's status was a question of both honour and security: of honour because of their grievances against Poland, which must be eliminated; of security because Poland had historically 'been the corridor for attacks on Russia'. This made it an absolute necessity strategically that Poland should be independent, strong, and democratic, since Soviet armies alone could not close this corridor. Soviet policy was for this reason very different from the Tsarist policy in the nineteenth century of suppressing and assimilating Poland. He defended the Russian right to the Curzon Line, including the retention of Lwów, by arguing that he and Molotov could not return to face their comrades if they were less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau, who had recommended this line after the First World War.[3] Poland could be compensated

[1] The leaders of the Provisional Government in Warsaw had repeatedly expressed their desire to establish diplomatic relations with the American and British Governments. In December Stalin had also suggested to Roosevelt that the Allies should prepare to establish diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government.

[2] See Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 29; also Churchill, vi. 321–2; U.S. edition, vi. 367–8.

[3] The Curzon Line differed from the line first established by the Russo-German 'Boundary and Friendship Treaty' (or Molotov–Ribbentrop line) in 1939, in that it gave the predominantly Polish province of Bialystok to Poland. Stalin argued that Lenin had opposed giving the Bialystok province to the Poles, and that, since the Soviet Government did not now dispute the Curzon Line in this area, the Russians were retreating from Lenin's position. If the British Government

in the west, and he requested that the Allied leaders should support the proposal for the extension of Polish territory to the Western Neisse.[1] As for the formation of a new government, this could not be done without the participation of the Poles. The London and Lublin Poles would be difficult to reconcile. The latter were unwilling even to discuss fusion with the London Poles; and they opposed the inclusion of Mikolajczyk. The leaders of the Provisional Government, which had at least as democratic a basis as de Gaulle's, should be invited to Yalta, or to Moscow, for discussions. They were ensuring order on the Soviet lines of communication—an argument which appealed to Churchill and Roosevelt—while 'agents of the London Government' were attempting to disrupt it.

Churchill immediately answered that, according to British sources of information, the Provisional Government represented less than one-third of the Polish people.[2]

That evening Roosevelt sent a letter to Stalin expressing his anxiety lest 'our people at home' should think that there was a disagreement among the Big Three, and emphasizing his determination that there should be no such breach. No temporary government could be tolerated that caused trouble to the Russian armed forces. Nevertheless, the Government of the United States could not recognize the Lublin Government as then composed; but, taking up Stalin's suggestion, he proposed that there should be invited to Yalta Bierut and Osobka-Morawski, from the Provisional Government, and also 'two or three' from a list of five representative leaders in Poland.[3] The three Heads of Government could agree 'jointly' with them on a provisional government for Poland which should 'no doubt' include some Polish leaders from abroad, such as Mikolajczyk, Romer, and Grabski. If such a procedure were followed, he felt sure that both the British and American Governments could then examine 'conditions' in which they could transfer their recognition from the Polish Government in Exile to the new Provisional Government. He added that such an interim government would, of course, be pledged to hold free elections as early as possible.[4]

On the next day (7 February) Molotov proposed that the Curzon Line had not already committed themselves to the support of the Soviet position, they might have argued with equal cogency for Curzon Line 'B', which would have left Lwów within Poland. This line had as much claim as Line 'A' to have been fixed by Curzon and Clemenceau. Roosevelt and his advisers were in favour of Curzon Line 'B', but could do little if the British and Russians agreed to Curzon Line 'A'.

[1] Stalin said that the prospect of such an extension of Polish lands in the west had delighted Mikolajczyk when he had visited Moscow.

[2] For a résumé of the discussion on Poland during the third plenary session at the Crimea Conference see Stettinius, pp. 143–8; Churchill, vi. 320–5; U.S. edition, vi. 366–72.

[3] The list consisted of Archbishop Sapieha of Cracow, Wincenty Witos, Zurlowski, Professor Bujak, and Professor Kutrzeba.

[4] For the text of Roosevelt's letter to Stalin see Stettinius, pp. 148–50.

should be Poland's eastern frontier, with deviations in some regions, to the depth of five to eight kilometres, in favour of Poland, and that the western frontier should run from Stettin southwards along the Oder and Western Neisse rivers. On the question of the formation of a government, the Russians, the proposal stated, considered it 'desirable' that some democratic leaders from 'émigré' circles should be added to the Provisional Government in Warsaw, and that such an enlarged Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments. As soon as possible the enlarged Provisional Polish Government ought, said Molotov, to 'call the population to the polls for organization, by general voting, of permanent organs of the Polish Government'.[1] It was proposed, further, that a commission consisting of Molotov, Harriman, and Clark-Kerr (the British Ambassador in Moscow) should discuss together the question of enlarging the Provisional Government and should submit their proposals for the consideration of the three Governments.[2] Molotov added that it had been impossible to get into touch with the Poles in Poland over the telephone in time to invite them to Yalta.

Roosevelt expressed his satisfaction that progress was being made on the Polish question, but said that he disliked the word 'émigré'. He requested time to consider the proposals. Churchill also disliked 'émigré' and suggested the phrase 'Poles temporarily abroad'. He urged caution in the granting of western lands to the Poles, since it 'would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion'. Referring to the problem that would be created thereby regarding the transfer of the German populations, Churchill recommended that study should be given to the question, with emphasis on the ability of the Poles to carry it out and on the capacity of Germany to absorb the deported population.[3] At Churchill's request, Stalin agreed to include a reference to democratic leaders 'from inside Poland'.[4]

On the next morning (8 February) the Americans circulated among the British and Russian delegations a set of counter-proposals. In regard to the frontiers they made no objection to the Soviet proposal for the eastern boundary of Poland.[5] They agreed that Poland should be compensated

[1] The difference between the Russian wording on the holding of elections and the British version of 'free and unfettered' elections is one example of the differences in terminology that plagued the Yalta discussions. See below, p. 337.

[2] For the text of Molotov's proposal see Stettinius, pp. 166–7.

[3] Cf. Churchill's support, in the House of Commons in December 1944, for the mass expulsion of Germans on the basis of the former Graeco-Turkish exchanges (see above, p. 190).

[4] For the discussions on Poland on 7 February see Stettinius, pp. 167–9.

[5] By making this statement Roosevelt was at last withdrawing his objection to the Curzon Line 'A'. Although he felt that the Poles should be given Lwów and the oilfields, Roosevelt had expected, even before the Yalta Conference, that he would be unable to make his view on this matter prevail, especially since Churchill had already expressed his unequivocal support for the Russian view about the Curzon Line. Both he and Churchill felt that the eastern frontier of

by receiving territory in East Prussia south of Königsberg, in Upper Silesia, and in the west as far as the River Oder, but they could see no justification for extending the western frontier to the Western Neisse. In regard to the composition of the Polish Government, they proposed that Molotov and the American and British Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. should invite to Moscow Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, Archbishop Sapieha, Wincenty Witos, Mikolajczyk, and Grabski, to form a 'Polish Government of National Unity'.[1] This should be done by the formation of a Presidential Committee of three (possibly Bierut, Grabski, and Sapieha), which should in turn form a government from 'representative' leaders from the Provisional Government in Warsaw, from 'other democratic elements' inside Poland, and from 'Polish democratic leaders abroad'. Such an interim government, the Americans suggested, should pledge itself to hold free elections as early as possible, in order to form a constituent assembly and thus follow the Western procedure for establishing a permanent democratic government. When the suggested interim government had been formed, the three Allied Governments should then recognize it as the Provisional Government of Poland.[2] The American proposals were discussed during the afternoon of 8 February. Stalin and Molotov asked about the future of the Polish Government in Exile, including their property and resources, if the three Governments were to recognize a new interim government according to the American plan. Churchill said that, in that event, recognition would be withdrawn from the London Polish Government by the British Government, and Roosevelt added that he thought that the property of the Polish Government in Exile would go to the new Government.[3]

Churchill then submitted a British plan which accepted the Russian proposal for the eastern frontier of Poland and was only slightly more specific about the territory to be given to Poland in the west. According to this, Poland was to include Danzig, East Prussia 'west and south' of Königsberg, the district of Oppeln in Silesia, and the lands 'desired by Poland' east of the River Oder.[4] The German population in these areas was to be transferred to Germany, and the Poles in Germany, if they wished, were to be transferred to Poland. Regarding the composition of a new government, 'representative' Polish leaders should consult together. Molotov, Harriman, and Clark-Kerr should talk with these leaders and submit to the three Governments their proposals for the composition of a

Poland was less important than the question whether she should be allowed to hold free elections and resurrect herself as a free, sovereign, and democratic state.

[1] The name 'Polish Government of National Unity' had been suggested at the conference in Moscow of British, Soviet, and Polish leaders in October 1944.

[2] See Stettinius, pp. 188–9.

[3] Churchill, vi. 331; U.S. edition, vi. 379.

[4] No mention was made in this proposal of the Western Neisse.

'fully representative' provisional government based upon 'all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland[1] and including democratic leaders from abroad'. When established, this provisional government should hold as soon as possible free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot. All democratic parties should have the right to participate and to put up candidates.[2] Churchill said that, with some 'slight amendments', he was willing to accept the American proposals.[3]

Molotov criticized both the British and the American proposals for ignoring the existing Government in Poland. The Poles would never agree, he said, to great changes in the Provisional Government in Warsaw, for it enjoyed immense prestige and popularity in Poland. Its leaders had participated in the liberation of Poland, whereas Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Witos had not. The only way of obtaining a 'practical result' was to enlarge this Government by adding other democratic elements from Poland and abroad. Instead of the presidential council suggested in the American plan, he proposed that three members of the Provisional Government and two from the list given in Roosevelt's letter should be invited to Moscow to discuss with the three Allied representatives the question of enlarging the Provisional Government. The results of these discussions, he said, could then be submitted to the three Allied Governments.[4]

On the matter of free elections he observed that all three Governments were in agreement. He said that he was pleased that the others agreed to the Soviet proposal concerning Poland's eastern boundary; but he added that the Provisional Government in Warsaw agreed with the Soviet Government in also desiring the western frontier that the Soviet Government had proposed. He approved of the suggestion that the Poles should confer with Clark-Kerr, Harriman, and himself in Moscow.[5]

Churchill then said that this was the crucial point of the conference: there would be lamentable consequences if the Allied leaders, when they dispersed, were still recognizing different Polish Governments. British sources of information contradicted Molotov's statement about the popularity of the Government in Warsaw. The Polish Government in Exile could not be lightly brushed aside, especially since there were 150,000 Polish soldiers fighting for the Allies in Italy; and, if his Government were to throw over the Polish Government in Exile and to recognize the Provi-

[1] This wording seems to have been intended to include representatives from the Polish Underground state as well as from the Communist Resistance Movement in Poland.

[2] The British Government continued to insist on their carefully phrased description of the manner in which they considered that an election of the Western democratic type should be carried out (Stettinius, p. 190).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. pp. 190–1; Churchill, vi. 330; U.S. edition, vi. 377–8.

[5] Stettinius, p. 191.

sional Government in Warsaw, this, taken together with their acceptance of the Russian view about Poland's future eastern frontier, would be regarded in Great Britain as a betrayal of Poland. The criticism which he would then have to expect in Parliament would be very serious. Therefore, before the British Government agreed to give up the Polish Government in London, it must be clear that a new start was being made on both sides on more or less equal terms. Before transferring their recognition to a new government, they would have to be satisfied that this was truly representative of the Polish nation. If there were to be a genuinely free election in Poland, then the British Government would be able to transfer recognition to this new Government without regard to the present Polish Government in London. The three Governments ought to reach a signed agreement on this matter before they left Yalta.[1]

Roosevelt here interposed that, since they were all agreed on the necessity for free elections, the problem was how Poland should be governed until those elections could be held.

Stalin answered that the Provisional Government enjoyed great prestige in Poland. The sympathies of the Polish people were not with those who had 'fled',[2] but with the leaders of the Provisional Government, who had stayed on in Poland and emerged through the Underground. The old Polish hatred of Russia was being removed with the advance of the Red Army, and good will towards Russia was emerging in its place. In view of Churchill's concern about reaching an agreement, he suggested that they should summon Poles from both groups and talk face to face with each. He repeated his argument about de Gaulle: why, if the Allied Powers dealt with him, could they not deal with an enlarged Provisional Government of Poland? It would be better to enlarge the present government than to try to establish a new one—although it would be best, of course, if free elections could be held immediately. The war, he said, had so far prevented this; but if there were no military reverses, it might be possible within a month.[3]

On 9 February Stettinius announced, at the beginning of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, to whom the question had been referred, that he had been instructed by the President to say that, if the Polish question were not settled at Yalta, it might easily jeopardize the participation of his Government in the planned new world organization.[4] He withdrew the

[1] Ibid. pp. 191–2; Churchill, vi. 330–1; U.S. edition, vi. 378–9.

[2] The insinuation that the members of the Polish Government in Exile had not been engaged in the fight against Germany for the liberation of Poland was absurd in view of the war record of the Polish Underground, directed by the Government in Exile, and of the Polish forces fighting with the Allies.

[3] Churchill, vi. 332–3; U.S. edition, vi. 380–1; Stettinius, p. 193. Churchill, according to Molotov, mentioned two months.

[4] Although the American representatives, no doubt, appreciated the breadth of the gulf between the Soviet and the Western points of view on the composition of a new Polish Government,

American suggestion for the creation of a presidential council. All three Governments were agreed that the Poles themselves must decide the question, and that a provisional government must include members of the Government in Warsaw, as well as 'representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad': the positions of the three Governments, then, were not far apart. He therefore suggested a formula which combined parts of the proposals put forward by each of the three Powers: the present Polish Provisional Government might 'be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed "The Provisional Government of National Unity" '.[1] Molotov and the two Western Ambassadors would be authorized to consult 'in the first instance' in Moscow with members of the various Polish groups from Poland and abroad and to reorganize the present Government in that way. The reorganized government, which would be recognized by the Big Three, would be pledged to hold free elections according to the definition that had been made in the British proposals, and 'the Ambassadors of the three Powers in Warsaw would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge'.[2]

Eden then gave the British view. There was a critical attitude at home towards his Government's acquiescence in the Curzon Line; and this might become a 'source of difficulty' between the British and Soviet Governments. He said that few people in Great Britain, the rest of Europe, or the United States felt that the Provisional Government in Warsaw was representative of the Polish people. It was for that reason that the British proposals had not mentioned 'adding' to the Provisional Government, but had emphasized that a new start was necessary. His Government wanted to include in a Polish settlement the question of the Polish army of 150,000 men. He enlarged on another of Churchill's points, namely that it would be much easier for his Government to decide to transfer their recognition from the Government in London to a new government, rather than to the existing Lublin Government. He was not convinced of the Provisional Government's opposition to Mikolajczyk, whose presence in a new government would add greatly to its authority and would do much to convince the British people of the representative nature of the new government.[3]

from this point in the conference onwards they were apparently determined to secure a compromise wording which would at least allow the three Governments to reach a signed agreement on the question before the end of the Conference.

[1] Parts of this formula were subsequently adopted by the Conference. It will be observed that 'reorganized' was an example of the ambiguous wording that was capable of being interpreted by the Russians as meaning that other members should be added to the present Government, whereas the Western Powers could and did interpret it as meaning a complete reorganization from the beginning.

[2] See Stettinius, pp. 199–200.

[3] Ibid. pp. 200–1. From this point onwards, and after the Yalta discussions, the Western

Molotov referred to a Polish general election and to Roosevelt's statement. He said that the Russians agreed that the most important consideration was the holding, as soon as was practicable, of a general election in Poland. With the creation thereby of a permanent government, the present difficulty—that of forming an interim government—would disappear. During the period before the elections could be held, which might be short, the Red Army would be preoccupied with keeping peace in its rear; and this was why he had suggested the reorganization of the Provisional Government in Warsaw by the addition of other 'democratic' Poles from Poland and abroad. He said that he might be wrong about the acceptability of Mikolajczyk, but that both this matter and the reorganization of their government must be decided by the Poles themselves after Harriman, Clark-Kerr, and himself, as a Commission, had discussed it with them on the basis of the principles agreed upon at Yalta.

Eden responded that he also agreed about the importance of the elections to Poland; but he and Stettinius agreed that, if the elections were controlled by the Provisional Government in Warsaw, it would be felt that they were not 'free elections truly representing the will of the Polish people'.[1]

Molotov, who had been waiting for the translation of the American proposals, said that he would like to make some preliminary comments before he consulted Stalin about them. He said that he still believed that the basis of a new Polish Government should be the Provisional Government now in Warsaw, but that these Poles must be consulted first. He thought Stettinius's last point had better be left out, not only because it was unnecessary to state that the duty of Ambassadors was to observe and report, but because it seemed to imply that the Poles, at the time of the election, would be under foreign diplomatic control.

Eden suggested that they were all agreed that 'a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army'.[2] In this event it would be possible to establish a provisional Polish government with a more broadly representative basis than had been possible before. He stated once more that it ought to be composed of Polish leaders from Poland and abroad as well as members of the Provisional Government, and agreed with Stettinius that it ought to be called the 'Provisional Government of National Unity'.[3] During the remainder of the Foreign

Governments continued to argue for the inclusion of Mikolajczyk. Since Churchill's December speech Mikolajczyk and his Peasant Party associates, in virtue of their exit from the London Government, were rapidly becoming, in the eyes of the British and Americans, symbolic of 'representative' leadership for Poland.

[1] Ibid. p. 202.

[2] Ibid. p. 203.

[3] The first part of Eden's suggestion was substantially adopted and later appeared in the first paragraph of the Yalta Declaration on Poland (see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Report of the Crimea Conference, 11th February 1945*, Cmd. 6598 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6598].

Ministers' discussion on Poland Molotov refused to change his view that the present Provisional Government in Warsaw ought to be the basis of a new government, with the addition of some other Polish leaders. Stettinius and Harriman both urged in vain that the words 'existing Polish Government' should not be used;[1] and the three Foreign Ministers decided to report that they had not been successful in their attempts to reach an agreement, but that they would continue the discussion later on.[2]

At the sixth plenary session, in the afternoon of 9 February, when Stettinius had reported this failure to agree, Molotov suggested several amendments to the American proposals. He suggested that the first sentence should be changed to: 'The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.'[3] He suggested, further, that the British reference in paragraph one to democratic parties should be amended by the words 'non-Fascist and anti-Fascist'. He then repeated his suggestion for the elimination of the paragraph in the American proposal on the Ambassadors' observing and reporting.

Churchill, knowing that Roosevelt had pressing engagements elsewhere and was anxious to clear things up at Yalta before he left, urged the leaders of the three Governments not to be hasty about settling this question; and the plenary session adjourned for half an hour to study the amendments suggested by Molotov. After the adjournment Roosevelt said that their three Governments were very near agreement on the Polish question, and that it was 'now only a matter of drafting'. He suggested that the words 'Provisional Government', which were difficult for those who still recognized the London Government, should be replaced by 'Government now operating in Poland'.[4] At the same time he insisted that the point which Molotov wanted to see deleted (that the Ambassadors should report to their Governments on the holding of free elections) was most important in view of the Polish-Americans' interest in the elections. He suggested that the question should be referred again to the Foreign Ministers. Churchill then argued for the inclusion of the preliminary statement, declaring the need for a more broadly based government that had been suggested by Eden. This might be an ornament, he said, but it

[1] Stettinius and Harriman urged that the following ambiguous wording should be inserted in the American formula: 'based on the old *and also* on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland'.

[2] For the discussion of the Polish question at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 9 February see Stettinius, pp. 199–204.

[3] Ibid. p. 209. Translated into Polish, the title recommended by the Russians would be substantially the same as the name that the Government in Warsaw already had—'The Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic'.

[4] Ibid. p. 214.

was an important ornament. Turning to the paragraph in the American proposal about the Ambassadors' report, he first pointed out the implications of the dispute between Underground elements in Poland; for example, members of the Provisional Government in Warsaw had declared that members of the Home Army were to be tried as traitors. He asked Stalin to consider this 'with his usual patience and kindness'.[1] On the question of having 'observers' at the Polish elections, Stalin remained unmoved, even after Churchill, following Roosevelt, had argued in its favour at great length, using comparisons with elections in Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, and Egypt.[2] Stalin said that the question of free elections ought to be discussed in the presence of the Poles. Churchill, in order that he might assure the House of Commons that free elections were going to be held, then insisted that the matter should be settled at Yalta. Roosevelt remarked[3] that he, too, would like to have an assurance of free elections to give to 'the six million Poles in the United States', for such assurances would remove all doubt about the sincerity of the agreement reached at Yalta.[4]

Later in the evening of 9 February the three Foreign Ministers met again. Eden, after saying that it was unlikely that his Government would accept any solution on Poland that was not similar to the British proposals of the day before, presented a 'British Revised Formula' which included the wording, slightly changed, of the first paragraph that he had introduced that morning.[5] The British Revised Formula also included the American proposal about observers. The three Foreign Ministers finally agreed to a compromise text which contained parts of the British, American, and Soviet proposals.[6] The question of Ambassadors observing and

[1] Ibid. p. 215. Several times during the discussions Churchill and Stalin exchanged innuendoes. These apparently referred mainly to their support for different resistance groups in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and to agreements that had been made between them on that subject, and on the question of spheres of influence.

[2] Churchill said that he understood that Tito would welcome observers at elections in Yugoslavia, and that the British would welcome observers at elections in Greece and Italy. He also referred to elections in Egypt, which often were controlled by the party in power. He asked if Mikolajczyk would be permitted to participate, to which Stalin agreed, since he was a member of the Peasant Party, which was not a Fascist party.

[3] Roosevelt was apparently beginning to have doubts about the sincerity of the Russian attitude on the Polish question.

[4] For the discussion of the Polish question during the sixth plenary session on 9 February see Stettinius, pp. 208–10, 214–18; Churchill, vi. 334–6; U.S. edition, vi. 382–5.

[5] Originally the statement had referred to the complete liberation of Poland as something that was still in the future. Eden's proposal now referred to the new situation that had been created by the *fait accompli*. As the discussions were taking place at Yalta the Red Army was moving swiftly through Poland, and in three weeks had accomplished the liberation of most of it from the Germans.

[6] The agreed text included the wording suggested by the British (Churchill's 'ornament'); a version of the Russian proposal on the *basis* of the new 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity'; and the British description of free elections. It was a compromise all round. For the text of the agreed version see Stettinius, pp. 221–2.

reporting on the elections was left to the plenary session on the next day.[1]

On the next morning, 10 February, Roosevelt decided that in the interests of hastening agreement he would not insist on the inclusion of the formula about observers; but, when Stettinius announced Roosevelt's decision to the Foreign Ministers later in the morning, he said that it must be understood that the President would feel free to make any statement he desired regarding the observing and reporting of the Polish elections by the American Ambassador.[2] Eden replied that he did not agree with the President's decision to drop the sentence, and he joined Stettinius in refusing a proposal submitted by Molotov that the British and American Governments should recognize the Polish Government 'as has been done by the Soviet Union'. It was felt that Molotov's proposal could not be accepted if it retained the implication that the Russians would continue to support the Provisional Government in Warsaw. Accordingly a sub-committee drew up a compromise wording;[3] and, before the meeting of the Big Three, Churchill and Eden had a private meeting with Stalin and Molotov, at which they induced them to agree to the inclusion of a declaration that the recognition of a new Polish Government would entail an exchange of Ambassadors who would inform their principals about the situation in Poland.[4]

At the plenary session Eden read the agreed formula for the formation of a 'Provisional Polish Government of National Unity', including the final sentence that had just been agreed between Churchill and Stalin.[5] Churchill then mentioned again the agreement on Poland's western frontier, and said that the War Cabinet in London were opposed to the crea-

[1] Eden and Stettinius wanted to include the paragraph. Molotov insisted that it should be discussed with the Poles in Moscow.

[2] Roosevelt had said: 'If we agree to withdraw this sentence, it must clearly be understood that we fully expect our ambassador to observe and report on the elections' (see Stettinius, p. 224).

[3] Ibid. pp. 224–5 and 230.

[4] Churchill, vi. 336–7; U.S. edition, vi. 385.

[5] In spite of Roosevelt's request that the name 'Provisional Government' should be changed, the final agreement still mentioned 'The Provisional Government' and contained the following formula, which was indefinite enough to allow free interpretation by either side: 'The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis, with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad'. Leahy says that he drew the President's attention to the indefiniteness of this wording, and that the President replied that he knew it, but that this was the best he could do for Poland at the time (Leahy: *I Was There*, p. 370). The final compromise paragraph, to which Churchill had secured Stalin's last-minute agreement, read as follows: 'When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.' For the agreed text on the formation of a Polish Provisional Government see Cmd. 6598.

tion of a western frontier for Poland as far west as the Western Neisse. Molotov remarked that it was not necessary to be as specific in regard to the western frontier as to the eastern one.[1] A statement was then drawn up, for inclusion in the Conference agreement on Poland,[2] mentioning the stipulated eastern frontier (the Curzon Line, with slight divergences in Poland's favour), but suggesting that the new Polish Government should be consulted 'in due course' about the extent of 'the substantial accessions of territory' that she was to receive in the north and west, and that the 'final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference'.[3]

(3) *Roosevelt's and Churchill's Defence of their Policies at Yalta*

When Roosevelt and Churchill arrived home from the Yalta Conference it was necessary for each of them to defend his part in the fundamental and far-reaching agreements that had been concluded at the Conference. In Roosevelt's speech before a joint session of Congress on 1 March 1945 he emphasized that a 'compromise' had been reached on the Polish question.[4] Defending the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier, he argued for Russia's right to security on her western border, and pointed out that, east of the line, the population was not predominantly Polish. The new government which was to be formed according to the Yalta formula would be recognized by the three Allied Powers as the temporary government of Poland. It would be pledged to free elections at the earliest possible time, so that the Polish Government would be formed, in a strong and independent Poland, by the Polish people themselves.[5]

Churchill faced a critical House of Commons when he began, on 27 February, to defend the agreements reached at Yalta. In his speech, opening the three-day debate, he soon turned to Poland, which he acknowledged to have been one of the most critical issues of the Conference. He had always felt, he said, that the freedom and independence of Poland was a more important issue than her frontiers. He described the Russian

[1] Churchill said that the opinion of the new Polish Government of National Unity on the western frontier ought to be obtained (Stettinius, p. 232).

[2] Molotov had suggested that the statement should be drafted by the Foreign Ministers, and that it should be added, as a last sentence, to the section dealing with Poland in the Protocol of the Conference. Roosevelt, however, suggested that the statement should be drafted by Churchill (ibid. pp. 231–2). Roosevelt was reminded by Hopkins that it was doubtful whether he had the constitutional power to commit the United States to a treaty establishing boundaries; and amendments were devised to make the statement on the eastern frontier of Poland an expression of personal opinion rather than an agreement by the United States Government (ibid. p. 239).

[3] Ibid. pp. 239–40; Churchill, vi. 337–9; U.S. edition, vi. 385–7. For the text of the statement on Poland's boundaries see Cmd. 6598, p. 6.

[4] Doubts about the Yalta discussions on Poland had been expressed in the *New York Times*, 14 February 1945.

[5] For the text of Roosevelt's speech see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1944–1945*, vii. 18–28.

claim to the Curzon Line, which had remained unchanged throughout, and the proposal for compensating Poland in the north and west. He believed that this was the fairest division of the territory, and he referred to Eden's detailed description of the Curzon Line on 15 December 1944.[1] He recalled that the frontiers of Tsarist Russia before 1914 had extended 200 or 300 miles to the west of the Curzon Line, and drew attention to Stalin's gesture of not insisting on the Soviet Union's retaining the province of Bialystok. Furthermore, he said, although it was reasonable to allow deviations of from eight to ten kilometres to follow the courses of streams or hills, the Russians had agreed to such deviations being made in favour of Poland only. He described the Germans' policy of destroying the Polish nation and people, and pointed out that within three weeks the Russian armies had driven the Germans out of Poland. His Government were not 'making a questionable compromise or yielding to force or fear', and he asserted with conviction the 'broad justice' of the policy. He described the agreement on the extent of the German territory that was to be given as compensation to the Poles, and said that many of these lands, in the north and west, were 'far more fruitful and developed' than the territory east of the Curzon Line, much of which consisted of the Pripet Marshes.[2] The Allied Powers were confident that this arrangement for Poland would not 'sow the seeds of future wars', for they were determined to make Germany impotent to commit aggression again, and security against such aggression was to be ensured also by the new world organization. He explained that, in view of the sacrifices made by the Russians in the liberation of Poland and the presence of their troops there, he considered them to have been very temperate in their territorial demands; and he felt pleased with the agreements reached and with the 'patient manner in which they have been discussed'.

The question of the freedom of Poland, however, was in a more indefinite and unsettled state. He said that he would state the case 'in all its bluntness': were the Poles to be free, in the Western sense, or were they going to be forced to adopt a Communist system and become 'a mere projection of the Soviet state'? He referred to the solemn declarations which had been made by Stalin and the Soviet Government, and in which the British and American Governments had joined, that Poland should be free, strong, and independent. 'The Poles', he gave it as his opinion, 'will have their future in their own hands, with the single limitation that they must honestly follow, in harmony with their Allies, a policy friendly to Russia. . . . That,' he said, 'is surely reasonable.'

The British Government would continue to recognize the Polish Government in Exile until they considered 'that a new Provisional Government

[1] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 406, coll. 1478–578.
[2] This formidable barrier would now belong to the Russians.

has been properly formed in Poland, in accordance with the agreed provisions'. He emphasized that this did not mean the 'previous or immediate' recognition of the Provisional Government already in Poland.

He referred to his previous speeches on Poland, in which he had said that, if the Polish Government in London had taken British advice long ago, there would have been no Lublin Committee. Even in October Mikolajczyk might have gone from Moscow to Lublin to become Prime Minister of a new Government. 'But these opportunities were cast aside.' He was aware that there were different interpretations among the members of the Grand Alliance of such things as 'democratic parties' and 'free and unfettered elections'; but he added: 'Obviously this is capable of being settled.' He had received the impression at Yalta, he told the House, that the Russians desired to live in friendship with the Western Powers.[1]

(*f*) From the Yalta Conference to the Formation of the Polish Coalition Government, 28 June 1945

(1) *Polish Reactions to the Yalta Declaration*

The day after the publication, on 12 February 1945, of the official report of the Yalta Conference, including the laboriously worked-out Declaration on Poland, the Polish Government in Exile issued a statement refusing to recognize the Yalta decisions. They objected to their not having been consulted, although a British and American memorandum handed to them before the Conference had led them to expect that they would be; to the 'imposition' of the Curzon Line, which they regarded as the fifth partition of Poland; and to the decision to create a new government in the manner decided at Yalta, which would 'only legalize Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs'. With Russian troops in occupation, there would be no assurance that Poland's fundamental rights would be respected even in the presence of British and American Ambassadors.[2]

Even Mikolajczyk, who was considered to have made the suggestions upon which certain of the Yalta decisions were based, disapproved strongly. He pointed out that he had always been in favour of the retention within Poland of Lwów and the Galician oilfields; and he felt, he said, that the eastern and western frontiers should have been determined simultaneously. In addition, his suggestions for the formation of a Polish government from democratic elements had never been intended to mean

[1] For the debate on the Yalta Conference see 27–28 February, 1 March 1945, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 408, coll. 1267–345, 1416–516, 1579–672.

[2] For text of the Polish Government in Exile's declaration of 13 February see *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference: Documents* (London, 1945), no. 5, p. 12. For the reaction in the Polish Underground to the Government in Exile's observations on the decisions taken at Yalta see the account of the trial of the sixteen Polish leaders in Moscow in June 1945 (see below, pp. 223–5).

the broadening and reorganization of the present Provisional Government in Poland.[1]

In Italy Anders wrote on 13 February 1945 to General McCreery, commander of the Eighth Army, asking for the men of the Second Polish Corps to be withdrawn from the battle line, since, after the Yalta decisions, he felt that he had no right to demand more sacrifices from them. In conferences with Generals McCreery and Mark Clark on 15 and 16 February, however, he was persuaded to leave his men in the line, there being no other units free to relieve them. He flew to Naples to confer with Field Marshal Alexander, who urged him to keep calm and to await events. At the request of President Raczkiewicz, Anders then flew to England, arriving on 20 February, and was received by Churchill on the next day. Churchill assured him that Poland had not been betrayed, but that there was a just and reasonable basis for the Yalta decisions. He also said that, if necessary, the Allies could do without the Polish units. On 26 February, while Anders was still in London, he was made acting Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, since General Bor-Komorowski was a prisoner of the Germans.[2] The Polish Government in Exile, however, had lost the sympathy of the Allies since the resignation of Mikolajczyk, and, though they decided that their forces should continue to fight alongside the Allies until Germany was defeated, Anders and his men found themselves in an atmosphere of increasing isolation.[3]

(2) *The Non-Fulfilment of the Yalta Agreements regarding Poland*

Between 24 February and 2 April 1945 Molotov, Harriman, and Clark-Kerr met many times in Moscow, as a Commission to arrange for consultations with Polish leaders in order that the Provisional Government in Warsaw might be reorganized, and to decide which Poles to invite for consultation. The differing interpretations and points of view, which at Yalta had been hidden behind indefinite wording, now immediately became apparent, and the Commission's efforts to overcome them came to nothing. The Warsaw Government, when offered a list of eight other Polish leaders[4] to consult in Moscow with their representatives, replied that those taking part ought to be representative of the will of the people and ought to state their agreement with the principles agreed upon at Yalta.[5] On 27 February Molotov suggested that the British and American

[1] See Mikolajczyk's letter in the *Daily Herald*, 16 February 1945; cf. *The Times*, 17 February 1945. [2] See above, p. 182. [3] Anders, pp. 250–64.

[4] The list named Archbishop Sapieha, Wincenty Witos, Zygmunt Zulawski, Professor Bujak, and Professor Kutrzeba from within Poland; and Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Romer from London (see Lane, p. 90).

[5] Among others, this referred no doubt to Mikolajczyk, who had expressed strong criticism of the Yalta formula. As for Witos, the well-known Peasant Party leader, they said that they thought he would be unable to take part. His whereabouts under the German occupation had been generally known; but he seemed to have disappeared after the liberation and, if he were in Poland

Governments should send someone to Poland to observe and report on conditions, since information was so scarce; but, when Clark-Kerr insisted that this must not imply official recognition of the Warsaw Government, and Harriman suggested that they should wait until they had talked with the Warsaw Government, he withdrew his suggestion, although both the others agreed with it in principle. To a list of twenty names suggested, Molotov objected that the only one he knew enough about was Mikolajczyk and that he was sure that Mikolajczyk would not be approved by the Warsaw Government. Harriman and Clark-Kerr rejected another list, proposed by Molotov,[1] because it would give the Provisional Government an advantage of four to three. After 5 March the three Governments took a hand, the British and Americans taking seriously Molotov's suggestion of 27 February; and Molotov then tried to foist the responsibility for the suggestion on to the Western Powers: he said that it had not been mentioned at Yalta, and that it would wound the national pride of the Poles. Communications on the subject ought to be directed to the Provisional Government in Warsaw. At the last meeting of the Commission, on 2 April, Molotov said that the main obstacle to further progress was the British and American insistence on inviting Mikolajczyk to the consultations.[2]

Meanwhile, as a result of representations that Churchill had been making to Roosevelt since 8 March,[3] personal protests over the non-fulfilment of the Yalta agreements about Poland had been sent to Stalin by Roosevelt on 29 March[4] and by Churchill on 1 April.[5] On 7 April Stalin sent official replies to both, together with a personal message[6] to Churchill, making counter-complaints against the line that was being taken, on the Commission of Ambassadors, by Harriman and Clark-Kerr.

Roosevelt, in his note to Stalin of 29 March, expressed his apprehension at the trend of events since Yalta, and at the difficulties that were arising over the implementation of the Yalta decisions, especially with regard to Poland. He was puzzled, he said, by the apparent indifference of the Russians. The core of the problem was the Soviet Government's interpretation of the Yalta decisions, and especially their apparent assumption

at all, he was keeping himself hidden. Witos was later arrested, held for a period, and released. His health, however, was broken, and he was unable to participate in the Moscow consultations (see below, p. 222, note 5).

[1] Molotov's proposal named Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, and Marshal Zymierski of the Provisional Government; Grabski and General Zeligowski (who had seized Vilna from Lithuania in 1920) from London; and Professor Kutrzeba from Poland.

[2] For the six meetings of the Moscow Commission see Lane, pp. 89–94.

[3] See Churchill, vi. 370–82; U.S. edition, vi. 422–35.

[4] For text see ibid. pp. 633–5 and 743–5 respectively. The date of Roosevelt's telegram is given here as 29 March, whereas Stettinius (p. 275) dates it 1 April. See also Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 54–55.

[5] For text see Churchill, vi. 382–4; U.S. edition, vi. 435–7.

[6] For text see ibid. pp. 384–5 and 437–9 respectively.

that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was to be virtually identical with the Provisional Government in Warsaw. Such an interpretation, he pointed out, was not in accordance with the Yalta decision or even with the discussions preliminary to it, and he emphasized that there would be no acceptance by his Government of a solution which was only a poorly camouflaged perpetuation of the Warsaw Government. The Moscow Commission's right to choose candidates for invitation to Moscow for consultation must not be either limited by or shared with the Warsaw Government. He would not bar candidates suggested by Molotov, and he expected to receive the same consideration for his own Government's suggestions. As a first step, he proposed that the Commission should summon a small group of Polish leaders who would be able to suggest others. The three Heads of Government should use their influence to see that opposing groups in Poland stopped obstructing one another, and to preserve calm there.[1] He also proposed that representatives of the American and British members of the Commission should be allowed to visit Poland, in accordance with Molotov's suggestion of 27 February, which had been quickly withdrawn on the same day. Churchill's telegram of 1 April to Stalin was in the same sense.

In his reply of 7 April to Roosevelt, Stalin declared that the impasse had been reached in the Commission because the British and American Ambassadors had interpreted the Yalta Declaration as meaning that the Provisional Government in Warsaw should be 'liquidated' and be replaced by an entirely new government. He accused Harriman of saying that it was possible that such a new government might include none of the members of the Warsaw Provisional Government. Although it had been agreed at Yalta to invite five Polish leaders from Poland and three from London, the British and American Governments were now asking that each member of the Commission should be allowed to invite an unlimited number of Poles. The Commission should only invite Poles who were willing to accept the Yalta Declaration, including the Curzon Line provision, and who were making sincere efforts towards the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. In reply to the proposal (originally Molotov's) to send observers to Poland, Stalin repeated the argument previously used by Molotov—that the Poles would consider it an insult to their national dignity.[2] In his answer to Churchill's note,[3] Stalin said that the opposition to Mikolajczyk might be withdrawn if he would make a public declaration that he accepted the Yalta Declaration and was in favour of the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and Russia.

[1] The Polish Underground leaders had disappeared on 27–28 March.
[2] See Churchill, vi. 384; U.S. edition, vi. 437–8.
[3] Ibid. pp. 384–5 and 438–9 respectively.

Roosevelt agreed with Churchill that they should send a joint reply to Stalin. While it was being drafted, however, Roosevelt died, on 12 April 1945. The message that had been prepared for his signature was later discussed, agreed with some amendments, and signed by the new President, Truman, and by Churchill, and was sent in both their names to Stalin on 18 April.[1] In it they said that they desired to correct Stalin's mistaken impression of British and American policy. They denied his statement that their Governments were asking that each member of the Commission should be allowed to invite an unlimited number of Poles. Referring to Roosevelt's suggestion to invite a few Polish leaders as a first step, they told Stalin that the real issue was whether the Provisional Government in Warsaw had the right to veto candidates. Such a right was certainly not mentioned in the Yalta Declaration. It appeared to them that the Russians were reverting to the position in regard to Poland that they had held at the beginning of the Yalta discussions.[2]

Meanwhile, an additional complication had arisen with regard to Poland's representation at the San Francisco Conference. On 5 March the press were told that invitations to the Conference were being sent neither to the Polish Government in Exile nor to the Provisional Government in Warsaw.[3] On 12 March the Polish Government in Exile issued a note in protest,[4] and reinforced it on 14 March by an oral protest from Ciechanowski to Stettinius. Ciechanowski was told that it was intended that an invitation should be extended to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, after its formation in accordance with the Yalta Declaration.[5] On 21 March the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs gave a similar answer in the House of Commons.[6]

Many attempts were made to get the Warsaw Provisional Government invited to San Francisco to represent Poland. On 9 March the Soviet Ambassador in Washington submitted a note to the State Department, suggesting that, if the implementation of the Yalta decision had not been completed before the San Francisco Conference met, the members of the Provisional Government should be invited.[7] This was followed on 22 March by a note from the Warsaw Government to the four sponsoring Powers (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) in which it urged them to invite Poland 'in the person of the now acting Provisional Government of the Polish Republic';[8] and by a Tass com-

[1] On 15 April, according to Churchill, vi. 426; U.S. edition, vi. 488; but other dates given in the immediate context for antecedent events suggest that '15th' is a misprint for '18th'.

[2] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 60; Churchill, vi. 424–6; U.S. edition, vi. 486–8.

[3] Lane, p. 94.

[4] See *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference*, no. 7, p. 14.

[5] Ciechanowski, pp. 362–4; cf. Lane, loc. cit.

[6] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 409, col. 835.

[7] *Soviet War News*, 3 April 1945; cf. Lane, loc. cit.

[8] See *Soviet War News*, 28 March 1945.

muniqué of 31 March, stating that the Soviet Government expected an early reply to their note of 9 March.[1] On the same day Stettinius delivered the reply. He once more expressed the hope of his Government that the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity would be formed in accordance with the Yalta Declaration in time to be given an invitation; but said that, in view of the consultations in progress in the Moscow Commission, his Government were not prepared to invite the Provisional Government in Warsaw.[2]

(3) *The Arrest of the Polish Underground Leaders*

At the end of the Warsaw rising General Bor-Komorowski, before surrendering to the Germans, had entrusted the leadership of the Home Army in Poland to Colonel Okulicki, who, with a few picked officers and several high-ranking political leaders of the Polish Underground, whose identities had not been revealed, infiltrated through the German lines round Warsaw and remained clandestinely in Poland after its 'liberation' by the Russians. In view of the Soviet treatment of Home Army units, particularly in what had been the eastern part of inter-war Poland, some of them, who had formed guerrilla units behind the Russian lines, were naturally antagonistic towards the occupying Red Army; and during the last months of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 complaints were made periodically by the Russians and by the Provisional Government in Warsaw that units under the leadership of the Government in Exile were engaged in hostile actions in the rear of the Red Army. On this ground, Polish Underground leaders had been denounced as spies and traitors in the weeks preceding the Yalta Conference, and this was the atmosphere in Poland when Mikolajczyk suggested,[3] before the Conference, that a meeting of Polish Underground leaders should be held in Warsaw, as a preliminary step to the establishment of a government representing all democratic elements. He himself said later that, after his resignation, members of the Council of National Unity in Poland had become dissatisfied with the Government in London headed by Arciszewski, and had taken the initiative themselves to reach a settlement with the Russians. They opened conversations with the Russians towards the end of February 1945, and were told that the Soviet authorities were anxious that the Underground political forces should come out into the open and be 'induced in the entire current of democratic forces of independent Poland'.[4] These conversations took place at the time of the deliberations of the Moscow Commission.

[1] See *Soviet War News*, 3 April 1945. [2] Lane, pp. 94–95.

[3] In a letter published after the Yalta Conference Mikolajczyk referred to his previous public suggestions for such a meeting (see *Daily Herald*, 16 February 1945).

[4] See statement by Mikolajczyk on 10 May 1945 in *The Times*, 11 May 1945. For the version of the Polish Government in Exile, see *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference,*

The circumstances of the arrest by the Russians of sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground were obscure. Jankowski, the Deputy Prime Minister, received a written invitation towards the beginning of March, from a Colonel Pimienov of the Red Army, to a meeting between a delegate of the Underground Government and Colonel-General Ivanov, representing Marshal Zhukov, who commanded the First White Russian Army Front, in order to discuss outstanding problems.[1] Jankowski received encouragement from the United States and British Governments and approval from the Government in Exile, but was advised to proceed with caution.[2] Preliminary talks took place from 17 to 27 March on the outskirts of Warsaw between Jankowski and other Polish Underground leaders on the one hand and Colonel Pimienov on the other. Pimienov asked for a clarification of the attitude and future intentions of the Underground leaders, and political views were exchanged. Pimienov apparently convinced Jankowski that he had authorization from Zhukov,[3] and it was decided that official talks should begin during the following week. The Polish leaders agreed to reveal themselves, and the Russians offered to release certain Underground leaders who had been arrested and to provide an aircraft to fly eight representatives of the Polish Underground authorities to consult Polish leaders in London.[4] Okulicki, Jankowski, and Puzak were apparently invited to a conference with Ivanov on 27 March, and on the following day thirteen other Underground political leaders seem to have been invited to a ceremonial luncheon to be given by Marshal Zhukov. The original group may have been told that they were being flown to London, and the other group that they were being flown to Zhukov's headquarters.[5] The sixteen Polish leaders were in fact all flown to Moscow, where they were taken to the Lubianka Prison.

The Polish Government in London made urgent representations to the British and American Governments to intercede, and issued a communiqué

no. 9, p. 18. The split with the London Government was confirmed later by the other leaders of the Peasant Party at the Moscow trial in June 1945.

[1] For the text of the letter, dated 3 March, see *The Dark Side of the Moon*, pp. 227–8. See also Kusnierz, ed.: *Stalin and the Poles*, p. 230.

[2] Zbigniew Stypulkowski: *Invitation to Moscow* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1951), p. 212; cf. Kusnierz, ed., op. cit. p. 231.

[3] Umiastowski: *Poland, Russia, and Great Britain*, p. 463; cf. Stypulkowski, op. cit. p. 215.

[4] Kusnierz, ed., loc. cit. See also *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference*, nos. 9 and 12, pp. 18–20; and Okulicki's message to London of 25 March (text in *The Moscow Trial of the Sixteen Polish Leaders* (London, Liberty Publications, 1945), p. 3).

[5] Stypulkowski, op. cit. pp. 217–21; cf. Kusnierz, ed., loc. cit. During the subsequent Moscow trial the President of the Court, Ulrich, clearly indicated that the invitation to Okulicki was a device to secure his arrest (*Trial of the Organizers, Leaders and Members of the Polish Diversionist Organizations . . . heard before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., June 18–21, 1945. Verbatim Report* [translated from the official Russian version] (London, Hutchinson, 1945), p. 131).

of their own on 6 April describing some of the circumstances relating to the disappearance of the Underground leaders.[1] The affair began to receive wide publicity, adding to the popular indignation that had been growing in Great Britain and the United States over various activities of the Russians in East and South-East Europe. On 9 April Harriman in Moscow asked Vyshinsky about the rumours, and received the reply that there was no truth in them.[2] The British Government followed suit with similar results.[3] On 12 April the Polish Government issued a statement on the arrest of Witos.[4] But the effect of this, and of the popular concern, which had been increasing daily with the continued Russian silence, was temporarily dimmed by the death of President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945. The Soviet Government continued to ignore British and American inquiries even after Molotov and Eden had set off for the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, which began on 25 April 1945.[5] On 27 April the Polish Government in London sent a telegram to Eden and Stettinius, appealing to them to 'ascertain the fate of the missing persons';[6] and, in the British Parliament on 2 May, the Minister of State, Richard Law, could not give a satisfactory answer to numerous questions put to him on the subject.[7]

(4) *The Polish (Warsaw Government)-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Collaboration, 21 April 1945*

On 16 April the Soviet Government informed the American Embassy in Moscow that they were preparing a Polish-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance similar to those concluded by them with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.[8] On the same day Stalin suggested to Harriman, as a solution of the impasse that had been reached in the Moscow Commission, that they should apply the formula that had been used in the formation of the Yugoslav Government.[9] Harriman said that the Polish and Yugoslav questions were not comparable. Attempts by Harriman, then[10] and on

[1] *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference*, no. 9, p. 18. The numerous conflicting versions of the affair, mainly from London Polish sources, present a confused picture.

[2] Lane, p. 98.

[3] See Eden's replies to oral questions in the House of Commons, 11 April 1945, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 409, coll. 1797–8.

[4] *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference*, no. 11, p. 19; and see above, p. 210, note 5.

[5] It had been announced on 29 March that Molotov would not attend the Conference (see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 578).

[6] *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference*, no. 12, pp. 19–20.

[7] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 410, coll. 1382–4.

[8] Lane, p. 100.

[9] Marshal Tito had just completed a visit to Moscow. For the Yugoslav solution see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 667–9 and *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 529–30, 559–60; and the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia (Cmd. 6598). For the suggestion that Churchill might have been willing to make a fifty-fifty deal over Poland, as he had over Yugoslavia, see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 498, note 4.

[10] Lane, pp. 101–2.

18 April, to persuade the Russians to defer signing the treaty until Molotov should have arrived in Washington, when the American view could be presented to him, were of no avail. Nor was Stalin induced to modify his policy by two declarations of Mikolajczyk's—one accepting the Yalta decisions about Poland, and the other explicitly accepting the Curzon Line and renouncing Lwów—which were telegraphed to Stalin by Churchill on 16 and 22 April.[1] The Russians replied to Harriman on 21 April that they had already informed the Provisional Government in Warsaw that they had agreed to the conclusion of the treaty: it should not be the cause of any anxiety, for it strengthened friendly relations between the two countries.[2]

This Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Collaboration was signed on the same day (21 April 1945) in Moscow by Stalin and Osobka-Morawski. It was to remain in effect for twenty years, and provided for mutual aid, military and other, in the war against Germany; for the strengthening of friendly collaboration with one another according to the principles of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty; for the elimination of the 'threat of a repetition of aggression' by Germany or any state allied directly or indirectly with Germany; and for mutual assistance in the event of attack by any such Power. Article III of the treaty stated that both parties would 'participate in a spirit of most sincere collaboration in all international actions aimed at ensuring the peace and security of the nations'.[3] Furthermore, neither party would sign 'without mutual consent' an armistice or peace treaty with Germany that encroached on the territorial integrity or security of either party.[4] Both parties undertook not to join an alliance or participate in a coalition directed against the other. In addition, they pledged themselves to economic and cultural collaboration in the future.[5]

The signature of the treaty strengthened the impression, which had been gaining ground during the period of preparations for the Conference in San Francisco, not only in governmental circles in Britain and America but also among the general public, that the Soviet Union was determined

[1] Churchill, vi. 426–7; U.S. edition, vi. 489.

[2] Lane, pp. 100–1.

[3] This perhaps referred to the proposed United Nations Organization, and may have been connected with the Warsaw Provisional Government's attempts, supported by the Russians, to secure an invitation to the San Francisco Conference.

[4] 'Territorial integrity' meant a common guarantee of Poland's western boundary, interpreted by both Governments as the Oder–Western Neisse line, although the Russians still had not managed to secure Allied agreement to it; and a guarantee of Russia's new western boundaries: the Curzon Line and a Russo-Polish frontier in East Prussia which would give the Soviet Union the possession of Königsberg. The word 'security' was susceptible of even more elastic interpretation.

[5] For the text of the Polish-Soviet Treaty see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *British and Foreign State Papers, 1943–1945*, vol. 145, pp. 1166–8, and for the accompanying speeches by Stalin and Osobka-Morawski, see *Soviet War News*, 23 April 1945. See also Bierut's press conference of 23 April (ibid. 25 April 1945).

to pursue a unilateral policy in Eastern Europe, regardless of the feelings of her allies. All that Churchill was able to obtain from Stalin in an exchange of telegrams, initiated by Churchill between 24 and 29 April,[1] was a promise to advise the Provisional Polish Government to withdraw their objections to inviting Mikolajczyk for consultations. Even before the San Francisco Conference opened, idealists with visions of an effective international organization were becoming disillusioned and apprehensive as Allied relations approached a crisis over the question of Poland.

Some of these apprehensions were expressed to Molotov when he arrived in Washington on 22 April. He was told that it would be contrary to the Yalta Agreement to use the Yugoslav formula as a solution for the Polish problem, and that the United States Government would not recognize a Polish government that did not represent all democratic elements. Disappointment was expressed at the impasse reached in the Moscow Commission, and he was told of the misgivings which the Russian attitude had aroused among those who believed in Allied co-operation. He was bluntly told that the Soviet Government had not adhered to the Yalta Declaration,[2] while the British and Americans, so it was claimed, had never departed from it either by action or by suggestion; and furthermore, that the British and Americans were determined to carry forward their plans for the world organization, regardless of differences or difficulties.[3]

In spite of what Stettinius had said on 31 March the Russians had continued to press, in newspaper articles and through diplomatic channels, for an invitation to San Francisco for the Provisional Government in Warsaw. Even after the Conference had begun on 25 April 1945 Molotov continued to urge the acceptance of the Warsaw Government as one of the members of the new international organization.[4]

At a dinner in San Francisco on 3 May with Stettinius and Eden, Molotov suddenly informed them that his Government had arrested the sixteen Polish leaders who had previously been reported to have disappeared.[5] His words were confirmed by a Tass communiqué on 5 May, which said that the group of Poles, headed by Okulicki, had been arrested by 'military authorities of the Soviet front'. They were to be committed for trial, and were accused of sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, as well as of the maintenance there of illegal radio transmitters.[6]

On 5 May Stettinius and Eden issued official statements about this

[1] Churchill, vi. 429–37; U.S. edition, vi. 492–501.

[2] Cf. Churchill and Truman's joint message of 18 April (see above, p. 213).

[3] Lane, pp. 102–3.

[4] United Nations Conference on International Organizations: *Documents* (San Francisco, 1945), vol. v, p. 93.

[5] Lane, p. 104; Churchill (vi. 434; U.S. edition, vi. 498) gives the date as 4 May.

[6] See *New York Herald Tribune*, 6 May 1945. The communiqué heatedly denied stories being circulated by the London Poles with regard to the affair.

affair. Mentioning previous inquiries which had been made, they expressed considerable concern about the new development, which had a 'direct bearing' on the solution of the Polish problem, and announced that they had asked Molotov for a list of the arrested Poles, with a full explanation.[1]

Just as in April Roosevelt's death had diverted public attention from the disappearance of the Polish leaders, so between 1 May, when the Germans announced the death of Hitler, and 8 May (V-E day) the various stages of the German collapse and surrender tended to lighten momentarily the cloud of pessimism that Molotov's announcement of the arrest of the sixteen Poles had cast over San Francisco. But the Polish Government in Exile published on 6 May an appeal to the Governments represented at San Francisco to induce the Russians to release the leaders. The Russians, they protested, had been guilty of bad faith in inviting the leaders to a conference and then arresting them.[2] Mikolajczyk issued a statement on 10 May, saying that the Poles would never have revealed themselves to the Russians if they had thought that they would be accused of activities against the Red Army.[3]

To an inquiry from *The Times* correspondent in Moscow on 11 May Stalin answered that the arrests had nothing to do with the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government.[4] The Poles had been legally arrested under a Soviet law which was similar to the British Defence of the Realm Act, and in accordance with an agreement between the Red Army and the Polish Provisional Government.[5] They could not have been invited for negotiations, for the Soviet leaders would not negotiate with men who had broken the law by endangering the Red Army rear. He reaffirmed, however, that the Yalta Declaration was the basis for the solution of the Polish problem, and suggested three conditions: first, in the reconstruction of the Government, the Polish Provisional Government must be recognized as the core of the future Polish Government of National Unity, as the National Liberation Committee in Yugoslavia had been recognized as the core of the United Yugoslav Government; secondly, the Government so created in Poland must be friendly to the Soviet Union, and not pursue a policy of *cordon sanitaire* against her; thirdly, the reconstruction of the Government must be carried out with the participation of the Poles who had ties with the Polish people.[6]

[1] For Stettinius's statement see *Department of State Bulletin*, 5 May 1945, p. 850. For the British Government's statement see *The Times*, 7 May 1945.

[2] *Poland and Great Britain before and after the Crimea Conference*, no. 15, p. 22.

[3] *The Times*, 11 May 1945.

[4] The correspondent's letter had suggested that several of the arrested men might have been valuable in a new Polish government.

[5] For the agreement between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Soviet High Command see above, p. 166.

[6] For the text of *The Times* correspondent's letter of 11 May and of Stalin's reply of 18 May see *Soviet News*, 22 May 1945.

(5) *The Last Mission of Harry Hopkins*

While Molotov's revelation of 3 May exacerbated the bewilderment and irritation felt in the West on the subject of the Russian activities in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the situation was complicated further by several actions taken by the Western Allies towards the end of the year, after Roosevelt's death, which had antagonized the Russians.[1] In the atmosphere of gloom cast over the Conference at San Francisco by the failure to reach agreement over the Polish problem,[2] Harry Hopkins was induced to undertake a flight to Moscow, in spite of his ill health, to make an attempt to settle, by direct discussion with Stalin, some of the issues that were disturbing the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.[3] Hopkins arrived in Moscow on 25 May 1945 and remained there for eleven days. At his first meeting with Stalin he said that he was prepared to stay in Moscow as long as the discussions required, and Stalin answered that his time was at Hopkins's disposal.

Hopkins had obviously prepared himself carefully for the general discussions which began on 26 May. He began by attempting to set forth the American conception of the reasons for the deterioration in relations, and Stalin, in return, outlined the Soviet grievances against the Western Allies, principally with reference to the United States. As at Yalta, Poland figured prominently, and on this particular subject it was necessary for Hopkins to rely on Harriman and State Department experts.[4]

Hopkins said that he was concerned with Poland, not as a specific issue, but as a symbol of the ability of his Government to work things out with the Russians. He attempted to explain Roosevelt's conception of world affairs, and to differentiate between the unchanging critics of Soviet Russia in the United States and the majority of the American people who supported Roosevelt's policies: it was this majority who were now becoming disillusioned because of Russia's actions, especially her unilateral actions in Poland.

In his efforts to remove the grounds for Soviet suspicion of the American Administration, Hopkins was careful to differentiate between British policy and that of his own Government, especially with regard to Poland. He assured Stalin of the Americans' good faith in the matter, emphasizing their lack of special interests in Poland. They would accept any Polish government that would be friendly to Russia and that was also desired by the Polish people themselves.

Stalin, however, insisted at the beginning that the trouble about Poland

[1] See Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 893–5; Eng. edition, ii. 882–3.

[2] For the atmosphere of public concern caused by the suspension of efforts to solve the Polish situation see the article by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times*, 13 May 1945.

[3] Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 885–7; Eng. edition, ii. 874–5.

[4] For a general account of these discussions, which included many other issues besides the Polish problem, see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 585–8.

was that the British Conservatives wished to re-establish a *cordon sanitaire* on the Soviet borders. He expressed the conviction that the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Declaration was the only one possible, and said that the Russians were not such simpletons as to swallow anything else. He admitted the Russians' unilateral steps in Poland, for example the recognition of the Provisional Government in Warsaw and the conclusion of a Polish-Soviet treaty. There were good reasons for these actions, which had not been properly appreciated by the Western Allies. First of all, there was the security of the Red Army's rear. It would have been impossible, he said, to wait until the Allies reached agreement on a Polish government; the Lublin Government had proved of great assistance in guarding the Red Army's communications, and the Soviet Government had been compelled, in the absence of another reliable government, to recognize the Lublin administration. Referring to recent British action in Greece, he told Hopkins that at least the Russians had not been compelled to take similar action in Poland. Poland would not be 'sovietized', but would have a parliamentary system of government similar to that in Belgium or Holland. He explained in detail the basis of his desire for a friendly Poland. He laid great emphasis on the devastation caused by German attacks, and insisted that such attacks must be made impossible in the future. Hitherto Poland had either been too weak to stop the Germans or had actually allowed them to come through. This was the reason behind the Soviet desire for a strong and friendly Poland; and it had not been his intention to exclude the Allies from the settlement.

In the conversation on 27 May Stalin proposed that four of the eighteen or twenty portfolios in the future Polish Government of National Unity should go to Poles on the lists submitted by the British and American Ambassadors. If this proposed solution proved agreeable to the others, consideration could then be given to the specific persons. Mikolajczyk, he thought, would be acceptable as one of them. Hopkins, who was keeping the State Department, and through them the British Government, fully informed, asked for time to consider the proposal.

At their meeting on 30 May the two men expressed agreement on the Western concept of free elections and fundamental rights; but Stalin said that it was necessary to limit such freedom during war-time, and to a lesser extent during peace-time. He made a clear reference to the arrested Polish leaders when he mentioned the necessary limitation in war-time of the use of radio transmitters behind the lines. He also said that 'Fascist' parties could never be allowed to exercise such rights.

Hopkins does not seem to have accepted Stalin's proposal of 27 May for the formation of the new Polish Government; and it was eventually agreed that twelve Poles should be invited to consult with the Moscow Commission: three from London (but not from the Government in Exile),

of whom Mikolajczyk was to be one; five from Poland; and four of the leaders of the Provisional Government in Warsaw.[1]

On the evening of 31 May Hopkins had a private conversation with Stalin, to attempt to induce him to release the arrested Polish leaders. Stalin said that they could not be released[2] but must be tried; for, according to Soviet evidence, they had been engaged in diversionist activities. Furthermore, the United States Government had been misled in the matter by Churchill and by the Polish Government in Exile. He hinted, however, that the Polish leaders would receive lenient treatment.[3]

The apparent success of Hopkins's final mission to Moscow brought great relief to the Conference in San Francisco. The interpretation by Gromyko (Russian Ambassador to the United States and member of the Russian delegation to San Francisco) of the veto question had momentarily brought the Conference to a standstill; but Hopkins's agreement with Stalin allowed the delegates to make progress once more towards the drafting of the Charter. It also enabled the Moscow Commission to resume its functions.[4] It received the approval of Truman, and on 12 June, not long after Hopkins's departure from Moscow, simultaneous announcements were made in Washington, London, and Moscow, giving the names of Polish leaders whom the Commission had agreed to invite to arrive in Moscow by 15 June for consultations in accordance with the Yalta Declaration on Poland.[5]

On 15 April, after Churchill had shown him a telegram from Stalin[6] in which he said that Mikolajczyk and his supporters were 'saboteurs of

[1] The names agreed upon included Mikolajczyk, Grabski or Jan Stanczyk, and Julian Zakowski from London; either Cardinal Sapieha or Wincenty Witos, Professor Stanislaw Kutrzeba of Cracow, Zygmunt Zulawski, Professor Adam Krzyzanowski, and Henryk Kolodziejski from Poland; and Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, Kowalski, and Gomulka of the Provisional Government (see Mikolajczyk, p. 128).

[2] There was a parallel between the disappearance from Soviet prison camps in 1940 of those officers and men who would have been the core of a future Polish army, and the removal from active life of these sixteen men at a moment when the reorganization of the Polish Government was an urgent problem.

[3] For the account of Hopkins's mission, together with a verbatim record of many of the discussions, see Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 887–912; Eng. edition, ii. 875–902.

[4] At their final meeting in Moscow on 6 June Stalin had expressed his thanks to Hopkins for the progress made on the Polish question. Among the telegraphic messages passing to and from Moscow, Churchill cabled to Hopkins his congratulations on a splendid job. Hopkins, however, had been told by Clark-Kerr that Churchill, whom Hopkins had not seen before he went to Moscow, was 'disturbed about the whole business' (ibid. pp. 913 and 903 respectively).

[5] The list coincided for the most part with the list agreed upon at the time of Hopkins's mission. Witos was being invited instead of Cardinal Sapieha, and Stanczyk instead of Grabski. Later, Witos sent a communication to the Commission, stating that the state of his health would not permit him to attend, and Dr. Wladyslaw Kiernik was then chosen in his place as a representative of the Peasant Party. (Baginski and Bien were standing trial in Moscow.) For the announcement see *The Times*, 13 June 1945, and for the invitation received by Mikolajczyk, through the British Foreign Office, see Mikolajczyk, p. 129.

[6] Ibid. p. 127.

the Allied cause', Mikolajczyk had made a public statement accepting the Yalta decisions on Poland and expressing his support for a friendly policy towards Soviet Russia;[1] and he decided to accept the Commission's invitation, because Churchill had urged him to attend the consultations. Churchill told Mikolajczyk that, because of his great popularity in Poland, he should go and try to get 'not only your foot but your leg in the door'.[2]

The long-delayed consultations in Moscow finally began on 17 June. The Moscow Commission withdrew into the background and allowed the assembled Poles to discuss the situation among themselves. On 23 June it was announced that they had agreed to form a coalition. The Provisional Government, as the Russians had continued to insist, still retained its essential structure, although it was now officially 'reorganized' to include members of the Peasant, Socialist, Democratic, and Christian Labour Parties; and a programme for post-war Poland was agreed upon. As decided at Yalta, the new Government was to be known as the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.[3]

(6) *The Trial in Moscow of the Sixteen Poles, 18–21 June 1945*

The political struggle over Polish problems which so greatly complicated Allied relations during the later years of the war reached a dramatic climax in Moscow in June 1945. As the Polish leaders invited to Moscow under the Hopkins formula were engaged in discussions on Poland's political future, a spectacle was being staged in the October Hall of the Moscow House of Trade Unions. Between 18 and 21 June the sixteen Polish leaders who, since their arrest in March, had been undergoing the preliminary investigation, characteristic of trials held in public under the Soviet judicial procedure, were on trial before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.[4]

As in previous Soviet trials, the indictment was not directed primarily against the accused in the dock, but, through them, against their leaders in London, who were beyond the reach of the Soviet law: the Polish Government in Exile, with their Underground political organization and Home Army, were, in effect, standing trial alongside the sixteen accused.

The foreign correspondents and observers present at the trial noticed that the accused appeared to be physically in good condition, if subdued, and to take a passionate interest in the proceedings.[5] To Western eyes the self-immolation of many of the accused seemed degrading, although

[1] Ibid. p. 128

[2] Churchill said that he had become very pessimistic about Russian policy in Europe (ibid. pp. 130–3).

[3] For the announcement, broadcast by Moscow radio, see *The Times*, 23 June 1945.

[4] For the experiences of one of the defendants during the investigatory period see Stypulkowski: *Invitation to Moscow*, pp. 233–306.

[5] *The Times*, 21 June 1945.

the public prosecutor, Afanasyev, pointed out that repentance was under Soviet law 'an extenuating circumstance and must be taken into consideration by the Court when fixing the penalty'.[1] The Soviet legal procedure appeared as bizarre as ever in Western eyes. Since it proceeded from the premiss of the infallibility of the Communist political philosophy, disbelief became a transgression, and insubordination a major crime.

The case against the accused, as presented in the indictment and in Afanasyev's final speech, was exaggerated, and the statements of the accused revealed an illuminating picture of events in Poland after the Warsaw rising. When the advance of the Red Army had made chaos of Home Army communications in the disputed eastern territories, some of the remaining Home Army detachments had turned into guerrilla forces and had engaged in partisan warfare and sabotage against both the Russians and the leaders of the Warsaw Provisional Government.[2] Upon orders from London in 1944 a secret Underground organization had been organized in the areas east of the Vistula, calling itself NIE (*Niepodległość* —Independence), whose stated purpose was to preserve Poland's independence.[3] In December 1944, apparently, Okulicki had informed the Russians of the disbandment of the Home Army, but simultaneously had issued secret orders for the preservation of a nucleus of the main forces and the concealment of arms, ammunition, and clandestine radio stations. There had not been time to do much about building up the organization before its leaders were arrested by the Russians.

The trial was also interesting because of its revelation of the differences that existed between the political parties in the Polish Underground, and the gulf that had widened between the Underground and the Government in London. Jankowski pointed out that the Peasant, Socialist, and National Democratic Parties had for some time been split into factions that favoured either the Warsaw Provisional Government or the Government in Exile. According to Baginski, the Peasant Party military organization, the *Bataliony Chlopskie*, had never co-operated very heartily with such aristocratic leaders of the Home Army as Bor-Komorowski. Since Mikolajczyk's resignation the Peasant Party had disapproved of the Polish Government in Exile, and had refused to take part in the political organization that was associated with NIE. Moreover, the rejection by the Polish Government in Exile of the Yalta Declaration on Poland had apparently antagonized the entire Underground organization. The Council of National Unity had expressed their approval of the Declaration,

[1] *Trial of the . . . Leaders . . . of the Polish Diversionist Organizations*, p. 199.

[2] It became apparent during the trial that this was the work of isolated detachments rather than of the leadership of the Home Army.

[3] Jasiukowicz testified that it was intended that the organization should remain underground until after the Yalta decisions had been carried out, in order to counteract any 'undesirable tendencies' on the part of the new Polish Government.

and had communicated their decision to London, where it was apparently ignored. Most of the parties of the Underground had then decided to come out into the open, which had prompted the overtures which led to their arrest.

Afanasyev asked the court in his concluding argument to pass sentence of terms of imprisonment rather than the death penalty. The court convicted all but three of the defendants, and sentenced four of the major leaders to the following terms of imprisonment: Okulicki to ten years; Jankowski to eight; and Bien and Jasiukowicz to five years each, while the rest received sentences ranging from eighteen months to four.[1] Afanasyev emphasized, however, that the trial was meant to 'serve as a stern warning to all enemies of the Soviet Union and of progressive mankind, to all those who may attempt to lift their criminal hands to disturb the friendship between the Soviet and Polish peoples'.[2]

(*g*) From the Establishment of the Polish Coalition Government of 28 June 1945 to the Election of January 1947

(1) *The Provisional Government of National Unity*

Radio Moscow announced on 23 June, one day after the sentences had been pronounced in the Moscow trial, that the Polish leaders from the Warsaw Provisional Government, from other groups in Poland, and from abroad had reached agreement among themselves on the composition of an enlarged Provisional Government.[3] In addition to the Poles assembled in Moscow, most of whom (including Mikolajczyk) were to take part in the new Government, invitations were being extended to other representatives of political groups in Poland and London. The Right-wing parties of the inter-war years, and the Right Wing of the Polish Socialist Party in London, which had committed itself to anti-Russian policies under the leadership of Arciszewski, were not included. The split with London was emphasized when the entire Peasant Party, eminent Socialist leaders in Poland such as Zulawski, and also Liberal-Conservative circles associated with the University of Cracow, all announced their support for the new Government.

Great satisfaction was expressed in Allied circles at the announcement. At the San Francisco Conference it was declared that a space would be reserved for the signature of the United Nations Charter by the representative of the new Polish Government.[4] The United States and British Governments made it clear that they only awaited a commitment by the

[1] Puzak was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. For the subsequent fate of the prisoners see Stypulkowski: *Invitation to Moscow*, p. 333.

[2] *Trial of the . . . Leaders . . . of the Polish Diversionist Organizations*, p. 199.

[3] For the text see *New York Times*, 23 June 1945; cf. *The Times*, 23 June 1945.

[4] *Sunday Times*, 24 June 1945.

new Polish Government to hold free elections before they would accord them recognition and withdraw all support from the Government in Exile.[1] The protests made by the latter, against both the Moscow trial and the nature of the new Government, were not received with sympathy.[2]

Several of the Polish leaders who had met in Moscow flew to Warsaw on 28 June, and soon afterwards Warsaw Radio announced the composition of the new Provisional Government of National Unity. Of the twenty-one portfolios in the Government, sixteen were to be held by former members of the Warsaw Provisional Government; the other five were to go to 'approved' leaders: three from London and two from Poland.[3] The splinter groups of the Socialist and Peasant Parties which had taken part from the beginning in the PCNL and in the Warsaw Government now combined with acceptable members of those parties who had been associated with the Government in Exile and the Underground, so that, officially at least, there were six representatives from each of these two parties in the new Government, and six members of the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party.[4]

The welcome given to Mikolajczyk showed that the inclusion of a few influential leaders from some of the pre-war political parties who had taken part in the Polish Underground movement might help to secure the popular support which had been so sadly lacking for the PCNL and the Warsaw Government. The Government in Exile, meanwhile, declared that they would never hand over their authority to such an 'illegal' Polish Government, and Bor-Komorowski, who had recently returned to London to assume his command after his liberation from a German prison camp, announced that the Polish armed forces, which had been fighting under Allied command in Western Europe, would remain loyal to the Government in Exile. Both the Government and the army, with their headquarters in London, announced their intention to return only to a truly free and independent Poland.[5]

The Russian leaders had been unable at Yalta to secure Allied agreement to extend the western frontier of Poland as far as the Western Neisse river; yet, after the occupation of the German provinces of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia, the Russians allowed the Warsaw Govern-

[1] *New York Times*, 24 June 1945.

[2] *New York Herald Tribune*, 25 June 1945; see also *New York Times*, 23 June 1945.

[3] For the announcement of agreement see *The Times*, 23 June, and for approving comment see ibid. 25 June 1945. For the list of members of the new Cabinet see Mikolajczyk, p. 147. The members from Poland itself were Kiernik (Public Administration)—one of Mikolajczyk's chief supporters—and Wycech (Education); from abroad Mikolajczyk (Second Deputy Premier—Gomulka was First—and Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform), Stanczyk (Labour and Social Welfare), and Thugutt (Posts and Telegraphs). Mikolajczyk says (loc. cit.) that most of his authority was appropriated by Tkaczow, a Communist, Minister of Forestry.

[4] For the announcement, and the make-up of the Government, see *The Times*, 29 June 1945.

[5] *New York Times*, 29 June 1945.

ment to set up their administration in these areas. The Yalta Declaration, however, had stated that the western frontier of Poland would be settled only at the peace conference, and in April the American and British Governments accordingly showed their concern. The Russians justified the Polish Government's establishment of a local administration in the Danzig area by stating that the German population had departed in the wake of the German troops, leaving only a Polish population in the area;[1] but this explanation was not accepted, and on 8 May the United States Government said that it appeared that the Warsaw Government intended, with Russian support, to establish a permanent administration in the areas in question.[2] The note pointed out that such changes, without Allied consultation, disregarded the principle agreed upon for the control of Germany. George Kennan, the United States chargé d'affaires in Moscow, said that his Government would recognize Poland's western frontier when it was established according to the Yalta decisions, and that meanwhile they insisted that no Soviet-occupied territories should be transferred to the Warsaw Government.[3] Vyshinsky's reply of 16 May was evasive. Referring only to the Danzig area, he replied to the general charges by declaring that the statement in the Yalta Declaration that the Poles were to receive substantial territorial acquisitions in the north and west presupposed the possibility that a Polish administration would be established in the area. He added that it was self-evident that Poland's western frontier would be finally determined at the peace settlement.[4]

In July, after receiving assurances from the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity that free elections would be held according to the Yalta formula, and that facilities for observation would be granted not only to diplomatic and consular officers, but also to Allied newspaper correspondents in Poland, the American and British Governments agreed to recognize the new Provisional Government. Both Governments announced the recognition on 5 July, and the new United States Secretary of State, Byrnes, designated Arthur Bliss Lane as the American Ambassador.[5]

(2) *The Polish Question at the Potsdam Conference*

At the Potsdam Conference (16 July to 2 August 1945) the Soviet leaders continued to argue in defence of the organs of administration which had been set up by the Warsaw Government in the German lands east of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers, although Stalin assured

[1] Lane, p. 256.

[2] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 608 and note 5.

[3] For the substance of the note of 8 May, together with Kennan's statement, see Lane, pp. 256–7.

[4] For the substance of the Soviet note see ibid. pp. 257–8.

[5] Ibid. pp. 120–1. Pending the selection of the British Ambassador, Robert M. A. Hankey was appointed chargé d'affaires. See also *Daily Telegraph*, 4 July, and *The Times*, 6 July 1945.

Truman that the Soviet Government were not committed to any line as the western frontier of Poland. The Russians tried to secure British and American agreement at Potsdam on a western frontier for Poland,[1] but both Truman and Churchill refused to settle the question there.[2]

With regard to the question of Polish administration in the disputed areas, however, the Russians were more successful. Stalin admitted that the Poles had been allowed to assume administrative powers, and continued to insist that this situation could not be changed. Both Truman and Churchill were preoccupied with the question of German economic possibilities, and both now opposed the extension of Polish control as far as the Western Neisse. Churchill argued that the Oder–Neisse provinces contained approximately one-quarter of Germany's arable land (not to mention mineral resources), and that their cession to Poland would call for the transplantation of $8\frac{1}{4}$ million Germans from the east side of the Oder–Western Neisse line to the west side, where there would be no food for them. He proposed, however, that the Poles should be allowed to exercise administration as far as the Oder and the Eastern Neisse,[3] and submitted that the ex-German territory within this line would provide room enough for the 3 or 4 million Poles who would have to be transplanted from the east side of the Curzon Line. Truman was concerned whether or not the disputed lands were to be treated as part of Germany for the purpose of assessing reparations, and whether or not they were to be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation. He would not agree before the peace conference to decide on a Polish western frontier or to recognize a Polish administration in the former German areas.

The Yalta Declaration had provided that the new Provisional Government should be consulted before the establishment of a frontier in the west; and on 24 July the three Foreign Ministers heard the views of President Bierut of the KRN (the Communist National Council of the Homeland),[4] as well as those of Rzymowski, the Foreign Minister, and Mikolajczyk, the Deputy Prime Minister. They all, including Mikolajczyk, argued strongly for the cession to the Poles of the whole area as far as the Western Neisse, including the port of Stettin; and Mikolajczyk took the opportunity of privately urging the Western representatives to insist, as well, on free elections in Poland.[5] Churchill saw Bierut privately on 24

[1] For reasons for and against the extension of Poland westwards cf. *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 616–17.

[2] The Soviet Government later claimed that the two Western Powers had agreed 'in principle' at Potsdam on the line of the Oder and Western Neisse as the western frontier of Poland. This was not true, for both Truman and Churchill had refused to settle the matter until the peace conference, and the report of the Potsdam Conference does not record a commitment on their part to support any particular frontier in the west.

[3] See above, p. 152, note 1.

[4] See above, pp. 149, 192.

[5] See Mikolajczyk, pp. 154–6. For one account of Bierut's argument see Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 80.

and 25 July and expressed his views to him forcibly.[1] After the victory of the Labour Party in the general election in the United Kingdom on 26 July, the Polish delegates presented their views to the new British Prime Minister, Attlee, and also to Truman; but, according to Admiral Leahy, not much impression was made on the President.[2] After exhaustive discussions it was agreed that, pending the final settlement of the frontier at the peace conference, the disputed territories should be placed under the interim administration of the Polish State, and should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.[3] Truman and Attlee agreed to support at the peace conference the proposal to establish the Russian frontier on a line running east from the Bay of Danzig to the junction of the frontiers of Lithuania, Poland, and East Prussia, which would leave the Königsberg area within the Soviet Union.

Churchill expressed a moral objection to the forcible expulsion of the Germans from the disputed territories.[4] After much discussion it was agreed to state in the report of the Conference that the three Governments favoured the orderly and humane transfer of populations. In view of the burden that the refugees would cause in Germany, the Governments requested various countries, including Poland, to suspend further expulsions of Germans until the respective Allied Control Commissions could investigate the situation, examine reports on the numbers in which expelled persons had already entered Germany, and arrange for their equitable distribution throughout the country. With regard to reparations from Germany, Russia undertook to pay the amount due to Poland from her own share.

In the report of the Potsdam Conference published on 2 August 1945, the three Governments formally acknowledged that the provisions of the Yalta Declaration relating to the formation of a Polish Government had been carried out and that diplomatic relations had accordingly been established. The leaders of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity had given assurances to Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, that elections would be held within a year, but the Potsdam report stated merely that the three Powers noted that the new Provisional Government had agreed to hold elections as early as possible according to the formula included in the Yalta Declaration. It was also stated that representatives of the Allied press would be able to report freely on conditions in Poland before and during the elections.

At the beginning of the Conference Stalin had indicated his desire that

[1] Churchill, vi. 573–7; U.S. edition, vi. 661–7.

[2] Leahy: *I Was There*, p. 485.

[3] In fact the Western Powers bowed to a *fait accompli* (*see* Survey for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 624).

[4] In the previous December Churchill had publicly declared in favour of the forcible expulsion of the Germans (see above, p. 190).

the Polish Government in Exile should be 'eliminated'. Churchill, however, argued strongly on this point; he mentioned that the British Government had entered the war in support of the Poland represented by the Government in Exile, and said that it was only natural that the British and Soviet Governments should differ in their attitudes towards Poland. When Stalin advocated the transfer of the assets of the Government in Exile to the new Provisional Government, Churchill pointed out that the Government in Exile had no property in Great Britain to speak of. In the discussions of the debts that had been incurred by the Government in Exile, Stalin said that the new Polish Government should not be required to assume them.[1] Truman insisted, in return, that his Government should not be made responsible for such debts and that any transfer of property should be made according to law. The report of the Conference adopted Stalin's original proposal, and declared that the Polish Government in Exile was no longer in existence. The three Powers agreed to see to it that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should receive all the property in their territories that belonged to the Polish State; to ensure that this property should not fall into the hands of 'third parties'; and to facilitate the return of all Poles abroad who wished to go back, including members of the armed forces and merchant marine, on the understanding that they would receive the same rights and privileges as other Polish citizens.[2]

The Potsdam Conference formally settled the status of the Polish Government in Exile and the question of the property belonging to the Polish State; but there still remained the problem of the relation to the new Provisional Government in Poland of the large number of Poles who remained abroad. Anders had never disguised, even from his troops, his hostile feelings towards the Russians and his contempt for what he regarded as their puppets or dupes in the Provisional Government in Poland. Of the 112,000 Polish troops in Italy, the majority had come from the eastern territories of inter-war Poland at the time of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, when those districts had been incorporated in the Soviet Union, and they had spent some time in prison camps scattered throughout the Soviet Union. The experiences which they had suffered had left a store of bitterness against their former Russian captors, which Anders had fostered. There was thus little likelihood that most of them would reconcile themselves to the present régime in Poland. A minority of the Polish troops in Italy, however, and 60,000 Polish troops in Great Britain, together

[1] One of the first acts of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, after its change into a Provisional Government in January, had been to repudiate the debts of the Government in Exile (see above, p. 192).

[2] For the discussions at Potsdam see Leahy: *I Was There*, pp. 463–500, and Churchill, vi. 560–77; U.S. edition, vi. 647–67. For the full text of the report of the Conference, including the statement on Poland, see Cmd. 7087.

with the large numbers on the Western European front, had for the most part come from Central and Western Poland; some of them had escaped at the time of the German invasion in 1939 to fight for their country abroad[1] and others had been conscribed by the Germans into the Wehrmacht or SS units and had come over to the Allied side at the first opportunity in battle. There was less likelihood that the Poles in this category would allow their feelings about Russia or the nature of the new Provisional Government to prevent them from returning to help to pick up the pieces of their shattered homeland; but many of them were hesitant to return because they feared that their association with the Polish Underground and the pre-war political parties would be held against them. When Bevin, in his speech in the House of Commons on 20 August, urged the Poles abroad to return and assume responsibilities in their country, he mentioned that the question of secret police in Poland 'had not yet been cleared up'.[2] There was no doubt that this consideration was a major obstacle to their return; and this fact was apparently realized by the Provisional Government of National Unity when they declared an amnesty in September for Home Army soldiers and political prisoners.[3]

Poland, in the area which she held *de facto* after the war, was a ravaged country. Warsaw on the west bank of the Vistula was virtually obliterated, and at first the Provisional Government hesitated whether to attempt to rebuild the city or to move the capital to Cracow.[4] Most of the other cities and towns, except Danzig, remained comparatively intact, but there was a serious shortage of all forms of transport and of industrial machinery. In the countryside the various armies that had passed in both directions had left very little livestock, and the peasants had neither animals nor tractors to pull their ploughs, nor seeds to sow new crops. The Polish families which were being moved from the territories east of the Curzon Line, as a result of the Russian agreements of September 1944 with the PCNL, were now being added to the already over-populated area of Central Poland. Since Poland had been deprived of her inter-war territories, virtually all the Poles, regardless of their political views, felt that they were entitled to the German lands over which the Russians had

[1] Some of these had staffed the Polish air force which had taken such an important part in the Battle of Britain, and the Polish navy whose exploits were much admired by the Allies.

[2] 20 August 1945, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 413, col. 295.

[3] The amnesty was subject to three conditions. They had to surrender their arms, register before 15 October, and declare that they would no longer take part in illegal activities. The amnesty did not apply to the NSZ (the anti-Russian National Armed Forces: see above, p. 134) who had fought against the Russians and the Soviet partisans throughout the war and who had maintained their terrorism against the Warsaw Provisional Government. The Home Army had made a formal announcement of disbandment in July, serving notice of a fight in the 'open political arena' for its twelve-point programme, which it considered a prerequisite for an independent Poland (for the text see Mikolajczyk, p. 334).

[4] See above, p. 193.

allowed them to assume control. As the Red Army advanced through Poland in the early part of 1945 and gradually allowed the Warsaw Provisional Government to assume the administration in these lands, the Warsaw Government began forthwith to expel the remaining Germans and to transfer the Polish families that had been moved from the Lwów and Vilna areas into Masuria and the Oder–Neisse provinces. But these provinces also had suffered heavily through the war, and a substantial amount of industrial machinery had been dismantled and removed by the Russians. The same was true of the port machinery in Danzig and other ports on the Baltic. This was the prospect that faced the Provisional Government of National Unity after their establishment, and it made them immediately dependent upon outside aid.[1]

After the leaders of the new Government had arrived in Warsaw from Moscow on 28 June, the members of the Warsaw Provisional Government formally dissolved their Government, and thus gave official notice that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was an entirely new government. Nevertheless, this new Government continued to recognize the validity of decrees passed in 1944 and early 1945 by the PCNL (later known as the Provisional Government, established first in Lublin and then in Warsaw).

(3) *The Soviet-Polish Frontier and Reparations Settlements*

In spite of what had been agreed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the entire Polish-Soviet frontier in fact remained open for definitive settlement between the Soviet and Polish Governments; in mid-August 1945 a delegation from the new Provisional Government of National Unity went to Moscow for this purpose, as well as to settle the amount which Poland was to receive from the Soviet Union's share of German reparations. Reparations were settled first, and it was decided that Poland should receive 15 per cent. of all reparations coming from the Soviet zone of Germany after the Potsdam Conference, and in addition 30 per cent. of the reparations delivered to the Soviet Union from the western zones of Germany, half of which was to be paid for by Polish goods supplied to the Soviet Government. The Poles refused to allow the Russians a controlling interest in their newly acquired industries in the former German lands, but it was agreed that the Russians should receive 12 million tons of Polish coal a year during the period of occupation in Germany, at the price of $1·25 per ton.[2] Molotov claimed that the Poles had received a net gain of $6,000 million in the net value of property in the western

[1] For a first-hand account of post-war conditions in Poland see Bernard Newman: *Russia's Neighbour, The New Poland* (London, Gollancz, 1945), chapters 1, 9, 10, and 11.

[2] Mikolajczyk (p. 158) says that this was less than the cost of mining it, and that the Swedes had offered them much more for coal; see also ibid. pp. 157–9.

lands, after the value of the Polish property left to the east of the Curzon Line had been subtracted from the total.

The southern section of the Polish-Soviet frontier had apparently been settled as far back as July 1944 in an agreement with the PCNL, which Molotov produced to show to Mikolajczyk. In spite of the latter's objections, it was settled that the frontier should be established as provided by the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences; and a treaty settling the Polish-Soviet frontier, together with an agreement on reparations, was signed by Molotov and Osobka-Morawski on 16 August 1945. It was provided that, after the ratification of the treaties, mixed Polish-Soviet commissions should be set up to implement the provisions.[1] As far as the western frontier was concerned, an article in *Izvestia* on the following day said that at Potsdam the three Powers had decided it in principle, and Bierut said in a press interview that the Poles had 'fully re-established' their 'historical western frontiers' on the Oder and the Neisse rivers.[2]

(4) *Social and Economic Conditions in Poland*

The war and the policies followed by the PCNL and the Warsaw Provisional Government in the wake of the Red Army produced catastrophic changes in the social and economic structure of Poland. The Germans had attained a certain degree of success in their attempts to eliminate the intellectuals and the core of Polish culture. The extermination by the Nazis of over 3 million Jews in Eastern Europe had bereft Poland of one of the characteristic elements in her economic structure: the Jews as a commercial class in Poland had been eliminated. The war and the Katyn massacres had removed a large part of the pre-war military leaders who had exercised great influence in Poland. One of the first acts of the PCNL after its establishment in Lublin in September 1944 was to pass a law (6 September) on agrarian reform, providing for the expropriation of the remaining large estates and for the division of the lands among peasant families; and, as the reins of administration were handed to it by the Russian authorities, the PCNL took immediate steps towards the implementation of this decree. When the new Provisional Government of National Unity was formed in June 1945, therefore, considerable progress had already been made. The Communist leaders left Church-owned lands exempt from these measures, probably because of the powerful influence of the Roman Catholic Church among the Poles. The inherent opposition of the Polish peasant to Soviet economic policies was also taken into consideration, for at first the Provisional Government were at pains to encourage the individual smallholder. Except for the Church lands,

[1] For the texts of the Polish-Soviet frontier treaty and the reparations agreement see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 145, pp. 1168–72.

[2] For the *Izvestia* article and the interview with Bierut see *Soviet News*, 20 August 1945.

the remaining large estates of over fifty hectares were confiscated without compensation to their owners even for their household effects, and small-holdings were increased to a minimum of five hectares. Land redistribution, however, was not a novel experience for Poland, for it had been in gradual progress for some time, and at the beginning of the Second World War there were some $3\frac{1}{4}$ million individual farms within her borders.[1] The measures that had been initiated by the PCNL and by the Provisional Government were carried on after June 1945 by Mikolajczyk, the new Minister of Agriculture; and, in the sphere of agriculture at least, it was possible to reach general agreement on policy among the various groups associated with the new Provisional Government.[2]

In the industrial areas, also, redistribution was taking place. Enterprises employing over forty men were nationalized and the owners were given the option of acting as managers under the new Government or of giving up their property without compensation.[3] In the former German provinces, where the Poles were consolidating their administrative control, the land and industries were nationalized outright.[4]

Stalin had given an assurance (as Bevin told the House of Commons on 20 August 1945) that Russian troops would soon be withdrawn from Poland, leaving only a small force behind to protect the communications of the Red Army in Germany.[5] The Soviet Government's policy towards the new Poland was, as had been continually emphasized during the war, to asseverate that Poland was to be free and independent within her new borders, and the Russians were accordingly careful not to antagonize the Poles by any obvious violations of their newly acquired sovereignty. In the Provisional Government of National Unity Communists had been given the key Ministries, and this was Stalin's safeguard for his 'friendly' Poland. In the latter part of 1945, therefore, Poland seemed to Western visitors to breathe a milder atmosphere than other countries that had experienced 'liberation' by the Red Army—certainly a milder one than the Soviet Union herself enjoyed. The Potsdam Declaration had provided that diplomatic representatives and newspaper correspondents should be free to report on conditions before the Polish election, and, for a time at

[1] For an account of previous developments in land redistribution see Newman: *Russia's Neighbour, The New Poland*, pp. 54–59.

[2] Support for measures of agrarian reform, based on the individual peasant proprietor, and for the nationalization of industry was by no means confined to the Communists or to the Provisional Government. In August 1943 the four political parties associated with the Polish Underground administration had issued a statement of policy advocating such radical measures, at least for the period of transition which should follow the war (text in Mikolajczyk, pp. 299–300).

[3] For the agrarian and industrial policies of the Provisional Government see Newman, op. cit. pp. 157–60.

[4] For Newman's observations as an eye-witness to the developments in 1945 in the Oder–Neisse provinces see ibid. pp. 195–214.

[5] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 413, col. 296.

least, correspondents were pleasantly surprised to find that they could move about Poland in relative freedom.

(5) *Political Strife in Poland*

The story of the struggle between Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party and the coalition of Communists and Left-wing splinter groups had been told already, before the present chapter was written, by a number of participants and observers, including Mikolajczyk himself and Lane, the United States Ambassador.[1] After the trouble taken by the Russians to ensure that the Warsaw Provisional Government should continue to be the core of the new Provisional Government of National Unity, it was unlikely that they would now permit their power to be lost to the traditional nationalist and anti-Russian political parties and Right-wing elements, most of which had been disqualified from participation in politics. Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party, which had begun as a genuine Left-wing agrarian party, gradually became the symbol, for those deprived of possessions and power in particular, of resistance to Communism and to Russian policies. The Peasant Party thus began to acquire, as did Maniu's group in Rumania and Petkov's group in Bulgaria, the support of a large number of strange political bedfellows, and developed from a predominantly peasant-supported party into a general party of nationalist opposition. The Communists, for their part, hoped at first to use Mikolajczyk's group as an instrument for securing some popular support for their own policy, which, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, was directed towards the establishment of a coalition of those Left-wing or even bourgeois elements which were willing to work with the Communists, theoretically on an equal basis, but actually under their direct control through the key Ministries, which they had been given by the Russians, with British and American approval, and which they were determined to retain. The Communists thus allowed the Left-wing groups of the bourgeois parties to share in the administration, but never to threaten or impede the Communists' own control of general policy.[2]

Mikolajczyk gradually became aware of the political realities when the Communists tried to obstruct the full reorganization of his party.

[1] Mikolajczyk, chapters xi-xiv, and Lane, chapters 9–20. For a much more concise account see H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 171–9.

[2] In July 1945 members of the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party officially held the posts of President of the KRN and of First Deputy Prime Minister, and the Ministries of Public Security, Industry, Shipping and Foreign Trade, Forestry, and Food and Trade. In addition to these they held control over the Polish army and had established agents in key positions in the other political parties in the Government. Many of the other Ministries, moreover, although nominally under Ministers belonging to other political parties, were actually under the control of Communist agents in key positions. One of the most powerful Communists in the Government was Jakob Berman, who was officially given a minor position in the Government but actually had greater decision-making powers than most of the Ministers in it.

When he attempted to unify his Peasant Party with the splinter-group of that name which had supported the Provisional Government,[1] Banczyk, chairman of the group, was quickly forced out of office by the Government leaders. With the support of their eminent but ailing leader, Witos, Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party then decided not to join the Government Coalition, but to organize separately, under the name of the Polish Peasant Party or PSL, and to depend upon popular support for their influence.[2]

The famous pre-war Socialist leader, Zulawski, made attempts about the same time to organize a Social Democratic Party, but was prevented from doing this by the Communists. He was persuaded instead to join the Left-wing group of the Socialist Party in the Provisional Government, which was a decided political gain for the Communists, since it brought to the Provisional Government the support of the former backbone of Socialism: the trade unions and co-operatives. Although Zulawski's adherence had done so much for the Provisional Government, he was never given a position of authority; the major posts in the Coalition, except for the key Ministries which were held by Communists, were given to post-1944 Socialist leaders, many of whom were wholeheartedly co-operating with the Communists either because of the fear of Russian occupation or because they cherished the illusion that the Communists would continue to respect Social Democratic political principles and that they would work on a footing of equality.[3] The particular device used by the Communists to keep the Socialists of the Left in check was to warn them of a return to reaction, pointing to the ostracized groups abroad who were staking their hopes on a war between East and West. The Communists warned these unfortunate Socialists that if any group should gain control in Poland that was not controlled by the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party, the Russians would occupy Poland.[4]

The creation of a Ministry of Regained Territories, under Wladyslaw Gomulka, allowed the Communists to exercise direct control over the former German territories that had been handed over to Poland. Although Kiernik, of Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party, was Minister of Public Administration, his sphere of authority included neither control of the police, which remained under a Communist, nor administration in the new provinces. By a careful policy of patronage, Gomulka was able to increase popular support for the Government in these territories; for jobs

[1] See Mikolajczyk, p. 162.

[2] For details see ibid. pp. 162–4, and cf. H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 174.

[3] Many of the Socialists believed that their acceptance of Communist control was only temporary.

[4] For a reliable version of the story of the Socialists, and of their relationship to the post-war Government in Poland, see 'R': 'The Fate of Polish Socialism', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1949, xxviii. 127.

of all kinds in the new industrial areas, farms vacated by the Germans, and even UNRRA supplies were granted only to those who could produce convincing evidence that they were sympathetic to the régime.

While he was still in the Government Mikolajczyk was used to procure UNRRA aid from the United States Government in October 1945;[1] but the control over the distribution of this aid was retained by the Provisional Government. Where the Communists could not control the distribution of aid from abroad, or use it for political purposes, they made great efforts to obstruct British and American relief activities in Poland.

As Mikolajczyk intensified his efforts to organize his party in Poland, the Communists in the Government Coalition, helped by the deluded Socialists, took more active measures to obstruct him. As the struggle developed, battle lines slowly formed, and it became apparent that Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party had acquired the support of many elements of the old traditional political parties which were now prohibited in Poland because of their anti-Russian nature. The National Democratic Party, which had maintained its armed organization, the NSZ, against Soviet partisans and the Red Army even at the height of the war against Germany, was still operating in Poland, and its guerrilla groups were now engaged in sporadic operations against the Provisional Government. The old Socialist Underground organization, the WRN, which had connexions with Polish Socialists in London, was also assumed to be taking part in clandestine activities. Zulawski and other moderate Socialists now in Poland were suspected by the Communists of association with this organization.[2] There was some truth, no doubt, in charges by the Government Coalition that Mikolajczyk's group had Underground support, although he probably never encouraged it. And in the aftermath of war, with conditions of existence so difficult, there were bandit groups of every description contributing to the confusion.[3]

(6) *The Referendum of 30 June 1946*

The consternation felt in the Government Coalition over the growing influence of Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party was shown increasingly after the first Party Congress which was held in January 1946.[4] From that time onwards the Communists were determined either to force the party to join the Government Coalition, where they could be brought under effective control, or, failing that, to drive them into the position of an isolated opposition, where they could be discredited through the organs of state propaganda. Restricted though they were, the Polish Peasant

[1] Mikolajczyk, p. 165.

[2] For one account of political conditions at the time see 'Mikolajczyk's Lost Opportunity', *The Economist*, 25 May 1946.

[3] See Newman: *Russia's Neighbour, The New Poland*, pp. 151–2, 206–12.

[4] For the Party Congress and its results see Mikolajczyk, pp. 169–74.

Party members were still able to communicate with their supporters in local meetings and to appeal to the non-Communist elements in the Sejm. It was probably because the Peasant Party were still able to make their influence felt, regardless of organized obstruction by the security police, by their civilian militia reinforcements, and even by the Polish army, that the Communists finally decided in the early months of 1946 to make a gesture towards the fulfilment of the promise, given at Potsdam, that elections would be held within a year. It became clear, however, that the Americans and British would never countenance the Communists' intention to hold an election with a single list of candidates, and it was therefore decided to hold a referendum on three questions, in order to show that the Polish people were unified behind their leaders and were desirous of a single-list election of members of a unicameral parliament. The three points chosen were thus points on which Poles of most political complexions (except those belonging to the pre-war Right-wing parties) would agree: the abolition of the upper house or Senate, the policies of land reform and nationalization (with the preservation of a limited amount of private enterprise), and a western frontier for Poland along the line of the Oder and the Western Neisse.[1] Mikolajczyk was confident of the strength of his following in Poland, and decided to use this occasion to demonstrate it to Poland and the outside world. Accordingly he gave instructions to his supporters, through his restricted channels, to vote against the abolition of the Senate, mainly as a gesture of opposition to the Government. When the referendum was held, on 30 June 1946, the Communists were forced to resort to violent methods to ensure that the results of the vote on the first question should remain concealed.[2] The actual extent of the support for Mikolajczyk was not clear, but there could be no doubt that illegitimate methods were used by the Communists in the calculation of the results. The reports on these events sent out by Western observers in Poland caused the British and American Governments to issue notes of protest in August, reminding the Polish Provisional Government of the definition of free elections which had been included in the Yalta Declaration.[3] In reply, the Provisional Government of National Unity merely protested against foreign interference.[4]

At the time of the referendum pogroms took place in Czestochowa and Kielce against Jewish survivors of the Nazi massacres. According to various observers the Kielce affair showed signs of having been carefully organized and staged, and security police were involved. Who was

[1] For the official attitude of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to the referendum see the Polish note of 24 April 1946 (text in Lane, p. 320).

[2] For details see Mikolajczyk, pp. 180–200, and Lane, pp. 240–6.

[3] For the text of the United States note to Poland of 19 August 1946 see Lane, pp. 320–2. For the substance of the British note see Mikolajczyk, p. 189.

[4] For the substance of Polish protests in reply see ibid. pp. 189–90.

actually responsible, however, remained obscure.[1] This was a sinister development, and it reminded outsiders that anti-Semitism remained a deeply ingrained malady in Eastern Europe.

The Communists in Poland conducted their political campaign with great skill. In pursuit of the first objective—to turn to their own use the popular support for Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party—they were careful to prevent the two strongest Polish parties, the Peasants and Socialists, from combining to form an anti-Communist front.[2]

The gulf between the Polish Peasant Party and the Government Coalition widened after the referendum. Obstructive tactics by the Government grew more violent, and in some cases they reached the stage of terrorism. The activities of the various guerrilla groups caused anxiety to the Communists in the beginning, but later proved useful in the campaign to discredit Mikolajczyk. The disapproval of the return of the referendum that was expressed by the British and American Governments spurred the Communists into outright hostility, and from that time onwards both Western Governments were often mentioned in connexion with Mikolajczyk and his Party, or as supporting either Underground groups in Poland or Polish Right-wing elements abroad, such as Anders and his army.

In the latter part of 1946 the Socialist leaders, having become aware of the actual extent of their support in the trade unions and co-operatives, were beginning to complain of inequality of treatment in the Government. A conference in Moscow in August, in which first the Polish Communists and then Socialist representatives presented their grievances to Russian leaders, failed to achieve positive results; and, after one of the Socialists in the Ministry of Security had been expelled by the Communists, the Socialists turned to Mikolajczyk's Party and made overtures for co-operation, offering them 25 per cent. of the seats in the new parliament if they would agree to enter the Government Coalition. By this time, however, the Peasant Party was so estranged from the Government Coalition, and so confident of its own strength, that it refused the offer and left the Socialists to face the Communists alone.[3]

In the autumn the Communists intensified their campaign of terror against the Polish Peasant Party. Many of its leaders were arrested by

[1] The Government accused Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party and the NSZ. Government sources also circulated rumours that the pogrom was condoned by the Roman Catholic Church in Poland; but this was denied by Cardinal Hlond. Mikolajczyk, on the other hand, accused the Government of staging it to divert attention from the referendum. There were other rumours of Zionist machinations to stir up world opinion in favour of opening up Palestine to the Jews. Even Lane, who was in possession of information from many different sources, was not able to arrive at a clear conclusion as to who was responsible (see Lane, pp. 246–53).

[2] See 'R': 'The Fate of Polish Socialism' in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1949, xxviii. 125. For methods used by the Communists to intimidate the Socialists see also above, p. 236.

[3] See 'R': 'The Fate of Polish Socialism', loc. cit.

the security police, and it was becoming extremely difficult for the members of Mikolajczyk's group to hold public meetings. Their allocation of newsprint was cut down to a trickle, and their party headquarters were subject to relentless raids. The much-publicized speech of Byrnes, the American Secretary of State, in Stuttgart, in which he referred to the unsettled status of the Polish-German boundary, was shrewdly used by the Communists as a valuable propaganda weapon; for, if there was any one issue on which almost all Poles were agreed, it was that the western lands as far as the Oder–(Western) Neisse line were rightfully theirs, in view of their loss of territory in the east.[1] Mikolajczyk, unfortunately for himself, was at this moment on a mission in Denmark, and his press conference criticizing Byrnes's statement on the Polish-German border was never given publicity in Poland, so that the Government press was able to accuse Mikolajczyk of being in the camp of Anglo-American supporters of Germany.[2]

(7) *The Election of January 1947*

The belated Polish election was finally announced for January 1947, and, in November 1946, in view of the dispute between the Communists and the Socialists, another conference of Polish Socialist and Communist leaders was held in Moscow, this time with Stalin and Molotov present. The strength of the support for the Socialists in Poland and the Russian leaders' concern at the possible outcome of the election apparently moved the Communists to offer the Socialists greater representation in the Provisional Government in return for their support against Mikolajczyk. When the Socialists accepted the offer the composition of the post-election Government was decided upon, and an agreement was signed between the Polish Communists and Socialists guaranteeing the status of the Socialists as a separate, equal, and independent political party.[3]

After the Polish Peasant Party's official refusal on 7 October to join the Government Coalition, a highly organized campaign was directed against Mikolajczyk and his supporters, in which the Communist-Socialist bloc used all its power and advantage to ruin Mikolajczyk politically before the election. Thousands of arrests were made of his subordinate Peasant Party leaders and members. In ten out of fifty-two election

[1] Byrnes's speech was intended to call the bluff of the Russians, who until that time had played on the hopes of both Poles and Germans with regard to the Oder–Neisse provinces. The speech resulted in Russia's definitely supporting Poland against Germany (see Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly,* pp. 187–92).

[2] Mikolajczyk, pp. 191–2.

[3] See 'R' 'The Fate of Polish Socialism', loc. cit. As a result of the agreement, which was published later, the Socialist influence in the Government was strengthened when Joseph Cyrankiewicz, a more influential Socialist than Osobka-Morawski, became Prime Minister. The Communists, however, retained control of the key Ministries. The agreement was published in *Robotnik* (Warsaw), 29 November 1946.

districts, where the support for Mikolajczyk was strongest, the Government disqualified the Polish Peasant Party lists. Gradually the election campaign assumed the character of a bitter struggle; several trials were staged in the weeks before the election, with the purpose of showing that connexions existed between the Polish exiles, the Underground groups, the American and British Embassies, and Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party; and accusations in the Sejm became steadily more acrimonious.[1] It is doubtful whether genuinely free elections could have been held in the atmosphere of violence which prevailed in Poland at this time. Weeks before the election Mikolajczyk prepared a memorandum of which he sent copies to Stalin and to the British and American Governments, describing the reign of terror that was being directed against the Polish Peasant Party; and he charged the Communists with violation of the agreement that had been reached in Moscow at the time when the Peasant Party leaders had joined the Provisional Government of National Unity. Describing the requisites for free elections, Mikolajczyk expressed the hope that they would be adhered to, and that the basis of the Polish-Soviet alliance would not deteriorate further.[2]

This memorandum had a pronounced effect in Washington; for on 5 January the United States Government delivered identic notes *mutatis mutandis* to the British and Soviet Governments,[3] expressing concern over the pre-election activities in Poland. These, they said, proved that there was little likelihood that free elections would be held in January according to the Yalta formula. Mikolajczyk's memorandum had been substantiated by other reports, and the failure of the Polish Government to live up to their obligations had a direct bearing on the principle of the sanctity of international agreements. Declaring that the United States Government intended to approach the Provisional Polish Government once more with a reminder of their obligations to hold an election according to the Yalta definition, the notes expressed the hope that the Soviet and British Governments would associate themselves with this approach.[4] On 9 January an American note[5] was sent to the Polish Government which expressed concern over the pre-election developments and stated that, unless these ceased immediately, the Polish Government would be held guilty of violating both the letter and the spirit of Yalta and Potsdam.

The Provisional Government replied on 14 January by declaring that the elections would be held in accordance with the electoral law of 27

[1] For the tactics used by the Communists to frustrate the Peasant Party's activities see Mikolajczyk, pp. 197–212; H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 175–9. See also Lane, pp. 200–4, 285.

[2] For text of memorandum see Mikolajczyk, pp. 339–41.

[3] For text see Lane, pp. 322–4.

[4] See ibid. pp. 278–81.

[5] For text see ibid. pp. 324–5.

September 1946.[1] The fears expressed by the Americans were said to be based on undemocratic sources of information. As evidence that the election would be carried out satisfactorily the note referred to the participation of other political parties, including groups of Polish Catholics, and it added that, in the Polish Government's opinion, no further consideration need be given to the subject.[2]

The Russians had replied the day before (13 January)[3] to the American note of 5 January, and had thereby reinforced the Polish Provisional Government's stand. They said that the sole basis of the American charges was information supplied by Mikolajczyk and his group, and referred to émigré circles who were stirring up Underground activities and bandit attacks against the Polish Provisional Government. They defended the right of the Provisional Government to take measures against the bandit activities, even if the guilty parties included some of Mikolajczyk's men. They therefore saw no basis for the approach to the Polish Government contemplated in the American note, which would amount to interference in the internal affairs of Poland.

In view of the attitudes expressed in the exchange of diplomatic notes before the election, there was little likelihood that the results would be accepted by the British and the Americans unless there were to be a complete reversal of the Polish Provisional Government's policy before the election. Such a reversal never occurred. The Communists resorted to mass arrests, to faked decrees, to political manœuvres and ruses in order to obstruct Mikolajczyk and his followers, and, after the results of the election had been announced on 20 January, the American Ambassador, Lane, resigned in protest.[4] After the election the British and American Governments accused the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity of not living up to the obligations which had been undertaken at Yalta and Potsdam, and declared that the election of Janaury 1947 could not be considered to be a true reflection of the will of the Polish people.[5]

(8) *Difficulties in Post-War Relations between Poland and the West*

After the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on 5 July 1945, both the American and British Governments were

[1] For a description of the methods used to pass the electoral law, which gave the Communist-controlled former German territories greater representation, see Mikolajczyk, pp. 195–7.

[2] For text of the Polish note of 14 January see Lane, pp. 325–6. The mention of other political parties in the note was part of an additional election manœuvre: cf. H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 177.

[3] For text see Lane, pp. 326–7.

[4] Ibid. pp. 288–90. See also *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 185–7. Mikolajczyk and the two other members of the original Peasant Party in the old Cabinet resigned from the Government in protest on the day after the release of the election returns (Mikolajczyk, p. 225), but kept their seats in the Sejm.

[5] For part of the United States statement to the press of 28 January see Lane, pp. 291–2. On 3 February 1947 the British attitude was expressed in the House of Commons by C. P. Mayhew, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 432, coll. 1376–7).

continuously frustrated in their attempts to bring diplomatic relations back to a normal footing. Lane, the United States Ambassador, was impeded at every turn when he demanded the customary respect for diplomatic privileges and a fidelity to the treaty obligations assumed by the pre-war Polish Government. The new Government refused to grant a special diplomatic rate of exchange for the staff of his Embassy; refused to allow the Ambassador to visit Polish-American citizens when they were arrested by security police for political offences; and refused to honour the Treaty of Commerce, Friendship, and Consular Rights of 15 June 1931. In January 1946 a law was passed nationalizing all foreign property in Poland, including American property, and no compensation was ever received by the owners. Furthermore, the Communists placed obstructions in the path of American attempts to reach an aviation agreement with Poland.[1]

Yet, even while the organs of state propaganda in Poland were attempting to justify the nationalization of American property by declaring that Poland would never again submit to being exploited by foreign capital, Polish Government officials were requesting financial aid from the United States. (The use to which the Communists in Poland put the aid which was received from UNRRA has been mentioned.)[2] The Polish Government used Mikolajczyk in November 1945 to request a substantial credit from the Export-Import Bank for the purchase of badly needed supplies for Poland, including locomotives and coal trucks;[3] and in April 1946 a credit was approved by the United States Government of $90 million, $50 million of it as a credit for the purchase of American surplus war equipment, and $40 million as the credit asked for by Mikolajczyk from the Export-Import Bank.[4] However, the Polish Government's subsequent refusal to honour the Treaty of 1931, together with the other diplomatic troubles experienced by Lane, led him in May to ask Byrnes, the Secretary of State, to cause the Export-Import Bank credit to be suspended.[5] The other credit was suspended in June, when the United States Government made any further aid to Poland dependent on adherence to the agreements reached at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences.[6]

The British Government's troubles with Poland were even more complicated, for, although they had recognized the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, they had accumulated during the course of the war a profound moral obligation to the Polish Government in Exile. It could not be ignored, for example, that the Polish air force had accounted

[1] See Lane, chapters 9–15.
[2] See above, p. 237.
[3] See *aide-mémoire* of Mikolajczyk's conference with Truman on 9 November 1945 (Lane, pp. 317–18).
[4] For the text of the Polish notes of 24 April 1946 see ibid. pp. 318–20.
[5] See ibid. pp. 238–9.
[6] For Polish post-war economic affairs see ibid. chapter 15.

for 10 per cent. of the German planes brought down in the Battle of Britain. The British Government had entered the war on behalf of Poland and had enlisted the help of the Poles in exile, and these had made a valuable contribution to the Allied cause. The units fighting in Italy under Anders had now become an urgent political problem. Bevin had urged the Poles abroad in August 1945 to return to Poland, and since then he had made great efforts to ensure that they, and especially the Polish troops, should be enabled to do so; but it now seemed certain that the majority would be unwilling to go back. There would be the problem, therefore, of their demobilization and resettlement.

At Potsdam the three Powers had agreed to see to it that the Polish Provisional Government should receive the property belonging to the Polish State, and also to take measures to ensure that this should not fall into the hands of 'third parties'. In accordance with that agreement the British Government froze the Polish assets in the Bank of England, and had, in consequence, to face considerable criticism. The Government in Exile, however, had incurred very large financial obligations during the war, and, since it was agreed at Potsdam that neither the Polish Provisional Government nor any of the three Allies should have to assume the debt, it was necessary to find a source of payment. The British Government's financial difficulties with Poland, although of a different nature from those of the American Government, were equally exasperating, and a dispute over the disposal of the Polish assets in England went on continuously during 1945 and 1946. Finally an agreement was reached between the British Government and the Polish Provisional Government that, of the $7 million in Polish assets in the Bank of England, $4 million should be retained by the British Government to meet the obligations of the Polish Government in Exile, and that the remainder should go to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.[1]

The 112,000 Polish soldiers in Italy were a source of constant worry to the Polish Provisional Government. The latter demanded, and were accorded, the right to present their case to the Polish armed forces in Great Britain and Western Europe,[2] but Anders had previously exhorted his men to be psychologically prepared for the wiles of government agitators.[3] In March 1946 an informal agreement was reached with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on the conditions under which Polish soldiers would be enabled to return to Poland; but, when Bevin explained this agreement in the House of Commons on 20 March,

[1] See W. Vucinich: 'Poland's Fate', *Current History*, July 1949, p. 19.

[2] Churchill had said at Potsdam that the future of the Polish soldiers fighting with the Allies involved British honour. It was hoped that it would be possible to open the way for them to return to their homeland; but any who did not wish to do so could become British citizens (Churchill, vi. 565; U.S. edition, vi. 652–3).

[3] See his orders to his men in Anders, pp. 276–7.

he showed that he was disturbed by the sudden moves made by the Provisional Government to vary the conditions. As agreed, however, a message from Bevin, appealing to the Poles to return, together with a statement by the Provisional Government setting forth the conditions for return to Poland, was circulated among the members of the Polish armed forces. Bevin added that the 'success of the arrangements for the repatriation of these men' would have a pronounced effect upon future relations between Great Britain and Poland.[1]

On 22 May Bevin announced in the House of Commons his plan for the future, after their demobilization, of the Poles who elected to remain outside Poland. He said that since the end of the war approximately 30,000 Poles had declared their desire to return to Poland, and that there remained about 100,000 overseas (mainly in Italy) and 60,000 in Britain. He explained the project, worked out by the British Government as a way of meeting their moral obligation to the Poles, for a Polish Resettlement Corps which was to give the Poles an assured status pending their resettlement or assimilation. Details were to be announced later. As a first step he declared his Government's intention to bring the Second Polish Corps from Italy to the United Kingdom.[2]

Great Britain's moral obligation to the Polish armed forces weighed heavily on British consciences at the time of the Victory Parade which took place in London on 8 June 1946. The Polish airmen were invited to participate, but, when none of the other Polish armed forces were invited, the men of the Polish air force refused to take part. In the House of Commons on 5 June Churchill expressed his deep regret at the situation and his dislike of the events which were taking place in Poland. He added: 'The fate of Poland seems to be unending tragedy, and we, who went to war, all ill-prepared, on her behalf, watch with sorrow the strange outcome of our endeavours.'[3]

(ii) The Baltic States

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) The Question of Recognition of the Soviet Baltic Republics by the Western Powers

The approach of the Red Army to the border of the three Baltic States at the beginning of 1944 thrust the question of their political status once

[1] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 420, coll. 1875–85; cf. Anders, pp. 288–93.
[2] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 423, coll. 299–306; cf. Anders, pp. 294–5. The leaders of the Provisional Government in Poland accused the British Government of organizing a Polish military unit under their command. The Second Polish Corps arrived in England in October 1946.
[3] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 423, col. 2027.

again before the attention of the major Powers. Up to this stage of the war it had been possible for the Big Three to avoid the clash in principle inevitable in a discussion of Soviet border territories. Effective collaboration in the war against the common enemy had been the overriding preoccupation; but this practical necessity, even in its most inspiring moments, could not obscure a fundamental difference in attitude between the Soviet Government on the one hand and the United States Government on the other (the British Government's attitude was less clear-cut and varied with changing circumstances) towards the fate of the territories which before 1939[1] had been independent states beyond the western borders of the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1940, immediately after the fall of France, the three Baltic Republics had been incorporated as member republics in the U.S.S.R. The events which accompanied that incorporation[2] were the source of the difference in attitude between America and the U.S.S.R. in regard to the Baltic States, and the breadth of the gulf became steadily more apparent as Soviet forces drew nearer to the inter-war western border of Russia.

The official attitude of the United States Government had been expressed on 23 July 1940 by the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. He had then firmly declared the opposition of the American people to 'predatory activities', whether carried out 'by the use of force or by the threat of force'.[3] The British Government had defined their position less clearly, but had refrained from granting recognition to the new Soviet Republics. Churchill had said on 5 September 1940:

> We have not at any time adopted, since this war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent and good will of the parties concerned.[4]

Diplomatic representatives of the constitutional Governments of the three Baltic States continued to enjoy diplomatic status in the United Kingdom, and it seemed at the time that the British attitude was similar to that of the United States as expressed by Welles.

In August 1941, in the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt and Churchill reaffirmed their adherence to the principle enunciated by Churchill in

[1] By 10 October 1939 the Soviet Union had concluded 'Mutual Assistance Pacts' with the three Baltic States, and had sent troops in to garrison key bases, which effectually overawed them. See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 78–79, 167, 317, 406.

[2] An account of these events will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Initial Triumph of the Axis*.

[3] *Department of State Bulletin*, 27 July 1940, p. 48.

[4] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 365, col. 40.

September 1940.[1] In September 1941 the Soviet Government, through the mouth of their Ambassador in London, informed their allies that they were in agreement with the fundamental principles of the Charter;[2] but this, it soon appeared, did not mean that there was any change in the Russian attitude towards the Baltic States.

From the date of the official incorporation of the three states, proclaimed by the Supreme Soviet on 3, 4, and 6 August 1940, the Soviet Government had regarded them as member republics in the U.S.S.R., and, as the war proceeded, it became steadily clearer that the Soviet leaders had no intention of losing these latest additions to the fold. As early as December 1941, when Eden was in Moscow, Stalin made a detailed statement of Soviet territorial aims. These included a particularly pressing demand for the restoration after the war of the Baltic Republics to the Soviet Union.[3] But Allied co-operation could not be jeopardized during the critical stages of the war, and during 1942 and 1943 both Roosevelt and Churchill were determined to avoid such controversial subjects, hoping to be able to postpone the attempt to solve the problem till they could take it up at a peace conference after the defeat of Germany.[4]

By November 1944 the Red Army was once again in occupation of the Baltic States. Russia's allies had had no time to argue about their status while the Red Army was advancing. During the period under review in this volume, however, the official attitudes of the United States and British Governments continued to keep the political status of the newly 'liberated' Soviet Republics uncertain.

In the United States the statement made in 1940 by Sumner Welles[5] had not been withdrawn or disavowed, though the American attitude towards the events of the summer of 1940 had appeared to change slightly during the period of close co-operation among the Allies. Roosevelt had even implied, in statements to Stalin, that consideration would have to be given at the peace settlement after the war to Russia's desire for security on her western border.[6] After the three states had been reoccupied,

[1] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Joint Declaration by the President of the United States of America and Mr. Winston Churchill, representing H.M.G. in the United Kingdom, Known As The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941*, Cmd. 6321 (London, H.M.S.O., 1941), second and third points; *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941–1942*, pp. 11, 209–10.

[2] For text of Maisky's address to the Inter-Allied Meeting in London, 24 September 1941, see ibid. pp. 214–17.

[3] See Churchill, iii. 558–9; U.S. edition, iii. 629.

[4] Ibid. pp. 349 and 391 respectively.

[5] See above, p. 246.

[6] In 1942, when Stalin was demanding British approval of the 1940 boundaries as a basis for Anglo-Soviet agreement (see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 167–70 and 178–9), Roosevelt, despite State Department opposition, suggested as a compromise that the 'Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns who did not wish to be incorporated into Russia should have the right to leave those territories with their properties' (Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1171). In negotiations for the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, concluded on 26 May 1942, the Russians agreed

however, State Department spokesmen repeatedly pointed out that the United States Government had not given either *de facto* or *de jure* recognition to the new Soviet Republics, and that the Baltic States were still officially regarded as being independent states.[1] In October 1945, when Mr. Justice Jackson signed, on behalf of the United States Government, the indictment of the German Major War Criminals at Nuremberg, with its reference to the 'Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics',[2] he sent a letter to the other prosecutors, making it clear that this did not mean that his Government recognized the Baltic States as Soviet Republics.[3]

There was some confusion about the official United States attitude after the communiqué of the Potsdam Conference[4] was issued on 2 August 1945. In Part V of the agreement reached at Potsdam the United States and British Governments provisionally recognized the border of the Soviet Union as running eastwards from the Baltic Sea through East Prussia, south of Königsberg, to the meeting-point of the frontiers of East Prussia, Lithuania, and Poland. Although the agreement was only to last until the peace settlement, Truman and Attlee declared that they would 'support the proposal of the conference at the forthcoming peace settlement'.[5] This acceptance of the 'western frontier' of the Soviet Union as passing south of Königsberg implied that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were included within Soviet territorial limits.[6]

British policy had run on different lines. After the incorporation of the Baltic States in the U.S.S.R. in July and August 1940 the British Government, as we have seen, had reserved their comment but had given no recognition. It was later confirmed, however, that on 22 October 1940 the British Government, in a proposal made to the Soviet Government through their Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, had offered, among other things, to recognize *de facto* the incorporation of the Baltic

to this compromise, and eventually they signed a treaty of alliance with Britain without territorial provisions. The compromise proposal showed that Roosevelt himself was not, in fact, irreconcilably opposed to Russian absorption of the Baltic States (ibid. pp. 1170–4).

[1] Statement by the U.S. Acting Secretary of State, J. C. Grew, at a news conference (*New York Times*, 4 March 1945). Cf. *Daily Telegraph*, 3 January 1946.

[2] *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, ii. 60–61.

[3] *New York Times*, 20 October 1945.

[4] For the Potsdam Conference see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 615–29, especially p. 626. Cf. ibid. p. 407, note 4, which says that the matter of the future of the Baltic States was dropped by the State Department after the Tehrān Conference (November 1943).

[5] The proposal, submitted by the Soviet Government, recommended that the 'section of the western frontier of the U.S.S.R. which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic, and East Prussia' (see Cmd. 7087 and *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, pp. 932–3).

[6] Cf. Council on Foreign Relations: *The United States in World Affairs, 1945–47* (New York and London, Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), pp. 176–7.

States in the U.S.S.R., in return for Russian neutrality in the war.[1] Although nothing had come of this proposal, its later disclosure helped to clarify subsequent British policy in this area. It gave weight to the Soviet Government's insistence in 1942 upon British recognition of the Baltic Soviet Republics as a preliminary condition for an Anglo-Soviet treaty.[2] It also helped to explain why the Soviet Government refused to discuss the question with the Americans 'on the grounds that it was a matter between Russia and Britain'.[3] The circumstances at the time of the Cripps mission, however, when Britain was fighting alone against Germany, were vastly different from those during the period of the Grand Alliance, and in the latter period the British Government, in order to preserve good relations with the United States, managed to refrain from formally recognizing the territorial changes in the Baltic region and elsewhere on Russia's border.[4] After the signature of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, on 26 May 1942,[5] a change occurred in the status of the diplomatic representatives accredited to the British Government by the independent Baltic States. In a diplomatic list published in August 1942 the three diplomats were mentioned, not as accredited representatives, but as individuals who 'personally are given privileges and recognition'.[6] Except for this event there was little apparent difference between official American and British policies towards the Baltic area until early in 1944. On 22 February 1944, in a speech in the House of Commons, Churchill gave indirect notice that Russian control of the Baltic region was not likely to be opposed by Great Britain when he stated that the British Government accepted the Curzon Line as the western boundary of Soviet Russia.[7] If British support were to be given to the reincorporation of the eastern part of inter-war Poland in the U.S.S.R., it seemed to follow that no objection would be raised, at least for the time being, to a restoration of the 1940 borders in the area of the Baltic States. During 1945 and 1946, indeed, it was gradually revealed that the British

[1] The Foreign Office officially confirmed this on 15 November 1940 (*New York Times*, 16 November 1940; see also *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1940). The proposals were offers by the British Government:

(*a*) to recognize *de facto* the inclusion of the Baltic States within Soviet frontiers;
(*b*) to invite Russia to share as an equal partner in the peace settlement after the war;
(*c*) to assure the Soviet Government that Britain would not join a hostile bloc or join in an attack on the Soviet Union.

In return they asked for Soviet neutrality in the war and an undertaking that no anti-British propaganda would be conducted in British territory (*The Times*, 18 November 1940). See also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason: *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York, Harper for Council on Foreign Relations; London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 124.

[2] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1167.
[3] Ibid. p. 1171.
[4] Ibid. pp. 1169–73.
[5] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 178–80.
[6] *New York Times*, 12 August 1942.
[7] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 397, coll. 697–8.

Government had accorded a *de facto*, but not a *de jure*, recognition of the Baltic Soviet Republics as states members of the Soviet Union.[1]

Nevertheless, in dealing with the problem of the Baltic displaced persons, the British Government aligned themselves with the United States Government in opposing Russian demands. An agreement had been concluded between the Allied Powers for the mutual repatriation of citizens,[2] and the Soviet Government claimed, after the war, that the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian refugees who had fled into Western Germany were Soviet citizens. When Soviet pressure was exerted for their return, the British and Americans refused to repatriate persons unwilling to return to their former countries.[3] In March 1946 the United States Government expressed their interpretation of the agreement on repatriation as applying only to those 'who were both citizens and actually domiciled in the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939'.[4]

The question of the status of the Baltic Soviet Republics came up at the Peace Conference held in Paris in July and August 1946, and on this occasion both the American and the British representatives adopted a policy of *laissez-faire*. The Soviet representative brought with him delegates from the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Soviet Republics, and no objections were raised to their attendance at the meetings. Later, they were even allowed to take part in the debates.[5] As one correspondent remarked at the time, it could be assumed that this had been a diplomatic success for the Soviet Government, and it might be interpreted as tacit acceptance by the Americans and British of the Soviet Government's thesis.[6]

During the later months of 1946, however, difficulties continued to arise between the United States and Soviet Governments over the recognition of diplomatic representatives from the former Baltic Republics. After the 'Ambassador' from pre-1939 Lithuania had been invited to an official diplomatic function in Washington, an article appeared in *Pravda* criticizing the United States State Department for 'harbouring a weakness for dead souls'.[7]

By the end of 1946 it was clear that there was no likelihood, for as far as could be seen ahead, that the Baltic States would become independent again. Nevertheless the United States Government continued to remember

[1] This position was explicitly announced by Hector McNeil, Minister of State, in the House of Commons on 10 February 1947 (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 433, col. 5).

[2] Cf. *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 March 1946, pp. 443–5.

[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 March 1946.

[4] *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 March 1946, p. 443.

[5] *Soviet News*, 25 September 1946. Professor Kruus of Estonia spoke in the debate on Trieste: see also *The Times*, 23 September 1946. The Latvian Foreign Minister, Valeskain, also spoke to the conference (*Manchester Guardian*, 26 September 1946).

[6] *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 August 1946.

[7] *Pravda*, 1 December 1946.

officially the circumstances in which the three states had become Soviet Republics, and refused even to grant them *de facto* recognition. The prospect of *de jure* recognition was even more remote, for there would first have to be reasonable evidence that each of the three Governments was not merely practically effective, but was possessed of that 'effectiveness based on popular consent which alone, as a rule, provides evidence of permanence'.[1]

(*b*) The Reoccupation of the Baltic States by the Red Army

Since the launching of 'Operation Barbarossa' (the German code-name for the invasion of Russia) in June 1941 the Baltic territories had been under German occupation and had constituted, together with occupied White Russia, the German administrative district of the Ostland.[2] After the suppression of an independent Lithuanian Government, set up by sanguine-hearted Lithuanian patriots in the wake of the retreating Red Army, the German administration, under Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, had made little pretence of restoring Baltic independence. Nazi policy in the first years of the war had been designed to harness the economies of the three states to the German war-machine. Heavy demands had been made on agricultural produce, and man-power had been drafted for labour in Germany.[3] In addition, the Germans had infuriated the people of Lithuania by carrying out several stages of their planned policy for the resettlement of *Volksdeutsche*.[4] The setting up of 'self-administrations' in 1941 had provided a transparent façade for direct German control, and it soon became clear that the administrations were to be used primarily for carrying out the most unpopular aspects of German policy.[5] There had been some success in 'reprivatizing' industry on the lower levels and in undoing the effects of Soviet economic policies, but even this limited success had been nullified by the Germans when they had put to their own use the administrative machinery established by the Soviet Government in 1940–1. The attempted conscription of Baltic man-power into units of the Waffen-SS had some measure of success in Estonia and Latvia, but in Lithuania the Germans had found themselves up against a stone wall of resistance.

At the time of the Red Army's counter-offensive during the winter of 1942–3 a change occurred in the German colonization policy for the Ostland. Intensified efforts to wring the last ounce from native agricultural

[1] H. Lauterpacht: *Recognition in International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 1947), p. 341.

[2] For a description of the structure of German administration in the Ostland see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 568–75.

[3] For German war-time agricultural policy see ibid. pp. 208 seqq.

[4] See ibid. pp. 85–86, 572–3, and 574.

[5] Some of these tasks were to enforce the requisitioning of agricultural products and the conscription of forced labour.

and industrial economies were now accompanied by attempts to win the support of the native peoples. Repeated warnings were given, emphasizing the consequences of another Soviet invasion, and German officials gave almost frantic assurances that the Baltic territories would be defended to the last.[1] There were even some vague commitments with regard to autonomy in the future. After three unsuccessful attempts at mobilization in Lithuania the Germans took the drastic step of allowing the formation of local 'self-defence' detachments of Lithuanians, to operate against 'bandits' and 'bolshevik elements'.[2] Such a concession by the Germans was a tacit recognition of the strength of the partisan movement in Lithuania. With the Russians' advance, partisan movements were growing throughout the Ostland, particularly in White Russia, and were causing great trouble to the German administration.[3] The hostility of the partisans towards the German occupying authorities was, moreover, increasing with the severity of German reprisals. By the end of 1943 it was clear that the Germans had lost what they could have had at the beginning—the support of the majority of the Baltic native populations—and it was also clear that they would soon greatly need that support.

Immediately before the offensive launched by the Red Army in February 1944 against the Narva front, a Soviet propaganda campaign was initiated to prepare the world for the 'liberation' of the Baltic Soviet Republics. On 1 February, concurrently with this campaign, the Soviet Government made an unusual gesture. After a report by Molotov, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. approved a measure whereby the member Republics were granted the authority to form their own Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.[4] Though this nominal concession to autonomy meant little change in the actual status of the Baltic Republics, Molotov's report contained some significant revelations. He made reference to 'national military formations' in the Red Army, including Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian units. These units, it appeared, were intended to form the cores of 'military formations in the individual Republics',[5] but they were also part of the Red Army. Molotov's measure was followed a few days later by articles in the Soviet press describing the achievements of these Baltic Red Army units, which were intended to form the 'backbone' of the armed forces of their respective Republics.[6] On 7 February there also appeared in *The Times* a letter to the editor, written from

[1] *Svenska Dagbladet*, 16 February 1943.
[2] See also below, p. 253.
[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 573–4.
[4] See Rothstein, ii. 42 seqq.: 'On the Transformation of the People's Commissariat for Defence and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from Union into Union-Republican Commissariats' (Report by V. M. Molotov at the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., 1 February 1944).
[5] Ibid. p. 44.
[6] *Soviet War News*, 8 and 17 February, 9 March 1944.

Moscow by the Commanders of the Lithuanian and Estonian units in the Red Army, in support of the course taken by the Baltic States in 1940, when they had become Soviet Republics. The leaders of the Baltic Soviet Governments in 1940, who had moved into Russia at the time of the German invasion in 1941, took part in the propaganda barrage in preparation for a Soviet reoccupation. There were paeans of praise for the generosity shown by the Soviet Government in granting limited autonomy to the individual Republics in the spheres of defence and foreign relations.[1]

While Molotov was making his report, Red Army troops on the Leningrad front were launching an offensive in the Narva sector. On 2 February 1944 they crossed the Estonian border, and by 13 February they had captured and cleared the eastern shore of Lake Peipus and the east bank of the River Narva.

Estonia now became a scene of disorganization and panic. Large numbers of refugees from former German-occupied areas in Soviet Russia streamed into the country, adding to the general confusion, while many Estonians escaped across the sea to Sweden. The influx of refugees caused acute problems for the German administration throughout the Baltic territories, and preparations had to be made in East Prussia for the reception of large numbers of them from the Baltic countries and Eastern Poland.[2]

Before Soviet troops had crossed the border German propaganda had become active in attempts to enlist Estonian support. General Commissar Lietzmann made a speech on 31 January 1944, emphasizing the seriousness of the military situation and the fate in store for Estonians in the event of invasion by the Russians. The mass deportations by the Russians of thousands of 'anti-Soviet elements' in 1941 were recalled in detail. Even the former Estonian Prime Minister, Uluots, who before this date had refused to have anything to do with the Germans, now made a speech declaring that an occupation by the Soviet Union would mean the destruction of the Estonian people and the final devastation of the country. A proclamation of general mobilization at the end of January by Dr. Maé, head of the native 'self-administration', received an enthusiastic response. Between 3 and 15 February the mobilization quota was greatly exceeded. But, after the initial shock of the Soviet offensive, the Russians were soon driven from their bridge-head on the west bank of the Narva, German defences were strengthened, and confidence returned in the Germans' ability to hold the Russians at the line of the river. The need for Estonian troops then became less pressing, and the Germans began to lose interest in arming and training them. In April and May 1944, after the German press had announced the discovery of an extensive Estonian Underground organization, mass arrests were carried out by the Germans, especially

[1] Ibid. 8 February 1944.

[2] *Svenska Dagbladet*, 9 February 1944.

among members of the professional and intellectual classes, and serious penalties were imposed on refugees attempting to leave Estonia by sea.[1]

Lithuania was in a similar state of confusion. As has been recorded, the Germans had met with little or no success here in their energetic efforts at conscription, and towards the end of 1943 the quisling leader, General Kubiliunas, had been allowed to form native 'self-defence units'. In February 1944 the patriotic Lithuanian General Povilas Plechavicius had been persuaded to form 'special units' of Lithuanians, ostensibly for defence against 'bandits'; but the overwhelming response to his appeal for volunteers, after so much resistance to German attempts at conscription, began to arouse German suspicion while the units were still in the early stages of their training. Suddenly, on 13 May 1944, the Germans announced their decision to absorb the native units into the Waffen-SS. When General Plechavicius refused to comply he was arrested by SS-General Hintze and was sent to Germany together with his chief of staff. At the same time German troops surrounded the quarters of the Lithuanian military staff in Kaunas, killed many of the officers, and disarmed the remainder. A skirmish took place at Mariampol between Lithuanian units and German forces, and severe losses were suffered on both sides before the local units were overpowered. Several Lithuanian battalions in the Vilna area were disarmed, but many others near Panevezys in the north were warned in time, and were able to escape to the forests with their arms and ammunition. The Germans followed up these measures by mass arrests among the intellectuals, but once again their attempted conscription of Lithuanians had failed.[2]

Strong Underground movements had been operating in each of the Baltic countries against the German occupation. In Estonia a German campaign against the intellectuals and professional classes in April and May 1944 had followed the discovery and arrest of many leaders of the Underground organization. On 22 June the 'National Committee of the Estonian Republic' issued an appeal for resistance against both Russians and Germans.[3] In Latvia the 'Latvian Underground Council' had been organized in the summer of 1943 to co-ordinate activities in that country. In December 1943 a 'Secret Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania' had been formed, representing all 'democratic and fighting' organizations with the notable exception of the Communist Party.[4] The

[1] *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, 24 April 1944.

[2] *Svenska Dagbladet*, *Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 1944.

[3] The effectiveness of Estonian resistance to German domination was shown by the fact that the Germans rarely had less than 150,000 troops in Estonia—one for every seven Estonians (*The Times*, 17 October 1944).

[4] *New York Times*, 31 March 1944. A publication of the Lithuanian Legation in the United States stated later that the Lithuanian Underground at one time had eight clandestine newspapers and several radio stations (*Current News on the Lithuanian Situation* (Washington, D.C., Lithuanian Legation, August 1945)).

Lithuanian Underground had strong ties among more than 500,000 Lithuanian-Americans, and war-time publications issued by Baltic Legations in the United States showed them to be in close communication with the Underground movements.[1] The 'Supreme Committee for Lithuanian Liberation' continually proclaimed that it was fighting for a free, independent Lithuania 'on democratic lines as proclaimed by the Atlantic Charter'.[2]

After the offensive against Narva in February 1944 the Baltic States enjoyed a few months of comparative calm. The next move in Red Army operations to 'liberate' the Baltic Republics did not come until 22 June, when a co-ordinated Soviet offensive was suddenly launched in the Central White Russian sector. The Germans suffered a severe reverse; in nine weeks they lost the entire territory of White Russia, two-thirds of Lithuania, approximately half of Latvia, and one-quarter of Estonia.[3] Before the middle of July a Russian force had advanced into eastern Latvia and south-eastern Estonia, while another force under General Bagramyan advanced northward through Lithuania into southern Latvia, driving a wedge almost to the Gulf of Riga. By 26 August the front lines extended from Tartu southward through central Latvia to the River Dvina (Daugava), near Jekabpils, and there connected with Bagramyan's wedge south-west of Riga. Bagramyan's force was, however, beaten back by German counter-attacks before it had cut off the German forces in the north-east. The north Estonian front remained relatively undisturbed, except for the capture of Narva by the Russians.

While the Russians were advancing the Germans were making desperate appeals to the native population of the Baltic States, assuring them that Estonia and the remainder of Latvia and Lithuania would be held at any cost. Some German reinforcements did arrive, and, though resistance to mobilization continued in Lithuania, appeals from the heads of the native 'self-administrations' in Estonia and Latvia for further recruits, both for the armed forces and for work on fortifications, met with a certain degree of success: Scandinavian sources estimated that by August 140,000 Estonians and over 75,000 Latvians were under arms.[4] Members of the Underground movement, moreover, were organizing anti-Russian partisan units. The remaining German-held areas were heavily congested with refugees. The East Prussian border was closed to Baltic nationals, and even to *Volksdeutsch* resettlers without permits. Local authorities were forced to cope with the refugees amid frightening epidemics of typhoid and spotted typhus. During August thousands of Baltic refugees were fleeing in boats

[1] e.g. *The Lithuanian Bulletin* (Lithuanian-American Council, New York); *Latvia under German Occupation, 1941–1943* (preface by Dr. Alfred Bilmanis).

[2] *Current News on the Lithuanian Situation*, February, June 1944.

[3] *Soviet War News*, 26 June 1944.

[4] *Aftonbladet*, 21 June, *Norwegian Radio*, 14 August 1944.

to Sweden, while others were starting on the long journey into other areas of Eastern Europe.[1]

The question of Vilna, the historic bone of contention between Lithuanians and Poles, arose once more during this summer campaign in Lithuania. As the attack progressed, the Soviet press made it clear, to the fury of the Polish Government in London, that the Russians intended to return Vilna to the Lithuanians, as they had done in 1939.[2] Stalin's Order of the Day of 13 July put an end to speculation by announcing the capture of Vilna and the 'liberation of the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic'.[3] But any jubilation among Lithuanians over the recovery of Vilna was tempered by discoveries near Vilna and Kaunas of some of the many Baltic extermination camps which had formed part of Himmler's organization for the extermination of Jews in German-occupied Europe.[4]

The third move in the Red Army's series of offensives into the Baltic Republics began on 19 September 1944 with a co-ordinated assault launched in Estonia and Latvia by troops under the command of General Govorov.[5] German defensive positions in Estonia were unable to stop the avalanche, and Stalin's Order of the Day of 22 September announced the capture of Tallinn.[6] Before the fall of the city, however, during the interval of three days after the offensive had been launched, Estonian patriots staged a revolt; they seized Cathedral Hill and the government buildings, and, with the Estonian flag flying, proclaimed the existence of a national Estonian Government, with the patriot Otto Tief as Prime Minister. In their official proclamation, the 'Government' ordered the Germans to leave and appealed to the Russians to respect Estonia's independence.[7] This interlude was closed when the city fell to the Red Army on 22 September. During the remainder of September and the beginning of October the Red Army was completing the mopping-up of Estonia, and the capture of the islands of Hiiumaa (Dagö), and Saaremaa (Ösel). Riga was still in German hands. The confusion in German-occupied Baltic areas had been greatly increased by the speed of the Russian advance. The Germans adopted a 'scorched earth' policy in their retreat, and German troops were now moving south, driving vast

[1] Cf. *Current News on the Lithuanian Situation*, September 1944.

[2] *Soviet War News*, 8, 10 July 1944. For the statement of the London Polish Government at this juncture see *Sunday Times*, 16 July 1944. They appealed to London and Washington to ensure a provisional government for Vilna.

[3] *Soviet War News*, 15 July 1944.

[4] A comprehensive report on an 'Extraordinary State Commission of Soviet Lithuania' was published in *Soviet War News*, 5 January 1945 ('The Lithuanian Evidence'). For an account of the extermination of the Jews in the Vilna ghetto see *New York Times*, 15 April 1944. For the story of the cultural glories of the Jewish community in Vilna before its extermination by the Nazis see Israel Cohen: 'The Jews of Vilna', *Manchester Guardian*, 9 August 1944.

[5] *Soviet War News*, 21 September 1944.

[6] Ibid. 25 September 1944.

[7] *The Times*, 25 September 1944.

numbers of Baltic refugees and livestock before them, leaving a bleak trail of farms and villages laid waste.[1]

On 8 October the fourth phase in the Soviet Baltic campaign began. Red Army units resumed the offensive,[2] with the object of driving the Germans from their remaining positions in Latvia and Lithuania. On 13 October Stalin's Order of the Day finally announced the capture of Riga,[3] after which the Soviet forces pressed on towards the Baltic coast. On 23 October units of the Third White Russian Front launched an attack in East Prussia,[4] and on 6 November it was reported that thirty German divisions, which had been cut off in the Courland pocket, between Liepaja (Libau) and Tukums, were being 'hammered to a finish'.[5]

(*c*) The Baltic States under Soviet Occupation

From 1944 onwards it was not possible in the West to obtain anything more than a very imperfect picture of events in the Baltic Soviet Republics, since it was seldom possible to check the official Soviet accounts against other sources of information. Except for a visit to Tallinn in August 1944, by Western newspaper correspondents accredited to Moscow,[6] the Soviet Government gave facilities for reporting on developments in these areas to Soviet journalists alone. But there were certain facts about which there was little dispute. There was no doubt about the enormous devastation which the war and the German occupation had wrought in the Baltic States. The physical destruction had been especially severe in southern Lithuania, where the Germans had destroyed hundreds of farms and villages during their withdrawal.[7] With the exception of Tallinn, where Estonian patriots had saved the power-plant from destruction by the Germans, the larger towns in the three Republics had lost their sources of electric power.[8] Since all vehicles had been confiscated by the Wehrmacht, few means of transportation remained. Agricultural produce and livestock had been requisitioned in great quantities during the German occupation, and little had been left behind for the Russians to find. Housing had become an even greater problem than it had been in Rosenberg's Ostland.[9] But the most serious loss suffered by the Baltic States

[1] Ibid. 17 October 1944; *Bulletin of International News*: 'Baltic States Under German Occupation (II)', 23 December 1944, xxi. 1087.

[2] *Soviet War News*, 10 October 1944.

[3] Ibid. 16 October 1944.

[4] Ibid. 25 October 1944.

[5] Ibid. 8 November 1944. The 'hammering' took some time, however, for the Germans were still holding out in Courland in March 1945.

[6] Paul Winterton: *Report on Russia* (London, Cresset Press, 1945), p. 84. See Leigh White in the *Chicago Daily News*, 6 October 1944; *Daily Telegraph* and *Yorkshire Post*, 7 October 1944. (There was a period of some weeks between the August visit and the publication of articles after the correspondents returned to Moscow.)

[7] *Current News on the Lithuanian Situation*, August 1945; 'In the Baltic Republics', *The Economist*, 28 December 1946.

[8] *Soviet War News*, 29 November 1944; *Current News on the Lithuanian Situation*, June 1945.

[9] 'In the Baltic Republics', *The Economist*, loc. cit.

had been the decrease in population. In addition to the numbers deported by the Soviet Government in 1940–1, and later by the Germans for war-time forced labour in the Reich, large numbers of Baltic refugees had fled before the latest Red Army occupation, and had reached Sweden and the western zones of Germany.[1] There were also, of course, the many who had died in the war.

The acquisition of the three Baltic States by the Soviet Union brought with it an important change in the strategic situation on the Soviet Union's western border. The Soviet Government now had effective control over the Gulf of Finland, with a naval base at Tallinn, directly opposite the leased naval base at Porkkala-Udd in Finland.[2] Russia's Baltic coast-line, which had been limited before the war to the Leningrad area, now extended into East Prussia and included the ports of Paldiski (Baltic Port), Riga, Liepaja (Libau), Klaipeda (Memel), and Königsberg. There was no longer any danger for the Russians that the westernized Baltic populations might be used as instruments for anti-Soviet intrigues.

In July 1945 an article in *Pravda* expounded the Russian point of view regarding the incorporation of the Baltic Republics in the Soviet Union. Before the war, the article maintained, the three 'bourgeois' states had not been actually independent. Instead, they had sunk 'deeper and deeper into poverty' as they became agrarian adjuncts to the big capitalist countries. The first period of Soviet control in 1940–1 had started a new era in these Republics. At that time they had received 'genuine' independence, which had been backed by the armed power of the Soviet Union. The possibility of their becoming 'jumping-off places' had been eliminated. The first period had been interrupted by invasion by the Germans, but in time these had been expelled by Baltic units fighting alongside the Red Army. Soviet Lithuania had become reunited with its traditional capital, Vilna, and its seaport, Klaipeda (Memel). Now, the article declared, the three Republics were engaged in building a new life for themselves with Soviet help.[3]

The Soviet Government probably had good reasons for not letting any outsiders see the 'brave new world' that was being created in the Baltic Soviet Republics. The West remembered the Baltic States as they had existed before the war, and knew that their peoples had had little sympathy

[1] Various estimates had been made of the number of Baltic refugees in Sweden and Western Germany. *The Economist* (28 December 1946) estimated that there had been 300,000 in Western Germany and 30,000 in Sweden. According to the Combined Displaced Persons Executive at Frankfurt a/M. in March 1946, 129,000 of the 'remaining' displaced persons in Western Germany came from the Baltic States. Of this group, 21,000 were Estonians, 61,000 Latvians, and 47,000 Lithuanians (*Christian Science Monitor*, 2 March 1946).

[2] For an account of the Armistice terms with Finland and the lease of the Porkkala-Udd area see below, pp. 270–3.

[3] 'The Rise of the Soviet Baltic Republics' (from a *Pravda* article reprinted in *Soviet News*, 23 July 1945).

for Soviet political and economic views. Some of those who had been the least sympathetic had been deported before the German invasion, but this had only scratched the surface. The group of British and American correspondents who were allowed to visit Tallinn in August 1944 obtained a glimpse behind the barrier, and, although their accounts were censored when they returned to Moscow, one of the correspondents published his full report on his return to London. According to him, the impressions of the entire group of correspondents tallied to form a fairly complete picture, which showed the Estonians in Tallinn to be a 'genuinely frightened' people 'who despised and feared the Russians'.[1] And these were the same Estonians who, according to the Russian version of the story, had 'spontaneously requested' admission into the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1940.

After the Republics had been 'liberated' by the Soviet Union, the policies of nationalization and collectivization, which had been mitigated before the German invasion, were resumed. At first it was declared that the Soviet leaders had profited from errors of the past and now favoured more gradual changes. According to Arnold Veimer, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in Soviet Estonia, the land was to be redistributed once more, but there was to be no immediate compulsory collectivization. Industry was to be nationalized, but small industries employing fewer than ten persons were to be allowed to practise private enterprise.[2] The universities were organized along Soviet lines, and education was based on Marxist-Leninist conceptions. Five-year plans were launched to improve industrialization in each Republic. According to official Soviet sources during 1945 and 1946 the emphasis was being placed on the shale oil, textile, and fish-canning industries in Estonia; on metal products such as rolling-stock in Latvia; and on the fuel industry, implements, and some consumer goods in Lithuania.[3]

Despite the lack of reliable information, there were signs that the Soviet Government were having trouble with the Baltic peoples. The German troops trapped in the Courland pocket held out for several months of 1945, and Soviet articles confirmed that this was not the only source of resistance.[4] The existence of partisan movements still operating against the occupying Power was occasionally indicated indirectly in

[1] Winterton: *Report on Russia*, pp. 84–90.

[2] *Yorkshire Post* and *Daily Telegraph*, 7 October 1944; cf. *The Times*, 17 October 1944.

[3] 'Baltic Shale Will Fuel Leningrad', *Soviet News*, 19 October 1945. See also *Glasgow Herald*, 15 August 1946; *Soviet News*, 19, 21 October 1946 (Reports by Baltic representatives to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.).

[4] *The Times* (19 January 1945) described German reprisals after battling with Latvians in the Courland pocket. In May 1945 the Germans finally announced the creation of a 'National Latvian Government' (*New York Times*, 9 May 1945). An article in *Pravda* on 15 March complained that agitators were having little success among the Latvians. *Pravda* explained that the workers were 'poisoned' by the 'false propaganda of the German-fascist usurpers and helpers—the Latvian-German nationalists' (*New York Times*, 15 March 1945).

Soviet publications, although the extravagant claims of Baltic émigré and exile publications remained unsubstantiated.[1] But it was plain that the Soviet Government were continuing their long-established policy of transferring 'unreliable elements' in Soviet border-states to areas in the interior of the Soviet Union. These 'deportations', which had struck terror into the hearts of the Baltic peoples before the German invasion, were now continuing, while families from other parts of the Soviet Union were being resettled in the Baltic States.[2]

When the Soviet Government returned Vilna and Klaipeda to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, an attempt was made to remove the basis of the minorities disputes between the Lithuanians and the Poles. Once again, the Soviet method was to solve the problem by an abrupt, large-scale transfer of population. On 22 September 1944 an agreement was signed between the Government of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, providing for the 'evacuation of the Lithuanian population from the territory of Poland and of Polish citizens from the territory of the Lithuanian S.S.R.'. The evacuation was to be carried out 'on an entirely voluntary basis'.[3] A new problem also arose, after agreement 'in principle' had been reached at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, for the transfer of the Königsberg area of East Prussia to the Soviet Union, 'pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement'.[4] Soviet resettlement policy was then extended to this area also, and in the autumn of 1945 the Tass agency announced that 1,700 families from collective farms in Minsk, Mogilev, and other districts in White Russia had settled in the area of the former Königsberg, now renamed Kaliningrad.[5]

[1] *New York Times*, 15 March 1945. The Soviet Government had said several times that one of the main purposes of the agrarian reforms was to 'crush the power of nationalist elements'. The existence of a Resistance force in Lithuania was confirmed by an order by the Metropolitan of Kaunas, directed against Resistance forces (*Christian Science Monitor*, 2 March 1946). For the extravagant claims of émigrés, &c., see the *Lithuanian Bulletin*, December 1944; *Current News on the Lithuanian Situation*, June, September, and October 1946.

[2] In 1945 J. Paleckis, an official of the Lithuanian Soviet Government, announced in a radio broadcast that 83,000 Lithuanians had 'voluntarily left their country for reconstruction work in the U.S.S.R.' (*Current News on the Lithuanian Situation*, February 1945. See also *The Economist*, 28 December 1946). *The Economist* also describes the influx of Russian settlers to the Baltic areas. See also the *Lithuanian Bulletin*, January 1946. In December 1946 Professor M. Krupavicius, chairman of the 'Lithuanian Committee of Liberation', made an appeal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization against deportations in the Baltic States (*Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 1946).

[3] For the text of the agreement see Rothstein, ii. 138–9. *The Times* for 15 April 1946 speaks of 80,000 Poles from Vilna being transferred to Western Poland. See also the *Lithuanian Bulletin*, July, August, September 1945.

[4] See Cmd. 7087 and *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, pp. 932–3.

[5] *New York Times*, 29 December 1946.

(iii) Finland

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) From the Failure of Finnish-Russian Negotiations in the Spring of 1944 to the Conclusion of the Armistice on 19 September 1944

(1) *Finland's Situation at the Beginning of 1944*

In the spring of 1944 Finland's position in the world was steadily deteriorating. Since the German invasion of Russia, in June 1941, Finland had been a 'brother in arms' of Germany fighting the Russians.[1] Finnish offensive action had, however, only lasted until December 1941, when Marshal Mannerheim had ordered the armed forces to switch from the offensive to the defensive because Finnish 'war aims' had been fulfilled.[2] The change to the defensive had not come in time to avoid a British declaration of war (6 December 1941), and Finland had suddenly found that her recent friend and supporter had turned into an enemy.[3] Finland was of vital importance to the German war machine, both as a source of timber, nickel, and other materials and for the protection of the route through the Gulf of Bothnia by which supplies of iron ore from Sweden reached Germany; and her own dependence on Germany for essential supplies enabled the Germans to exercise close control of the Finnish economy.[4] The presence of a considerable number of German troops in North Finland gave the German Government the means of exerting pressure.[5] Despite German insistence, however, the Finns had not taken part after December 1941 in the offensive against Leningrad; and, under diplomatic pressure from the United States Government (with whom they still maintained relations), they had refrained from cutting the Allies' supply route into

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 580 seqq.

[2] Finnish war aims seem to have been confined to recapturing Finnish territory lost in 1940 and rendering harmless the bases beyond the border from which the Russian attack had come. Much controversy, however, had arisen over Mannerheim's Order of the Day of 10 July 1941, in which he had exhorted Finnish soldiers to liberate the Karelians. See John H. Wuorinen, ed.: *Finland and World War II* (New York, Ronald Press Company, 1948), pp. 123–43. [This work will be referred to hereafter as Wuorinen.]

[3] Mannerheim's order of 6 December 1941 was badly timed, for, if he had given heed to a note from Churchill supplementing a British ultimatum on 28 November (ibid. pp. 134–5), it is possible that Great Britain would not have declared war on Finland. Väinö Tanner, formerly Finnish Foreign Minister, testified in the Finnish 'war guilt' trials of 1945–6 that twenty-four hours would have made all the difference (*New York Times*, 18 December 1945). For Britain's reluctant yielding to Stalin's pressure to declare war on Finland see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 55–56.

[4] Finland was dependent upon Germany for coal, machine tools, machine oils, textiles, and largely for food (see F. A. Voigt: 'Finland and the Baltic States', *The Nineteenth Century*, November 1944, p. 204). See also Wuorinen, p. 145: 'Economically, then, Finland was completely at Germany's mercy'.

[5] Germany had approximately seven divisions in Finland under the command of Colonel-General Dietl in the spring of 1944.

Soviet Russia along the railway running south from Murmansk.[1] Behind the façade maintained by strict war-time censorship and control a desire had begun to grow and manifest itself among the Finnish people to get out of the war,[2] and the need for decision had become ever more pressing as the offensive of the Red Army had met with greater success. How was Finland to free herself from her association with Nazi Germany, and at the same time safeguard her future independence? The seriousness of the dilemma was brought home to the Finnish people by recollections of events in the Baltic States when they had been under Soviet occupation in 1940 and 1941, and by more recent reports of the fate of Italy since she had turned against Germany.[3]

(2) *The Abortive Negotiations with the Russians, February to April 1944*

The inevitability of Germany's defeat after the Battle of Stalingrad was recognized in Finland as early as February 1943.[4] It was not until a year later, however, that the Finns made a serious effort to extricate themselves from the war and to negotiate a peace with the Allies. Attempts had been made during the winter of 1943–4 to establish a common ground for negotiations, but these had failed, mainly because the Finns could not reconcile themselves to acceptance of the Soviet claim to territory acquired by the U.S.S.R. under the peace treaty of March 1940 and since reconquered by Finnish forces.[5] By February 1944, however, internal and external pressures had brought the issue to a head,[6] and in the middle of the month the Finnish Government sent

[1] Cordell Hull gives an account of American pressure on Finland to cease offensive operations, especially against 'war material dispatched from the United States via the Arctic Ocean' (Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 978–80).

[2] In August 1943 this feeling was symbolized by a declaration to President Ryti by thirty-three prominent citizens, recommending steps towards a separate peace. The main support for the agitation for peace at this time came from the Swedo-Finns ('Finlanders') and the Left-wing Social Democrats (Waldemar Erfurth: *Der Finnische Krieg, 1941–44* (Wiesbaden, Limes, 1950), p. 214).

[3] An account of the incorporation of the Baltic States in the U.S.S.R. will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Initial Triumph of the Axis*. For the fate of Italy, after she concluded an armistice with the Allies, see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 324 seqq.

[4] Mannerheim presented this conclusion to a conference of political leaders on 3 February 1943 (Wuorinen, p. 144).

[5] When the Finns did not respond to Soviet overtures in 1942 Molotov made it clear that subsequent conditions would be more severe. As for the subsequent demands, however, 'as long as the Finnish army was victorious, and in some sectors far beyond the 1939 boundaries, no Finnish government, ready to accept once again the crying injustice of the Moscow peace, could have remained in office' (ibid. p. 145; cf. p. 162).

[6] An anti-Finnish campaign in the Soviet press at the end of 1943 was followed by internal pressure by opposition groups. One of the leaders of the 'peace activists' was Dr. Fagerholm, a Social Democrat, who wrote articles and made speeches urging the need for peace negotiations. Cordell Hull's note, warning the Finns to get out of the war or suffer the consequences, received wide publicity. This pressure was emphasized early in February by the bombing of Helsinki by the Russians (Wuorinen, p. 163).

Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who had conducted negotiations with the Russians after the signature of the Peace Treaty in 1940, to Stockholm 'with instructions to ascertain conditions for Finland's withdrawal from the war'.[1] Through a Swedish go-between the Soviet Government were asked whether they would negotiate with the existing Government of Finland, and they agreed to do so. On 16 February Paasikivi asked Madame Kollontai, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, to ascertain the Soviet terms for an armistice with Finland,[2] and on 19 February he was able to return to Helsinki with a list of them.[3]

The list consisted of six points,[4] three of which were preliminary conditions which must be accepted by the Finnish Government before negotiations could even begin. The preliminary conditions were, first, that Finland must sever relations with Germany and intern all German troops within her territory (in the event of the Finnish Government finding this task beyond their powers, the Soviet Government offered their assistance); second, that the Finns must immediately accept a restoration of the situation established by the Peace Treaty of 1940, and withdraw their forces to the 1940 border;[5] third, that Allied prisoners of war and civilians must be repatriated forthwith. If these preliminary conditions were accepted by the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government were prepared to receive a delegation in Moscow for negotiations on the questions of demobilization, reparations, and the future of Petsamo province.[6]

The Finnish Government submitted these proposals for discussion in a secret session of Parliament on 29 February 1944.[7] In spite of substantial opposition they received a vote of confidence in their recommendations,[8] and a Finnish reply was presented to Madame Kollontai on 8 March, requesting further discussion and an opportunity for presenting the Finnish point of view before such 'complex' conditions as that for the internment

[1] *Soviet War News*, 2 March 1944. Another version is published in Rothstein, ii. 56–57: a communiqué of the Information Bureau of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on Soviet-Finnish relations.

[2] Rothstein, ii. 56; *Soviet War News*, 2 March 1944.

[3] Wuorinen, p. 163.

[4] For the six points see ibid. pp. 163–4; Rothstein, ii. 56–57.

[5] For the text see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1939–1940*, ed. S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1940), pp. 392 seqq. Stalin had given official notice that the Soviet Government would demand the 1940 frontier in his speech on 6 November 1943, in which he spoke of the 'liberation' of the Karelo-Finnish Republic. For this speech see Rothstein, i. 62–70. One of the main Finnish objections to the 1940 frontier was the loss of Viipuri (Viborg), the second city of Finland, and of control of the Saimaa Canal, which drained the lake system of south Finland.

[6] *Soviet War News*, loc. cit.; Rothstein, ii. 56–57; Wuorinen, pp. 163–4. An account of the previous Soviet interest in Petsamo will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 576, and also ibid. *The Initial Triumph of the Axis*.

[7] Wuorinen, p. 164.

[8] Ibid. The results of the vote were 105 for the decision and 80 against.

of German troops could be accepted.[1] During the period of time elapsing between the presentation of the Soviet terms and the Finnish reply the Soviet Government had begun to show signs of impatience,[2] and the receipt of this vague statement after such a long delay did not demonstrably ease the tension. On 10 March the Finnish Government were informed that their statement was considered in Moscow to be unsatisfactory, and that only after the acceptance of the 'minimum and elementary' armistice terms could negotiations for a settlement even begin. Furthermore, the Finnish Government were now given only one more week in which to accept the Soviet terms.[3]

During this seven days' period of grace Finland was subjected to a great deal of pressure by the heads of certain Governments who were trying to persuade her to come to terms with Soviet Russia and withdraw from the war.[4] In spite of this advice, however, the Government, after receiving another vote of confidence in a secret session of Parliament, informed the Soviet Government on 17 March that they were unable to accept the six points in advance 'without even knowing definitely their content and meaning'.[5] Their reply was, nevertheless, conciliatory in tone, and this apparently had some effect, for two or three days later a communication was received from the Soviet Government suggesting that 'one or several' of the Finnish representatives should be sent to Moscow to obtain a clarification of the Russian proposals. Accordingly, on 25 March Paasikivi and the Foreign Minister, Carl Enckell, left for Moscow, and, at meetings on 27–29 March,[6] the Soviet leaders presented them with an elaborated version of the six points of the original proposals. The Finns were given the alternative of either interning or expelling the Germans by the end of April. In addition to the three preliminary conditions, however, the three remaining points, which had purposely been left vague in the original demands, were now amplified into more definite and also more alarming terms. During the month of May 50 per

[1] 'Soviet-Finnish Relations', A. Y. Vyshinsky's statement, in *Soviet War News*, 24 April 1944; Rothstein, ii. 69.

[2] A Moscow broadcast reminded the Finns on 3 March that 'time is important'.

[3] 'Soviet-Finnish Relations,' loc. cit.; Rothstein, loc. cit.

[4] The King of Sweden through his Foreign Minister expressed his hopes to Mannerheim that the present contact would not be severed (Wuorinen, p. 165). President Roosevelt also issued a statement urging the Finns to break with Germany. For the discussions between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehrān concerning Finland see Churchill, v. 351–4; U.S. edition, v. 397–400.

[5] Wuorinen, p. 166. A different translation appears in Rothstein, loc. cit., and *Soviet War News*, 12 April 1944.

[6] During the discussions Molotov raised the question of the Finnish delegates' authority to negotiate. It was established later that for the most part they were able to express only their own personal views (Wuorinen, p. 167). After the breakdown of the negotiations Vyshinsky complained at a press conference in Moscow on 22 April 1944 that the delegates' views had not reflected those of their Government, whose attitude was much more rigid.

cent. of the Finnish army was to be demobilized, and during the following two months the entire army was to be reduced to peace-time proportions. Reparations were demanded to the extent of U.S. $600 million, to be paid in commodities over the course of five years. The region of Petsamo, 'voluntarily ceded by the Soviet Union to Finland under the peace treaties of 1920 and 1940', was to be restored to Soviet Russia. On her own initiative, the Soviet Union declared that she was prepared to give up her lease of the district of Hangö.[1]

If the previous version of the Soviet terms had seemed to the Finns difficult to accept, the terms as now stated were considered impossible. The Finns did not see how they were to expel a considerable German force, while at the same time reducing their own armed force to impotence, without asking for Russian support—a course which they were naturally reluctant to follow. If their economic lifelines were to be severed by the loss of Viipuri, the Saimaa Canal, and now Petsamo, and if they were to be deprived of the important industries on the Karelian Isthmus, they did not see how they could pay what appeared to be a fantastic amount of reparations.[2] The members of Parliament considered the terms over the Easter week-end, and on 12 April gave the Prime Minister a unanimous vote of confidence in his decision to refuse to accept the Soviet proposals.[3] The Finnish Government's reply, delivered to the Soviet Government on 19 April, expressed regret that the more precise armistice terms, which were 'partly incapable of realization even for technical reasons', were impossible for Finland to accept.[4]

Strong as was the desire in Finland to withdraw from the war, especially in view of the Allied solidarity declared at the Tehrān Conference[5] and the relentless drive of the Red Army, the negotiations which had begun in mid-February thus came to nothing. A curt Soviet reply was delivered on 22 April, stating that 'the Soviet Government takes note that the Government of Finland in its reply has rejected the Soviet armistice terms as a basis for negotiations, and has discontinued negotiations for an armistice'.[6] On the same day, at a press conference in Moscow, Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, reviewed the course of the negotiations and severely criticized the Finnish Government for their stand, blaming for the breakdown of negotiations Finland's connexions with Germany and the 'influence' of German troops in Finland. Finland's

[1] Rothstein, ii. 69–70; *Soviet War News*, 12 April 1944.

[2] The terms specified that the reparations were to be paid in 'commodities (paper, cellulose, ships, various machinery and installations)'. Finland had no raw materials for shipbuilding, and her capacity for producing machinery was very small. An estimate of what this amount of reparations would have meant is given in Wuorinen, p. 169.

[3] Ibid. p. 170.

[4] Rothstein, ii. 70; *Soviet War News*, 12 April 1944; Wuorinen, p. 170.

[5] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 367.

[6] Rothstein, ii. 71; *Soviet War News*, loc. cit.

independence was not threatened, said Vyshinsky, since in fact Finland had no independence, and was indeed but a vassal of Germany.

(3) *The Russian Offensive in June 1944, and the Ryti–Ribbentrop Pact and its Sequel*

After the Finnish rejection of the Soviet armistice terms in April 1944 the attitude of the United States (as well as of Great Britain) towards Finland became noticeably stiffer. This was evident in the joint Allied statement of 12 May, which was addressed to the satellites of Nazi Germany, among which Finland was now, it seemed, officially included.[1]

On 10 June Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus were surprised by a strong Soviet offensive, for the second time in four years. In a frontal assault on the Mannerheim Line north of Leningrad a large Soviet force under General Govorov succeeded in breaking through the strong Finnish defence.[2] The Finns rapidly withdrew, and in ten days Red Army forces were able to advance as far on the Isthmus as they had during the 'Winter War' of 1939–40. On 20 June they had once again captured the key city of Viipuri, the capital of Finnish Karelia.[3] These Russian successes forced the Finns to reconsider their decision not to make peace on the Russian terms. At first it looked as though a new government would be formed for the purpose of asking the Soviet Government for their terms, but before long the influence of Mannerheim, who advised against a break with Germany,[4] and of the Germans themselves, had prevailed against the arguments for negotiations with Russia.

If Finland made peace with Russia, the consequences would be very serious for Germany. Her valuable nickel supplies from Petsamo would be lost; German troops in northern Finland would be isolated; and a Soviet occupation of Finland or Finnish bases would bring with it a threat to the supplies of vital ore from Sweden. Accordingly, at the time when a fresh tentative approach was being made by the Finns to Soviet authorities in Stockholm,[5] German diplomatic and military pressure was

[1] For the Allied statement on Germany's satellites see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943–1944*, p. 189; cf. Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1570–82.

[2] Stalin's Order of the Day of 11 June (*Soviet War News*, 13 June 1944) said that the force comprised perhaps 100,000 men, commanded by twenty generals; see also *New York Times*, 13 June 1944.

[3] See Stalin's Order of the Day of 21 June (*Soviet War News*, 22 June 1944). For a comparison with the 1940 invasion see *The Times*, 19 June 1944.

[4] Mannerheim's advice to the President was that the need of supplies for the army made it essential to maintain good relations with Germany (Wuorinen, p. 173).

[5] On 19 June Gripenberg, the Finnish Minister to Sweden, informed the U.S.S.R. through the Swedish Government that the Finnish Government was about to be reconstructed. On 22 June Moscow was informed that the Finns were prepared to send delegates to Moscow. A reply was received from the Soviet Government on the same day demanding Finland's surrender (ibid. pp. 172, 173). Contact was, of course, broken off after the announcement of the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact (see below, p. 267, note 2).

being exercised in Helsinki,[1] and this reached a climax with the arrival there of the German Foreign Minister. On 27 June the rumours and confusion of the preceding weeks were suddenly clarified. As a detachment of German troops marched through the streets of Helsinki, it was officially announced by the German and Finnish Governments that, after discussions between Ribbentrop and the Finnish leaders, Germany had agreed to send armed help to Finland. The announcement did not mention, however, that President Ryti had, on his own initiative, signed an agreement with Germany, promising, in return for German aid, that the Government of Finland would not sign a separate peace.[2]

Before this there had been some uncertainty in Western countries over Finland's status and some sympathy for her plight, but the announcement of the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact seemed to remove any doubt about her position, and her last link with America was severed on 30 June, after the United States representative in Helsinki had asked for his passport.[3] With the arrival of German aid, a period of relative stabilization set in on the Karelian front, since the force of the Soviet offensive was now transferred to Byelorussia (White Russia).[4]

Finland was no longer fighting a 'separate war'. Her fate seemed now to be interlocked with that of Germany. None the less, the agreement with Germany was by no means popular with the Finns. Since the pact had been signed without the authority of Parliament, it was considered that a *coup d'état* had taken place.[5] Opposition to the Government's action was so strong, in fact, that a Cabinet crisis was only just avoided. The Social Democrats, however, decided not to withdraw their support in view of the need for unity, and for the time being the Government carried on.[6]

The unsteady foundations of the Government of President Ryti grew weaker throughout July. It seemed only a question of time before the Red

[1] The German Minister in Helsinki, von Blücher, warned the Finns that Germany would not recognize Finland's non-belligerency if she made peace. Dietl, commander of the German forces in northern Finland, was said to have ordered his 100,000 troops to 'fight to the last man and the last bullet' (*Chicago Daily News*, 22 June 1944), and both he and Jodl visited Helsinki and urged the Finns to stay in the war.

[2] For the text of the agreement, in the form of a personal letter from Ryti to Hitler, see Wuorinen, p. 174.

[3] The Finnish Minister in Washington had been asked on 16 June to leave America on account of propaganda activities, but this had not constituted a breach of relations (Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1450).

[4] See Stalin's Orders of the Day of 25, 26, 27, and 28 June (*Soviet War News*, 27–30 June 1944).

[5] A Cabinet meeting was held on 24 June in the presence of Ribbentrop, Dietl, and Jodl. The pact was not submitted to Parliament because it was learned that a large proportion of the members would oppose it. It was, therefore, unconstitutional, and the Government soon felt able to ignore it (see below, p. 268).

[6] Members of the Social Democrat Party had unanimously decided to withdraw their support from the Government, but later they reversed their decision. Wuorinen (p. 175) attributes this largely to a statement by Tanner, their anti-Russian leader.

Army would launch another drive. The German aid received by Finland after the Ribbentrop pact had been disappointingly slight, for Germany was now busy defending other fronts.[1] The hopelessness of Finland's position became glaringly apparent towards the end of July, when the Russians were advancing through Estonia to the Baltic coast. The substantial opposition to the Government in Parliament had again been making itself felt,[2] and the result this time was that on 1 August the resignation of Ryti was announced. In his place the Finnish Parliament appointed Marshal Mannerheim, who had been Commander-in-Chief three times and was regarded as the symbol of Finnish independence, to lead the country through the coming period of crisis.[3]

The first duty of the new President, after taking the oath of office on 4 August, was to form a government more in harmony with the circumstances. On 8 August a new list of Ministers was published, which included a large proportion of men with experience of Soviet Russia.[4] Ryti, Linkomies, and Tanner, whose anti-Russian sentiments were well known, were not included. The formation by Mannerheim of this new Government, which was obviously less antagonistic to the U.S.S.R., was the preliminary step to new negotiations for peace.

(4) *The Soviet 'Preliminary Condition' and its Acceptance by the Finns*

The deterioration in the German military position towards the end of August 1944 made a deep impression upon the Finns. The Russian advance into the Balkans, coupled with Allied successes in France, made it clear that Germany would need to concentrate all her efforts on her own defence, and would be unable, even if she were willing, to send Finland the military aid provided for by the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact. On 17 August Mannerheim informed Keitel that he no longer considered himself bound by the agreement made by Ryti. Soon afterwards the Finnish Government made overtures to the Russians, once again through Stockholm. On 25 August Gripenberg handed to Madame Kollontai a statement asking the Soviet Government to receive a delegation for

[1] Wuorinen states that, although German aid in the shape of war material was quite generous and had an appreciable effect in helping to stop the Russian advance, aid in the shape of troops amounted to only one infantry division and one Panzer brigade.

[2] Social Democratic Ministers were urged to resign by the trade unions in a circular dated 3 July. The Foreign Minister did not inform the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs of Ryti's pledge to Germany until 19 July, whereupon seven of its seventeen members lodged a formal protest.

[3] Parliament passed a special law, enabling itself to elect the President.

[4] The new Prime Minister, Antii Hackzell, a Conservative, had been Finnish Minister in Moscow from 1922 to 1927, and had a considerable knowledge of the U.S.S.R. His Foreign Minister, Carl Enckell (Independent), had had diplomatic experience in the U.S.S.R. and had accompanied Paasikivi to Moscow in the spring of 1944 (see above, p. 264).

armistice or peace negotiations. The statement was accompanied by a *note verbale*, describing Mannerheim's meeting with Keitel.[1]

The Soviet reply which was handed to Gripenberg on 29 August demanded, as a preliminary condition which must be fulfilled before negotiations could begin, that the Finnish Government should make a public statement announcing the severance of relations with Germany and insisting on the withdrawal of German armed forces from Finland within two weeks or in any case before 15 September. If the withdrawal had not been carried out by that date, the German forces were to be disarmed and handed over as prisoners of war to the Allies. It was made clear to the Finns that this reply was approved by the British Government, and that the United States had been informed and had made no comment.[2]

On 2 September the Finnish Parliament met in secret session and approved the Prime Minister's decision to accept the Russians' preliminary condition.[3] On the same evening Hackzell, in a broadcast speech, told the Finnish people the reasons for his decision. He reviewed the discouraging military situation, and the circumstances which had made the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact invalid. He described the exchange of notes with the Soviet Government, and pointed out that this time the Soviet Government had not insisted upon unconditional surrender.[4] Moreover, he expressed his hope that the Germans would co-operate and would withdraw their forces by the specified date.[5]

On 2 September, also, Gripenberg handed to Madame Kollontai a note from Mannerheim, making proposals, in advance of formal acceptance of the Russians' preliminary condition, for fulfilling that condition and bringing hostilities to an end.[6] Mannerheim proposed that Finland herself should carry out the evacuation or internment of German troops in southern Finland;[7] that hostilities should cease, and Finnish forces withdraw to the 1940 border at the same time as the Russians advanced up to it; and that the breach with Germany should be announced upon receipt of a Soviet reply. Gripenberg also stated that the Finns were ready to take part in operations for the disarmament of Germans in northern Finland, but that they desired an understanding with Moscow on that matter.[8] The Soviet Government replied on 3 September, agreeing to cease hostilities as soon as their preliminary condition had been fulfilled and to assist

[1] *Soviet War News*, 5 September 1944; Rothstein, ii. 106; Wuorinen, p. 178.
[2] *Soviet War News*, loc. cit.; Rothstein, ii. 107.
[3] Wuorinen, p. 178.
[4] See above, p. 266, note 5, for the Russian demand for Finland's surrender immediately before the conclusion of the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact.
[5] For the text of Hackzell's speech see *Manchester Guardian* and *The Times*, 4 September 1944.
[6] *Soviet War News*, 5 September 1944; Rothstein, loc.cit.
[7] There was, apparently, an agreement between Mannerheim and the Germans for a German withdrawal from the south of Finland. Their peaceable withdrawal was proceeding according to plan.
[8] *Soviet War News*, loc. cit.; Rothstein, loc. cit.

in disarming German troops remaining in Finland after 15 September. All other questions were to be settled during the negotiations.[1] On the same evening a statement by the Finnish Government was broadcast, announcing the severance of relations with Germany.[2] Simultaneously the Finnish High Command announced the cessation of hostilities against Russia as from 8 a.m. on 4 September.[3] Two days later the Soviet Government announced that the Red Army High Command had given orders that firing should cease as from 8 a.m. on 5 September, twenty-four hours after the Finnish cease-fire.[4]

(5) *The Negotiation and the Terms of the Armistice of 19 September 1944*

The Soviet Government's preliminary condition had been fulfilled, and representatives for peace negotiations were appointed by Mannerheim without delay. The delegation, which was headed by the Prime Minister, Hackzell, and included other members with experience of Russia,[5] was given authority to make decisions on both political and military matters.[6] It arrived in Moscow on 7 September, but the opening of negotiations was delayed for a week because the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was occupied in negotiating an armistice with Rumania.[7]

While the delegates were waiting in Moscow, it became clear that, though the withdrawal of German troops in southern Finland was proceeding satisfactorily, the evacuation of those in the north could not be completed by 15 September. The Finns, therefore, in accordance with the Russians' preliminary condition, began to prepare for possible operations against the German division in the north, while the German Commander, Rendulic, evacuated as many troops as possible before the deadline and proceeded to consolidate his position. At the same time Finland was faced with the additional complication that the population of Finnish Karelia was moving across the frontier-line drawn in 1940, now that they knew a Russian occupation to be inevitable.[8]

On 14 September negotiations began in Moscow for an armistice

[1] Rothstein, ii. 107.

[2] On 4 September a Tass communiqué criticized Hackzell's speech for failing to mention the condition that the Germans were to be disarmed (*Soviet War News*, 5 September 1944).

[3] Ibid. 6 September 1944; Rothstein, ii. 111.

[4] Ibid. Soviet troops continued the attack during this twenty-four-hour period, although the Finns had ceased firing (*New York Times*, 6 September 1944).

[5] The delegation consisted of Hackzell, General Walden (Minister of Defence), Lieut.-General Heinrichs (Chief of Staff), Lieut.-General Oscar Enckell, and their advisers.

[6] During the negotiations at the end of the 'Winter War', in 1940, the delegates had been hampered by lack of authority, as Paasikivi and Enckell, too, had been in the spring of 1944 (see above, p. 264, note 6, and Wuorinen, p. 167).

[7] *Soviet War News*, 14 September 1944; Rothstein, ii. 122.

[8] The northern part of the Swedish-Finnish border was closed by the Germans, thus preventing more refugees from crossing into Sweden. German troops had withdrawn from Oulu to more defensible positions.

between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, on the one hand, and Finland on the other.[1] (Since the United States had never declared war on Finland, she could not participate in negotiations.) After two days, progress was suddenly interrupted by the collapse of Hackzell, but the Foreign Minister, Carl Enckell, was immediately sent to act as head of the Finnish delegation, and the discussions were resumed.[2] On 18 September the Allied terms were presented to the Finnish delegates, with the demand that they should be accepted immediately, in order that the ceremony of signing might take place on the following day. The Finnish Parliament was summoned for a session at six o'clock in the morning on 19 September and the members present voted unanimously for acceptance.[3] On the same day the Finnish delegates, thus constitutionally provided with the necessary powers, signed the Armistice terms in Moscow,[4] and in Helsinki the acting Prime Minister of Finland, Ernst von Born, made public the main points in a broadcast speech. Stating that '19 September 1944 will be one of the hardest days in our history', von Born expressed gloomy resignation over the harshness of some of the provisions, but urged the Finnish people to face the realities of the situation and to remember that they must 'live and dwell as the neighbour of powerful Russia'.[5]

The twenty-three points of this Agreement were much more exhaustive and detailed than the six points put forward in April. While in some respects the terms were more severe, some concessions had also been made to the Finns—particularly in respect of the amount of reparations demanded—and, most important of all, they were not to be subjected (as the Rumanians were) to Russian occupation. The provisions placed the Soviet Government in a position from which they could easily control, and even occupy, Finland: but it was made clear that the manner in which the Finns carried out the Armistice terms would determine the manner in which control was exercised.[6]

The Agreement provided that Finnish troops were to be withdrawn behind the 1940 frontier, and that the situation established by the Peace Treaty of that year was to be restored.[7] The Soviet Government renounced their right to a lease of the Peninsula of Hangö, but in exchange received,

[1] *Soviet War News*, 21 September 1944; Rothstein, ii. 128. The negotiations could only cover armistice terms, since the Allies had already agreed that peace treaties with Germany's satellites should not be concluded until the Peace Conference.

[2] Rothstein, loc. cit.

[3] Wuorinen, p. 180.

[4] *Soviet War News*, 21 September 1944; Rothstein, loc. cit.

[5] For text of von Born's speech see *The Times*, 20 September 1944.

[6] See Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Conditions of an Armistice with Finland, signed at Moscow, 19th September 1944*, Cmd. 6586 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6586].

[7] Thus Russia once more acquired the territory which in 1940 she had considered necessary for the defence of Leningrad, territorial gains on the Karelian Isthmus, islands in the Gulf of Finland, and protection for the Murmansk railway and the Baltic–White Sea Canal.

for a term of fifty years, a lease of 'territory and waters for the establishment of a Soviet naval base in the area of Porkkala-Udd'.[1] In addition, the district (*oblast*) of Petsamo, which had been ceded to Finland by the Soviet Government after the First World War, was to be returned to the Soviet Union.[2] For the duration of the war Finland was to make aerodromes in south and south-west Finland available at the request of the 'Allied (Soviet) High Command'.[3] The Finns were to undertake the disarming of German troops remaining in Finland after 15 September, and were to be assisted in this by the Soviet Government. Finland was to place her army on a 'peace footing' within two and a half months from the day of signature.[4] She was to return immediately all 'Soviet and Allied' prisoners of war, while, at the same time, Finnish prisoners were to be returned to her. She was to pay reparations for Soviet losses, amounting to 'three hundred million dollars payable over six years in commodities' (that is, half the total amount demanded in the spring and an extension of one year in the period of payment), as well as restitution for property losses to other Allied states and nationals.[5] The 1940 agreement concerning the demilitarization of the Åland Islands was to come into force again.[6] Most of the remaining articles dealt with the disposition of Allied and German property in Finland, but Articles 20–22 were of significance for the immediate future of Finland. Article 20 provided for the release of political prisoners.[7] Article 21 placed an obligation upon Finland to dissolve all 'pro-Hitler organizations (of a fascist type) situated on Finnish territory', and not to tolerate them in the future.[8] Article 22

[1] This was an advantageous bargain for the Soviet Union Porkkala-Udd was within thirty miles of Helsinki. It had at least as much strategic value as Hangö, since it was situated directly opposite Tallinn in Estonia, so that the two positions formed a solid protection for the approaches to Leningrad. Also, transport rights to and from the area through Helsinki provided a means of quick movement if necessary. The lease of this area to Russia for fifty years made it evident that Finland's existence as a free country would depend on her friendliness towards the U.S.S.R.

[2] The Soviet Government thus reacquired the area, with its valuable nickel mines, that had been the cause of so much trouble with Germany before the 1941 invasion. This acquisition also afforded protection for Murmansk, deprived Finland of her frontage on the Arctic, including a significant port through which Finland had made unhindered contact with the West, and gave the Soviet Union a common border with Norway.

[3] These were to be used for operations against Estonia and against German shipping in the Gulf of Bothnia.

[4] This provision was much the same as that in the Soviet terms of April 1944, but it now presented less difficulty to the Finns, since the German position was much weaker now that their forces had withdrawn from southern Finland.

[5] This was the same amount of reparations as was demanded of Rumania and later of Hungary.

[6] For the 1940 agreement on the Åland Islands, see Finland: *Finland reveals her secret documents on Soviet policy, March 1940–June 1941*: *Official Blue-White Book of Finland* (New York, Funk, 1941), Document 34, p. 65. [This will be referred to hereafter as *Finnish Blue-White Book.*]

[7] These included Communists and Left-wing Social Democrats, who had been imprisoned for opposing the war with the Soviet Union.

[8] This was subject, of course, to different interpretations. The Soviet definition of 'fascist' did not coincide with that known in the West.

provided for the establishment of an Allied Control Commission (under Soviet direction), which, 'until the conclusion of peace with Finland, [would] undertake the regulation and control of the execution of the present Agreement'.[1]

(*b*) From the Armistice Agreement of 19 September 1944 to the Treaty of Peace of 10 February 1947

(1) *Finland's Situation after the Signature of the Armistice Agreement*

During the Finns' short period of independence between the wars their policy had had three main objectives: the cultivation of Finland's national heritage (an objective which raised delicate questions between the Finnish-speaking majority and a Swedish-speaking minority of the population), the development of Western democratic institutions, and independence from Russia. After the Armistice Agreement with the Soviet Union and Britain in 1944, however, Finland's position was drastically altered. As against Russia, her frontier was not defensible,[2] and a realistic appraisal of the situation forced upon the Finns the conclusion that their future fate would depend almost entirely on one factor—their relations with the Soviet Union.

Finland, unlike many of the states of Eastern Europe, was not under actual Soviet occupation, but her territory had been considerably diminished. She had lost the fertile land and the timber industry of the Karelian Isthmus and parts of Northern Karelia.[3] The Arctic port of Petsamo and the valuable nickel deposits of the Petsamo area had been reincorporated in the Soviet Union. The Mannerheim Line was now useless for purposes of defence; for Finland was manifestly at the mercy of her great neighbour on the east and south, now that the Soviet Union had secured a naval base in the area of Porkkala-Udd, very close to Helsinki, together with rights of transport to and from the area, including a right of transit through Helsinki.

The importance that the Russians attached to Finland's position and policy became apparent with the arrival of the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission. Andrei Zhdanov had been in charge in Estonia

[1] *Soviet War News*, 21 September 1944; Cmd. 6586.

[2] Finland's south-eastern frontier in Karelia in the inter-war period had been approximately coincident with her historic frontier in this quarter. As a dominion of the Swedish Crown, Finland had lost this historic frontier in the Great Northern War of 1700–21, as a result of which the frontier had been set back approximately to the line of the subsequent 1940 frontier, in order to give Russia protection for the approaches to her then newly founded capital at St. Petersburg. The historic frontier had been restored to Finland by her first Grand Duke, the Tsar Alexander I of Russia, after the cession of Finland to him in 1809 to constitute an autonomous constitutionally governed Grand Duchy united to the Russian Empire by a personal union only.

[3] Wuorinen (p. 15) states that 'Karelia alone represented ten to fourteen per cent. of Finland's industrial and agricultural resources'.

during the period of her incorporation in the U.S.S.R. A member of the Politburo, he had risen to prominence by leading the defence of Leningrad, and memories of the horrors of the German siege must still have been fresh in his mind. It seemed probable that his appointment signified Russia's intention to adopt a harsh and uncompromising policy towards a country, within a stone's throw of Leningrad, that had been Germany's accomplice.[1]

Yet, from the date of the Armistice onwards, the policy of the Soviet Government towards Finland was surprisingly mild. Except for certain activities against Finland's war-time leaders and against 'fascist type' or 'chauvinistic' organizations,[2] the Finns were allowed on the whole to manage their own affairs. The air bases used by the Allies for the duration of the war with Germany were handed back to the Finns in August 1945, along with those channels of communication which had been restricted while the war continued. The absence of direct interference in the elections of March 1945 was conspicuous enough actually to provide a ground for the official resumption of relations with Finland by the United States,[3] and the retention by Finland of her Western type of democratic institutions was in striking contrast to the fate of other countries of Eastern Europe.

The Russians' conciliatory policy towards Finland at this time stands out in contrast to the oppressiveness of their contemporary treatment of other East European countries, particularly Poland. This striking difference of policy may have been due partly to a difference in their experience of dealing with Finland and with 'Congress Poland' during the century that had ended in the First World War. Partly, again, as far as Finland was concerned, the difference was due, no doubt, to lessons which the Russians had learned during and after the Winter War of 1939–40, and to their recognition of the stubbornness of the Finnish character. Stalin told a Finn in 1945 that Soviet policy toward Finland was 'not kindness, but common sense. We must not repeat the mistakes of the old Czars.'[4] Another consideration in Russian minds, at least at a later stage, may have been a concern to avoid alarming and alienating the Finns' neutral neighbours, the Swedes. In the last analysis, however, the preservation

[1] The Finns had stopped offensive action, just beyond the old frontier, on 6 December 1941, but the presence of Finnish forces had given strength and moral support to the German siege of Leningrad.

[2] By February 1945 about 500 associations and societies had been dissolved, including the IKL (Finnish Fascist Party), the Lotta Svärd (Finnish women's organization), and the Brothers-in-Arms League (an organization for ex-service men).

[3] *Department of State Bulletin*, 21 August 1945, pp. 283–339. This announcement stated that, since the elections appeared to have been freely held, and the people's wishes expressed, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations would be proposed. Relations were resumed on 31 August 1945.

[4] *Sunday Express*, 14 October 1945. Stalin had a special feeling towards Finland, which had its roots in the fact that, as Commissar of Nationalities in 1917, he himself had proclaimed Finland's independence (see Deutscher: *Stalin*, pp. 181–2, 447).

of a liberal régime in Finland after the Armistice of 1944 was due to a large extent to the statesmanship of one man. Paasikivi, who became Prime Minister in November 1944 and President in March 1946, possessed the great (and rare) advantage that he understood the Russians. He also had sufficient vision to realize that the existence of Finland and the maintenance of her Western institutions depended upon a realistic policy towards the Soviet Union. He had the courage to break with previous policy, and to pursue an orientation coinciding with the change in the international situation. In the light of the developments in Poland and South-East Europe, it can be seen that the policy of Paasikivi during these years had a pronounced effect upon Finnish-Russian relations, and therefore upon the fate of Finland.[1]

(2) *The Expulsion of the Germans from Finland*

After the signature of the Armistice Agreement in September 1944 the first problem facing Finland was the fulfilment of her responsibility for disarming approximately 200,000 Germans in the north. The Finns had approached this task without any feeling of hatred for the Germans. On the contrary, they had been conscious of a bond, welded in the common struggle, which could not easily be broken. But Finnish feelings changed when, on 15 September, the Germans attempted to seize the island of Hogland in the Gulf of Finland. They were repulsed after fierce fighting, but the attempt aroused much bitterness among their recent 'comrades in arms'. At the same time the Germans were making frantic preparations to defend the north of Finland, and Finnish anger increased as the retreating German troops destroyed bridges and other communications in their wake. On 20 September Finnish forces marched north, occupying Oulu, and at the same time the Germans announced their determination to defend their positions in the north of Finland, and to carry out a 'scorched earth' policy if forced to retreat. The next day the Finns were given a sharp reminder by the Soviet Government. An article in *Izvestia* drew their attention to their obligation under Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement to disarm German troops on Finnish soil, and warned them not to delay but to take advantage of this opportunity to secure their independence by the expulsion of the Germans.[2]

The Soviet Government were specially interested in securing the evacuation of the Germans from the strategically valuable and economically

[1] Although Paasikivi had formerly been a member of the Conservative Party, he now considered himself an Independent. He had led the delegation which signed the Peace Treaty with the R.S.F.S.R. at Tartu on 14 October 1920. In 1939 he had been Finnish Minister in Stockholm, and, as we have seen, he had taken a leading part in peace negotiations with the U.S.S.R. in 1940 and in 1944. Stalin had once said to him: 'If we two had known each other before, the war between our two nations could have been avoided' (see Arnost Krása, in *Central European Observer*, 9 February 1945).

[2] *Soviet War News*, 23 September 1944.

rich region of Petsamo on the Arctic Ocean. Molotov had stated as early as June 1940 that the Soviet Government were not interested in the ore alone, 'but in the area itself and the nickel in it for all time, and that the British must be cleared out of the area'.[1] The Russians had been frustrated in their attempts in 1940 and 1941 to gain a foothold in the area, but they were now in a position to clear the 'British' out.[2] The Petsamo nickel mines, however, were protected by formidable defences erected by the German Lapland Army, and it was clearly unlikely that the small Finnish force marching from the south would be able, unassisted, to make much progress against them. Accordingly, Soviet forces launched an offensive in the Petsamo region in mid-October 1944, in accordance with the provision in the Armistice Agreement that the Soviet Government would assist the Finns in their task if necessary. On 15 October, after the encirclement of the German Lapland Army, the Germans were driven from Petsamo, and soon afterwards the Red Army entered Northern Norway, capturing the port of Kirkenes on 25 October.[3] Stalin's Order of the Day on 1 November announced that the entire Petsamo area had been cleared.[4]

The destruction of the German Lapland Army lightened the Finns' burden considerably, and on 23 November Finnish forces reached the Norwegian border from the south. At the same time they were in process of demobilization, and by 1 December the Finns had reduced their forces to the stipulated peace-time establishment of approximately 39,000 men. Such a small force as this could not make speedy progress against the remaining Germans, who had prepared their defences well. The Finnish advance was relatively slow and unspectacular, therefore, during the first three months of 1945. On 1 March the Finnish Government legalized the hostilities which had been in progress since 15 September by belatedly declaring war on Germany.[5] On 11 April a spring offensive was launched against the remaining Germans, and by the end of April there were no German troops left in Finland.

[1] Paasikivi to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 June 1940 (*Finnish Blue-White Book*, Document 15, p. 51).

[2] A supplementary protocol to the Armistice Agreement provided for compensation to the Canadian nickel companies whose property would be taken over (*Soviet War News*, 21 October 1944; Rothstein, ii. 161). A second supplementary protocol, signed on 29 September 1947, provided for an alteration in the instalment payments (Canada, Treaty Series 1947, No. 24, Ottawa, 1948). The companies concerned were the Mond Nickel Corporation and the International Nickel Corporation of Canada.

[3] Stalin's Orders of the Day for 15 and 25 October (*Soviet War News*, 17 and 27 October 1944).

[4] Ibid. 3 November 1944.

[5] The Finns were, no doubt, influenced by the Yalta Declaration, which made this measure a prerequisite to membership in the new international organization (see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Yalta, 11th February 1945*, Cmd. 7088 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 7088].

(3) *The Paasikivi Government and the Swing to the Left in Finnish Politics*

Immediately after the Armistice strong opposition developed in Finland, especially within the Social Democratic Party, to politicians connected with the war-time Government. The leader of the party, Tanner, had been a member of the war-time Cabinet, and was widely known for his hostility to the Soviet Union. It was an expression of disapproval of Tanner and the other war-time leaders that brought about the formation of a new Government on 17 November 1944, under Paasikivi, and gave Finnish policy a new orientation. Paasikivi's Government did not include any of the leaders of the war-time Government, but he invited politicians of the extreme Left and even a member of the newly reconstituted Communist Party to join his Cabinet. The break with the past was even sharper in the policy which Paasikivi announced that he intended to pursue. He would seek, he said, the 'best possible understanding' with the Soviet Union, and would work 'conscientiously to fulfil the terms of the armistice agreement'.[1]

The opposition which had arisen to Tanner's leadership within the Social Democratic Party gave rise to other developments as well. Many dissidents seceded from the party and joined the new 'People's Democratic League', in alliance with the Communists. The most important internal issues, however, were the pending election, to be held in March 1945, and the question of the future leadership of Finland. The apprehension felt by the Finns in regard to their position was increased when the Yalta Declaration declared it to be the intention of the Allies to intervene, if necessary, in the administration of former Axis satellite countries.[2] In January Paasikivi was faced with a demand by the Left for the arrest and trial of war-time leaders. After receiving a legal opinion on the matter from ex-President Stahlberg, he declared that there was no Finnish law under which elected leaders could be tried for mistaken policies, but he asked war-time leaders, in the interests of Soviet-Finnish relations, not to seek in future to play a part in public life.[3] Parliamentary candidates who had been associated with the war-time Government now withdrew, and the field was open to the Left.[4] Moreover, immediately before the elections on 17 and 18 March, Paasikivi once again reminded the Finnish people of the importance of this election to Finland, and requested them to give a 'new face' to the Parliament. Paasikivi's two statements made a strong impression on the public, as had an earlier speech by Eero Vuori, a member of the Government and a former trade-union leader, who had

[1] *New York Times*, 17 November 1944.

[2] The crucial words were 'where in their judgment conditions require' (see Cmd. 7088).

[3] His request followed a statement by a Soviet representative, Orlov, that the Russians would view with suspicion the continuance in office of the war-time leaders.

[4] Upon his withdrawal from candidature, Tanner accused the Government of methods 'foreign to democratic procedure' (*The Times*, 5 February 1945).

stressed the implications of the Yalta Declaration with regard to Finnish independence. The elections took place, without Russian interference, and the result was a resounding success for the People's Democratic League. Popular support for the parties of the extreme Left was reflected in the new Government formed in April by Paasikivi. Members of the People's Democratic League received some of the most important portfolios in the Cabinet, including the Ministries of Education and Defence, and the Ministry of the Interior was given to Yrjoe Leino, a Communist. The three major political parties, however, declared their intention in April of co-operating with one another in trying to solve the many problems facing Finland.

The formation of the new Cabinet in April 1945 enabled Paasikivi to push on with his policy of providing a basis for friendship with the Soviet Union. With the aid of such organizations as a new Soviet-Finnish Society, which had a very large membership, a campaign was launched to 're-educate' the Finnish people.[1] Military and 'fascist type' organizations were banned, along with cultural societies with 'chauvinist' tendencies. Plays and books with pre-1939 conceptions of Finnish history were prohibited. The new Minister for Education, a member of the People's Democratic League, saw to it that anti-Russian portions of Finnish history text-books were deleted or changed.[2] At the same time a campaign was initiated to purge the civil service and the army of 'fascist' elements.

(4) *Finland's Economic Problems, 1944–6*

In addition to Finland's many other problems the territorial rearrangements that took place under the Armistice Agreement produced serious economic dislocation. At the time when Finland was having to adjust herself to the loss of Karelian industry and resources,[3] and to the mutilation of her transport system,[4] she was also having to assimilate the population of the areas ceded to Soviet Russia. Moreover, she was obliged by the Armistice Agreement to pay to the U.S.S.R. within six years reparations

[1] The Soviet-Finnish Society was formed after the Armistice and by May 1945 it had approximately 100,000 members. Its leadership was largely Communist (although Paasikivi was made its honorary President), and its self-appointed mission was to 'cleanse the country of Fascism'. Its resolutions reflected the views of the Moscow press on the 're-education of the Finnish people' (Nordicus: 'Finland Goes to the Polls', *Time and Tide*, 24 February 1945; A. J. Fischer: 'Finland's New War', *Contemporary Review*, May 1945).

[2] Ibid. See also Wuorinen, p. 21.

[3] Finland lost one-sixth of her railways, one-fifth of her hydro-electric power resources, one-third of her fishing industry, and one-tenth of her arable land (Nordicus: 'Finland Goes to the Polls', loc. cit.).

[4] Finland lost Viipuri, her greatest export port, and also the control of the Saimaa Canal, the main outlet to the vast system of lake transport from central Finland. She lost Petsamo, her only outlet in the Arctic, and for the time being was deprived of the use of the railway between Helsinki and Turku, because it passed through the Porkkala-Udd area, which was now a Soviet naval base (ibid.).

to the value of $300 million, and she had to develop her industries in order to produce the commodities required. During the years immediately following the Armistice Finland was thus at the economic mercy of Soviet Russia. But, though the task at first appeared almost impossible, the Finnish people showed remarkable resilience and applied themselves with great determination to the burden of meeting their obligations to the Soviet Union.

In October 1944, within a few weeks of the signature of the Armistice Agreement, a special delegation was appointed to discuss reparations with the Soviet authorities. After several weeks of negotiation in Helsinki an agreement was signed specifying that machinery and ships were to be handed over to a total value of $175 million, while the balance of $125 million was to be made up by timber and other products associated with the timber industry. Payment was to be made in annual instalments of the value of $50 million. As an index of payment the 1938 price level was agreed upon, with slight increases for each category of goods. This meant a considerable increase in the amount of reparations.

Finland's timber industry, which had been flourishing before the war, was revived without much difficulty;[1] and soon after the Armistice Sweden came to the aid of her neighbour by granting her credits for raw materials to build up her metal industry. Sweden also supplied Finland with many of the necessities which she had previously received from Germany.[2]

In October 1945 the Minister of Education, Helo, returned from a visit to Moscow to announce that Stalin had agreed to extend the term for Finnish reparations payments from six to eight years, in view of the difficulties that Finland was experiencing in obtaining raw materials. But, in spite of economic help from Sweden, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., the burden of reparations weighed very heavily on the Finns. Their standard of living was substantially reduced, and by the end of 1945 there were serious scarcities in food, clothing, and housing.[3] After a visit to Finland in March 1946, which revealed the seriousness of conditions in that country, ex-President Herbert Hoover returned to the United States and made an appeal for aid. As a result, Finland was temporarily relieved by a shower of gift parcels. The economic situation was further complicated by the addition to the agricultural population of approximately 400,000 Karelians who had moved into Finland at the time of the Armistice,[4] and who required land and living space. The Finns had to assimilate these at a time when their own resources were seriously strained. In the

[1] J. Hampden Jackson: 'Finland and the Soviet Union', *World Affairs*, July 1948.

[2] Nordicus: 'Finland Goes to the Polls', loc. cit. Finland also benefited in 1945 from a barter agreement with the U.S.S.R., whereby grain and raw materials were exchanged for deliveries of Finnish timber and paper products, over and above deliveries on account of reparations.

[3] J. Hampden Jackson: 'Finland Since the Armistice', *International Affairs*, October 1948, xxiv. 505–6, 508.

[4] Ibid. pp. 507–8.

spring of 1945 the Parliament passed two bills giving the Government the power to requisition land and other property. Karelian families shared farms with Finnish families, or started new farms beside the old ones. Because of the shortage of arable land many families were given plots of forest land, which had to be cleared.

(5) *The Finnish 'War Guilt' Trials*

By Article 13 of the Armistice Agreement, Finland had undertaken to 'collaborate with the Allied Powers in the apprehension of persons accused of war crimes and in their trial'. The Russians were dissatisfied with the measures which Paasikivi had taken before the election in regard to war-time leaders,[1] and their impatience increased when, in July 1945, the Communist Minister for the Interior, Leino, announced that many arrests had been made in connexion with the discovery of a plot by Finnish army officers to conceal arms. There was a danger that, if the question of war guilt were allowed to drift, Soviet impatience might suddenly turn to exasperation, and Paasikivi was faced with the necessity for prompt action.

On 28 July a report was published by the 'Hornborg Committee', which had been established for the purpose of investigating the policies of the Finnish Government from 1938 until the Armistice. This report was later to form the substance for the accusations made against the war-time leaders. After its publication a bill was drawn up by the Paasikivi Government providing for the creation of a special court of twelve members for the purpose of trying war criminals. On 11 September, when agitation by the Left produced a Government crisis, Paasikivi made the bill a question of confidence in his Cabinet, whereupon it was passed by the Finnish Parliament by a vote of 129 to 12. On 6 November eight of the accused politicians who had led Finland during the war were arrested.[2] Their trial began on 15 November, with the reading of the indictment[3] and the introduction of evidence by the prosecution, and lasted until

[1] See above, p. 277.

[2] The eight accused were ex-President Ryti; two former Prime Ministers, Rangell and Linkomies; a former Foreign Minister, Ramsay; the former Minister in Berlin, Kivimäki; and three ex-members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Kukkonen, Reinikka, and Tanner.

[3] Ryti and his subordinates were indicted, jointly or separately, under seven charges. They were accused of (1) having allowed the entry of German troops after the Moscow Peace Treaty of 1940; (2) having made war against the Soviet Union in co-operation with German troops, and having reconquered territory ceded to Russia under the Moscow Treaty; (3) having broken off relations with Great Britain, and having provoked the British declaration of war; (4) having, during Rangell's term of office, ignored or neglected early opportunities for peace; (5) having, during Linkomies's term of office, communicated the United States offer of mediation in 1943 to the German Government, and having ignored other possibilities for peace; (6) having failed to give their representatives in the Moscow negotiations in the spring of 1944 adequate powers, and having provoked the breaking off of the negotiations; (7) having suggested in the summer of 1944 that Germany should be given a written assurance that Finland would not sign a separate

2 February 1946, with two adjournments. The first session lasted from 15 to 17 November, and the court was then adjourned until 10 December, to allow the defence time to prepare its case. During the second session, from 10 to 21 December, the statements by Ryti and Tanner in their own defence gave rise to considerable tension. The last session lasted from 9 January until 2 February, and news of its proceedings was more carefully censored than the earlier reports.

If there had been no evidence during the elections of 1945 of interference by the Soviet Government, the trial presented quite another picture. Paasikivi seemed to be constantly conferring with Zhdanov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, in attempts to allay the Russians' suspicions of Western methods of justice and to make the findings of the Court acceptable to them. The Soviet Government interfered with the defence of Ryti by prohibiting evidence submitted by his counsel pertaining to the Winter War.[1] The Allied Control Commission, through its Soviet Chairman, censored the publication in Finland of the testimony given by Ryti. In the meantime a campaign was being carried on in Soviet publications against the eight accused leaders.[2] But, though the Russians exerted their influence and occasionally interfered, they were careful to leave the conduct of the trial to the Finns themselves, and to allow Finnish legal practice to prevail.[3] On 21 February, after prolonged consultation with the Allied Control Commission, the Finnish Government announced that all eight of the accused had been found guilty and had been given sentences ranging from two to ten years in prison.[4] The Commission raised no official objection to the sentences, but, while Soviet publications approved of the result, they also expressed considerable dissatisfaction that so much support had been shown for the 'reactionary' leaders.[5]

peace—an assurance which President Ryti subsequently signed on his own individual responsibility on 26 June 1944 (Hjalmar J. Procopé: *Sowjetjustiz über Finnland* (Zürich, Thomas, 1947), pp. 80–81). For the circumstances out of which charges 1–5 arose, see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 578 seqq.; for charges 6–7 see above, pp. 264 and note 6, 267.

[1] On 15 January, Hjalmar Procopé, counsel for Ryti, declared that the possibilities of defending his client were limited by the prohibition on the use of this material.

[2] 'Finland's Pampered Fascists', *Soviet News* (formerly *Soviet War News*), 19 December 1945; 'End of a Finnish Legend', and 'The Buschenhagen Document', ibid. 16 January 1946; O. Kuusinen: 'What the Trial of Hitler's Finnish Accomplices Has Revealed', *New Times*, 1 February 1946. For the testimony of Buschenhagen at Nuremberg see *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, vii. 309–13.

[3] An article in *Pravda* at the end of the trial stated that 'the Finnish people' brought the offenders to justice, in spite of a struggle with 'reaction' which was attempting to defend its leaders (*Soviet News*, 26 February 1946). The Soviet pressure had been exerted, as far as possible, within Finnish constitutional limits.

[4] The court was to have announced its decision on 20 February, but the punishments were considered too mild by the Allied Control Commission, and the judgement was revised. Ryti was sentenced to ten years penal servitude, Rangell to six years, Linkomies and Tanner to five and a half years each.

[5] *Soviet News*, 26 February 1946.

One of the principal results of the 'war guilt' trials was their effect on the reputation of President Mannerheim. The extremely popular former Commander-in-Chief of Finland had been ill since the spring of 1945, and had delegated many of his presidential duties from time to time to Paasikivi. At the time when the trial began he was recuperating in southern Portugal. Perhaps because of his popularity, he was not mentioned by name in the attacks against the defendants in the Soviet press;[1] but his depositions were produced at the trial, together with evidence with regard to his part in the war plans concerted with the Germans in 1941, the responsibility for war with Great Britain, and his recommendation of the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact. Largely because of Mannerheim's association with the war-time Government, Soviet pressure was exerted after the trial to remove him from office, and, whether or not as a consequence of these representations, it was announced in March 1946 that the serious condition of his health forced him to resign the Presidency.

(6) *The Pekkala Government and Relations with the U.S.S.R., March 1946 to February 1947*

After the resignation of President Mannerheim the members of the Finnish Parliament, in a special election on 9 March 1946, chose Paasikivi as his successor. Paasikivi took some time to decide on a Prime Minister, but on 24 March he asked the former Minister of Defence, Mauno Pekkala, to form a Cabinet. Pekkala was a member of the Socialist Unity Party (a part of the People's Democratic League coalition), and it was to be expected that his Government would be farther to the Left than that of Paasikivi. Pekkala gave six portfolios to members of the People's Democratic League, three of them being members of the Communist Party. The new Prime Minister immediately announced that he intended to pursue a policy of 'peace', and to strengthen even further the friendly relations with the Soviet Union which his predecessor had established. In April, in demonstration of his intention, he led a delegation to Moscow to ask for the views of the Soviet Government on certain subjects. After the Finns had had several meetings with Stalin and Molotov, a joint statement was issued announcing that the Soviet Government had agreed to waive further compensation for property removed by the Finns from the Soviet Union, and to sell Finland 100,000 tons of grain to tide her over until the harvest. In return for this, Finland was to lease to the Soviet Government the Janisocki power-station, which supplied electric power to the nickel mines in Petsamo.[2] The Soviet Government had, however,

[1] Articles in the Soviet press during the trial did not refer to Mannerheim by name, but referred to the 'military'. However, they did mention by name General Heinrichs, former Chief of Staff.

[2] Communiqué on Soviet-Finnish negotiations, in *Soviet News*, 26 April 1946; *The Times*, 26 April 1946.

refused to consider changes in the territorial provisions of the Armistice terms, which Stalin regarded as 'final', and a Finnish request for a reduction in the amount of reparations was also refused. But the Finnish delegation did secure a promise by Soviet leaders to consider the restoration of Finland's transport system, which had been disrupted by the Armistice Agreement. These economic concessions by the Soviet Government were soon offset by an Allied decision that German property in Finland should be transferred to the Soviet Government, without compensation to the Finns for the large amount of property which the Germans had destroyed in the north.[1]

A series of demonstrations on May Day 1946 gave the Government an opportunity for moving still farther to the Left. Several 'rightist' organizations were suppressed,[2] a Communist demonstration launched a campaign for a purge of public life, and Leino renewed his crusade against members of the Finnish General Staff.

The friendly atmosphere in which Finnish-Russian relations had been conducted while Pekkala and his delegation were in Moscow was maintained for the next three or four months, but was dispelled at the Paris Peace Conference in August 1946.[3] The Finnish Government, already aware of the contents of the draft Peace Treaty for Finland, were invited, in accordance with the arrangements made by the Council of Foreign Ministers, to send a delegation to Paris to present to the Conference their views on the draft.[4] The delegation consisted of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and representatives of the four Government parties, the Foreign Minister (Enckell) being given the task of expressing the Finnish point of view. On 15 August, at a plenary session of the Conference, Enckell referred to Finland's record as a democratic state, and to the fact that she had carried out her Armistice obligations. On behalf of the Finnish Government he expressed the hope that 'some modification in Finland's favour might be adopted', both in the territorial and in the reparations clauses of the Treaty,[5] which were the same as those of the Armistice Agreement.

Evidently this turn of events had not been expected by the Russians, for, in a private conversation with the Finnish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister soon afterwards, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Vyshinsky,

[1] This became known with the publication of the draft Peace Treaty in July. (For the drafting and terms of the peace treaties with Finland and Germany's former allies see below, pp. 337 seqq.)

[2] Demonstrations against workers and the Allied Control Commission resulted in the banning of the Conservative Students' Association and the Independence League.

[3] See below, pp. 340 seqq.

[4] J. Hampden Jackson: 'Finland Since the Armistice', *International Affairs*, October 1948, xxiv. 509; Wuorinen, p. 23.

[5] See 'Observations on the Draft Peace Treaty with Finland by the Finnish Government', in U.S.A., Department of State: *Paris Peace Conference, 1946, Selected Documents*, Dept. of State Publication 2868 (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1947), p. 1274.

expressed strong disapproval. He accused the Finns of seeking the support of other nations against the Soviet Union, and stated that 'the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union had taken a definite turn for the worse'.[1] Molotov also commented at the Conference on the Finnish statement, mentioning that Finland had not been occupied militarily, and warning her not to listen to the voices of 'adventurers'.[2] When news of Enckell's speech became known in Finland, a Communist campaign was launched against the 'reactionaries' in Paris, and this became so violent that part of the delegation was forced to return to Helsinki, during the Peace Conference, to restore order. When the delegates returned to Paris, they found that, in spite of American efforts on their behalf,[3] their plea for a modification of the terms had not been heeded by the Conference, and the territorial and reparations provisions were to remain unchanged. This development seemed to soften, for the time being, the hostility of the Soviet leaders, but in his concluding speech Molotov again expressed his suspicion of American and British efforts to influence Finland, and reminded the Finns of the unhappy consequences which had followed foreign intervention in the past.[4]

With the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Finland on 10 February 1947[5] the period for implementing the provisions of the Armistice Agreement was officially brought to an end. The Allied Control Commission, with its Soviet chairman, was now to be replaced, but for a period of eighteen months only, by the heads of the diplomatic missions of the British and Soviet Governments 'acting in concert', who would have the task of executing and interpreting the articles of the treaty.

During the period between the signature of the Armistice Agreement in 1944 and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Finland, under Paasikivi's leadership, had managed to remain unoccupied and had even achieved a certain degree of cordiality in her relations with the U.S.S.R.; but her position, under the shadow of her great eastern neighbour, had never been anything but precarious. The signature of the Peace Treaty brought little change in this respect. It was clear that the fate of Finland still depended largely on the policy that she adopted towards the Soviet Union. At the time of the departure of the Allied Control Commission, the chairman, Zhdanov, took the opportunity to remind the Finns of the possible consequences that might follow a change in Finland's policy. Referring to

[1] *The Times*, 4 December 1946.

[2] U.S.A., Department of State: *Paris Peace Conference, 1946, Selected Documents*, p. 1275.

[3] The U.S. Government had never been at war with Finland, and therefore could not say much about the Peace Treaty with her; but the American desire to help Finland was expressed in a proposal by Senator Vandenberg to decrease the amount of Finnish reparations. Ex-President Hoover also appealed for support for Finland's case.

[4] Ibid. p. 1332.

[5] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaty of Peace with Finland, Paris, 10th February 1947*, Cmd. 7484 (London, H.M.S.O., 1948) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 7484].

rumours that some Finns desired to 'turn back the wheel of Finnish policy', he emphasized in his speech what a 'misfortune' it would be if the serious mistake were to be made of 'frivolously playing with the future' of relations between Finland and the U.S.S.R.[1]

(iv) Rumania

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) The Armistice Agreement between Rumania and the Allies, 12 September 1944

Negotiations for an armistice between Rumania and the Allies had begun in March 1944 and had been conducted both in Cairo, with delegates nominated by the Rumanian opposition leader Maniu with the consent of the Conducator, Marshal Ion Antonescu,[2] and through the Russian Minister in Stockholm with Antonescu himself. Before the negotiations began the Russians had made it clear that Rumania's cession to them of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940[3] must be regarded as definitive, and in their armistice terms, which had been conveyed to Maniu at the end of March, they had insisted in addition that Rumania must change sides; she must break with Germany and fight for the Allies. On the other hand, the Russians had declared that they had no intention of 'acquiring any part of Rumanian territory, or of changing the existing social order of Rumania',[4] and they had offered their help in liberating Transylvania and restoring to Rumania the northern area which had been given to Hungary by the Second Vienna Award in August 1940.

The Red Army had completed its occupation of Bessarabia and crossed the River Pruth into Moldavia at the beginning of April 1944, but the negotiations for an armistice did not enter their final phase until after King Michael of Rumania had carried out a *coup d'état* in the last week of August. By that time the German line in Moldavia had been broken by the Russian offensive, and the King and the Rumanian political leaders had decided that Rumania could now change sides without incurring the risk of destructive German reprisals.[5] On 23 August, on the King's orders,[6] Marshal Antonescu had been arrested, together with his principal

[1] See O. Kuusinen: 'Finland's New Foreign Policy', *The Times*, 11 April 1947.

[2] For a description of Ion Antonescu and his influence upon Hitler see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 606–7.

[3] For Russia's views on Bessarabia and other border territories see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 78–79, 406–7.

[4] Rothstein, ii. 65–66.

[5] The Germans did, however, bomb Bucharest immediately after the coup; but their attempt to seize the city was unsuccessful.

[6] Maniu had arranged for the coup to take place on 26 August, but the King took matters into his own hands three days earlier.

lieutenant and namesake, Mihai Antonescu, and, two days later, Rumania had declared war on Germany.[1] King Michael had then appointed a Government headed by General Sanatescu and including representatives of the four parties (the National Liberals, National Peasants, Socialists, and Communists) which had constituted themselves into a National Democratic Bloc, in order to prepare for Rumania's change of front. On 27 August the King and the new Government accepted unconditionally the terms for an armistice which the Russians had laid down in the spring, and on 31 August a Rumanian delegation arrived in Moscow to negotiate for an armistice agreement.

The negotiations began on 10 September and an Agreement was signed on 12 September.[2] The Russian delegation was headed by Molotov and Vyshinsky, and, though the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow were present during the discussions, they took little part in the formulation of the terms, since the Anglo-Russian agreement on spheres of influence in the Balkans, which had been concluded in May 1944 and reluctantly accepted by the Americans in June,[3] had recognized Rumania as falling within the Russian sphere. Under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement the Rumanians were to send at least twelve divisions to fight under the Soviet High Command against the Germans and Hungarians. They were to ensure free movement for Russian troops operating against the enemy, to return Allied prisoners, to liberate political prisoners, to hand over German property and military equipment, and to supply the Soviet High Command with everything that it needed in order to carry on the war in Rumania. In consideration of Rumania's declaration of war on Germany, the Russians agreed not to demand full compensation for damage inflicted by Rumanian troops in Russian territory, and the total value of Rumanian reparations was fixed at $300 million, to be paid in commodities over six years. The Rumanians were to return to the Soviet Union 'all valuables and materials removed from its territory during the war', to co-operate in the apprehension and trial of war criminals, and to dissolve 'fascist-type' organizations. The Soviet High Command was to exercise control over Rumanian periodical and other literature, drama, and channels of communication. An Allied Control Commission was to be responsible, until the conclusion of peace, for supervising the execution of the Armistice terms under the general direction and orders of the Soviet High Command. Rumanian civil administration was to be restored up to 50–100 kilometres from the front lines, but Rumanian officials were to

[1] These events and the developments which led up to them, including the initiation of armistice negotiations, are described in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 625 seqq.

[2] Text in Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Conditions of an Armistice with Roumania, signed at Moscow 12th September 1944*, Cmd. 6585 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6585] and *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1944–1945*, pp. 231 seqq.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 422–5.

be subject to the orders of the Soviet High Command with regard to fulfilment of the Armistice terms. The Second Vienna Award was declared by the Allied Governments to be null and void, Transylvania ('or the greater part thereof') was to be returned to Rumania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement, and the Russians agreed to take part with Rumanian forces in military operations against Germany and Hungary.

(*b*) Events leading up to the Russian Intervention in Rumania in February 1945

Rumania presented a confused picture in the weeks following King Michael's *coup d'état*. Sanatescu and the army officers were occupied with the task of switching fifteen divisions from the Russian front to the front against the Germans and Hungarians in Transylvania. At the end of August the Red Army entered Bucharest and then proceeded to occupy the remainder of Rumania. After 12 September the Russians began to implement the Armistice terms, dealing with the Rumanian Government through Vișoianu, who had taken part in the Armistice negotiations in Cairo.[1] It was not long before a cleavage began to develop within the Sanatescu Government, between the 'historical parties' on the one hand and the Communists and their political allies on the other. The Communists, with their allies in the Ploughmen's Front and the splinter groups of the Left, were working with considerable success to organize support for themselves in the towns and in the countryside. Early in October they formed a 'National Democratic Front' and demanded a larger share in the Government. Their desire to purge the bureaucracy of elements implicated in various degrees in the policy of Antonescu contributed to the cleavage. Friction between political groups, and between Rumanians and Hungarians in Northern Transylvania, soon led to its occupation by the Red Army. The historical parties, for their part, were rapidly becoming embittered, both because of what they considered to be their desertion by the British and the Americans and because of general resentment against Soviet policy in Rumania. Their most important leader, Maniu, had not taken part in the Armistice negotiations in Moscow, and they considered that the Russians, having imposed the Armistice terms on Rumania, were now carrying them out in a clumsy and sometimes brutal manner. The most serious difficulties arose over the implementation of the economic provisions. On 5 November the Sanatescu Government resigned after General Vinogradov, of the Allied Control Commission, had protested against delays in carrying out the Armistice terms. Sanatescu then formed another Cabinet containing a larger proportion of Ministers from the National Democratic Front. This Government proceeded to pass legislation to secure the arrest of former

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 626.

members of the Iron Guard, to repeal previous legislation against the Jews, and to expel the entire German minority from Transylvania. A dispute between the Communists and Maniu's party over the Ministry of the Interior resulted in the resignation of Sanatescu on 2 December. General Radescu, with the approval of the Russians, then became Prime Minister and also assumed control over the Ministry of the Interior.[1]

Meanwhile, during their visit to Moscow in October 1944, Churchill and Eden had secured an extension of the agreement of June 1944 on spheres of influence.[2] The Russians promised not to interfere if the British were to be forced to take action in Greece and, in return, were informally assured of being left in undisputed predominance in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and of being given an equal share in the control of Yugoslavia.[3] From 6 December until the middle of January British troops were occupied in putting down the ELAS revolt in Greece,[4] and, as Churchill later observed,[5] Stalin meticulously observed his part of the October agreement during the course of the fighting in Athens.[6]

Stalin had the right, of course, to expect Churchill to live up to his part of the October agreement in return. Perhaps it was not entirely by coincidence that in the middle of January, as the fighting in Greece was coming to an end, the Rumanian Communist leaders Anna Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej received instructions during a visit to Moscow that an all-out campaign for a monopoly of power was to be launched, on their return to Rumania, by the National Democratic Front. Their programme emphasized the need for executing the Armistice terms straightforwardly and for purging the Government and army of 'fascists' and war criminals, for eliminating Maniu from public life, and for carrying out agrarian reforms immediately. As an additional inducement to Rumanians to support the National Democratic Front, it was announced that Northern

[1] H. L. Roberts: *Rumania, Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951), pp. 258–62; Elisabeth Barker: *Truce in the Balkans* (London, Percival Marshall, 1948), pp. 133–5; H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 202–5; R. H. Markham: *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston, Meador, 1949), pp. 191–200; E. D. Tappe: *Rumania*, in R. R. Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe 1945–1948* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), pp. 4–5.

[2] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 422–5, 495–6; Churchill, vi. (published since the above-mentioned *Survey* volume), 63–71, 181, 198–9, 201–4, 207–8; U.S. edition, vi. 72–81, 208–9, 227–8, 231–5, 237–8.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 495; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1458; Stettinius, pp. 20–21.

[4] See below, pp. 395 seqq. For a vivid account of the Civil War in Athens see William H. McNeill: *The Greek Dilemma* (London, Gollancz, 1947), pp. 134–57. Cf. Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, pp. 178–80.

[5] See Churchill, vi. 351, 369, 432, 617; U.S. edition, vi. 400, 420, 495, 713.

[6] Stalin also made several other gestures at the time, notably in France and Italy, where the Communists continued to co-operate with other parties, regardless of their renewed strength. In Italy the Communists also supported the Lateran Pacts and Stalin recognized Badoglio (see Deutscher: *Stalin*, pp. 518–19).

Transylvania would be returned to Rumania when the Front came into power. The campaign also received support in Russian broadcasts.[1]

During the course of this political campaign in the early part of February 1945 the Yalta Conference was taking place in an area of the Soviet Union that had been occupied largely by Rumanian troops during the war.[2] The October understanding between Stalin and Churchill did not prevent a 'Declaration on Liberated Europe'[3] from being included in the protocol of the Conference, although the understanding and the Declaration were obviously in direct contradiction, since by the Declaration the three Governments agreed to concert their policies to consult together, and to co-operate with one another in liberated Europe. The difficulty of reconciling military agreements on spheres of influence with three-Power consultation on political settlements was not faced at the Conference, nor was the incompatibility between the concept of free elections in East European countries and the Soviet Government's insistence that the Governments of those countries must be friendly to the U.S.S.R.[4]

Meanwhile in Rumania the struggle for power which had begun in January was becoming fiercer. Agitation by the National Democratic Front produced demonstrations and strikes against the Government, and the Prime Minister, Radescu, became involved on the side of the historical parties when he used his powers as Minister for the Interior in attempts to suppress the demonstrations.[5] Radescu and those of his colleagues who shared his views were not strong enough, however, to arrest the course of events. The army for the most part was engaged in fighting on the Hungarian front, and the exercise of authority against supporters of the National Democratic Front was hampered by the fact that some Ministers were members of the Front. The decision that the National Democratic Front was to come into power had been taken in January 1945 in Moscow, as has been seen, and after that it was only a question of the time at which the change was to take place. In the absence of the greater part of the Rumanian army, the Communists, with Russian support, were bound to win the struggle for power. Intervention by Vyshinsky after a demonstration in Bucharest on 24 February, and the direct help which the Russians gave to the Communists in disarming Rumanian troops in the capital, left King Michael with no choice, and he accepted a National Democratic Front Government under the leadership of Dr. Petru Groza.[6]

[1] Roberts: *Rumania*, pp. 262, 269; cf. Tappe: *Rumania*, loc. cit. pp. 6–7.

[2] For the Yalta Conference see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 539–66.

[3] See Cmd. 7088.

[4] See Roberts's analysis of this problem (op. cit. pp. 266–9).

[5] For the events of this time see Tappe, op. cit. pp. 5–7; H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 204–5; Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, p. 136; Roberts, op. cit. pp. 262–3.

[6] For an account based on the despatches of the American representative in Bucharest see Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 50–52; cf. Tappe, op. cit. p. 7; and Markham: *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke*, pp. 207–12.

The plea that there was a danger of disorder and civil war—Molotov later said that the risk of unrest in the Red Army's rear had been the cause of Russian intervention—was superfluous. The Russians already had a precedent for independent action in the Allied actions in Italy and Greece.

The United States Government, on the other hand, had continued to hope that the agreements for military spheres of influence could be kept separate from political settlements; and in their view the reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter in the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted at Yalta had superseded the principle of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.[1]

Coming, as they did, so soon after the Yalta Conference, Vyshinsky's actions in Rumania seemed to Americans to be a clear and callous violation of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. While the events were taking place, the American representative in Bucharest and Harriman, the United States Ambassador in Moscow, made inquiries which did not receive satisfactory answers; and detailed reports of Vyshinsky's activities in Bucharest, sent by the American representative, made Roosevelt feel anxious about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.[2] After the Soviet intervention and the formation of the Groza Government on 6 March, the Americans did not try to conceal their disapproval of the new régime, and henceforth they showed an increasing sympathy with the cause of the historical parties.

(*c*) Conditions in Rumania under the Groza Government

The circumstances of their accession to power made it impossible for the National Democratic Front Government to be anything but hostile to the Rumanian historical parties. After the disturbances on 24 February and the ensuing Russian intervention Radescu took refuge in the British Legation. Maniu and Bratianu dissociated themselves and the Peasant and Liberal Parties from the Government in power after 6 March, and the Right-wing Socialists followed their leader Titel Petrescu in taking the same course. The Groza Government were able to persuade the former Liberal, Tatarescu, who was already well known to the Western Powers, to accept the post of Foreign Minister. The other Ministers were taken from the Ploughmen's Front, the Communists, the Left-wing Social Democrats, and associated splinter groups which were supposed to represent various elements in Rumanian society. The Communists officially held the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, and Public Works, and unofficially exerted much more power than their numerical representation in the Government would have suggested. On 9 March, in fulfilment of the

[1] For a description of the politico-military shift in Europe, which began in August 1944, see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 457 seqq.

[2] See Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 50, 53.

National Democratic Front's promise during their campaign for power, the Russians returned Northern and Eastern Transylvania to the control of the Rumanian Government under the new régime. It was understood that the local Magyars would be protected from persecution, and that the different racial elements in Transylvania would be encouraged to live together in harmony. The land-reform measures, which had been the main issue of the election campaign, were now launched in earnest. Many peasants had already helped themselves to plots of land, but the new measures were intended to correct the mistakes which had rendered the previous land reforms unsatisfactory.[1] Rumania, in her devastated condition, found the burden of reparations very heavy, and, temporarily at least, her economy was in a serious plight.

Although the Groza Government were now firmly in power with the support of the Russians, they, like the Warsaw Provisional Government, lacked popular support. The purges of the Ministry of the Interior and the organs of local government were effective in giving them the means for exercising control, but were ineffective in procuring support for them, and the Communists were forced by their unpopularity to use organized techniques of mass control to discourage the opposition. The inability of the Allied Control Commission to influence the course of events had been shown at the time of the National Democratic Front's advent to power, and there was no change in this respect after 6 March.

(*d*) The Potsdam Conference, 17 July to 2 August 1945: the Allied Dispute over Rumania and the Balkans

The Conference at Potsdam produced little change in Allied relations in the Balkans. The American leaders, who felt strongly that the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe had been violated, particularly in Rumania, submitted proposals to the Conference for joint action by the Big Three in reorganizing the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria so as to permit of the participation of all democratic groups, and for joint supervision of elections in Eastern Europe. The atmosphere at Potsdam, however, was different from that at Yalta. The Russians, as Hopkins had recently learnt during his visit to Moscow as Truman's special envoy,[2] were now showing definite hostility towards British policy in Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, Churchill was also showing open antagonism towards Russia's Balkan policy. Echoes of the agreement of October 1944[3] were heard in the discussions: whenever an American or British complaint was made against developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary, Molotov would bring up, each time, the question of Greece. The Russians, moreover, tried to use the American and British desire

[1] For a detailed account of the 1945 agrarian reforms see Roberts: *Rumania*, pp. 274–99.
[2] See above, pp. 220–3.
[3] See above, p. 288.

for a settlement with Italy as a bargaining point. They expressed a desire for a larger share in discussions on Italian affairs and insisted on coupling preparations for Balkan treaties with those for the Italian peace treaty. When British and American interests in Rumania came up for discussion, Stalin and Molotov stubbornly defended the removal to the Soviet Union of equipment belonging to British and American firms, on the ground that it was German in origin and was therefore subject to confiscation under the Rumanian Armistice conditions.[1]

The desire of the Americans to secure a greater degree of participation in the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary remained unfulfilled at Potsdam. The Report of the Conference did, indeed, include a statement that the three Governments had agreed to a 'revision of the procedures' in the Allied Control Commissions now that hostilities had ended, but this was nothing but an empty gesture. The report provided that preparatory work on the peace treaties with Italy and with the Axis satellite countries should be carried out by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and added: 'The three Governments agree to examine, each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of Peace Treaties with those countries.' It was also agreed that, in view of the changed conditions since the end of the war, Allied press representatives should 'enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland'.[2]

(*e*) Relations between the Allies over Politics in Rumania after the Potsdam Conference

Relations between the Allies over Rumania became still more strained when the Russians established diplomatic relations with the Groza Government on 6 August.[3] The British and American Governments did not follow suit, and on 20 August Bevin said in a speech in the House of Commons that the forms of government in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary 'do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations'.[4]

On the following day (21 August) the American and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission presented a note to King Michael, declaring the Groza Government unacceptable to their Governments.[5] The King then asked Groza to resign, and at the same time asked the three

[1] For two personal accounts of the Potsdam Conference see Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, chapter 4, and Leahy: *I Was There*, chapter xxii.

[2] See Cmd. 7087.

[3] *Soviet News*, 8 August 1945.

[4] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 413, col. 291.

[5] Markham: *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke*, p. 256.

Allied Governments to assist in the formation of a government which, 'according to the report of the conference of Berlin, might be recognized by the three principal Powers'.[1] The statement was first released to the press by Byrnes, who added that he had notified the British and Soviet Governments that his Government were ready to undertake the 'consultation suggested'. When Groza, after consulting with the Russian representative, refused King Michael's request for his resignation, the King retired to his mountain palace at Sinaia, where he refused to sign government decrees or approve appointments. The Groza Government then carried on the business of government without the participation of the King.[2]

Byrnes made an attempt to break the deadlock at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945.[3] His frank talk with Molotov at least reduced the problem to its essential elements. The contradiction inherent in the American point of view was clearly expressed when Byrnes said that the objective was a government both friendly to the Soviet Union and representative of all democratic elements of the country. In East European and especially Rumanian, politics, this dual objective was unattainable. No free elections in Rumania would have produced a government friendly to the Soviet Union. The traditional anti-Russian feeling of the Rumanians had been demonstrated only recently by the support which they had given, at least in the initial stages, to Germany in her war against the Soviet Union.[4] The antagonism had not disappeared with the reversal in military fortunes. When Byrnes repeated the American complaint against Vyshinsky's violation of the Declaration on Liberated Europe in intervening to place Groza in power, Molotov replied, as he had done at Potsdam, with an attack on the Western Allies' policy in Greece.[5]

After the London meeting of Foreign Ministers, Byrnes said that he wanted to make certain that their views on conditions in these countries were not based on erroneous or prejudiced information; and, in order to verify the accuracy of the reports that he had been receiving from the Balkans, he sent Mark Ethridge, a highly regarded American newspaper publisher holding liberal views, to Bulgaria and Rumania. Byrnes

[1] *The Times*, 23 August 1945.

[2] For the propaganda battle waged by the Western and Soviet press as a result of this incident see *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1945, and the *Izvestia* reply in *Soviet News*, 10 September 1945. Cf. an article by Dorothy Thompson in the *Chicago Daily News*, 29 August 1945, and see also the *Izvestia* attack on British and American intentions in Greece (*Soviet News*, 24 August 1945).

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 697–8.

[4] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 606–8.

[5] See Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 97–99. Byrnes suggested that the Allies should try to agree on a government for Rumania, as had been done in the case of Poland, but Molotov refused, on the ground that such a solution of the disagreement among the Allies would produce civil war in Rumania.

instructed the State Department to withhold its reports from Ethridge, in order that he might undertake his mission with an open mind.[1] Ethridge visited Bulgaria and Rumania, and also Moscow, in October and November, and in the two Balkan countries his mission caused considerable excitement among political groups of both Right and Left.[2] The report which he made after he had completed his journey confirmed the previous accounts of Vyshinsky's activities in February and March. Ethridge reported that the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments were authoritarian in character, were dominated by one party, and excluded many democratic elements from representation in the Government.[3]

Meanwhile, the Russians had supported Groza's action in acting independently of the King, and had received a delegation, including Groza and Tatarescu, in Moscow during September, when it was announced that agreement had been reached on economic aid from Russia to Rumania and on some relaxation in the economic terms of the Armistice.[4] This success for the Groza Government, however, did not have the effect of making it popular at home. The Rumanian public, which had never shown great enthusiasm for Groza, had clearly been impressed by the King's attitude, and during October members of the Government were becoming increasingly aware of the fact that they enjoyed very little popular support.[5] Tension in Bucharest increased until, on King Michael's birthday on 8 November, a large crowd gathered in front of the palace as a gesture of defiance towards the Groza Government. Organized attempts by the Government to break up the demonstration were unsuccessful, although they led to violence, resulting in some fatal injuries.[6]

(*f*) The Moscow Agreement of 27 December 1945 and its Implementation

In December 1945, during the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, Byrnes presented Molotov with a copy of Ethridge's report on his visit to Rumania and Bulgaria. When Molotov seemed quite unmoved by the report, Byrnes insisted on taking the matter up with Stalin. Using the Ethridge report as background, Byrnes put before Stalin the American proposal that had already been presented to Molotov in London, namely that the Groza Government should be organized to include all democratic elements and that the reorganized Government

[1] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 107.

[2] See *New York Times*, 23, 25, 27 October, 10, 21 November 1945; cf. Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, pp. 69–70.

[3] Byrnes, op. cit. p. 115; Markham: *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke*, pp. 262–4, and cf. the same author in *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 December 1945.

[4] *New York Times*, 6, 13 September 1945.

[5] Roberts: *Rumania*, p. 302.

[6] For a description of the event see Barker, op. cit. pp. 154–5.

should undertake to respect the 'basic freedoms' and to hold free elections at an early date. Stalin said that it would be difficult to make changes in Bulgaria now that elections had been held, but that it would be relatively easy in Rumania. He reminded Byrnes that Rumanian troops had advanced into Russian territory as far as the Volga, but he made a limited concession to American wishes.[1] On 27 December 1945 the terms of an agreement on Rumania were made public.[2] In response to King Michael's request of 21 August for advice in forming a government acceptable to the three Allied Governments, the Big Three recommended that the Government should include one member each of the National Peasant and Liberal Parties. A commission, composed of Vyshinsky and of the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow, was to ascertain that the two selected members were representative of the groups of their parties that were not already represented in the Government, and also to make sure that they were 'suitable and will work loyally with the Government'. The three Governments noted that the Rumanian Government, after being reorganized in this way, would declare their intention of holding, as soon as possible, free elections on the Western pattern in which all 'democratic and anti-Fascist' parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. The reorganized Government were also to 'give assurances concerning the granting of freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association'. After all these tasks had been completed, the Rumanian Government, which had been previously recognized by the Russians, would also be recognized by the American and British Governments.

Neither British nor American officials can have expected that the two representatives of the historical parties would be able to make their influence felt in determining the policy of the Rumanian Government, which, even with the new additions, would still remain substantially unchanged, or that the Russians would allow free elections, since these would inevitably result in an anti-Russian government. Nevertheless, British and American spokesmen continued to profess the belief that free elections would be a test of the sincerity of the Groza Government.

Vyshinsky, Harriman, and Clark-Kerr arrived in Bucharest from Moscow on 31 December 1945 to carry out the terms of the Moscow agreement. All three of them together met King Michael, who now took up again his royal duties, after which Harriman and Clark-Kerr received

[1] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 115–17. This concession was little more than a gesture on Stalin's part in return for concessions to Russian wishes about Japan (see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 705–7).

[2] For the text of this agreement and of the communiqué of the Moscow Conference see U.S.A., Department of State: *Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers December 16–26, 1945. Report by James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, and Soviet-Anglo-American Communiqué*, Department of State Publication 2448 (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1946).

representatives of the historical parties. Hostility towards the Groza Government had led the leaders of the opposition to demand certain guarantees before their parties chose representatives to participate in the agreement,[1] and they also refused to commit their representatives to accepting responsibility for the Cabinet's actions when they were only to be given minor posts. Harriman and Clark-Kerr apparently advised them to accept the assurances which the reorganized Government were to give, in accordance with the Moscow communiqué, and the historical parties then nominated as their proposed representatives I. Mihalache and B. Bratianu. The Groza Government, presumably on Vyshinsky's advice, rejected these nominees on the ground that they were 'reactionaries'; but after some bargaining Emil Hatsieganu of the National Peasant Party and Mihail Romniceanu of the National Liberals were accepted. At the first Cabinet meeting, on 8 January 1946, the two new members declared that they intended to work loyally with the Government, but that they accepted responsibility only for carrying out the terms of the Moscow communiqué, and not for the other actions of the Cabinet. At the same meeting, Groza read a declaration embodying the assurances promised at Moscow.[2] On the following day the American and British Ambassadors insisted that Groza should amplify this declaration. After an oral explanation Harriman, Vyshinsky, and Clark-Kerr had another meeting with King Michael, after which they announced that the conditions laid down in Moscow had been fulfilled and that the Commission had completed its work.[3]

The United States and British Governments recognized the Rumanian Government in February, under carefully defined conditions. The American and British notes handed to the Rumanian Government on 5 February 1946 provided a basis for future diplomatic action by laying special emphasis on the declaration which Groza had read to his Cabinet and which he had amplified orally to Harriman and Clark-Kerr. Groza, it was stated, had explained to the Ambassadors in detail the steps which he intended to take for holding free elections in Rumania and for guaranteeing fundamental human rights. He had also assured them that his Ministers, particularly those of Justice, the Interior, and Propaganda, would be responsible for putting these assurances into effect immediately. The

[1] S. Brewer (in *New York Times*, 1 January 1945) listed some of their demands as (1) a really free press, (2) full equality in all forms of activity for the opposition parties, (3) genuine freedom in the elections. The *Daily Express* (4 January 1945) said that they were also insisting that the Ministers for War, the Interior, Justice, and Propaganda should be dismissed, in order to provide a 'neutralized' background for free elections.

[2] According to Brewer, Groza promised 'to hold free elections as soon as possible, to respect the rights and liberties of citizens and to guarantee freedom of the press, of opinion, of religion, and of assembly, and to guarantee the King's constitutional rights' (*New York Times*, 9 January 1946; cf. Tappe: *Rumania*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, p. 11).

[3] *New York Times*, 9 January 1946.

United States note expressed the view that responsibility for the implementation of the assurances ought to be shared by the entire Government 'as reconstituted', rather than to be undertaken by individual Ministers. The United States note also expressed the hope that elections would be held in April or May, while the British note referred to the Government's understanding that the Rumanian Government intended to hold elections by May at the latest.[1]

(*g*) The Rumanian Elections

The key posts in the Groza Government were still held by Communists, and their conception of a 'democratic' election was very different from the Western conception.[2] Moreover, the historical political parties in Rumania, which were in opposition to the Government Coalition, were regarded as 'democratic elements' by the British and Americans but not by the Communists. The Russians and the Rumanian Communists felt, not without justification, that the sole aim of the opposition parties was to unseat the Government and to set up a régime similar to those which had held office in Rumania between the wars.[3] Such a programme was unacceptable, not only to the Communists, but also to many other Rumanian political groups, who remembered how the breakdown of 'democratic' government before the war had opened the way for dictatorship.

It became clear during the spring of 1946 that the Russians intended neither to allow Groza to carry out the assurances that he had given in January in a manner that would accord with the Western interpretation of the undertakings, nor to permit the holding of elections under Western procedure. Attempts by Maniu's deputy, Mihalache, to hold political meetings were deliberately frustrated, and the Groza Government took steps to break up the meetings of the historical parties, to curtail their propaganda, and to hamper their organization.[4] These measures against the historical parties were accompanied by an organized attempt to consolidate support for the Government among the other political parties. The Government scored a considerable success at the Congress of the Social Democratic Party in March, when a large majority of the delegates

[1] For the text of the American note see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, pp. 337–9. For the substance of the British note see *The Times*, 7 February 1946.

[2] See below, pp. 299–300.

[3] Cf. the Soviet definition of 'fascism' (*Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 587, note 1), which would apply to the historical parties.

[4] A vivid personal account of the tactics of the Groza Government at this time is given by R. H. Markham, who accompanied Mihalache on a tour of Moldavia and Transylvania and, later, verified reports of developments in other parts of Rumania by personal visits and interviews with witnesses (Markham: *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke*, pp. 272–321). Markham was expelled by the Government in July 1946 for associating too closely with Maniu and Mihalache.

endorsed the Left-wing proposal to form a joint electoral bloc with the Communists. A party split resulted, however, and Titel Petrescu, with some followers from the Right Wing of the party, walked out of the Congress and joined the historical parties in opposition to the Government bloc.[1]

The tactics used by the Groza Government against the opposition in the spring of 1946 were fully reported by Western correspondents and officials. In May the American and British Governments attempted to induce the Russians to participate in a joint *démarche* in Bucharest to press for the immediate holding of elections; and, when the Russians refused, they sent notes to the Rumanian Government on 27 May, complaining that the assurances given on 5 February had not been carried out, 'either in letter or in spirit', and in particular that the two Ministers who had joined the Government in January had been prevented from carrying out their duties because of lack of co-operation from other members of the Government. The notes strongly advocated the early promulgation of an electoral law, and the announcement of a date for the elections.[2] The Groza Government replied to these notes on 3 June. They declared that a provisional draft of an electoral law was nearing completion, and that they intended to 'proceed without delay' to the drawing up of electoral lists, after which they would consult the electorate. They heatedly denied, however, that they had not lived up to Groza's assurances. Mentioning the need to preserve 'public order and security', they placed the blame for any incidents which had taken place upon opposition 'campaigns of agitation and hatred'. The opposition, they said, had at their disposal sixteen newspapers, and had raised no complaint during February against censorship activity. The two Ministers appointed in January were still attending Cabinet meetings, and, though they were exercising 'only the function of observers, not that of collaborators', this was in accordance with a statement of their intentions made at the time of their joining the Government.[3]

The British and American Governments, in further notes sent on 14 June, expressed dissatisfaction with the Rumanian note, which they described as inadequate and inaccurate; and they pointed out that it had mentioned no dates, either for the promulgation of an electoral law or for the holding of elections.[4] The Rumanian Government, in their reply, pointed out that the Soviet Government had made no similar objections, and took the line that recommendations ought to be made collectively by the British, American, and Soviet Governments. The Rumanian Government declared that they aimed at a 'loyal implementation' of the Moscow

[1] For details of the Social Democratic Party Congress see Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, pp. 142–3; cf. Markham: *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke*, pp. 342–54.

[2] *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, 1 June 1946.

[3] For text of the Rumanian note of 3 June see *New York Times*, 8 June 1946.

[4] For texts of both United States and British notes see ibid. 18 June 1946.

decisions, and that their main purpose was to hold free elections at the earliest possible date.[1]

This exchange of notes apparently had some effect, for on 14 July King Michael signed an electoral law providing for a unicameral legislature and granting the franchise to Rumanian women for the first time.[2] Some steps were taken in the ensuing months towards the registration of voters, and finally, in the middle of October, it was announced that the election would be held on 19 November 1946.

Meanwhile, the Government were pursuing, with ever-increasing vigour, the tactics of limiting the circulation of opposition newspapers, preventing opposition leaders from broadcasting, breaking up political meetings, by force if necessary, and hampering the opposition's efforts to register voters under the electoral law. On the other hand, the ranks of the opposition were steadily recruiting their strength from groups of all shades of political opinion who were hostile to the régime or to the Russians.

During the final stages of the election campaign there were further exchanges of notes between the American and British Governments on the one hand and the Rumanian Government on the other, in which the Western Powers again expressed concern over the methods used by the Rumanian Government parties, and the Rumanian Government protested against this 'interference' in their internal affairs. In the first pair of notes from London and Washington, delivered on 28 October, the British Government described the procedure for holding free elections in Western countries, while the United States Government drew attention to the fact that Groza's assurances of respect for the 'four freedoms' had 'formed a basis for recognition of the Rumanian Government by the Government of the United States'.[3] The Rumanian reply, dated 2 November, rejected the Western Governments' protests, but gave renewed assurances that the Rumanian people would be free to express their will in the elections.[4] Reports continued, however, to reach Washington and London to the effect that members of the opposition parties were being systematically intimidated, and that some were being injured or even killed in skirmishes arising out of their attempts to hold meetings. The two Governments also received an appeal from Maniu for their intervention to protect the historical parties. On 16 November they presented another pair of notes in Bucharest rebutting the charge that their interest in the election was 'interference' in Rumanian internal affairs. The American note added that the United States Government 'would not fail in its support for the

[1] *The Times*, 21 June 1946.

[2] Tappe: *Rumania*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, p. 12.

[3] For the text of the United States notes see *New York Times*, 30 October 1946, and for the substance of the British note see *The Times*, 29 October 1946.

[4] *New York Times*, 5 November 1946.

democratic principles of liberty, freedom, and justice by which the United States endeavors to live and upon which, it is convinced, the future peace and welfare of the world depend'.[1]

Three days later, on 19 November, the election was held throughout Rumania. The result, announced some days later, was that the majority of the seats in the new legislature (348 out of 414) were divided among the parties adhering to the Government Coalition. The section of the National Liberal Party which had followed Tatarescu received a slightly larger number of seats (75) than the Communists and the Ploughmen's Front (73 and 70 respectively). The Left-wing Social Democrats, who had followed Voitec and Radaceanu in opposition to Titel Petrescu, also had 75 seats. Of the remainder, 32 seats were won by Maniu's opposition National Peasant Party, while only 20 went to the Left-wing splinter group of the same party which adhered to the Government Coalition. Of the seats won by candidates supporting the Government, 26 went to the National Popular Party, 7 to the Independents, and 2 to the Jews. The opposition parties, other than Maniu's party, won 34 seats; 29 of these went to the Popular Hungarian Union (who, it may be noted, were not in sympathy with the views of Maniu's party), 3 to the opposition National Liberals, and 2 to the Democratic Peasant Party.[2] The true strength of the opposition parties was undoubtedly misrepresented by the result, but, even when due allowance was made for the questionable methods employed by the Government parties before and during the election, the result showed that there had been a genuine swing to the Left in popular feeling in Rumania, as there was in other Eastern European countries and in Finland after the war. The Government Coalition, after the election, included Left-wing elements from the traditional parties and some men of moderate views. The Communists, however, continued to hold the key Ministries, and the proximity of the Red Army was a guarantee that they would continue to control the sources of political power and to decide government policy. As in Poland, the determination of the Russians to prevent the traditional parties from regaining control was the dominant factor in Rumanian politics, and any desire on the part of Rumania for friendly relations with the West was powerless to make itself felt.

The American and British Governments had shown, by the notes which they had delivered in Bucharest in October and November, their knowledge of the fact that 'democratic freedom'—in the sense in which those words were understood in the West—did not exist in Rumania; and the reports which reached them of the conditions in which the poll had been taken could only confirm their view that the Groza Government had not fulfilled the promises which had been a condition of their receiving

[1] For the text of the American note see *New York Times*, 17 November 1946.
[2] *The Times*, 23 November 1946.

American and British recognition. In the international circumstances of the time, however, the two Western Governments felt unable to do more than register yet another protest, though they must have known that this would affect the course of events as little as their earlier representations. In a press release of 26 November 1946 the State Department in Washington referred to the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and to Groza's assurances, and expressed the opinion that, by the campaign of intimidation before the election and the methods used on election day, 'important sections of the population' had been denied their right to vote. For this reason the United States Government felt bound to put on record their view that the Rumanian Government had not kept their promises.[1] The British Government's opinion, as expressed in the House of Commons on 2 December 1946 by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,[2] was that the Rumanian elections had been neither free nor fair, that parties not in the Government bloc did not enjoy full freedom, and that, because of this and because of the circumstances on election day, the election did not 'truly represent the opinion of the Rumanian people'.

(v) Bulgaria

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) The Formation of a Fatherland Front Government in September 1944

King Michael of Rumania's coup of 23 August 1944, which opened the way for Russian troops to advance through Rumania as far as the Danube,[3] caused agitation in Bulgaria, where opinion was divided on the question of what to do to prevent disaster. A new Government was formed on 2 September 1944 by Muraviev, the leader of the Agrarian Party. He and his moderate supporters wished to hold out in the hope of help from the West, but they were unable to secure the support of the Fatherland Front, which combined a pan-Slav orientation with 'leftist' political views. The Government sent envoys to Cairo to seek terms from Britain and the United States of America, but by this time the Red Army had reached Bulgaria's northern frontier, and on 5 September the Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria. The Muraviev Government then took the step which might well have been taken much earlier: they severed relations with Germany on 7 September and on the next day declared war on her. At the same time Bulgaria asked the Russians for an armistice, and Russian

[1] *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, p. 340.

[2] C. P. Mayhew: see H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 431, coll. 39–40. For a discussion of the post-war settlement in Rumania see Roberts: *Rumania*, pp. 303–7. For the continued uneasiness of the relations between Rumania and the West see *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 194–5, 220–1.

[3] See above, pp. 285–6.

troops ceased operations in Bulgaria on 9 September. Meanwhile, however, the Fatherland Front had not been idle. Partisans had descended from the hills to seize power in the villages with the help of peasants, while army officers from the experienced *Zveno*[1] group were consolidating support in the Bulgarian army. During the night of 8 September 1944 the Fatherland Front, under the leadership of Generals Velchev and Stanchev, seized power in Sofia and ousted the Muraviev Government. This coup[2] was popular, and the new Government could count on the support of the majority of the Bulgarian people, who regarded them as the saviours of the country from destruction at Russian hands.

The development of the Fatherland Front had been greatly helped by the broadcasts delivered during the war by Georgi Dimitrov[3] in Moscow. Dimitrov was a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and he held an influential position in Soviet Government circles. He advised the Communists in Bulgaria to co-operate with radical and bourgeois parties, in accordance with the policy of entering into coalition governments which the Russians had been recommending during the war to Communists in all the countries of Central and South-East Europe.[4] In Bulgaria the coalition appeared at first to be a genuine one, for in the Government formed early in September the Communists shared power with the Agrarians and the *Zveno* Party on a numerically equal basis, and the Social Democrats and Independents were also represented. As happened elsewhere, however, the Communists secured the key Ministries of the Interior and of Justice, and their control over the Partisans and over the Communist political organization in the Bulgarian countryside gave them a preponderance of power. Their influence was partly counterbalanced, for the time being, by the fact that officers belonging to the *Zveno* Party remained in control of the Bulgarian army; but the presence of the Red Army could always be used by the Communists to check any rebellious tendencies on the part of the *Zveno* Party.[5]

Since Bulgaria was now at war with Germany, the leaders of the *Zveno* group proceeded to organize their forces in preparation for an offensive against the Germans on the Yugoslav front. At the same time supporters of the new Government began to carry out a purge of officials who had been associated with the war-time Governments of Bulgaria. In

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 612 and note 2.

[2] For the events leading up to the coup see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 627–8. Cf. H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 96–98; Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, pp. 44–45; Michael Padev: *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets: Nikola Petkov, the Test Case* (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), pp. 41, 116–17; P. Auty: *Bulgaria*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, pp. 28–29. For the Soviet note of 5 September, declaring war on Bulgaria, see Rothstein, ii. 109–10.

[3] The Bulgarian Communist who, after his notable defence of himself, and acquittal, in the Reichstag fire trial in Germany (September–December 1933), had gone to live in the U.S.S.R.

[4] Barker, op. cit. p. 59.

[5] See ibid. p. 47.

trials before 'People's Courts' the three Regents for the young King Simeon and many former Ministers and members of the Bulgarian Sobranye (Parliament) were condemned to death, and many others (including members of the moderate Muraviev Government, whose only apparent crimes were their delay in breaking with Germany and their sympathy with the West) were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In the countryside Partisan groups were indulging in an orgy of purges; their victims included local officials, members of the police, and personal enemies, and their excesses neither enhanced their reputation nor augmented their support.[1] During September 1944 the Agrarian leader, Dr. G. M. Dimitrov,[2] who had spent most of the war working with the British in Cairo, returned to Bulgaria. Determined to build up his party's decayed organization to a point at which it could act as a balance to the Communists, he refused to enter the Government and, instead, took the post of general secretary of the Agrarian Union.[3]

(*b*) The Bulgarian Armistice Agreement

The political future of Bulgaria and the question of her southern frontier were among the subjects discussed during Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944, within the framework of the Anglo-Russian agreement on spheres of influence in the Balkans.[4] As a territorial dividing line between Bulgaria and Greece the inter-war frontier had already been provisionally agreed upon. On 11 October the three Allied Governments made a public statement to the effect that the Bulgarian Government must undertake, as the condition for an armistice, to withdraw all Bulgarian troops and officials from Greek and Yugoslav territory within fifteen days.[5] This withdrawal was to be supervised by a Joint Military Mission, with the Russian representative as chairman. The Bulgarian Government accepted this condition immediately, and Georgiev, the Prime Minister, informed the Allies that the evacuation of Bulgarian troops from Greek territory had actually begun on 10 October, and that the evacuation of officials and the transfer of administrative authority to the local population had been completed before that date. He undertook that the Bulgarian authorities would give the fullest assistance to the Allied Military Mission.[6]

The communiqué issued when Churchill left Moscow on 19 October announced that agreement had been reached on the 'remaining points' in the Bulgarian armistice terms.[7] On 26 October negotiations for an armistice

[1] H. Seton-Watson, op. cit. pp. 211–12. Cf. Barker, op. cit. pp. 46–48; Auty, op. cit. p. 30.
[2] Not to be confused with the Communist Georgi Dimitrov mentioned above.
[3] H. Seton-Watson, op. cit. p. 213; cf. Barker, op. cit. p. 52.
[4] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 493–5. See also above, pp. 18–19 and 288.
[5] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 470–1, 474.
[6] See Rothstein, ii. 156–7.
[7] Ibid. p. 162.

started in Moscow.[1] The Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Stainov, began by reading a prepared statement acknowledging the errors and crimes of the war-time Bulgarian Governments, and declaring the determination of the Fatherland Front Government to pursue an entirely different policy. The Government, Stainov said, were now waging war against Germany, and had already begun to weed out the war-time officials. 'The sword of the people's justice', he said, 'will strike them all down without mercy.'[2] At the session on the following day Stainov accepted the Armistice terms, some of which were, he said, already in process of being fulfilled. The Bulgarian delegation asked for, and received, explanations on some detailed points, and on 28 October the Armistice Agreement was signed. The terms were much the same as those accepted by Rumania.[3] Russian forces were to be granted freedom of military movement throughout Bulgarian territory, and all the needs of the Soviet High Command were to be provided for. The Bulgarian Government undertook to release Allied prisoners of war and to accept responsibility for providing for them and for war refugees; to dissolve 'fascist-type' organizations; and to take action against war criminals. Drama, publications, and communications were placed under Soviet control. The Bulgarians agreed to disarm Germans in their territory; to make available Bulgarian forces to take part in actions under Red Army command; to supplement their previous commitment to withdraw from territory outside their pre-war frontiers by repealing all legislation providing for the annexation of Greek or Yugoslav territory; and to return goods removed by Germany or by Bulgaria, either from the Soviet Union or from Greek or Yugoslav territory. Perhaps because Bulgarian forces had never invaded the Soviet Union, no provision was made for the payment of a definite amount of reparations, and the question was left open for decision at a later date; but the Bulgarians were to hand over to the Soviet High Command all war material, including warships, belonging to Bulgaria herself or to any other of Germany's allies. Bulgarian merchant vessels were also placed under Russian control. Largely because of American objections to the vagueness of the wording in the Rumanian Armistice Agreement with regard to the authority of the Allied Control Commission, the corresponding article in the Agreement with Bulgaria contained a reference to the participation of Western representatives in the work of the Commission, and also provided that the Soviet High Command's general direction of the Commission should last for the duration of hostilities against Germany.[4]

[1] The British Ambassador (Clark-Kerr) and the American chargé d'affaires (Kennan) had the assistance in the negotiations of Lieut.-General Sir James Gammell, representing the supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean.

[2] For text of the Bulgarian statement of 26 October see Rothstein, ii. 167–9.

[3] See above, pp. 286–7.

[4] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 472. For the text of the Armistice

Even before the Armistice negotiations had begun, Bulgarian forces under the command of General Stanchev had launched an attack into Yugoslavia to cut the line of the German retreat from Greece. Communist leaders from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had held a conference in September for the purpose of co-ordinating their action against the Germans.[1] The position of the Bulgarian delegation at the Moscow negotiations in October was considerably strengthened by the news that Bulgarian forces under Stanchev had seized the important Yugoslav town of Niš on the main German line of communications.[2] In November 1944 Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist leaders, having reached an uneasy compromise over Macedonia, were considering plans for a South Slav federation, but were unable to agree whether Bulgaria should enter this on the same footing as the members of the already existing Yugoslav federation (i.e. should be incorporated within Yugoslavia), or whether she should enter a South Slav federation on the same footing as Yugoslavia as a whole (i.e. as a partner of Yugoslavia and not as a part of her). The dispute was finally referred to Stalin for arbitration, but, for various reasons, nothing came of these proposals for federation.[3]

The civil war in December 1944 in Greece, in which British troops intervened against ELAS forces, aroused suspicions among Bulgarian Communists that the British had entered on a campaign to suppress 'leftist' political groups and governments in the Balkans. This situation reacted unfavourably upon the position of the Agrarian leader, G. M. Dimitrov,[4] who had served under the British during the war and was now regarded by the Communists as a British agent who was carrying out the traditional British policy of attempting to check Russian expansion towards the Bosporus. Dimitrov's efforts to build up the strength of the Agrarian Party aroused so much hostility among the Communists that his position as general secretary of the Agrarian Union became untenable, and on 18 January 1945 he resigned.[5]

G. M. Dimitrov's resignation was only one of the signs of growing friction

terms see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Conditions of an Armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, 28th October, 1944*, Cmd. 6587 (London, H.M.S.O., 1945). [This will be referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6587.] Cf. *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1944–1945*, pp. 239–43.

[1] Elisabeth Barker: *Macedonia, its Place in Balkan Power Politics* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 99.

[2] Padev: *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets*, p. 117.

[3] Barker: *Macedonia*, pp. 99–101. One reason may have been Stalin's fear of the growing power of Tito. At any rate, the proposals were nullified in 1948 by the break between Tito and the Cominform. See also below, p. 365.

[4] See above, p. 303 and note 2.

[5] Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, pp. 49–55; cf. H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 213. Dimitrov was placed under house arrest by Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, in the spring. He escaped, and, after the British Legation had refused to shelter him, he successfully appealed to the American representative, Maynard Barnes, who gave him protection until they left Bulgaria together in August, when Barnes was going on leave.

between the Communists and Agrarians in Bulgaria. The Fatherland Front committees in towns and villages had never worked very well, and the Communists and the Agrarians soon began to indulge in mutual recrimination.[1] In May 1945 steps were taken by the Communists to split both the Agrarian and Social Democratic Parties. G. M. Dimitrov's successor as general secretary of the Agrarian Union, Nikola Petkov, was forced to resign in his turn and was replaced by Obbov, an Agrarian more amenable to the Communists, who also assumed control of the party newspaper. At about the same time a Communist-supported Social Democratic nominee, Neikov, seized control of the Socialist newspaper, *Narod*, and two months later Neikov's group also secured the leadership of the Socialist Party organization.[2] In consequence the Agrarian Union was divided into two groups, one of which, under Obbov, supported closer co-operation with the Communists, while the other and larger group rallied round Petkov. Similarly, among the Social Democrats, there was a splinter group supporting Neikov's policy of co-operation with the Communists and a larger section which followed the leadership of the moderate Socialists, Cheshmedjiev and Lulchev. The Socialist Right Wing had been in opposition to the Government from the beginning, under the leadership of Pastuhov. For the time being, Petkov and Cheshmedjiev continued to serve in the Government, although their supporters had in effect formed new parties in opposition to the Fatherland Front Government.

(*c*) The Potsdam Conference and the Bulgarian Election of 18 November 1945

At the Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945 the Council of Foreign Ministers were given the task of preparing peace treaties with Bulgaria and the other German satellite countries. Procedure for dealing with these countries in the interval before the conclusion of peace treaties was, as we have seen,[3] laid down in the report of the Conference, and the Western Powers did not accede to Stalin's wish that the Communist-controlled Governments in Balkan countries should be recognized at once by the United States and Great Britain. At the beginning of the Conference Churchill referred to the presence of Bulgarian forces on the Greek frontier in Macedonia. The revision of frontiers, he said, must be reserved for the Peace Conference, and there must be no settlements by force. The matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers, but Stalin, who supported Bulgaria's claim to an outlet on the Aegean,[4] took the line that a settlement could most easily be achieved by means of private conversations.[5]

[1] Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, p. 55.
[2] H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 213–14; cf. Barker, loc. cit.
[3] See above, p. 292.
[4] See below, p. 313.
[5] Leahy: *I Was There*, p. 467. For text of Potsdam communiqué see Cmd. 7087.

Meanwhile, on 18 June 1945, the Fatherland Front Government in Bulgaria had announced that an election would be held on 26 August. During July there was increasing bitterness between members of the Government over questions of electoral procedure, and at the beginning of August six Ministers, most of whom belonged to the Agrarian and Social Democratic Parties, presented a memorandum to the Regents, demanding that opposition parties should be allowed to publish lists of candidates in addition to the Government lists. The assurances which the Regents gave in reply did not satisfy the Agrarian and Social Democratic leaders, Petkov and Cheshmedjiev, and they resigned from the Government.[1]

Reports of pressure and intimidation exercised by the Fatherland Front against opposition candidates caused the United States Government to present to the Bulgarian Government, on 18 August 1945, a note declaring that the United States Government would recognize and conclude a peace treaty with the Bulgarian Government only if they were convinced that a majority of the Bulgarian people, through free elections, had signified that they supported the Government. The American Government were not satisfied either that the present 'provisional' Bulgarian Government were fully representative or that the election was going to be held under conditions which would allow the participation, free from intimidation, of all the democratic elements in the country.[2] Three days later a similar British note was delivered protesting against the methods used in the election campaign and declaring that the British Government would 'be unable to recognize as democratic or representative any Bulgarian Government formed as a result of elections held under these conditions'.[3] On the same day (21 August) it was announced that the now almost legendary Communist leader-hero, Georgi Dimitrov, had been allowed to resign his position as deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and to relinquish his Soviet citizenship in order to stand as a candidate in the Bulgarian elections.[4] In these circumstances it was not likely that the Western Governments' representations would be well received in Sofia; and on 23 August Stainov, the Foreign Minister, in a statement referring to the American and British notes, took the line that any demands on the Bulgarian Government must, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, be submitted to the Allied Control Commission.[5] Thereupon, the Western representatives called a meeting of the Allied Control Commission to discuss the question of the elections, and succeeded—perhaps to Stainov's surprise—in winning their point. On 25 August it was announced that, after considering a recommendation from the Allied Control Commission,

[1] *The Times*, 20 August 1945.
[2] For text of the American note see *Department of State Bulletin*, 19 August 1945, p. 274.
[3] For text of the British note of 21 August see *The Times*, 22 August 1945.
[4] Ibid. 21 August 1945.
[5] Ibid. 24 August 1945.

the Bulgarian Government had decided to postpone the election.[1] In a press release on the same day the American Secretary of State expressed the hope that at a later date the Bulgarian people would be able, in free elections, to choose a fully representative government with which it would be possible for his Government to conclude a peace treaty and to establish normal relations. He was especially gratified that the three representatives on the Allied Control Commission were unanimous in agreeing that the elections should be postponed. This, he felt, was a 'striking demonstration' of the three Governments' unity of purpose in the matter of assisting the liberated peoples of Europe to establish democratic governments of their own choice.[2]

In the hope, perhaps, of hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty and securing American and British recognition, the Bulgarian Government in September amended the electoral law and allowed the names of opposition candidates to appear on separate lists. They also gave permission to three opposition parties (the Agrarians, the Social Democrats, and the 'rightist' Democratic Party led by Mushanov) to publish party newspapers. In mid-September it was announced that the election would take place on 18 November. The opposition newspapers lost no time in denouncing the conduct of the election campaign by the Fatherland Front coalition. They demanded that the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice should be taken out of the hands of the Communists; and, when the Government refused to do this, the three opposition parties announced on 11 October that they would boycott the election.[3]

In the latter part of October Mark Ethridge (the American newspaper publisher who had been sent to the Balkans to investigate political conditions)[4] spent some time in Sofia interviewing supporters of both the Government Coalition and the opposition parties, and his visit caused some excitement and speculation about its possible outcome. On the other hand, the position of the Fatherland Front coalition was greatly strengthened when the Communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, arrived on 7 November from Moscow. He immediately launched violent attacks against the opposition parties; he was specially bitter in his references to Mushanov who, when he was Prime Minister, at the time of the Reichstag fire trial, had refused to restore to Dimitrov his Bulgarian citizenship. It was Stalin, Dimitrov said, who had saved him by granting him Soviet citizenship.[5]

On 16 November 1945, two days before the election was to take place, another American note was presented to the Bulgarian Government. This

[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, 26 August 1945.
[2] For the text of Byrnes's statement see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, p. 318.
[3] *New York Times*, 17 October 1945; cf. Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, p. 57.
[4] See above, pp. 293–4, and cf. Barker, op. cit. pp. 69–70.
[5] *New York Times*, 9 November 1945. For an account of Dimitrov's previous career and of his arrival in Sofia on this occasion see Barker, op. cit. pp. 57–61.

note stated that, according to Ethridge's report, no steps had been taken to reorganize the Bulgarian Government in order to make it more representative; a single list of candidates for election, excluding many democratic candidates, had been issued, and there were indications of threats and coercion. There was no reason to believe, the American note concluded, that 'the results of an election conducted under such conditions will reflect the Bulgarian people's choice of a representative democratic government'.[1] The presentation of this American note was followed by the publication of a letter from the Bulgarian opposition leaders exhorting the Bulgarian Government to postpone the elections once more, under pain, if they persisted, of bearing 'the historical responsibility before the people and the State'.[2] These protests had no effect, and the election took place on 18 November. On the same day the Bulgarian reply to the American note was presented. This drew attention to the concessions which had been granted to the opposition parties after the postponement of the election in August, and recalled the fact that the opposition leaders had declared a boycott of the elections on 11 October. Since the opposition had consequently abstained from participation in the election, there could be no basis for the charge that threats and coercion had been used against them. The note added that the Government intended, after the election, 'to broaden on our own initiative the democratic basis of the present Fatherland Front Government'.[3]

In the election of 18 November 1945 the Fatherland Front secured three-quarters of the seats in Parliament, and the new Government consisted entirely of members of the Fatherland Front coalition. The opposition leaders, notably the Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov, challenged the result of the poll, and declared that the Agrarians would participate in the Government only if the Communist Ministers of the Interior and of Justice were to be replaced and a new election were to be held under conditions that would ensure that there should be no intimidation. Georgiev, the Prime Minister, then accused Petkov of acting under 'foreign influence', and he added that, since the opposition had withdrawn from the Government, they could not expect to receive places in the Cabinet.[4]

(*d*) The Moscow Agreement of December 1945 and Subsequent Diplomatic Exchanges

When, during the Moscow Conference in December 1945, Byrnes discussed Ethridge's report with Molotov and Stalin, he found even less willingness on the Russians' part to meet American wishes regarding Bulgaria than he found in the case of Rumania.[5] Molotov told him that the

[1] For text of the note see *New York Times*, 17 November 1945.
[2] Ibid. 18 November 1945.
[3] *The Times*, 19 November 1945.
[4] *New York Times*, 24 November 1945.
[5] See above, pp. 294–5.

Russians were unwilling to interfere with the Bulgarian Government now that elections had taken place, but Stalin later agreed to 'advise' the Bulgarian Government to include two members of the political parties not represented in the Government, while insisting that his 'advice' could not be reinforced by any pressure.[1] Molotov and Vyshinsky objected at first to the wording of the American draft of a paragraph for inclusion in the report of the Moscow Conference, which made the acceptance of the Russian 'advice' by the Bulgarian Government a condition for British and American recognition; but in the end the American draft was accepted.[2] It was agreed that, as soon as the American and British Governments were convinced that two members of opposition parties had been included in the Fatherland Front Government, they would grant recognition to the Bulgarian Government, as the Russians had done already.[3]

However, it soon became clear that the agreement on Bulgaria, like other agreements between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, was open to different interpretations. The Bulgarian Government accepted the Russian 'advice', but interpreted it to mean, as did the Russians, that the two opposition Ministers would enter the Government unconditionally. The opposition party leaders, Petkov and Lulchev, had no such intention. When approached by Fatherland Front leaders, and later, when Vyshinsky visited Sofia on 9 January 1946, they held out for the conditions that they had previously demanded: they would agree to enter the Government only if new, genuinely free, elections were held, and if the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice were freed from Communist control.[4] This angered Vyshinsky, who told them that they had no right to make such conditions.

American disagreement with Vyshinsky's interpretation of the Moscow decisions was soon expressed. A conversation took place on the subject on 16 February in London, between Vyshinsky and Cohen, of the United States State Department. On his return to America, Cohen sent an *aide-mémoire* to the Bulgarian representative in Washington on 22 February, setting out the American interpretation of the Moscow agreement on Bulgaria: namely that the Bulgarian Government and opposition should be urged to find a mutually acceptable basis for the participation of the two additional representatives mentioned in the Moscow communiqué; not that pressure should be exerted on the opposition to nominate two candidates for unconditional inclusion.[5] Cohen's note provoked a vigorous reply from Russia on 7 March; this declared that the only two conditions

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 706–7.

[2] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 115–21.

[3] For the text of the paragraph concerning Bulgaria in the report see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, pp. 318–19.

[4] Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, pp. 73–74; cf. Padev: *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets*, p. 44.

[5] For text of the United States *aide-mémoire* of 22 February 1946 see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, p. 319.

for participation by opposition members in the Government mentioned in the Moscow Report were that they must be representative of their parties and that they must be loyal to the Government; there was no reference to any 'mutually acceptable condition'. Furthermore, the Russian note accused the American representative in Sofia, Barnes, of having systematically instigated the opposition not to act in accordance with the Moscow decision, and of having encouraged them to put forward new conditions for participation in the Government; and it also declared that the American *aide-mémoire* of 22 February, which likewise encouraged the Bulgarian opposition to sabotage a decision taken by the Big Three at Moscow, was a unilateral statement put forward without any attempt at parliamentary co-ordination with the partners of the United States in the Moscow decisions.[1] Byrnes answered on 10 March that it had never occurred to his Government that the participation of the two opposition members in the Bulgarian Government should be on any terms that were not mutually acceptable to both parties; this seemed to them to be the essence of the Moscow agreement. Byrnes referred to the London conversations of 16 February, when Cohen had explained the American view to Vyshinsky, as proof that his Government had not acted unilaterally. They had taken no action inconsistent with the friendly spirit of co-operation which had inspired the Moscow agreement; and the activities of Barnes were in accordance with their instructions that he should impress on all parties the need for this co-operation. It was the sincere hope of the American Government that 'in this spirit an implementation of the Moscow agreement regarding Bulgaria will be achieved'.[2]

In the latter part of March the Bulgarian Cabinet resigned, and Georgiev was asked by the Regents[3] to form a new, fully representative, government. He had talks with leaders of the opposition parties to discuss conditions under which they would agree to participate. They demanded a new election before the middle of June, control over the Ministry of Justice, and a footing in the Ministry of the Interior.[4] Georgiev rejected these proposals, but he did offer to hold elections in mid-September, to allow separate lists for all parties in the election, and to agree to limited changes in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior. He stipulated, however, that members of the opposition participating in the Government must agree to co-operate loyally with the Fatherland Front coalition.[5] The negotiations

[1] For text of the Soviet note of 7 March see ibid. pp. 320–1.
[2] For the text of the United States note of 10 March see ibid. pp. 321–2.
[3] See below, p. 313.
[4] They suggested either that the Minister for the Interior should be a 'neutral' or that his two deputies should be members of the opposition.
[5] For the Russian account of the negotiations between Georgiev and the opposition leaders see the Tass communiqué in *Soviet News*, 2 April 1946.

broke down, and on 31 March it was announced that Georgiev had formed a new Government whose members were again drawn exclusively from the Fatherland Front coalition. On 28 March the Soviet Minister to Bulgaria, Kirsanov, made a statement declaring that the terms demanded by the opposition were in contradiction with the Moscow agreement and were therefore unacceptable, whereas Georgiev's proposals to the opposition leaders were to be regarded as just.[1] On the following day, on the other hand, the United States and British Governments announced their refusal to recognize the new Bulgarian Government on the ground that the provision in the Moscow agreement for the inclusion of members of the opposition had not been carried out.[2]

At the meeting of the American, British, and Russian Foreign Ministers in Paris in June and July 1946 the leader of the Bulgarian delegation, Vassili Kolarov, made another approach to the British and American Governments. He was told by Bevin that the opposition ought to be given a fair and reasonable share in the Government,[3] and by Byrnes, who referred once again to the Ethridge report, that the Americans would never recognize the Bulgarian Government until the opposition had been allowed to exercise full political and civil rights. Byrnes said that his object during the discussions in Moscow on Bulgaria had been to create conditions in which the opposition could exercise their rights. Kolarov then promised that within three months Bulgaria would hold free and open elections with adequate guarantees for a Constituent Assembly. On 19 July the Bulgarian Government announced that a referendum would be held on 8 September 1946 to decide whether the monarchy should be abolished and Bulgaria be declared a 'People's Republic', and that elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held on 27 October.[4]

Meanwhile, the Communists were making use of an Allied demand, in connexion with the preparations for the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, for the cutting down of the Bulgarian army, to take action against the more powerful officers of the *Zveno* group. The influential Minister for War, Velchev, after he had been deprived by legislation of most of his powers, finally resigned and accepted the post of Bulgarian representative in Switzerland. Measures were taken against many Bulgarian officers who continued to insist that the army ought to remain non-political. Even Stanchev was not saved from arrest by being the hero of the campaign against the Germans in the later stages of the war; and in August it was reported that 1,800 officers had been dismissed.[5] By this purge in the spring and summer of 1946 the Communists were able to accomplish the double purpose of complying with Western demands for a substantial

[1] *The Times*, 1 April 1946.
[2] *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 April 1946.
[3] Barker: *Truce in the Balkans*, p. 75.
[4] *New York Times*, 21 July 1946.
[5] Ibid. 24 August 1946.

reduction in the size of the Bulgarian army and of breaking the power of the only serious obstacle to the consolidation of the Communists' control over Bulgaria—the group of officers in the *Zveno* Party; and they were able to achieve this before the signature of a peace treaty, while the Red Army was still in Bulgaria.[1] The Bulgarian delegation drew attention to these measures of demilitarization at the Paris Peace Conference in August and September 1946, when the post-war economic and territorial settlement for Bulgaria came up for discussion. The Western recommendation that the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier should be the pre-war frontier was opposed both by the Greeks, who wanted to extend their territory northwards for 'security purposes', and also by the Bulgarians, supported by the Eastern Slav bloc, who wanted Western Thrace in order to obtain an outlet on the Aegean. The pre-war frontier was, however, eventually adopted in the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.[2]

(*e*) The Referendum of 8 September and the Election of 27 October 1946

Preparations had been going forward since July for the holding of the referendum on 8 September, when the Bulgarians were to decide whether or not they would retain the Coburg dynasty, which had reigned in Bulgaria for nearly seventy years. On this question, at least, there was a notable unanimity. All the eight political parties of Bulgaria appealed to the people to vote for the abolition of the monarchy. Even before the referendum was held there was no doubt about its outcome, and the polling took place on 8 September 1946 without incident. The result, announced on the following day, put the figure of those in favour of abolition at 92 per cent., and, though this may have been an exaggeration, there was no doubt that a majority of the Bulgarian people approved the measure. Large parades were organized; for not only was this the occasion of the rejection of the Teutonic dynasty, but it had also been arranged to coincide with the second anniversary of the seizure of power by the Fatherland Front. The powers which up to this time had been nominally exercised by the Regents (two Republicans and a Communist) were now transferred to the Communist President of the Sobranye (Kolarov). Young King Simeon left Bulgaria without delay with his mother, Queen Ioanna, to join his grandfather, ex-King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, in exile. On 15 September, at a meeting of the Sobranye, the Fatherland Front Government declared Bulgaria to be a 'People's Republic'. Preparations then began for the election of members of the Great National Assembly, which was to be held on 27 October.[3]

[1] Padev: *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets*, pp. 119, 127–8; cf. H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 215–16.

[2] See below, pp. 348–9.

[3] See *The Times*, 7 September, and *New York Times*, 9 and 10 September 1946.

In August 1946, at the Paris Peace Conference, Byrnes had protested once more that the Moscow decisions had not been carried out, and, in reply, Georgiev had denied that the responsibility for this rested with the Bulgarian Government. Byrnes followed up these conversations with Georgiev by a letter of 24 September, in which he complained that nothing had been done since August to implement the Moscow decisions. He had therefore instructed General Robertson, the American representative on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria, to ask the acting president of the Commission, Colonel-General Biryusov, to arrange for all party leaders to appear before the Commission and express their views on the coming elections and on political conditions in general. Robertson was to ask for a special meeting of the Allied Control Commission to consider the steps that might be taken to ensure the holding of free elections by guaranteeing freedom of the press and of broadcasting and the right of assembly for the opposition; by prohibiting interference by the militia, except for the maintenance of law and order; by the release of political prisoners or open formulation of charges against them; and by the elimination of any possible threat of retaliation for political reasons after the election.

Georgiev, replying to Byrnes's letter several days later, declared that the situation had not changed since August. The result of the free elections that were to be held would decide both the composition of the Government and the 'manner of settlement of relations' with the opposition. He then tried to show that most of the conditions for free elections mentioned by Byrnes were already in force. Freedom of the press was assured 'within the limits of existing law', and newspapers which printed opposition views and criticized the Government were appearing without hindrance. The Government had agreed that all political parties should be able to express their views over the state radio system.[1] Freedom of assembly was assured. The militia would not interfere in the election, except 'to assure order and freedom for every citizen to vote as he chooses'. Measures had already been taken to release prisoners held on political grounds, who had not committed any breach of existing laws.[2] The elimination of any danger of reprisals after the election would be sufficiently guaranteed by the measures that had been taken and would be taken by the Bulgarian Government. As proof that conditions were favourable for a free election, Georgiev stated that the Fatherland Front had posted ninety-nine lists of candidates throughout the country, the United Opposition (Agrarians and Social Democrats) eighteen lists, and the Democrats thirty-five; and he concluded with an assurance that the Bulgarian Government would do 'everything

[1] On 20 October the Socialist and Agrarian Parties refused the offer of a single broadcast apiece, on the ground that one was not enough (*New York Times*, 21 October 1946).

[2] In a note of 21 September Georgiev had informed Byrnes that about 1,700 political prisoners had already been released.

necessary so that the Bulgarian people may freely express their will on 27 October'.

On 1 October Robertson carried out his instructions from Byrnes by asking Biryusov to arrange that 'all political leaders in Bulgaria' should be given a hearing by the Allied Control Commission, and that the regular meeting of the Commission, appointed for 3 October, should be converted into a special session. The British representative, General Oxley, Robertson said, approved of this proposal. Biryusov's reply, which was not officially delivered until 4 October, rejected the American suggestions. The Bulgarian Government, he declared, 'had done everything necessary' to guarantee free elections. He cited as evidence the decision of the opposition parties, who had boycotted the last election, to participate in this one. Such questions were not within the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Commission, as this had been defined in the Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria; and the adoption of Robertson's suggestions would violate the prerogative of the Bulgarian Government and would be 'a rude interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria'. Robertson acknowledged receipt of this note on the same day, stating that he did not agree with Biryusov's conclusions and was forwarding the note to Byrnes for any action that might be considered necessary.[1]

The correspondence that had passed between the Bulgarian and United States Governments was released to the American press on 21 October, at the height of the election campaign.[2] On the same day, General Oxley sent a note to Biryusov citing the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe as the basis of the Allies' jurisdiction, recalling previous negotiations in connexion with the Bulgarian elections, and declaring that the British Government were in full agreement with Robertson's letter of 1 October. On 22 October a British Foreign Office spokesman hinted that his Government might not recognize the Bulgarian Government that would be formed after the election. At a meeting of the Allied Control Commission in Sofia on 24 October Robertson presented another American proposal, this time recommending detailed procedure to ensure the correct counting of votes.[3] Biryusov refused to comment on the suggestion at the meeting, and on the next day the State Department announced that the Russian representative had blocked a new United States proposal to facilitate the holding of free elections in Bulgaria.[4]

[1] For the full text of Byrnes's note of 24 September, of Georgiev's reply, and of the exchange between Robertson and Biryusov see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, pp. 322–6, and *New York Times*, 22 October 1946.

[2] A report from Barnes that Biryusov had prevented the publication of the correspondence in Bulgaria was made public by the State Department in Washington on 23 October (*New York Times*, 24 October 1946), but on the 24th, at a meeting of the Allied Control Commission, Biryusov promised full publication in the Bulgarian press, and this promise was fulfilled.

[3] For the four points of his proposal see ibid. 26 October 1946.

[4] Ibid.

The election of 27 October thus took place in an atmosphere of tension between Russia and the Western Powers, and under conditions resembling those that had prevailed in Poland and Rumania. During the last stages of the election campaign the measures taken to obstruct the activities of the opposition parties were perhaps less violent than those taken in Rumania, but opposition meetings were broken up by supporters of the Government, and opposition leaders complained that the Government's assurances had proved to be nothing but empty words. On the day before the election the Communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, declared that it would be treacherous to vote for the opposition, and reminded the opposition leaders of the fate of Draža Mihailović in Yugoslavia.[1] This statement did much to discourage supporters of the opposition from voting, for fear of reprisals; and some of those who were not discouraged were obstructed in their attempts to attend election meetings by the erection of road blocks, or were frustrated in their efforts to vote by delays in the issue of voting cards. In addition, many potential candidates and supporters of the opposition were detained in prison. Nevertheless, the official result of the election showed that the united Agrarian and Socialist opposition had received as much as 22 per cent. of the votes, and they were allowed 101 seats in the new Assembly.[2] The Fatherland Front retained 364 seats, but an overwhelming majority (277) of these now went to the Communists. In the new Government formed as a result of the election Georgi Dimitrov replaced Georgiev as Prime Minister. His Cabinet was composed, once again, of members of the Fatherland Front coalition, but, this time, nine portfolios were held by Communists, and this reduced the element of coalition in the Government to a mere façade. In an interview on 30 October 1946 Dimitrov said that, now that the election was over, the Moscow agreement belonged to a phase that had passed. He blamed the opposition for the failure to carry out the agreement, and said that the election had shown the opinion of the Bulgarian people on the question. He declared that, despite the change in the ratio of party representation, co-operation would continue between the Communists and other members of the Fatherland Front coalition.[3] The most important result of the election was, in fact, Dimitrov's emergence from behind the scenes to assume control officially. Thenceforward he was in a position to deal at his leisure with his enemies in the opposition parties.

On 2 November a British Foreign Office spokesman said that reports received from Bulgaria showed that the elections had been held in an atmosphere of terror. The tactics used to obstruct the efforts of the

[1] *New York Times*, 27 October 1946. For the fate of Mihailović see below, p. 359.

[2] The opposition leaders maintained that the official results had been falsified. Petkov claimed that 60 per cent., not 22 per cent., of the total votes had been cast for opposition candidates.

[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 November 1946.

opposition were mentioned, including the use of road blocks, one of which had stopped General Oxley himself. The announcement stated that the British Government's information fully justified Oxley's note of 21 October, which had protested against the lack of civil liberties in Bulgaria.[1] The British Government withheld recognition of the Dimitrov Government until after they had signed a peace treaty with Bulgaria on 10 February 1947,[2] and the United States Government continued to withhold their recognition even after that date.

(vi) Hungary

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) The Debrecen Government and the Armistice Agreement

The successful German coup in Hungary on 16 October 1944[3] frustrated Admiral Horthy's attempt to follow the Rumanian and Bulgarian examples and to secure an armistice with the Soviet Union, with the result that the country was devastated during the fighting between the Russian and German armies, which did not end completely until the last German troops were driven out in April 1945. Szálasi and his followers were completely servile to Hitler in their attachment to his cause, and they engaged in competition with the Nazi SS in outrages against the Jews (who until then had been treated comparatively mildly in Hungary) and against their Magyar political enemies. The Red Army entered Hungarian territory during October and captured Debrecen. The Szálasi Government accompanied the Germans as they retreated westwards, taking with them many civil servants and some members of the former privileged classes (many of these had already left the country or disappeared). The Russian forces entering from the east thus found a ravaged country devoid of administrative organization. Any hope that the Hungarian capital might be spared the fate of Warsaw disappeared when the German garrison made it clear, by their treatment of Russian overtures, that they had been ordered to defend the city to the last.[4]

As in other areas occupied by the Russians, political developments kept pace with the military advance. An Underground 'Hungarian Front',

[1] *New York Times*, 3 November, *The Times*, 4 November 1946.

[2] See below, pp. 348–9.

[3] For the circumstances of the coup and the establishment of the puppet Szálasi Government see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 631, and cf. H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, pp. 103–5.

[4] For a Russian account of overtures by Marshals Tolbukhin and Malinovsky to the German commander in Budapest and of the German reply see *Soviet War News*, 1 January 1945. It was alleged that Russian liaison officers were murdered on 29 December while these negotiations were in progress.

consisting of the Communists, the Smallholders, and the Social Democrats,[1] had been established during the period of German occupation with the intention that they should form a coalition government after the war. The Red Army was accompanied by Magyar Communists who had been trained for a long period in Moscow, and their immediate objective was soon seen to be the establishment of a coalition government of 'democratic' parties. A political executive committee was set up, which included representatives of the National Peasant Party and Independents, as well as the three parties belonging to the Hungarian Front, and, under this committee's nominal supervision, National Committees were established throughout the country on a pattern similar to that followed in Bulgaria. Representatives were chosen for a Provisional National Assembly which was convoked at Debrecen in December 1944 under the auspices of the Russian High Command. The Assembly, on 22 December, accepted by acclamation a Provisional National Government in which the Communists, the Smallholders, and the Social Democrats secured two portfolios each, and the rest were distributed among members of other groups, including one or two former Ministers and generals who had held posts under the Horthy régime.[2] The 'Muscovite' group of Communists (whose leader Matyas Rákosi, like Dimitrov, the Bulgarian, remained for the time being in Moscow) had been warned, during their period of training, to avoid the mistakes made by Bela Kun in 1919. The policy of the Communists, as we have seen, was to attempt to secure national support in different states by co-operating at first with other political groups not associated with a former régime; and in Hungary, in the early stages, the Communist members of the Debrecen Government openly helped in the organization of the other political parties belonging to the coalition. In the Provisional National Government the Communists officially held only the Ministries of Agriculture and Trade; but their position was strengthened by the appointment of Communists as Deputy Ministers in the important Ministries, and they were able to reorganize the police and security forces, although the Ministry of the Interior was under the nominal authority of the National Peasant Party. Eastern Hungary was under direct Russian occupation, so that the Provisional Government were at the mercy of the Red Army High Command. At first, at any rate, there was undoubtedly a genuine attempt at co-operation between the Communist and non-

[1] These three were the only political parties, not associated with former régimes, which retained party organizations of any consequence. The Communists had the advantage of enjoying the Red Army's patronage. The Social Democrats were organized to a certain extent in the industrial areas. The Smallholders had support in towns and villages, but were less well organized. See Ferenc Nagy: *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, Macmillan, 1948), p. 52. [This work will be referred to hereafter as Nagy.]

[2] For the Debrecen period see J. Paál and A. Radó: *A debreceni feltámadás* (Debrecen, 1947); cf. Nagy, pp. 73–75.

Communist members of the Government in carrying out certain fundamental economic and social changes that were recognized to be necessary.

Hungary, within the frontiers to which she had been confined by the Treaty of Trianon, had not made the economic and social reforms which had been carried out, to some extent, in each of her successor states. She had retained a semi-feudal order throughout the inter-war period and even during the war. Her antiquated economic system, under the control of industrial magnates and landowners who had long combined to protect their interests against reform, was now ripe for radical changes. In this preliminary stage the Communists in Hungary could therefore afford to co-operate with groups who were equally interested in overthrowing the existing system, many of whose supporters had absconded with Szálasi.[1]

On 28 December the Debrecen Government issued a statement which condemned the policies of the Bárdossy and Szálasi Governments, expressed particular bitterness against the German *Putsch* in October which had established the Szálasi régime, declared war upon Germany, and announced that the Provisional Government had asked the Allied Governments for an armistice.[2] The Armistice Agreement with Hungary, which was signed on 20 January 1945 in Moscow, followed the pattern already used in the cases of Finland, Rumania, and Bulgaria.[3] The terms provided for the disarming of Germans in Hungary; the release of political prisoners and the repeal of racial legislation; the assurance of free movement for Russian armed forces through Hungary; the return of prisoners of war; the return of valuables and property removed from the Soviet Union and from neighbouring countries occupied by Hungary during the war; the confiscation by the Russians of all German war material, including warships, as booty, and the use of all other vessels for the duration of the war; the payment of all the expenses of the Soviet High Command and the Allied Control Commission; the restoration of Allied rights and property; co-operation in the apprehension and trial of war criminals; the dissolution of pro-Hitler 'or other Fascist-type' organizations; and the taking over by the Soviet High Command of all means of propaganda. An Allied Control Commission, with a Russian chairman, was to regulate and supervise the execution of the terms, and was to act under the direction of the Russian High Command as long as hostilities against Germany continued. The Provisional Government undertook to supply at least eight infantry divisions for use against the Germans, after which the Hungarian army was to be placed on a 'peace-time' basis. Measures were to be taken to prevent the export of German property from Hungary. The territorial provisions reduced Hungary once more to her inter-war limits. The Vienna Awards

[1] See above, p. 317.
[2] For the text of the announcement see Tass communiqué in *Soviet War News*, 1 January 1945.
[3] See above, pp. 270–3, 285–7, and 304.

of 2 November 1938 and 30 August 1940 were declared null and void, and provision was made for the evacuation of territories formerly included in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Rumania, and for the repeal of legislation or administrative provisions relating to the reannexation of such territories by Hungary. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were to share (to the amount of $100 million between them) in the reparations which were demanded of Hungary. The amount due to the Soviet Union as reparations was fixed at $200 million, and the possibility was left open that damage suffered by the other Allies might be assessed at a later date. Hungarian civil administration was to be restored up to within 50–100 kilometres from the front lines, but was to be subject to orders issued by the Soviet High Command for the purpose of carrying out the Armistice terms.[1]

The civil administration mentioned in the Armistice terms consisted of National Committees which were established under the nominal authority of the Provisional Government at Debrecen. While fighting continued in the western part of Hungary, the Red Army authorities, who controlled communications, could not always restrain themselves from showing preference for their Communist protégés; and the co-operative basis of the National Committees became in many cases rather theoretical. Nevertheless, during the early part of 1945, most of the coalition parties, particularly the Smallholders, were able to make some progress in organization.[2] Though much of the citadel of Buda had been destroyed by the Russian siege it became possible, after the capture of the city in February 1945, to transfer the Provisional Government to Budapest by April 1945.

(*b*) The Land Reforms

The long-neglected need for the redistribution of land ownership in Hungary furnished an additional stimulus for co-operative action in the first months after the establishment of the Provisional Government at Debrecen; and in mid-March 1945 the Government issued a decree on agrarian reform, which they began at once to put into effect. The new law was applied to all agricultural estates, regardless of ownership. The unusually large estates formerly held by Hungarian landowners, and most of the enormous territories belonging to the Catholic Church, were parcelled out into holdings of 100 yokes or less.[3] By September 1946, when the execution of this reform was officially declared to have been completed, the process of redistribution had gone too far for it ever to be reversed. The execution of the law did not take place without excesses, for in many

[1] For text of the Armistice Agreement with Hungary see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1944–1945*, pp. 244–50.

[2] See Nagy, pp. 97–98.

[3] A very few selected people were allowed to retain holdings of 300 yokes. The majority, however, received 100 or less [1 yoke = 1·4 acres].

cases the peasants seized the land themselves; nevertheless, there seemed to be general agreement among the parties associated with the Provisional Government that the speed of execution and the radical nature of the reforms were the best course in the circumstances.[1] The reforms gave 642,000 persons the right to own land.[2]

(*c*) The Municipal and General Elections

By an agreement made as early as 10 October 1944 leaders of the Hungarian Communist and Social Democratic Parties had entered into a pact for full collaboration, including an understanding that the two parties would eventually be merged.[3] The co-operation between the two groups was felt by their leaders to be particularly advantageous in the industrial areas round Budapest, where the leadership of the trade unions had been taken over by the Communists, and where support from the workers might be expected to be strong. Confidence in their position led the Communist-Socialist bloc to propose to leaders of the Smallholders' Party that municipal elections should be held in Budapest before the Hungarian general election;[4] and the Smallholders agreed to take part in such elections on 2 October 1945, on condition that the general election should follow within a month. The elections were conducted under conditions that were scrupulously fair; except for the Communists and Socialists, who combined to form a joint electoral bloc, each party issued a separate list of candidates. The result was that the Smallholders received 51 per cent. of the votes. The Smallholders considered this a resounding success for their party, while the Communist-Socialist bloc considered that the result had been engineered by 'reactionary elements'. The implications of the result of the municipal elections for the forthcoming general election in November 1945 were not lost on the Russians; and Marshal Voroshilov, chairman of the Allied Control Commission, took matters into his own hands in October.

[1] See Nagy, p. 112.

[2] For details of the agrarian reforms see Leland Stowe: 'Hungary's Agrarian Revolution', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1947, xxv. 490; and cf. Elizabeth Wiskemann: *Hungary*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, pp. 102–4.

[3] S. Kertesz: 'The Methods of Communist Conquest: Hungary 1944–47', *World Politics*, October 1950, p. 23.

[4] The Hungarian Smallholders' Party had few ties with the enormous number of landless labourers and dwarf-holders, and advocated only moderate and gradual land reform. After a brief period of influence in the 1920s, in opposition to the Bethlen régime, it had lost strength until, immediately before the war, it had come forward, under Tibor Eckhardt's leadership, as a strongly revisionist party which nevertheless advocated liberal domestic policies and preferred the Western democracies to Nazi Germany. Part of the Smallholders' support came from the 'Swabian' German gentry (for the Germans in West Hungary and for the 'Swabians' see *Survey* for 1920–3, pp. 304–7 and *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 609, note 1, and 614, note 4). After the war, although during it the party had swung to the Left, the Smallholders received some support from Right-wing elements who had not fled before the Russian advance, for, in the eyes of the dispossessed, this party represented the only makeweight to Communist politics in Hungary.

Summoning the Smallholder leaders, he pressed them to accept a common electoral list for the entire Government coalition, offering them first 40 per cent., then 45 per cent., and finally 47½ per cent. of the seats in the new Parliament. Voroshilov's action caused concern among the Western Powers, who were watching the Hungarian election campaign intently, with an eye to its bearing on the possibility of their subsequently recognizing the Hungarian Government.[1] The Smallholders' national executive committee refused to accept Voroshilov's proposal, and at an inter-party conference called by Smallholder leaders the Communists eventually agreed to the issue of separate party lists, but they stipulated that, whatever the outcome of the election might be, coalition government should continue; the actual representation of the different parties could be determined later. After the conclusion of this agreement, a declaration of common policy was issued in the name of the 'Independence Front', inter-party recrimination ceased, and the way was clear for the holding of what was probably the freest general election ever held in the history of Hungary.[2] When the poll was taken, on 4 November 1945, the Smallholders won a resounding victory. They gained nearly 60 per cent. of the total number of seats in Parliament; and even Voroshilov was sufficiently impressed to announce that the Soviet Government wished to base their friendship with Hungary on relations with the Smallholders' Party.[3]

Because of the pre-election agreement the Smallholders could not form a single-party government, and they feared that the Communists would refuse to participate if they insisted on occupying a majority of the seats in the Cabinet. In inter-party discussions it was finally agreed to enlarge the Cabinet from twelve to eighteen members, and to distribute the portfolios among the Smallholders, Communists, Social Democrats, and National Peasant Party in the proportion of 9–4–4–1. A struggle developed over the all-important post of Minister of the Interior, and the Smallholders finally conceded it to the Communists when the latter threatened to withdraw from the Government.[4] One of the Smallholder leaders, Zoltán Tildy, became Prime Minister, and his party's nine portfolios included those of Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Defence, Reconstruction, and Supply. The United States Government showed their appreciation of the conditions under which the election campaign had taken place by granting *de facto* recognition to the Hungarian Government on the eve of polling

[1] See leading article in *The Times*, 20 October 1945; and Bevin's written statement in the Commons debate delivered tardily on 24 October 1945 (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 414, coll. 2151–2).

[2] See Nagy, pp. 145–51; Bevin's statement in *The Times*, 1 November 1945, and *New York Times*, 24 October 1945.

[3] Nagy, p. 154. For the exact election results see S. Kertesz in *World Politics*, October 1950, p. 41.

[4] This portfolio was given to the Smallholder leader's namesake, Imre Nagy (Nagy, pp. 159–64).

day, and the British Government recognized the new Government after the announcement of its composition in mid-November.[1]

The party harmony achieved before the election was soon threatened. The parties were divided on the question of the expulsion of the German minority from Hungary. The Communists and Socialists were in favour of a directive issued by Voroshilov, recommending the immediate expulsion of the entire minority *en masse*. The Smallholders, however, were split on the question, mainly because many of the 'Swabians' in question were Smallholders themselves, and some of them even Hungarian patriots. Nevertheless, several of the dissident Smallholders voted for Voroshilov's solution, and it was adopted. The Smallholder leaders who had voted against it, however, remained antagonistic to the methods proposed, and the dispute gradually developed into a source of serious friction between the Smallholder leaders and the Left-wing bloc within the new Government.[2]

Over another vexed question—that of the status of the monarchy—the members of the new Government coalition managed to resolve party differences. The 945-year-old Kingdom of Hungary, consecrated by the aura surrounding the Crown of St. Stephen, was brought to an end with virtually no opposition when on 1 February 1946 the Hungarian National Assembly proclaimed the establishment of the Third Hungarian Republic and the election of Zoltán Tildy as its President.[3] Tildy's election to the presidency left vacant the post of Prime Minister, but it was soon agreed among the parties that his successor should be the Smallholder leader, Ferenc Nagy, who until that time had been president of the National Assembly.

(*d*) The Economic Position

The growing tension in the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers towards the end of 1945 found its expression in Hungary in the economic sphere, although the Russians' intention of linking the economy of Hungary with their own plans for post-war economic recovery was revealed only by degrees. Under the Armistice terms, as we have seen, Hungary was obliged to supply Russia, as reparations, with commodities to the value of $200 million over a period of six years, and also to provide for the maintenance of the Red Army High Command and the Allied Control Commission. The devastation caused by the fighting between the Russians and Germans in Hungary would have made the fulfilment of these obligations extremely difficult, even if the Szálasi Government and their hangers-on, when they fled with the retreating Germans, had not taken with them all available resources and supplies, including the Hungarian

[1] *New York Times*, 3 November, and *The Times*, 19 November 1945.
[2] Nagy, pp. 168–70.
[3] *New York Times*, 2 February 1946.

gold reserve. Moreover, at the beginning of the Russian occupation, large amounts of industrial plant and machinery had been removed to the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, the burden imposed by the Armistice terms was too heavy to be shouldered by the Hungarian economy, and the Hungarians were forced to turn to others for help. In the summer of 1945 a Hungarian trade delegation went to Moscow ostensibly for the purpose of discussing an agreement, which had been proposed by the Russians, whereby Hungary would be able to import urgently needed raw materials from the Soviet Union in exchange for manufactured goods. In fact, the negotiations developed into discussions for a far-reaching pact which provided for close collaboration over a five-year period in all major economic fields, and which laid the foundations for the establishment of Russian-Hungarian joint-stock companies.[1] Protests from the American and British Governments caused a certain delay, but the treaty was eventually signed in the autumn and was ratified in December 1945. Details of the terms were not published, presumably because both parties wished to conceal the extent of the Soviet Union's economic penetration of Hungary.[2] Russian policy throughout 1946 was directed towards the strengthening of economic ties established by the treaty, and the Russian representative on the Allied Control Commission systematically tried to block proposals for economic assistance from the United States, though his efforts were not always successful. In April Nagy headed a delegation which visited Moscow, and secured from Stalin an extension of the period for Hungarian reparations payments from six to eight years;[3] but in May any increase in Russian popularity that might have resulted from this concession was offset by the fact that the Soviet Government accepted the decision of the Foreign Ministers' Conference by which Rumania was to be allowed to reoccupy the whole of Transylvania.[4] The Russians had already found themselves unable to prevent the Hungarian Government from accepting a credit from the United States Government for surplus war material to the value of $10 million; and in June 1946 a Hungarian Government delegation, headed by Nagy, visited Washington. Although the delegates included the Communist leader Rákosi, their visit was a remarkable success, for they received assurances from the United States Government that the Hungarian gold bullion, to the amount of $32 million, which was in the American zone of occupation in Germany, would be returned to the Hungarian Government. Moreover, the credit for surplus war material was increased by $5 million; and an understanding was reached that the Hungarian Danube fleet should be allowed to sail under the

[1] See Nagy, pp. 136–7.

[2] The Russians took all possible steps to frustrate Western attempts to obtain information about the economic position of Hungary (ibid. p. 221).

[3] Ibid. p. 208. For the similar concession to Finland and Rumania see above, pp. 279, 294.

[4] See below, p. 328.

Hungarian flag, though a final decision on the ownership of the vessels was reserved.[1]

On 27 June 1946 a press release issued by the State Department in Washington revealed the fact that the question of economic assistance to Hungary had been causing friction between the United States and Soviet Governments since the end of 1945. As early as 3 December 1945 the Hungarian Government had asked the Allied Control Commission for the appointment of a joint commission to examine the economic situation in Hungary and to recommend methods of assistance in reconstruction; and at a meeting of the Control Commission held during the same month the United States representative had proposed the establishment of a sub-committee to consider questions of Hungarian finance, industry, and economics. The Russian chairman of the Commission had refused to consider the Hungarian request, and had also rejected the American proposal. On 2 March 1946 the United States Government had sent a note to the Soviet Government suggesting that joint efforts should be made, on the basis of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, to improve the economic situation in Hungary, which was described as being overburdened by reparations, requisitions by the Red Army, and occupation costs. The note recommended that a programme should be drawn up for the rehabilitation of the Hungarian economy and its integration within the general economy of Europe. In a reply of 21 April Vyshinsky denied that the deterioration in the Hungarian economy was due to the causes mentioned by the Americans. In the Russian view, the principal reasons for it were the damage done by the war and the failure of the United States Government to return Hungarian property, worth some $3,000 million, which had been carried off to Austria and Germany by the Szálasi Government and which was now in the American zone of occupation. Vyshinsky rejected the American proposal for joint action on the ground that economic rehabilitation was 'within the competence' of the Hungarian Government. The American Government replied in a note of 22 July, which gave a detailed economic analysis in support of the arguments put forward in their note of 2 March. Vyshinsky's estimate of the value of Hungarian property in the American zone was said to be 'grossly exaggerated', though it had not been possible yet to arrive at the true figure. The note emphasized the concession made to the Hungarian delegation on their visit to Washington, including the return of gold bullion; declared that the United States Government wished, not to impose their own point of view, but merely to respond to the Hungarian Government's request for assistance; and pleaded that the Soviet representative should be instructed to act in concert with the other members of the Allied Control Commission in time to help in carrying out a programme for financial

[1] See Nagy, pp. 229–30.

stabilization which was to be put into effect by the Hungarian Government on 1 August.

This appeal produced no effect; in a note of 27 July, the Soviet Government refused once again to co-operate with the Western Powers in working out a joint plan for the economic restoration of Hungary. In certain passages, indeed, the note took the line that there was no need for any special measures. The establishment of new factories in Hungary was mentioned, and figures were given to show that there had been a rise in Hungarian industrial capacity in both light and heavy industry. The Russians maintained that their claim to reparations was not excessive; that Red Army requisitions and removals of industrial equipment were of little significance; and that Hungary had benefited more than Russia from the economic treaty. In other passages in the note, however, the Americans were again blamed for causing the deterioration in Hungary's economic situation by their retention of Hungarian property. By this time it was clear that the Russo-American exchange of notes was merely exacerbating inter-Allied relations. It was therefore brought to a close by an American note of 21 September 1946, recognizing that an impasse had been reached. After reaffirming the statements made in previous American notes and refuting the Russian charges, the United States Government drew the conclusion that it was impossible for them to agree with the Russians on the questions of the Hungarian economic situation and its causes. No useful purpose would therefore be served by 'further assertions and denials'; but, since Hungary undoubtedly needed assistance, the American representative on the Allied Control Commission would always be ready to take part in joint measures such as had been suggested in earlier American notes.[1]

(*e*) Political Developments, February to December 1946

Although Nagy possessed a strong national mandate for his party through free election, neither he nor President Tildy was able, as was Paasikivi of Finland, to keep his country's head above water during the most critical period of its relations with the Russians. Nagy adopted a policy of maintaining, before everything else, the unity of the Government Coalition, looking forward to the time when the signing of the peace treaty and the departure of Russian troops (which, he supposed, would follow) would give Hungary a new lease of life. With the uncertain help of Tildy he succeeded in keeping the Coalition together for a short period, but only at the price of acquiescing in Communist control of the levers of government, and of bringing about a disastrous split within his own party. The Communists took advantage of this split when a change in policy caused

[1] For these exchanges of notes between the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, pp. 327–34, and *New York Times*, 25 September 1946.

them to take steps to eliminate their major political opponents, the Smallholders' Party, which they had previously helped to strengthen. The most important step in Nagy's policy of maintaining unity by gradual retreat was the relinquishment to the Communists, after the free elections of November 1945, of control over the Ministry of the Interior.

Soon after Nagy assumed office on 23 February 1946 differences developed within his party. Not only was there the question of the expulsion of the German minority: some members of the Smallholders' Party, who were strongly nationalist and revisionist, desired to see Magyar minorities in the successor states incorporated, with their territory, in Hungary. Some were opposed in principle to the Government's policies of agrarian reform and nationalization, and were critical of Nagy's policy of maintaining the unity of the Coalition by granting concessions to the Communists on vital issues. Since it was clear that, regardless of the appeal to Hungarian nationalism, the Coalition would not survive if a policy of seeking a revision of frontiers were adopted, Nagy chose a middle course in this policy, as in others, demanding only, as 'limited' peace aims, that equal rights should be given by the surrounding states to their Hungarian minorities, and asking of the Allied Powers only that a part of Transylvania should be returned for a second time, to Hungary.[1]

In order to exert pressure on Nagy the Communists first of all organized within the Government a Left-wing bloc, consisting of the Communists, Socialists, National Peasant Party, and the Trade Union Congress. Moreover, they could threaten to withdraw from the Government, or, if this proved insufficient, they could stage workers' strikes and demonstrations. Voroshilov, too, proved a most effective ally, for he could legally apply pressure for greater energy in carrying out the economic terms of the Armistice. This was apparently what happened in March 1946, when some of the Smallholders, including Desider Sulyok, criticized the Government policy in the National Assembly. Sulyok advocated revisionism, particularly with regard to Slovakia, where Hungarians were being ill-treated. He criticized the Supreme Economic Council, which, under the leadership of the Communist Zoltán Vas, was responsible for most of the Government's radical economic policies, including the nationalization of primary resources and sources of energy, and he complained that the establishment of the Council had created a dual government in Hungary. He also criticized the Communist control of the police.[2] Sulyok's speech precipitated a bitter Communist propaganda attack, which was supported by Radio Moscow and by demonstrations staged in Budapest, and was accompanied by demands for the purging of the Smallholders' Party of

[1] See Nagy, pp. 203–4.

[2] For the substance of Sulyok's speech see *New York Times*, 24 April 1946, and for the Soviet economic pressure which followed see Nagy, pp. 193–5.

'reactionary elements'. These demands, supported as they were by pressure from Russian officials, could not be resisted by Nagy. On 12 March he eventually agreed, in the interests of coalition unity, to a demand made by the Left-wing bloc for the expulsion of twenty-two members of his party.[1] After this, party differences were apparently resolved,[2] but under the façade of amity the Communists took several steps to consolidate their position. Imre Nagy[3] was now replaced at the Ministry of the Interior by the militant fanatic László Rajk. About the same time another Communist assumed effective control over the Ministry of Defence, where he immediately formed 'mobile frontier guards' under the command of the Communist General Palffy-Oesterreicher. The Communists were by now in full control of the key Ministries, as well as of the Supreme Economic Council; and their leader Rákosi was in a position, as Deputy Prime Minister, to assume official control over the Government itself if this should become necessary in the Communist Party's interests. By April 1946 the Smallholders' victory in the election of November[4] had come to seem very hollow indeed.[5]

Russian leaders thus had good reason for welcoming the delegation headed by Nagy which visited Moscow in April 1946. Although Stalin and Molotov had restored Transylvania[6] to their Rumanian tool, Groza's Government, after the coup of February 1945, they still managed to give encouragement to Nagy. Molotov recommended that he should negotiate directly with Groza's Government,[7] but this approach to Groza was not successful, and it was announced on 7 May that the Foreign Ministers, in conference in Paris, had agreed to recommend to the Peace Conference that Rumania should continue to possess the whole of Transylvania. When the Hungarians protested, the Russians blamed the Americans, although it was revealed later that the Russian Foreign Minister had himself insisted on confirming, without change, the Armistice condition providing for the return to Rumania of that part of Transylvania which had been annexed by Hungary during the war. Charges and counter-charges between the Americans and the Russians continued during the visit of the Hungarian delegation to Washington in May 1946.

An approaching clash between the Communists and the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary was foreshadowed by two incidents in which Russian

[1] The twenty-two Smallholders in question resigned from the party and formed a party of their own called the Freedom Party. For the time being, however, they retained their seats in Parliament.

[2] Nagy, p. 197; see also *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 March 1946.

[3] See above, p. 322, note 4.

[4] See above, p. 322.

[5] See *Observer*, 31 March 1946.

[6] They had been committed since December 1943 to Rumania's possessing the whole of Transylvania: see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 625.

[7] Nagy, pp. 209–10.

officers and soldiers were killed by Hungarian civilians, youths connected with either the Smallholders' Party or the Catholic Church or both. The Russian authorities used the assassinations, which they chose to interpret as part of a conspiracy, as an excuse for intervention against opponents of Communist policies in Hungary. In a note dated 28 June General Sviridov[1] accused the Hungarian Government of taking ineffective action against men who imperilled the security of the Red Army and the 'future of democracy' in Hungary. He demanded (*a*) that the Catholic Youth Organization and the Boy Scouts ('nests of reaction' where youths were trained to hate the Red Army) should be dissolved immediately; (*b*) that the clergy, under the leadership of Cardinal Mindszenty, should be directed to cease their attacks on 'democracy' and the Red Army; (*c*) that certain Smallholder local officials should be suspended; (*d*) that Zoltán Pfeiffer, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, should be forced to resign for obstructing swift investigation and punishment; and (*e*) that the two Smallholder leaders implicated in the incidents should lose their parliamentary immunity from arrest.[2] Both the American and British Governments protested against this action, the latter describing it as 'unwarrantable interference in the country's internal affairs',[3] but Nagy consented to carry out the first two demands. The third was already being met, but he refused to give in to the last two and, for the time being at least, defended the threatened members of his party.

During August anti-Semitic feeling, which had been stimulated by former Hungarian fascists who were now members of the Communist Party, gave rise to two incidents. For political reasons, the guilty persons were protected by the Communists. Nagy attempted to shield the Communists from publicity, with the result that two members of his own party were condemned to death by a court chosen by the Communists and their allies within the Coalition. The two Smallholders were subsequently acquitted by a Court of Appeal, but the affair heightened the existing tension between the Communists and the Smallholders.[4]

By the autumn of 1946 Nagy, though still holding the position of Prime Minister, had become virtually powerless. The key Ministries and the levers of power were already in the hands of Communists, and their control was steadily being extended. The reorganization of the 'mobile frontier units' was well under way, carefully supervised by General Kondratov, the head of the Russian military section of the Allied Control Commission. The Smallholders had abandoned their demand for local

[1] Sviridov had succeeded Voroshilov as chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary in April 1946.

[2] Nagy, pp. 239–44.

[3] For the American protest, made by the American representative on the Allied Control Commission, see *New York Herald Tribune*, and for the British protest see *The Times*, 19 July 1946.

[4] Nagy, pp. 245–9.

elections and were struggling in vain for representation in local government in proportion to the results of the general election of November 1945, and for the formation of a separate organization to represent the Hungarian peasantry. They were equally unsuccessful in their attempts to prevent the Communists from exercising discrimination in the purge of the bureaucracy. In October the new Freedom Party under Sulyok, after several unsuccessful attempts, finally secured permission from Sviridov for its official recognition as a new political party. It was in direct opposition to the Government and strongly nationalist, and was therefore assured of a certain amount of popularity from the start.

Despite their majority in the election of November 1945, the Smallholders, by the autumn of 1946, had been manœuvred into the position of an opposition party similar to the oppositions in Rumania and Bulgaria, and Nagy was only drifting with the current. The Communist-Socialist bloc were beginning openly to criticize his party and to challenge the basis of its majority, which they alleged to be 'unnatural'.[1] In a propaganda campaign the Right Wing of the party was called a 'hotbed of reaction'. Nagy now associated himself with the Right Wing, and his lieutenant, Bela Kovács, answered the Left-wing attacks in kind.[2] The main issue of the political struggle was soon clearly defined as being whether or no the Smallholder Right Wing was to be expelled from the party. Discussions between Nagy and Russian representatives foreshadowed the coming battle between the Communists and the Roman Catholic Church, which was still a major obstacle in the path of Communist policy, although its lands had, to a large extent, been expropriated by the agrarian reforms. In the autumn of 1946 the Communists launched a campaign for fundamental changes in the educational system of Hungary, which meant a major attack on the deep-seated Hungarian tradition of Church schools, and, as a first step, they began to apply pressure for the replacement of the Minister of Education by a candidate of their own named Joseph Darvas.[3]

(*f*) The Discovery of a Nationalist Conspiracy in December 1946

In December 1946 Communist leaders in the Ministries of Defence and the Interior began to make large-scale arrests without informing or consulting the Prime Minister. When it became generally known that considerable numbers of army officers and politicians were undergoing interrogation *in camera*, Nagy tried unsuccessfully to find out what was happening, and, as a result of Russian pressure,[4] he seems to have acquiesced in the exclusion of the Smallholders from the investigations that were

[1] See *New York Times*, 19 January 1947.

[2] See Nagy, pp. 265–7.

[3] See Nagy's account of his conversations with Pushkin, the Soviet diplomatic representative with the Red Army (ibid. pp. 296–9). For one account of the position of the Catholic Church in Hungary see E. Wiskemann: *Hungary*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, pp. 119–21.

[4] See Nagy, p. 319.

being conducted by the Communists. After several days of these secret interrogations Rajk, the Minister of the Interior, issued a communiqué announcing the discovery of a large-scale conspiracy originated by a nationalist organization called *Magyar Közösség* (Hungarian Community) which had existed before the war. A committee of seven men, most of them officers or officials, had, it was declared, made preparations for a *coup d'état* which was to take place either at the time of the signing of the peace treaty or when Russian troops were withdrawn. The military leader of the conspiracy was General Lajos Veress, and the civilian leaders included Balint Arany, a former executive secretary of the Smallholders' Party. The political objective of the conspiracy was said to be the re-establishment of the Horthy régime as this had existed before the German occupation in March 1944.[1] Up to this point Nagy had patiently persisted in his attempts to resolve differences with the Communists, but, as the secret interrogations continued during January, gradually more and more of the Smallholder leaders became involved, including some close associates of Nagy's. Further Communist attempts to split the Smallholders' Party and reduce their majority in Parliament led Nagy to resume the role of peacemaker. In an interview he admitted the existence of a plot against the state, and promised that the Smallholders would purge their own membership.[2] By the end of January, however, most of the Smallholders had realized the Communists' intentions, and were beginning to show signs of resistance. When the charge of implication in the conspiracy was made against Nagy's trusted friend and associate, Bela Kovács, the peasant members of the Smallholders' Party rallied to his defence, and protested publicly against the allegation that he was seriously involved. Rákosi and the other leaders of the Communist-Socialist bloc demanded the suspension of Kovács's parliamentary immunity, but, although he was forced to resign his posts in the party and abandon his connexion with the party newspaper, he retained his immunity from arrest. Early in February one of the peasant members of the Smallholders' Party introduced a motion in Parliament proposing that a committee of twenty-five members should be appointed to investigate the charges against Kovács. This was carried in spite of the opposition of the Left-wing bloc, who refused to associate themselves with the motion and threatened to withdraw from the Government if it were put into effect.[3] The main object of Nagy and Tildy was

[1] Ibid. pp. 322–3. For Rajk's communiqué see *New York Times*, 5 January 1947. For the nature of the conspiracy see *The Times*, 25 January 1947. See also a special article, 'The Conspiracy in Hungary', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 26 February 1947.

[2] *New York Times*, 21 January 1947. Nagy declared that the purge would not decrease the party's majority, but by the end of January, as a result of the expulsions of implicated Smallholders from Parliament (in addition to the twenty-two members previously expelled), the total number of Smallholder seats had been reduced from 245 to 210, and the entire Left Wing of the party was threatening to break away; cf. *The Observer Foreign News Service*, no. 378, 28 January 1947.

[3] *The Times*, 10 February 1947.

still to preserve inter-party peace, and Nagy arranged a compromise by which the Smallholders withdrew their motion, and in return the leaders of the Communist-Socialist bloc agreed to desist from their attacks on the Smallholders' Party.[1] It is to Nagy's credit that, despite strong pressure from the Communists, Kovács's immunity was not surrendered; but the Prime Minister's loyalty could not save his colleague. Kovács eventually consented to appear for police interrogation on three successive days, on condition that he should be allowed to return to his home in the evening, and also that he should not be treated as one of the accused. At this stage either the Russians lost patience, or perhaps, as they later claimed, they discovered that Kovács was involved in espionage against the Red Army; for on 26 February 1947, the day before the conspiracy trial was to begin, the Russians suddenly seized Kovács when he appeared on the second day for questioning, and, after taking him to his home for a search, spirited him away.[2]

This discovery by the Communists of a clandestine nationalist organization thus gave them the opportunity that they wanted for striking at their only remaining political opponent of any consequence. The seizure of Kovács by the Russians was an important step in the Communists' struggle to eliminate all serious opposition, which was soon to involve Nagy himself and to drive him into exile.

(vii) The Peace Settlement in Eastern Europe

By Sidney Lowery

(*a*) The Post-War Situation

By the time when the Allies began the process of drafting peace treaties with the former satellites of the Axis, Eastern Europe had already virtually taken its post-war shape. Stalin had been unsuccessful in his attempts early in the war to obtain recognition from the Western Allies for the territorial provisions of the secret additional protocol attached to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939;[3] but, with the increase in strength and confidence that came to Soviet Russia after the battle of Stalingrad, he had been able, regardless of the attitude of his allies, to reoccupy the Baltic States and the predominantly Ukrainian and White Russian eastern part of inter-war Poland, and to go on to occupy the ethnographically

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 12 February 1947. Nagy received some applause for his efforts, but it should be noted that the Communist newspaper *Szabad Nep* did not acknowledge that party differences had been resolved by the compromise. The cessation of the internal political crisis, said the newspaper, could only be achieved 'by means of complete destruction of the plotters and the reaction within our coalition' (*Soviet Monitor*, 15 Feburary 1947).

[2] See Nagy's account of these events (pp. 311–70).

[3] See *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 78; *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, i. 409–10.

Polish western part of inter-war Poland as well. Anxiety about the security of Russia's western frontier had probably been the primary consideration prompting Stalin to lay hands on the western border-lands. By controlling these, he would be compensating for Russia's lack of a 'natural frontier' in the great plains; for, under Russian control, the border-lands would constitute a broad glacis which any new invader from the west would now have first to traverse before he could strike the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Government had gone to war with Finland in 1939 in order to reacquire the territorial cover for the approaches to Leningrad which Russia had possessed in this quarter from 1721 to 1918; and security considerations were one motive for the annexation and sovietization of the Baltic States in August 1940. In the territory of inter-war Poland east of the Curzon Line security considerations coincided with White Russian and Ukrainian national aspirations, and the question of security in this case was combined with the determination to redress Russian political grievances against the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Riga.[1] Similar considerations applied to the partly Ukrainian and partly Rumanian territory of Bessarabia, to which Russia had historical claims going back to her conquest of Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire in 1812, and her possession of it, thereafter, till 1918; but in Northern Bukovina, where Russia could not plead previous possession, the need for security for the Soviet Union was adduced to supplement the Ukrainian claim on grounds of nationality. During the later stages of the war the Russians incorporated Poland, east of the Curzon Line, and these other territories in the Soviet Union, although the ease with which the Germans had invaded Russia had already cast doubts on the security value of the border territories for the Soviet Union in the most recent phase of the technique of war.[2] The Arctic shore of Finland as far as the Norwegian border was also now reacquired by the Soviet Union; and, when Stalin secured the Western Allies' agreement to the extension of Soviet territory as far west as the warm-water port of Königsberg, he was implicitly obtaining their tacit recognition of the territorial terms of the Nazi-Soviet agreement in regard to the hinterland. Stalin was also able in June 1945 to secure the formal cession from Czechoslovakia of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which completed the political unification of all Ukrainian lands within the frontiers of the Soviet Union and eliminated the last possible base of operations, outside Soviet territory, for Ukrainian separatist movements. The acquisition of this territory gave the Soviet Union a common frontier with Slovakia, and also, south of the Carpathians, with Hungary.

This new defensive glacis on the west was not the only advantage which

[1] See above, p. 128.

[2] For a comparison between Stalin at the end of the Second World War and Alexander I after the Napoleonic wars see Deutscher: *Stalin*, pp. 530–3.

Stalin had secured. By the provisions of the Armistice Agreements with the former satellites of the Axis, Finland and Rumania, and to a lesser extent Hungary and Bulgaria, were now tied to the Soviet Union economically. The Armistice with Finland also gave the Russians strategic advantages[1] which would make it virtually impossible for the Finns to defend themselves in the event of another Russo-Finnish war. The existence of Finland was thus now dependent on the maintenance of friendly relations between her and the Soviet Union. Stalin also ensured the continuing 'friendliness' of the 'friendly' Poland, which he had taken harsh and ruthless measures to establish in the face of outraged Western opinion and the protests of the Polish Government in London, by granting to Poland extensive German territories on the west in compensation for the White Russian and Ukrainian territories that she had had to cede to the Soviet Union on the east. For the implementation of this settlement, which extended Polish sovereignty to the Oder and the Western Neisse rivers,[2] and for protection against the danger of a German war of revenge, Poland was made completely dependent on her eastern neighbour by the Polish-Soviet treaty of April 1945.[3] In similar fashion, by restoring to the Rumanians the whole of the territory which the Axis Powers had compelled them in August 1940 to retrocede to Hungary,[4] Stalin obtained a guarantee of the 'friendliness' of Rumania by making her dependent upon the support of the Soviet Union against a possible resurgence of Hungarian irredentism.

The agreement concluded by the Russians with the British Government in 1944 for the establishment of spheres of influence[5] had led Stalin to expect that he would be able, with Western approval, to exercise a controlling influence in the Balkan Peninsula except for Greece, and it had also encouraged his hope of acquiring for Russia some hold over the Black Sea Straits. On the other hand, Stalin's desire to preserve harmony among the Big Three led him to make gestures in Greece, Italy, and France in 1944,[6] and to put forward the pattern of 'People's Democracy' as the best

[1] These were the reduction of Finnish armed strength, the granting of transportation rights to and from the new Russian naval base at Porkkala-Udd, which was itself within easy range of Helsinki, and the Soviet Union's reacquisition of the warm-water port of Petsamo in the north (see above, pp. 271–2).

[2] See above, pp. 226–7. The policy of compensating Poland at Germany's expense for her territorial losses to the Soviet Union had been approved, and perhaps even been initiated, by Churchill in principle, but Churchill had insisted that an extension of Poland westward to the line of the Oder and the Eastern Neisse would be sufficient to give Poland the fair equivalent, on the west, of her losses on the east, and he had strenuously opposed an extension to the line of the Western Neisse as being both unjust and inhumane.

[3] See above, p. 217.

[4] See above, p. 285.

[5] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 422–5, 495.

[6] Viz. abstinence from any kind of interference during the civil war in Greece, recognition of Badoglio, the co-operation of the Communist Parties, regardless of their newly acquired strength, with other political groups in Italy and France, and Communist support for the Lateran Pacts and for de Gaulle. Cf. Deutscher: *Stalin*, pp. 516–19.

form of government, midway between capitalism and Communism, for the countries of Eastern Europe.[1] Yet his overriding preoccupation was with the military security of the Soviet Union's western border, which he thought of in traditional terms of warfare on the ground, and, when he was forced to choose between this and the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States, he chose military security, as he conceived of it. Stalin's obsession, up to the time of the Potsdam Conference (July 1945), with the thought of future German revenge, was, in 1944 and 1945, a dominating consideration in his policy towards Europe, and especially in his determination to secure a 'friendly Poland'. In Rumania the Russian intervention in February 1945[2] was partially justified by Stalin's good faith in honouring, in the case of Greece, his commitments under his agreement with Churchill on spheres of influence; but Rumania also occupied a special position in relation to the traditional Russian policy on the question of the Straits, and moreover, the injuries inflicted on Russia by invading Rumanian troops during the critical phases of the war were still fresh in Russian minds. The establishment of a 'friendly' Poland and a 'friendly' Rumania would prevent the traditional political parties in these countries from regaining a predominant influence.[3]

But, just as Communist activities before the war had caused the failure of the 'popular Front' policy, so immediately after the war the ostensible purpose of the 'People's Democracy' policy was defeated by the revolutionary Communist methods used in implementing it. Moreover, there were economic, as well as political, points of friction. Russian economic plans, which were developed during 1945 and 1946, were designed to integrate the Eastern European economies with post-war reconstruction in the Soviet Union, and these plans clashed with Western second thoughts about spheres of influence, and with Western attempts to establish equality of economic opportunity. The development of tension between the members of the Grand Alliance was a gradual process which could be traced back to as early a date as the later months of 1944.[4] During the next eighteen months the methods adopted by the Communists in East European countries under Russian control caused anger and anxiety in the West; Western reactions gave rise to Russian suspicions that the British and the

[1] Georgi Dimitrov (see above, p. 302 and note 3), who, as leader of the Comintern in 1935 had been responsible for 'popular front' policies, was now in charge of applying the 'People's Democracy' principle to his native Bulgaria.

[2] See above, pp. 289–90.

[3] Deutscher, himself a Pole, says: 'In truth, of all Polish parties, only the Communists were "friendly to Russia"' (*Stalin*, p. 521).

[4] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 432–3. Towards the end of 1945 the Russians and local Communists were still co-operating with other parties on the 'People's Democracy' basis in Hungary, even to the extent of permitting the holding of a free election on 2 October. In Bulgaria the Communists continued to co-operate with the groups within the 'Fatherland Front' coalition.

Americans wished to re-establish anti-Russian régimes in the lands bordering on the U.S.S.R.; and these suspicions spurred on the Russians to an undisguised seizure of power by means of Communist agents in East European countries. The path that led to this goal had in fact been cleared when the advance of the Red Army had produced the overthrow of the former ruling groups and had created a vacuum by the destruction of the basis of their political power.

It was at this stage in the development of the one-sided settlement in Eastern Europe, and against a setting of political conflict between East and West in Central Europe, that the Council of Foreign Ministers and their deputies began the process of drafting the Peace Treaties. The participants came from two different worlds with mutually alien outlooks, ideas, and ideals. The peacemakers at Versailles had not had to struggle under such a handicap; for the world of the three major victorious Powers in 1919 was, to all intents and purposes, one and the same: it was the world of liberal capitalism and parliamentary democracy. Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau did not always agree either about principles or about questions of *Realpolitik*, but at least they understood each other's idiom. But between the representatives of the Grand Alliance in the Second World War there was no common denominator. Even at the height of war-time camaraderie there had still remained a gulf between the Soviet Union and her Western allies.[1] As Communists, the Russian leaders could never accept the Western conception of democracy, which they considered to be no more than a mask for the subjection of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie. Stalin's hostility to the bourgeoisie, which was always associated by Communists with Western democracy, had roots in the early days of his underground activity.[2] The attack on the bourgeoisie was dropped by the Communists at the time of the adoption of the Popular Front policy, and again during the heyday of the Grand Alliance, when the Communists officially dedicated themselves to the defence of 'democracy'; but if the word 'bourgeois', as a term of abuse, was sometimes tactfully discarded, it was never forgotten. The Western leaders, however, did not attempt, on their side, to understand the Communists' point of view, and continued to judge their actions by Western standards. The basis of Communist hostility to the capitalist world was summarized as follows in the Soviet Constitution of 6 July 1923:

> Since the time of the foundation of the soviet republics, the states of the world have divided into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. There—in the camp of capitalism—national enmity and inequality, colonial

[1] Stalin's biographer has expressed the Soviet leader's early attitude towards his war-time allies as follows: 'In his eyes the conflict between the fascist capitalism of Germany and the liberal capitalism of Britain and the United States was much more superficial than the basic antagonism between Bolshevik Russia and either of the other two' (Deutscher: *Stalin*, pp. 473–4).

[2] Cf. one of Stalin's earliest published articles castigating the bourgeoisie (ibid. pp. 40–41).

slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars. Here—in the camp of socialism—mutual confidence and peace and the brotherly collaboration of peoples.[1]

In consequence of this hostility, dissimulation had become a characteristic of Soviet diplomacy in dealing with the capitalist Powers. During the war Stalin made gestures in support of the cause of inter-Allied co-operation, but by the time of the peace-making the Communist conceptions of class warfare were once again in official use.

Relations between East and West were impaired at the time of the making of the Peace Treaties by the application of Russian power politics in Eastern Europe, and by the Communists' attitude towards 'bourgeois democracy' (or liberal capitalism). Moreover, there were differences in the definition of such words as democracy and freedom, and differing conceptions of what constituted free elections and the fundamental freedoms —safeguards for which must, the Western Powers insisted, be included in the treaties with Germany's satellites. As a result neither side understood accurately what the other was saying or thinking.[2]

(*b*) The Genesis of the Peace Treaties with Germany's Former Allies

(1) *The Procedure*

The first meeting in London of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which began on 11 September 1945, not long after the Council had been created at Potsdam, broke up abruptly before progress could be made towards establishing a procedure for the drafting of Peace Treaties with Italy[3] and the former Axis satellites.[4] Nevertheless, preliminary views were exchanged, and proposals were put forward which formed the basis of the agreement that was reached when Byrnes and Bevin travelled to Moscow in December 1945.[5] During this visit it was announced on 24 December that the three

[1] Max Beloff: *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–41*, 2 vols. (London, Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945), i. 2.

[2] See the use of the word 'democratic' in the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe (Cmd. 7088), the violation of which became the basis for Western resentment against Russian policy in Eastern Europe; and the differences of definition revealed during the discussions at Yalta on Poland (see above, pp. 195–207). Another example was the difference in the usages of the word 'imperialism'. Lenin's economic definition of imperialism (Deutscher: *Stalin*, p. 411) resembled some of the arguments used by Molotov during his opposition, at the Paris Peace Conference and elsewhere, to Western economic penetration in South-Eastern Europe and to Western attempts to ensure freedom of navigation on the Danube. The unfavourable American conception of imperialism was different, again, from the British view of what the British Empire stood for. 'Fascism' and 'fascist parties' were also defined differently.

[3] For details of the peace settlement with Italy see below, pp. 453–80.

[4] For this meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which ended on 2 October 1945 in 'resounding failure', see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 696–701.

[5] R. Opie and others: *The Search for Peace Settlements* (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1951), pp. 78–79.

principal Powers had agreed that the treaties should be drafted in each case by those members of the Council of Foreign Ministers who had been signatories of the terms of surrender (this meant that China would not take part, although a special provision was to be made for France to participate in the drafting of the Peace Treaty with Italy). The draft treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, then, were to be drawn up by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom, while the treaty with Finland was to be drafted by the British and Russian Foreign Ministers only. When the drafts had been completed, a conference was to be convoked, not later than 1 May 1946, to consider them. The Conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers (the United States, Britain, Russia, France, and China), 'together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states'. These states, twenty-one in all, were enumerated in the communiqué.[1]

After the conclusion of the deliberations of the Conference and upon consideration of its recommendations the States signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland—France being regarded as such for the purpose of the peace treaty with Italy—will then draw up the final texts of peace treaties. The final texts of the respective peace treaties as so drawn up will be signed by representatives of the States represented at the Conference which are at war with the enemy States in question. The texts of the respective peace treaties will then be submitted to the other United Nations which are at war with the enemy States in question.[2]

The Peace Treaties were to become effective as soon as they had been ratified by the states which had drafted them, but they were also to be ratified by the enemy states concerned. The communiqué of 24 December announced that France and China had been asked to adhere to this procedure, and that the Foreign Ministers' deputies would immediately resume their work in London on the basis of understandings reached, presumably in Moscow, on matters discussed at the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. It was not mentioned in the communiqué that the Foreign Ministers had also agreed in Moscow that, during the proposed Conference, which they suggested should be held in Paris, a hearing should be given to the representatives of the former enemy states in question, each of whom would be allowed to discuss and present his views on the peace settlement.[3]

[1] The U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, Australia, Belgium, the Byelorussian (White Russian) S.S.R., Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia, and the Ukrainian S.S.R. For the source of the communiqué see above, p. 295, note 2.

[2] i.e. those who had not been engaged in active hostilities against the enemy states.

[3] U.S.A., Department of State: *Making the Peace Treaties, 1941–47*, Department of State Publication 2774 (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., February 1947), pp. 19–20.

The deputies of the Foreign Ministers met soon afterwards in London (18 January 1946), but little progress was made in treaty-drafting, mainly because of disputes over the treaty with Italy. Nevertheless, the deputies were able to examine treaty drafts submitted by the Soviet delegation, which appear to have been brief and to have consisted for the most part of an extension of the Armistice terms. The American and British deputies then submitted amendments to the Soviet proposals, and, according to Byrnes, some progress was made towards agreement.[1] By the beginning of April 1946, however, it was apparent that, if the Peace Conference was to be held on the scheduled date, which was 1 May, the completion of the draft treaties must be hastened. Byrnes suggested another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, to be held in Paris.[2] The British and Soviet Governments agreed; and the choice of Paris proved a fortunate one for the French, for when the Foreign Ministers met on 25 April they were able to obtain Molotov's consent to allow French participation in the discussion of all five treaties.[3] The foremost obstacles to progress were the familiar disputes over certain aspects of the Italian treaty and over the current situation in Persia (the Western Powers complained of the continued presence of Russian troops, and of Russian interference in Persian affairs).[4] The date for the forthcoming Conference was soon postponed, and the American proposal to introduce clauses in the treaties with satellites to guarantee equality of economic opportunity and freedom of navigation on the Danube were denounced by Molotov as attempts at imperialist expansion by the capitalist West.[5] When Byrnes pressed for a date in June for the Peace Conference, Molotov insisted that the Foreign Ministers should first agree on the 'basic' issues before setting a date for the Conference. Many clauses remained unsettled by the middle of May, and in his impatience at the delay Byrnes suggested, on the 14th, that, since the discussions were not making appreciable progress, the Council should adjourn until 15 June, and that in the interval the Foreign Ministers should re-examine their positions 'in the hope of finding means of reconciling them'.[6] The other Foreign Ministers agreed to his suggestion two days later.

While Byrnes and Molotov were using the period of recess to throw verbal stones at one another from their respective capitals, their subordinates were able to continue their labours in Paris, so that, when the Foreign Ministers assembled once again in the middle of June,[7] they found that

[1] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 124.
[2] See U.S.A., Department of State: *Making the Peace Treaties*, pp. 22–26.
[3] It was understood, however, that France would have voting rights on the Italian treaty only.
[4] For the sequence of events in Northern Persia see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 626, 693, 704, 711–12, 741.
[5] Byrnes, op. cit. p. 129.
[6] U.S.A., Department of State: *Making the Peace Treaties*, p. 25.
[7] For this meeting see ibid. pp. 27–29.

an appreciable number of additional clauses had been agreed on.[1] Many issues still remained unresolved, however, and Molotov's insistence on thrashing them out individually before deciding on a date for the Conference conflicted with the desires of Byrnes and Bevin to hold the Conference as soon as possible, in spite of the fact that a number of points were still in dispute. Molotov used Byrnes's emphatically expressed desire for an early date to secure concessions on several outstanding issues. He was able to secure a commitment from Byrnes to sign all the treaties with the satellite states, and on 4 July the Americans agreed to a fixed amount ($100 million) of reparations from Italy to the Soviet Union. A dispute ensued over the procedure to be followed at the Conference, but it was finally agreed that the Council should send draft rules of procedure, as no more than 'suggestions', to the delegations invited to the Conference. By 9 July the invitations had been sent, and it had been settled that the first meeting of the Conference should be held on 29 July 1946.[2]

(2) *The Paris Peace Conference, 29 July to 15 October 1946*

The Paris Peace Conference began on 29 July under the sponsorship of four out of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers (the Chinese Foreign Minister was not present). The delegations received copies of the draft Peace Treaties, many articles of which had still not been agreed on.[3] A Committee of the whole Conference was set up at once to consider the draft rules of procedure 'suggested' by the Council of Foreign Ministers,[4] and during its discussions, between 30 July and 8 August, many of the Council's suggestions were adopted. It was decided to establish an administrative and a general Secretariat[5] and a number of Commissions. These included a General Commission, consisting of representatives of all twenty-one members of the Conference, the purpose of which was to 'assist the plenary conference'; five Political and Territorial Commissions (for the five enemy states), consisting of the four sponsoring members of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the states represented at the Conference which were at war with the various enemy

[1] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 130.

[2] Ibid. pp. 133–6.

[3] For the texts of the draft peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland, see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Draft Peace Treaty with* . . . [country in question] *Prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers for consideration by the Peace Conference of Twenty-one Nations meeting in Paris on the 29th July, 1946*, Cmds. 6892, 6894, 6895, 6896, 6897 (London, H.M.S.O., 1946), and U.S.A., Department of State: *Paris Peace Conference, 1946, Selected Documents*, pp. 71 seqq., 1011 seqq., 833 A seqq., 649 seqq., 1215 seqq.

[4] For the Rules of Procedure see New Zealand: *The Conference of Paris: Report of the New Zealand Delegation on . . . the Treaties of Peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland: Paris, 29 July–15 October 1946* (Wellington, 1947), pp. 14 seqq.

[5] The Administrative Secretariat was exclusively French; the General Secretariat consisted of eight members, including the four members of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The latter body became the Steering Committee of the Conference.

states concerned (the same states which, as provided in the Moscow communiqué, would later sign the individual treaties); an Economic Commission for Italy, consisting of all states represented at the Conference which were at war with Italy (twenty of the twenty-one, excluding only Norway), to consider the economic and financial clauses of the Italian Treaty; an Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland, consisting of the four Council members and all represented states who were at war with the satellite states (fourteen in all); a Military Commission, consisting of all twenty-one members, to consider the military, naval, and air clauses of all five treaties; and a Legal and Drafting Commission, also consisting of all twenty-one members, whose competence was never clearly defined.[1]

The members of the Committee of the whole Conference were encouraged by Byrnes to draw up their own rules and they refused to adopt some of the suggestions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, e.g. the proposal that only recommendations passed by a two-thirds' majority should be received by the Council. After a good deal of debate the Conference adopted a British proposal that recommendations passed by a simple majority should also be received.[2] During the deliberations over procedure, which later proved important because of the publicity value of the recommendations, a struggle developed between Byrnes, who resolutely attempted to strengthen the Conference's powers of recommendation, and Molotov, who attempted unsuccessfully to reduce them. When Byrnes committed himself publicly at the Conference to pressing for the adoption of all Conference recommendations which received two-thirds' majorities, Molotov said that this would violate agreements made previously in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Molotov's opposition, however, was not strong enough to prevent the adoption of the British proposal, and the Conference was able to go on to discuss questions of substance.

From 10 to 15 August the Conference, as had been agreed at Moscow, heard representatives of the five enemy states, who were allowed to present their observations on the individual treaties.[3] Because of delays in the submission of amendments by the various delegations, consideration of the draft treaties by the Commissions did not begin in earnest before the latter part of August. Even then progress was slow, and at the end of August the Council of Foreign Ministers met to decide on measures for speeding up the proceedings.[4] On 8 September the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations was postponed for a month, from 23

[1] New Zealand: *The Conference of Paris*, pp. 16–18.
[2] Opie and others: *The Search for Peace Settlements*, p. 91.
[3] For verbatim records of the observations on the treaties, as presented to the Conference by representatives of Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, including some proposed amendments to the treaties, see U.S.A., Department of State: *Paris Peace Conference, 1946*.
[4] Their deputies were instructed to go through the amendments which had been submitted, and to find those which could command general support in the Conference.

September to 23 October. This put a definite time-limit on the Conference, and it was decided that its last session should be held on 15 October. On 12 September the Steering Committee announced that the Commissions must complete their work by 5 October, in order to leave sufficient time for their reports to be considered in plenary sessions. A time-limit was imposed on speeches in the Commissions, and these completed their work by the appointed date. After two days' discussion of the Commissions' reports in plenary sessions, voting on their recommendations regarding the Italian Treaty took place between 7 and 9 October, and voting on the treaties with satellites between 10 and 13 October.[1] When the Conference formally ended on 15 October, it had passed fifty-three recommendations by two-thirds' majorities and forty-one recommendations by simple majorities. The recommendations were then submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers for their consideration before the final texts of the treaties were drawn up.

On 14 October, before the end of the Conference, it was decided that the Council of Foreign Ministers should meet on 4 November in New York City, and that their agenda should include the Paris Conference's recommendations on the treaties with the satellite countries. As soon as the meeting began, however, it became clear that there were still differences between the Foreign Ministers in their approach to the problems on their agenda. Byrnes was the only member of the Council who had undertaken to accept all recommendations of the Conference that had been passed by a two-thirds' majority, and the Soviet representatives seemed determined to disregard the Conference's recommendations altogether and to adhere to their original position on the clauses of the draft treaties that were still in dispute. Byrnes soon declared that, rather than enter upon another period of acrimonious and frustrating debate, he would prefer to abandon the attempt to reach agreement on the treaties, and this statement produced an immediate change in Russian policy.[2] Molotov made a large number of concessions and eventually agreed (subject in some cases to slight changes in the wording) to forty-seven of the fifty-three recommendations passed in Paris by two-thirds' majorities, and to twenty-four of the forty-one passed by simple majorities.[3] Agreement was reached even on the outstanding questions which had hitherto proved insoluble, and by 6 December the treaties had been virtually completed. It was decided that the ceremonies of signature should be held in Paris on 10 February 1947. As provided in the Moscow communiqué, the treaties were to become effective as soon as they had been ratified by the states signatories to the terms of Armistice, and, in the case of the Italian Treaty, also by France.[4]

[1] New Zealand: *The Conference of Paris*, pp. 4–6.

[2] For the various advantages to be gained by the Soviet Government by concluding the treaties see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 722–3.

[3] Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 154.

[4] U.S.A., Department of State: *Making the Peace Treaties*, pp. 60–62.

(*c*) The Substance of the Treaties with the Satellite States

(1) *The Relation of the Peace Treaties to the Armistice Agreements*

Although the drafting of the Peace Treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland was a long and laborious process, many of the political provisions had their origin in the respective Armistice Agreements. These Agreements, in turn, were based to a certain extent on the arrangements made at the time of Italy's surrender. The original Agreement with Italy of 3 September 1943 had been entirely military, but the Additional Conditions of Armistice, signed on 29 September, had contained political and economic provisions as well.[1] These Agreements had been concluded between Italy on the one side and Britain and the United States on the other, and the Russians had taken no part in the negotiations for a political settlement with Italy until Hull and Eden had gone to Moscow in October 1943. At that time the Soviet leaders had mentioned seven points which they wished to see included in the arrangements with Italy, and, although Eden had assured Molotov that most of them had already been adopted, it had been agreed at the Moscow Conference that a joint statement on Italy should be published which would include the seven points proposed by the Russians.[2] The additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy, together with Molotov's seven points, were apparently used by the Russians in their negotiations with the Rumanians and Finns, during the spring and early summer of 1944, for the Armistice Agreements which were eventually signed in September 1944. The Rumanian Armistice Agreement was then used in the following month as a model for the Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria, and subsequently in January 1945 for the Agreement with Hungary.

The general conditions which were common—with minor local variations—to all the Armistice Agreements, and which clearly originated in

[1] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Documents relating to the Conditions of an Armistice with Italy (September–November 1943)*, Cmd. 6693 (London, H.M.S.O. [1945]) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6693], Articles 23–24.

[2] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1283–4. The joint statement on Italy appeared in the communiqué of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers issued in October 1943. The seven points were:

'(1) It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

(2) Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

(3) All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist régime shall be suppressed.

(4) All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from administration and from institutions of a public character.

(5) All political prisoners of the Fascist régime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

(6) Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

(7) Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.'

(*Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943–1944*, pp. 230–1.)

the Agreement with Italy of 29 September 1943, were those for the arrest and trial of war criminals, the disbandment of Fascist organizations and institutions, the repeal of racial and other discriminatory legislation, and the release of prisoners confined because of sympathies with the United Nations.[1] The military provisions of the Armistice Agreements were concerned, for the most part, with the termination of hostilities with the Allied Powers and with the continuation of the war against Germany, and therefore had little direct bearing on the Peace Treaties.

The territorial provisions of the Armistice Agreements, on the other hand, were of considerable importance. In the case of Rumania, they confirmed the Soviet-Rumanian frontier which had been established on 28 June 1940, when Rumania had ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. At the same time they nullified the Second Vienna Award (of 30 August 1940), which had given Northern Transylvania to Hungary, and declared that Transylvania (or the greater part thereof) should belong to Rumania. No mention was made of the frontier between Rumania and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Armistice terms made no provision for the establishment of frontiers, but it had been a preliminary condition of the Armistice that Bulgarian armed forces and civil authorities should be withdrawn from Greek and Yugoslav territory, and that legislation incorporating such territory in Bulgaria should be repealed. For the time being, therefore, the pre-war frontiers of Bulgaria were restored, and territorial disputes between her and her neighbours were left for later solution. In the case of Hungary the provisions were more definite. The Vienna Awards of 2 November 1938 and 30 August 1940 were declared null and void, and Hungary accepted the obligation to withdraw her armed forces and civil authorities from territories outside the Hungarian frontiers as these had run on 31 December 1937, and to repeal legislation incorporating such territories in Hungary. Provisionally, at least, Hungary was thus once again confined within the frontiers established by the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920). The Armistice Agreement with Finland restored the Soviet-Finnish frontier established by the Treaty of 12 March 1940, except for the exchange by the Russians of the lease of the Hangö Peninsula for a fifty-year lease of territory and waters in the area of Porkkala-Udd, and also for the retrocession to the Soviet Union of the

[1] Cmd. 6693: Articles 29, 30, 31, 32 of the Italian Armistice Agreement of 29 September 1943. Some of these points were also among those proposed by the Russians. The Articles providing for the establishment of Allied Control Commissions originated in Article 37 of the Italian Agreement. Other provisions common to the Italian Agreement and to the Agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were contained in Articles 16, 21, and 23 of the Italian Agreement (for the control and censorship of communications and means of propaganda, for the right of passage for United Nations forces and for the supply of the necessary facilities and assistance, and also for the provision of such currency as might be required by the United Nations Command) but were omitted from the Agreement with Finland because she was never under Allied military occupation.

province of Petsamo, which cut Finland off from the Arctic Ocean and gave the Soviet Union the common frontier with Norway that had formerly been possessed by the Russian Empire. The Armistice with Finland also re-established the Finnish-Soviet Convention of 11 October 1940 concerning the demilitarization of the Åland Islands.[1]

The economic clauses of the Armistice Agreements, of which account had to be taken in drafting the Peace Treaties, included provisions for the restoration of the legal rights and interests of members of the United Nations, for the restitution of 'valuables and materials' removed from the Soviet Union, and, in the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, for the restitution of articles removed from the territories of neighbouring states which they had occupied during the war. Some war material was acquired by the Russians under the Agreements as 'booty', and the Armistice terms also prohibited the removal or expropriation of any German property without the express permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The same provision was made in the Agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland in regard to Hungarian property. Merchant vessels belonging to the satellite states were placed under Soviet operational control. Rumania, Finland, and Hungary were required to pay reparations to the amount of $300 million each in commodities over six years. Rumania and Finland were to pay the entire amount to the Soviet Union, while Hungary was to pay the Russians $200 million and was to provide a further $100 million which was to be divided between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in compensation for damage inflicted on them during the Hungarian occupation. In the case of Bulgaria no definite sum was fixed, and the Armistice Agreement merely provided (Article 9) that she should make such reparations to the United Nations, including Greece and Yugoslavia, 'as may be determined later'.[2]

Many of the non-military terms of the Armistice Agreements were incorporated in the draft Peace Treaties at some stage. The Armistice terms regarding frontiers did not become subjects for dispute, except in the case of Hungary. The Armistice Agreement with Rumania had provided that Transylvania, 'or the greater part thereof', should be transferred to Rumania, and this gave the Hungarian Government an opening for pressing their claim to retain part of Transylvania. Byrnes had originally been in favour of Hungary's claim, but, in order to reduce the number of questions in dispute, he later agreed that the pre-war frontiers of Hungary and Bulgaria should be restored pending the presentation of views at the Peace Conference.[3]

[1] See above, p. 272.

[2] For the terms of the Armistice Agreements with Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria see Cmds. 6585, 6586, 6587; for that with Hungary see *Soviet War News*, 25 January 1945, and also *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1944–1945*, pp. 244–50.

[3] Council on Foreign Relations: *The United States in World Affairs, 1945–47*, p. 123.

(2) *Issues discussed and Recommendations passed at the Paris Peace Conference*

At the Paris Peace Conference the clauses of the draft treaties on which agreement had not been reached could be examined afresh in the light of the many amendments submitted. In this section, it is possible to mention only the main issues that were discussed by the various Commissions. The territorial arrangements for Transylvania had already been settled by the Russians in favour of Rumania, and the attempts made by the Hungarians at the Conference to secure a revision of the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier were not successful. In the Commission which dealt with political and economic terms for Bulgaria the frontier with Greece gave rise to much dispute. Bulgaria's proposal that she should be allowed to retain Western Thrace and an outlet on the Aegean was supported by the Soviet Union and the Eastern Slav bloc, while the British Commonwealth and some West European countries supported a proposal made by Greece that, for security reasons, she should be allowed to expand her territory northwards. An American compromise proposal for the demilitarization of the pre-war frontier between Greece and Bulgaria did not meet with general approval at Paris,[1] but it was suddenly accepted by Molotov at the subsequent meeting in New York.

In the Commission on the Hungarian Treaty the Czechs presented several amendments. The First Vienna Award had already been nullified by the Hungarian Armistice; but the restoration of the pre-war Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier did not satisfy the Czechs, and they proposed an amendment providing for the transfer to them of several villages in the north-west corner of Hungary near Bratislava. Most of the delegations were impressed by the economic case presented by the Czechs for the cession of this territory, and the New Zealand delegation proposed an amendment which gave the Czechs their desired frontage on the Danube, but reduced by half the area and population to be ceded, and imposed on Czechoslovakia an obligation to guarantee the 'human and civic rights' of the population. This amendment was adopted by the Conference as a recommendation. The Czechoslovak delegation also proposed that the problem of the Hungarian minority remaining in Slovakia after the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Agreement of February 1946[2] should be solved by the expulsion of 200,000 Magyars, and hinted that, if an amendment to this effect was not accepted, the remaining Magyars would be resettled and assimilated. Hungarian arguments that there was no room for these Magyars from Czechoslovakia were not received with sympathy in view of the known depletion of population—German, Jew, and Magyar—

[1] New Zealand: *The Conference of Paris*, pp. 47–49.

[2] A partial agreement had been concluded on 27 February 1946, providing for the exchange of the Slovak population of Hungary for a similar number of the considerably larger number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. It was agreed that negotiations should continue on the problem of the remaining Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia. See Hungary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs: *Hungary and the Conference of Paris*, vol. iv (Budapest, 1947), p. viii.

during the war, and the recent expulsion of Germans from Hungary. Nevertheless, the American, British, and Australian delegations desired a compromise solution, and the amendment finally adopted by the Conference made no provision for a forcible transfer of populations, but merely imposed an obligation on Hungary to enter into negotiations with Czechoslovakia on the problem of the Magyar minority in Slovakia. It was provided that, if no agreement were reached within a certain period, Czechoslovakia should be entitled to refer the dispute to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Another proposal that was submitted to the Conference by Czechoslovakia and was accepted was for the insertion of a provision in the treaty to ban Hungarian revisionist propaganda.[1]

In the Economic Commission for the Balkans and Finland the United States delegation tried unsuccessfully to obtain a reduction in the amount of reparations to be paid by Hungary and Finland. When the question of Bulgarian reparations came up for discussion Greece was in favour of the maximum sum, while Yugoslavia, with the support of the Eastern Slav bloc, advocated the minimum. An American compromise proposal was eventually adopted in Paris, providing for a total payment of $125 million,[2] but the amount was reduced at the New York meeting, as a result of pressure from Molotov, to $70 million, of which Greece was to receive $45 million and Yugoslavia $25 million.

Many of the other issues discussed at the Conference were of relatively minor importance, or became meaningless in the light of the current economic struggle in Eastern Europe between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. A dispute over fair prices for Western oil companies in Rumania was a reflection of the West's struggle to retain its economic position in the face of the Soviet Government's determination to prevent further Western economic penetration, and to eliminate, if possible, the existing Western economic interests in Eastern Europe. The Russians' intention, in thus working for the exclusion of the Western Powers from Eastern Europe, was to clear the ground for gradually tying the economy of Eastern Europe to the economy of the Soviet Union through various techniques, such as that of the joint-stock company;[3] and the Soviet delegate in the Economic Commission fought resolutely to secure recognition for Russia's special economic position in Eastern Europe. He achieved at least one success, when a special provision was adopted which enabled the Soviet Union to substitute bilateral negotiations with Rumania for the treaty provisions for restitution. Western attempts to secure equality of economic opportunity in Eastern Europe and most-favoured-nation treatment from the various countries concerned were opposed by the Slav

[1] For the Czechoslovak amendments, and their outcome in the Political and Territorial Commission for Hungary, see New Zealand: *The Conference of Paris*, pp. 50–55.

[2] Ibid. pp. 63–65.

[3] See above, p. 324.

bloc, led by the Soviet Union, on the grounds that they constituted attempts at capitalist economic penetration and that they also encroached on the special position of the Soviet Union with regard to the Eastern European countries.[1] The dispute over navigation on the Danube was a further manifestation of the same economic struggle, though, in this case, Russian concern over security also played a part. In any event, the Soviet Union, as a riparian Power by virtue of her recovery of Bessarabia,[2] was clearly in a position to control traffic on the Danube, if the Soviet Government considered that this would serve their interests.

(*d*) The Treaties in their Final Form[3]

The signature in Paris, on 10 February 1947, of the Peace Treaties with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, officially brought to an end the state of war between these countries and the Allies, terminated the period of implementation of the Conditions of Armistice under the supervision of Allied Control Commissions, and, officially at least, restored Germany's former satellites to the status of sovereign states.

Under the territorial provisions of the treaties, the frontiers of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland were restored to the positions at which they had stood on 1 January 1941, except in the cases of the Hungarian-Rumanian and Finnish-Russian frontiers. As far as Rumania was concerned the treaty confirmed the loss of the territories which she had ceded to the Soviet Union and to Bulgaria in 1940. The Soviet-Rumanian frontier was re-established along the Pruth River, and the Soviet Union became, once again, like the former Russian Empire, a riparian Power on the delta of the Danube. The Armistice provision declaring the Second Vienna Award of 30 August 1940 null and void was incorporated in the treaty, and all the territory acquired by Rumania from Hungary after the First World War was restored to Rumania. In the case of Bulgaria the restoration of the frontiers of January 1941 enabled her to retain the Southern Dobruja, which had been ceded to her by Rumania under the Treaty of Craiova on 5 September 1940. The inter-war frontier between Bulgaria and Greece was confirmed in the Bulgarian Treaty, but the frontier was to be demilitar-

[1] New Zealand: *The Conference of Paris*, pp. 59–73; cf. Opie and others: *The Search for Peace Settlements*, pp. 154–64. For the complete reports of the various Commissions, together with the list of amendments passed at the Conference, see U.S.A., Department of State: *Paris Peace Conference, 1946, Selected Documents*.

[2] A description of Russia's frontier on the Danube, gained by the acquisition of Bessarabia, will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Initial Triumph of the Axis*.

[3] For the texts of the treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaty of Peace with . . .* [country in question] *Paris, 10th February, 1947*, Cmds. 7483, 7484, 7485, 7486 (London, H.M.S.O., 1948). The combined texts will be found in Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaties of Peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland*, Cmd. 7022 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947).

ized. Thus neither the Greeks' desire for an expansion of territory northwards nor the Bulgarians' desire for access to the Aegean through Western Thrace was realized. The frontier between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in Macedonia, which was re-established by the treaty along the inter-war line, remained, for the time being, a matter for settlement between Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist leaders.

The Peace Treaty with Hungary restored her frontiers with Yugoslavia and Austria, as well as her frontier with Rumania, to the positions at which they had stood on 1 January 1938. The pre-war Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier was also re-established, except for the new 'Bratislava Bridge-head', which was ceded by Hungary to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the recommendation of the Peace Conference.[1] Hungary was to negotiate with Czechoslovakia over the remaining Magyar minority in Slovakia, and Hungarian revisionist propaganda was forbidden.

In the case of Finland the restoration of the frontiers of January 1941 confirmed the territorial provisions of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of 12 March 1940 which had followed the Winter War, except where these had been amended by the Armistice Agreement of 19 September 1944; for the Peace Treaty incorporated the Armistice conditions providing for the return of the Petsamo province to the Soviet Union and for a long-term lease to her of Finnish territory and territorial waters round Porkkala-Udd.[2]

The political clauses of the four treaties confirmed and elaborated the political provisions of the Armistice Agreements relating to the prohibition of racial and other discriminatory legislation, the release of prisoners confined because of their sympathies with the United Nations, the dissolution and future prohibition of 'Fascist-type organizations',[3] and the arrest and trial of war criminals and traitors. Each treaty, moreover, contained a clause providing a guarantee that all persons under the jurisdiction of the Governments of the four countries should enjoy the fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The military clauses placed restrictions on the size of the armed forces of the four countries,[4] and prohibited them from experimenting with

[1] The point of meeting between Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary was moved slightly south along the Austrian border, and the Czecho-Hungarian frontier was extended eastwards from there 'along the northern cadastral boundary of the village of Rajka' as far as the right bank of the Danube.

[2] Article 4 confirmed the Armistice provision for unlimited use of transport and communication facilities between this area and the Soviet Union. See above, p. 273, for the strategic and economic effects of the territorial provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

[3] The wording of this provision in all four treaties defined such organizations as those 'which have as their aim denial to the people of their democratic rights'. In the case of Hungary it included the provision against revisionist propaganda.

[4] The 'maintenance of land, sea, and air armaments and fortifications' by the four countries was to be 'restricted to meeting tasks of an internal character and local defence of frontiers'. The actual strength to which these armed forces were to be reduced was fixed on the basis of their pre-war strength, and this gave Rumania (which had not been subjected to military restrictions by

atomic weapons and guided missiles. The treaty restrictions were to remain in force until the Allied and Associated Powers should agree to their removal, or until the former satellite countries should be admitted to membership of the United Nations Organization. The provision in the Armistice Agreement with Finland for the demilitarization of the Åland Islands was maintained, while the Bulgarian Treaty, in accordance with the compromise accepted by Molotov in New York, prohibited the building by Bulgaria on the Greek frontier of permanent fortifications in which either weapons capable of firing into Greek territory could be emplaced or observation posts capable of controlling such fire could be established. The military clauses also provided for an extension of the Armistice conditions relating to the return of prisoners of war, and for the withdrawal, within ninety days, of all Allied forces from Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, except that in Rumania and Hungary the Soviet Union received the right to keep such forces as might be needed for the maintenance of lines of communication with the Russian zone of occupation in Austria.[1]

The Peace Treaties confirmed the reparations provisions of the Armistice Agreements and included the Peace Conference's recommendation with regard to reparations from Bulgaria as amended by Molotov in New York.[2] Stalin's extension in 1945 of the period of reparations payment from six to eight years for Rumania, Hungary, and Finland was incorporated in the treaties. The provisions of the Armistice Agreements relating to the restitution to the Soviet Union of 'valuables and materials' removed during occupation were extended and enlarged in the treaties, and the Armistice condition providing for restitution by Bulgaria and Hungary to neighbouring states which they had occupied during the war was also included in the treaties. Article 11 of the Hungarian Treaty provided for the return to the Habsburg Monarchy's successor states of a variety of cultural objects which, after 1848, had come into Hungarian possession 'as a consequence of Hungarian domination over those territories prior to 1919'.[3] On the other hand, identifiable Hungarian property which had been removed to Germany (by the Szálasi Government) after 20 January 1945 was declared liable to be restored to Hungary. The Rumanian Treaty included the special provision agreed upon at the Paris Peace Conference, which made it possible for bilateral negotiations to supersede the Armistice arrangements for restitution by Rumania to Russia. All German assets,

earlier treaties) an advantage over the others. Thus Rumania was allowed a land army (including anti-aircraft forces) of 120,500, compared with 65,000 for Hungary, 56,800 for Bulgaria, and 34,000 for Finland.

[1] This had been agreed during Byrnes's visit to Moscow in December 1945.

[2] See above, p. 347.

[3] Paragraph 3, for example, provided that Hungary should hand over to Yugoslavia 'the archives of the Illyrian Deputation, the Illyrian Commission and Illyrian Chancellery, which relate to the 18th century'.

which had been frozen in the various countries by the Armistice terms, were transferred by the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Treaties to the Soviet Union. Rumanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian property in the territory of states which had been at war with the three countries was to be disposed of at the discretion of these states, but Finland received preferential treatment on this point in a proviso that Finnish property abroad was to be restored.

The economic clauses of the treaties included safeguards against German exploitation of Eastern European and Balkan countries for rearmament purposes. The question of the international status of the Danube, which had been disputed throughout the process of drafting the treaties,[1] was only partially solved. At the Peace Conference the French Government had proposed, as a compromise between conflicting Anglo-American and Russian views, that a clause should be included in the treaties providing for freedom of navigation on the Danube and for the holding of a conference of the Big Four and the riparian states within six months after the ratification of the treaties. The Eastern Slav bloc were opposed to the participation in the Conference of any but the riparian Powers, and, though the French proposal was adopted at the Peace Conference as a recommendation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, Molotov was able in New York to secure the omission from the treaties of any mention of a conference by agreeing to sign a separate declaration providing that soon after the treaties had been ratified a conference should be held at which the question of a new international convention for the Danube could be discussed between the Big Four and the Danubian states. The Peace Treaties did, however, include provisions for the freedom of navigation and equality of treatment for vessels of all nations on the Danube.[2]

The final clauses of the treaties provided for supervision over the execution and interpretation of the treaties, and stipulated that the Allied and Associated Powers should be represented for a period of eighteen months after the coming into force of the treaties by the heads of the American, British, and Russian diplomatic missions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and by the British and Soviet diplomatic representatives in Finland. In the case of disputes arising over the treaty clauses which could not be settled by the heads of diplomatic missions and the Governments in question, provision was made in the treaties for the appointment of arbitration commissions composed of the two parties to the dispute and a third party to be chosen by mutual consent.

[1] See e.g. Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, p. 149.

[2] For fuller treatment of the Danubian question, including the subsequent conference, see Opie and others: *The Search for Peace Settlements*, pp. 164–72.

(viii) Yugoslavia

By Hugh Seton-Watson

(*a*) The Revolutionary Régime

The 'war of liberation', whose issue was decided already by the autumn of 1944, when more than half of Yugoslavia had been cleared of German forces, was not only a national but a civil war, not only a war but a social revolution. It brought to power not only completely new men, but a completely different state machine. The Yugoslav revolution was in fact one of the only three successful Communist revolutions of the first half of the twentieth century, following the Russian by some twenty-five years and preceding the Chinese by five. Not only Yugoslavia's foreign relations, but the whole situation in the Balkan Peninsula in the following years, were influenced by the nature of the new revolutionary régime. A brief account of its main features must therefore be given here.

The Yugoslav revolution was led by the underground organizers of the pre-war Communist Party, professional revolutionaries in the tradition of Lenin. By their social origin, these men were partly industrial workers and partly members of the intelligentsia. Students and graduates of Belgrade University were extremely numerous among them. But, like the professional revolutionaries of Lenin's Bolshevik Party, or of the Chinese Communist Party of the 1920s and 1930s, they had ceased to belong to any social class. The dedicated cadres of the Party stood outside class, outside society; for them the Party was the only society. They remained quite distinct from the industrial working class or the intelligentsia from which they had sprung. Both these classes provided recruits for the movement which the Communists led, the intelligentsia rather more and the workers rather fewer than might have been expected. The overwhelming majority of their recruits, however, came from the peasantry. This is not surprising, for not only was Yugoslavia a predominantly peasant country, but the war was fought for the most part in the most remote areas, populated by the poorest and most backward of the peasants. But the Partisan Movement was not a peasant movement. Like the Chinese Communist army, the Yugoslav was an army of peasants firmly controlled by the Communists and manipulated for their purposes. The force which enabled the Communists to lead and use the peasants was, as in China, patriotism. As in China, the patriotic propaganda spread by the Communists was effective because it corresponded to realities. The patriotic struggle was no less a necessity because it was exploited by the Party.

The Yugoslav Communists, like the Russian Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communists, succeeded in drawing into the struggle, and bringing under their influence, hundreds of thousands who had hardly been touched by

politics under the previous régime. To the illiterate mountaineers of Bosnia and Montenegro, as to the peasants of Russia and China, the 'war of liberation' brought new and wider horizons. For the first time somebody had treated them as important. This was perhaps even more true of women than of men, and especially of the Muslim women of Bosnia or the Sanjak. Under Communist control there grew up the Committees of National Liberation, which corresponded very closely to the Russian and Chinese soviets. Like their prototypes, though largely organized from above by the Party, they were none the less genuinely representative, in crude fashion, of the masses in whose name they acted. They recruited persons of no definite political background, but of natural organizing ability. Through the committees and through the army new men and women made brilliant careers. They became the officers and the bureaucrats of the new régime. They owed everything to the Party and to Marshal Tito, and, as later events were to show, they remained loyal to their leader. The invaders had destroyed the state machine of the old Yugoslavia. The quisling state machine of Pavelić's Croatian State never had a solid foundation. In the 'liberated territories' controlled by the Partisans a new state machine, both military and civil, was built, ready to take over the whole country. This was essentially the same process as took place in Mao Tse-tung's territory in China from 1928 onwards. Its essential feature was the partnership between the politically naïve masses and the politically sophisticated professional revolutionaries, the partnership which in its various phases had been the key to success in the career of Lenin.

The 'mass organization', controlled by the Communist Party and designed to mobilize the masses politically, was the People's Liberation Front, renamed People's Front after the war was over. Among the outwardly prominent leaders of the Front were even some former members of pre-war political parties. Their presence gave respectability to the Front, but the parties to which they had once belonged had no organized existence independently of the Front. The two apparent exceptions were only apparent. These were the rump Croatian Peasant Party, which contained several former members of the Yugoslav Parliament,[1] and the (Serbian) People's Peasant Party led by Dr. Dragoljub Jovanović. The Croatian Peasant Party's enormous prestige was of considerable value to the Communists, and its old radical slogans fitted well with the slogans put forward by the Communists during the war. Jovanović commanded a smaller but important following in Serbia, and his name was useful to the Communists too. But the leaders of the rump Croatian party were persons subservient to the Communists, and, when Jovanović tried to take an independent line, he found that his party had been undermined.[2]

[1] One of them, Franjo Gazi, became the leader of the rump party and Vice-Premier in the Croatian republican government in Zagreb.

[2] See below, pp. 359–60.

Local power in liberated Yugoslavia was exercised by the People's Committees. The entry of the forces of Tito into the plainlands and the large cities, first of Serbia in the autumn of 1944, and then of Croatia in the spring of 1945, created painful problems. The liberating mountaineers contrasted their own heroism and sufferings, of which they had no mean opinion, with the passivity of the liberated, who had remained inertly under enemy occupation. The townsmen were inclined to scorn the mountaineers as semi-civilized peasants who could never understand the complexity of urban life. The administration of the towns was placed in the hands partly of mountaineers, partly of persons who had belonged to underground Communist organizations in enemy-occupied towns, and partly of non-Communist experts who were jealously watched and controlled by the Party. In few cases were the new authorities representative, as the war-time People's Committees in liberated mountain areas had been. The elements of spontaneity and local initiative, which the Communist régime had had in the heroic days, were quickly lost.

A curious feature of the revolutionary régime was that the Communist Party, of whose control over all other authorities and 'mass organizations' there could be no doubt, kept in the background. In contrast to the Communist Parties of the other 'People's Democracies', 'liberated' not by the actions of their Communists but by the valour of the Red Army, the Yugoslav Communist Party did not seek the limelight, nor did it make much effort to recruit large numbers of new members. The press contained hardly any news of the Party's activities. Even the location of its offices was not advertised. The Party, in short, behaved almost as conspiratorially as in the days when it had been persecuted by the Governments of King Alexander. This secretiveness was made a matter for reproach to the Yugoslav Communists at the time of their breach with the Cominform in 1948. It is indeed possible that the Soviet and East European Communists believed that, because the Yugoslav Communist Party remained so quiet, it was not acting as energetically as it should. This, however, was not the truth. The Yugoslav Party had a far firmer grip upon the People's Front than had the Communist Parties of neighbouring countries on the 'mass organizations' or 'coalitions' to which, at this stage, they belonged.

(*b*) Political Consolidation

The formation in March 1945 of a united Government had been represented, at least to public opinion in the West, as a compromise between Tito and King Peter, between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon points of view.[1] The King had agreed to appoint three Regents—Dr. Srdjan Budisavljević (a Serb), Dr. Ante Mandić (a Croat), and Dr. Dušan Sernec (a

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 529–30, 559–60.

Slovene).[1] The Government included four prominent politicians from exile—Dr. Milan Grol, former leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, who became Vice-Premier; Ivan Šubašić and Juraj Šutej, of the Croatian Peasant Party, who became respectively Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister without Portfolio; and Vasa Čubrilović, of the Serbian Agrarian Party, who became Minister for Agriculture.

In practice, however, this was even less a compromise between West and East, between Communists and exiles, than was the Polish settlement.[2] On returning to Poland, Mikolajczyk was at least for a time able to reconstitute his Peasant Party's organization and to hold large public meetings. This the returning Yugoslav exiles were never allowed to do. They were able to speak as members of the Government coalition, to describe themselves as members of the parties that they had once led, and to put forward those points in their parties' programmes which agreed with the very broad democratic principles that formed the official programme of the People's Front. But they were unable to reorganize their party machines or to hold separate public meetings. They protested that they were dogged by the ubiquitous security police, who were firmly controlled by the Communist Party. They were accused, in return, of seeking to enlist the support of 'collaborators' and 'reactionaries'. The Government's draft electoral law proposed to exclude from the franchise all those who had been guilty of 'active or passive collaboration' with the enemy. Believing that this law would be so widely interpreted as to disfranchise large numbers of persons who were in reality good patriots but who opposed the Communist Party, Grol resigned from the Government on 18 August. The electoral law was passed by the provisional assembly on 23 August, by 370 votes to sixteen. At the beginning of September Grol formed an electoral alliance with the leaders of the Serbian Radical, Agrarian, and Socialist Parties,[3] and declared that he would put up candidates against the Government.

Meanwhile Tito had shown that he interpreted the compromise with King Peter in his own fashion. In a speech to a Congress of the People's Front on 7 August the Marshal strongly urged the abolition of the monarchy. From London King Peter replied next day that he 'dismissed' the three Regents. He also appealed to the 'great allies' to intervene and to order the postponement of the election, which was now being prepared for the autumn. The King's action had not the slightest effect on the course of events in Yugoslavia, and elicited no response from the Powers.[4]

In September it was announced that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Šubašić, was ill, and would be unable to make a projected official visit abroad. A few days later it was learned that he was confined to his house under guard, and that the British Ambassador had been refused

[1] See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 668.
[2] See above, pp. 235 seqq.
[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 4 September 1945.
[4] *The Times*, 8 and 9 August 1945.

permission to see him[1]. On 8 October he resigned from the Government together with Šutej. Semi-official comment in Washington made the point that this was the end of the coalition that resulted from the Yalta agreement, and that the promised conditions regarding free elections were not being fulfilled.[2] But no official action by the Western Powers followed. Tito replied to Šubašić's resignation by publishing in the press of 13 October a letter in which he accused him of manœuvring to give an excuse for foreign intervention in Yugoslav internal affairs. The Marshal insisted that he himself had scrupulously fulfilled all the promises that he had made to Šubašić, and had complied with all the requests made by the Big Three after Yalta.

At the end of September Grol obtained permission to publish an opposition newspaper, *Demokratija*. Its circulation was made difficult by obstruction and violence, but it continued to appear up to the eve of the election, which had now been fixed for 11 November. In October another opposition paper, *Narodni Glas*, appeared. It was published by the widow of the Croatian Peasant Party's leader of the 1920s, Stepan Radić, and was intended to reflect that party's views. It was suppressed after it had appeared for two days. During the pre-election campaign the opposition parties—the Serbian group led by Grol and the Croatian Peasant Party—were unable to hold meetings, distribute propaganda, or communicate with local representatives. At the beginning of November Grol appealed in *Demokratija* to his supporters to boycott the election. Notes were presented by the British and United States Governments, drawing attention to apparent violations of the Tito–Šubašić agreement.[3] On 11 November the election was held. A separate box was provided in polling-booths in which voters could express opposition to the Government, though no opposition list of candidates was now available. A group of British Members of Parliament, led by K. Zilliacus and accompanied, as special press correspondents, by several former British liaison officers with the Partisans, watched the voting and declared that there had been no irregularities. The result officially announced was that 88·6 per cent. of the electorate had voted, and that 90·5 per cent. of these had voted for the People's Front.

On 29 November, the second anniversary of the Jajce meeting of AVNOJ,[4] the new Assembly proclaimed Yugoslavia a Republic.

The new Constitution was formally adopted by the Assembly on 31 January 1946. It was closely modelled on the Soviet Union's 'Stalin Constitution' of 1936. The rights and duties of citizens were similarly described. The powers of the Assembly and its Presidium corresponded

[1] *New York Times*, 26 September 1945.
[2] See article by James Reston, ibid. 16 October 1945.
[3] Signed 1 November 1944: see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 667–8.
[4] i.e. Antifašističko Veće za Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavje (see ibid. pp. 659–60).

to those of the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium in the U.S.S.R. The system of courts of law and of Public Prosecutors was taken from the Soviet Union. The local authorities were to be the People's Committees. A separate law defining their powers, published on 25 May 1946,[1] made it clear that their functions would be the same as those of the soviets in the U.S.S.R.—that they would be subordinate instruments of the Central Government, controlled by the Communist Party. They would bear the same relation to the comparatively spontaneous and representative Committees of war-time as the emasculated soviets of 1936 bore to the comparatively spontaneous and representative soviets of 1917.

One of the most striking similarities of the Yugoslav Constitution to that of the Soviet, and certainly that which most directly concerned foreign policy, was its 'federal' structure. The Republic was divided into six constituent republics, corresponding to the S.S.R.s of the U.S.S.R. Like their Soviet prototypes, the Governments of the Yugoslav republics were subordinate to, not co-ordinate with, the Central Government. The constitutional structure was not, in fact, a federation, but a unitary form of government allowing for the devolution of powers to regional authorities. Moreover, the practical value of the devolution was narrowly limited by the facts that the Governments of all the republics were controlled by the Communist Party, and that the Communist Party was organized on the well-tried system of 'democratic centralism'.

Nevertheless, the 'federal' organization was politically important. The new régime publicly admitted that Yugoslavia was the home of several distinct nations; and this was something that the pre-war Governments had either categorically denied or had admitted so grudgingly that their sincerity had been doubted by their subjects. The new régime made it clear that it intended to put an end to all discrimination against individuals on the basis of their national or religious origin. Even many citizens who disliked the theory and practice of government by the Communist Party were none the less favourably impressed by the determination, here shown by the new régime, to put a stop to the disruptive nationalist quarrels which had undermined the old Yugoslavia.

The six republics were Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia. The Serbian Republic contained an Autonomous Region (corresponding to an Autonomous S.S.R. in the Soviet Union) and an Autonomous Province. The latter was the Kosovo–Metohija district in the south-west, whose population was predominantly Albanian-speaking. The former was the Voivodina. This contained the district of Srem, historically part of Croatia but populated by Serbs, and the Bačka and Banat, which had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary until 1918. Of the native population of the Voivodina the German

[1] *Opšti zakon o narodnim odborima*, including speech by Tito, Belgrade, 1946.

element (some 400,000 strong) had fled or were expelled. Their land was given to Yugoslav peasants who were brought in from poorer parts of the country. The Hungarian element (nearly 500,000) was allowed to stay, and was promised equality of status with other citizens. This generous attitude resembled that adopted by the Communist-dominated Government of Dr. Petru Groza in Rumania,[1] and was in marked contrast to the extreme nationalist attitude of the Czechoslovak Government.[2] The two smaller minorities in the Voivodina, the Rumanians and the Slovaks, were also assured an equality of status.

The Croatian republic included historical Dalmatia and Croatia (without Srem). The boundaries of Slovenia with Croatia were as they had always been. Both Slovenia and Croatia expected to receive territory from Italy, the former in Venezia Giulia and the latter in Istria.[3] Montenegro's claim to separate status was based on historical tradition, not on any difference of language, religion, or nationality from the Serbs. A separate status for Bosnia-Hercegovina was the best solution for a problem that could not be solved by drawing political boundaries that would coincide with ethnic boundaries. In the Bosnian Republic the three national groups of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims[4] balanced each other. The solution could not satisfy either Serbian or Croatian nationalists, each of whom were equally convinced that it was devised by their rivals to destroy them.[5] But one may doubt whether the Archangel Gabriel himself would have been able to satisfy both.

Perhaps the most interesting experiment of all was the establishment of a republic of Macedonia. No pre-war Serbian politician in power[6] had ever admitted that the Macedonians were anything but 'South Serbs'. It was, however, no secret that many Macedonians had strong sympathies for Bulgaria, who had long concealed her own imperialistic aims behind the slogan of Macedonian autonomy. The Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia from 1941 to 1944 had caused much disappointment, for the Sofia Government had then made it perfectly clear that they would tolerate no autonomy.[7] The Yugoslav Communist Party adopted, from the beginning of the war of liberation, the view that the Macedonians were neither

[1] See above, pp. 290–1.

[2] See below, pp. 385 seqq.

[3] See below, pp. 463 seqq.

[4] The Bosnian Muslims spoke the same language as their Serbian and Croatian neighbours. They were, however, separated from them by differences of historical, religious, and social tradition so profound as to constitute them in effect a separate nation.

[5] These nationalist opinions were, of course, not openly expressed in Yugoslavia under the new régime. They may be found in publications by both Serbian and Croatian exiles, which attack each other at least as fiercely as they attack Tito's régime. Examples are Branko Lazić's *Titov pokret i režim u Jugoslaviji, 1941–1946* (1946), in Serb, and Anton Ciliga's *La Yugoslavie sous la menace intérieure et extérieure* (Paris, Les Îles d'Or, 1952).

[6] Dr. Dragoljub Jovanović, the Serbian Left-wing Agrarian leader, admitted that the problem existed. But he was never in power.

[7] The best available discussion of the Macedonian problem is Elisabeth Barker's *Macedonia.*

Serbs nor Bulgarians, but a distinct nation, and must have their own autonomous status within the future Yugoslavia. The subject was for a time disputed between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian underground Communist Parties,[1] but the Yugoslav view prevailed. Tito quickly put his programme into practice. His action was extremely unpopular with Serbian nationalists. It also raised international problems, for, since 1913, portions of historical Macedonia had formed part of the Greek and Bulgarian states. These problems will be mentioned below.

The bulk of the Četnici[2] had retreated from Yugoslavia at the time of Germany's defeat. General Mihailović himself, however, remained behind in Bosnia with a handful of followers. In March 1946 it was announced that he had been captured. He was tried for treason at the end of June. The trial raised a great deal of controversy in Western countries. In the West, and particularly in the United States, attacks on the Yugoslav Government stressed the undoubted facts that Mihailović was no German agent but a Serbian patriot, and that he had saved scores of Allied pilots who had baled out over Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslav Government's counter-propaganda stressed the equally undoubted fact that the forces commanded by Mihailović had, with his knowledge and approval, taken part in joint military operations with Italian and German troops against the Partisans. Had the Yugoslav Government wished to conciliate the Western Powers, who had formerly supported Mihailović in good faith, or to show leniency to a man who had been drawn into 'collaboration' by political forces which he never understood, by 'the whirlwind' as he himself said in his last speech before the court,[3] they could have spared his life. But Tito in July 1946 seemed to regard the Western Powers as enemies, and both he and his followers desired vengeance for all that they had suffered at the hands of the Četnici. Mihailović was therefore shot on 17 July 1946.

There remained some opposition to Tito's policy within his own People's Front. Jovanović, the Serbian Left-wing Agrarian leader, had been elected to the Assembly on the People's Front ticket. By the summer of 1946 he had convinced himself that the Front's broad democratic programme was not being fulfilled. In July he made a speech in the Assembly criticizing three features of the Government's policy. First, he claimed that the interests of the peasants were being sacrificed, and that the peasant co-operatives of Serbia, which had played a small but valuable part before the war, had been completely subjected to the will of the Central Government. Secondly, he objected to the institution of Public Prosecutors. Like its prototype, the Soviet Procuratorship, it had powers which made non-

[1] Ibid. pp. 83–98.

[2] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 651, 656 seqq.

[3] This phrase gave the title for Stephen Clissold's excellent work on Yugoslavia in the years of German occupation: *Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power* (London, Cresset Press, 1949). The passage from Mihailović's speech is quoted on p. 242.

sense of the alleged independence of the judiciary. The Public Prosecutor was entitled to 'raise demands for the defence of legality against valid decisions of courts and administrative organs',[1] that is to say, to reverse a verdict of a court of law if he thought that it did not suit the interests of the state, or, in other words, of the Communist Party. Thirdly, Jovanović criticized the one-sided dependence of the Government's foreign policy on the Soviet Union, and asked that it should seek the friendship of all three Great Allies, as the People's Front's official statements had said that it would. It was this criticism which most angered the Government, and let loose a storm of abuse and threats against Jovanović. He was deprived by majority vote of his seat in the regional Parliament of the Serbian Republic and was dismissed from his chair in the Faculty of Law of Belgrade University, at the 'spontaneous request' of the Faculty, duly led by its Dean. On 11 August 1946 a meeting of his People's Peasant Party was held in Belgrade, summoned and packed by the Communists, and it duly expelled him from his own party. Later in the year he was arrested, and in September 1947 he was tried on charges of subversive action on behalf of the 'British intelligence service'.[2]

The political trial in Yugoslavia in this period that was most important in itself and that created the greatest international controversy was the trial of the Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb and Primate of the Catholic Church in Croatia, Mgr Alojzije Stepinac. In the passions aroused by this trial, both within and outside Yugoslavia, the personal guilt or innocence of the Archbishop was largely overshadowed by political considerations. On the one hand, Catholic opinion in Western Europe and America inclined to take the view that Catholic archbishops are by definition immaculate. On the other hand, anti-Catholics in the West and Serbian opinion inside Yugoslavia vented on the person of Stepinac their wrath against the forces that he represented.

The trial cannot be understood without reference to the Serbo-Croatian conflict and the treatment of the Serbs, during the war, by Pavelić's Croatian fascist régime. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs had been massacred by Pavelić's Ustaše, and individual Catholic priests had been involved in the killings. The Catholic hierarchy had never publicly protested against these outrages, certain bishops had gone out of their way to praise Pavelić's régime, and Stepinac himself had dealt with Pavelić as with the Head of a State. Thousands of Serbs had escaped death only by conversion to Catholicism—which automatically involved acceptance of Croatian and denial of Serbian national status.[3] Stepinac had not protested against

[1] Article 127 of the Constitution.

[2] See *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 196–7; also H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 223 and note.

[3] The only means of distinguishing a Serb from a Croat was by his religion. Nevertheless, the difference between Serbs and Croats was definitely not merely religious, but was national as

these mass conversions by force, nor instructed his priests to refuse them. To the Serbian public, both of Bosnia and of Serbia Proper, Stepinac was a symbol of the forces that had tried to destroy the Serbian nation.

Tito's régime had many enemies among the Serbs. It had long been believed—though wrongly—that the Partisan movement was a non-Serbian or anti-Serbian movement. This view had been strengthened by the execution of Mihailović, who, notwithstanding his collaboration with the invaders, was regarded by many Serbs as their national leader. After having dealt so harshly with Serbian nationalism, Tito could not afford to deal leniently with a man who, in Serbian eyes, symbolized not only Croatian nationalism but Croatian persecution of Serbs. Moreover, the Yugoslav Communists were bitter enemies of Catholicism, not only on general ideological grounds but also because, in their view, the Vatican was associated with the Italian state, and Italy had not only invaded their country in 1941, but was now strongly resisting their claims to annex Venezia Giulia and Trieste. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Communists should act against Stepinac, and equally inevitable that this action should be regarded by many Croats, including not only admirers of Pavelić but also democrats who had hated Pavelić and had even supported the Partisans, as an act of nationalist oppression by Belgrade against the Croatian nation.

Most of this had little to do with the merits or guilt of Stepinac. From a formal point of view Stepinac had committed treason. The state of which he had been a citizen had been conquered, the conquerors had installed a puppet régime, and he had recognized the puppet as the legal authority. If the exiled Government had returned to power, or if Mihailović had won, there can be little doubt that they, too, would have punished Stepinac. Whether Stepinac was responsible for atrocities is much more doubtful. On the contrary there was evidence that he had saved endangered persons, and in general that his actions had mitigated the severity of the régime. His relations with Pavelić, and his attitude to mass conversions, were capable of more than one interpretation. At the trial (30 September to 9 October 1946) the worst interpretations were accepted, and the Archbishop was condemned to sixteen years' imprisonment.

(*c*) Foreign Relations

The main feature of Yugoslav foreign policy in the first years of Tito's régime was its subservience to Soviet policy. This followed naturally from the Communist discipline and loyalty of the new Yugoslav leaders. They considered the Soviet Union to be the homeland of all the toilers of the

well. The relation between English and Irish had some similarity, but was not a complete parallel.

world, the territorial base of world Communist revolution, and the leading Power in the 'camp of peace and democracy' menaced by the 'camp of warmongering imperialism'. The Yugoslav Communist leaders made great efforts to popularize the Soviet Union among the peoples of Yugoslavia, making use both of her prestige as the greatest military Power on land and 'liberator' of Eastern Europe from the German armies, and of the traditional sympathy, tinged with pan-Slavism, of the South Slavs, especially of those of Orthodox religion, for Russia.

One consequence of this was that Yugoslavia turned her back on her former friends and made friends of her enemies. Britain and the United States were now enemies. So was their friend and the traditional friend of Yugoslavia, Greece. France was not considered important—though, as long as the French Communist Party was represented in the Government at Paris, occasional polite phrases were addressed to her. The new-found friends were Rumania, once an ally, but since 1941 a satellite of Germany, and Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, which had been rewarded by Hitler with slices of Yugoslav territory. Of all her former friends, only Czechoslovakia was still treated as a friend, in virtue of her being also a member of the 'camp of democracy', though Yugoslavia's friendliness towards her was coloured by a strong tincture of contempt for her poor Resistance record.[1]

An important feature of Yugoslav foreign policy was an extreme nationalism, which enemies of Yugoslavia termed imperialism. Territorial demands were put forward against Italy, Austria, Greece, and even the new-found friend Bulgaria. The powerful patriotic emotions stirred by the war of liberation, and deliberately fostered by the propaganda of the régime, became a positive factor affecting foreign policy. The new ruling group, the officers and bureaucrats who had made their careers in the Partisan army, expected not only that the invaders would be expelled and the pre-war régime replaced by a social 'new deal', but also that Yugoslavia would become a great and powerful country, at least the dominant state in the Balkan Peninsula. These views were encouraged, and to some extent shared, by the veteran leaders of the Communist Party, who had been trained in the pre-war school of Marxist internationalism, but whose outlook had been appreciably affected by intimate contact with the peasant masses whom, before, they had barely known.

The nationalism of Yugoslav foreign policy was reinforced by the new quasi-federal organization of the state. The non-Serbian Yugoslav

[1] Some interesting light is thrown on the climate of Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relations at this time by the book of the former Czechoslovak Ambassador in Belgrade, Dr. Josef Korbel, *Tito's Communism* (University of Denver Press, 1951). Dr. Korbel notes that President Beneš was not eager to conclude the alliance of May 1946. This is independently confirmed in Vladimir Dedijer: *Tito speaks, his Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), p. 315.

nationalities which, in the past, had been subordinated to Serbian interests, began, now that they had received theoretical recognition of their separate national status, to put forward national claims at the expense of neighbouring states, and demanded that these should be accepted as the claims of Yugoslavia as a whole. To refuse such demands would have been very dangerous, even if the Government had wished to refuse them. The Slovenes demanded territory from Austria and Italy, the Croats from Italy, the Macedonians from Greece and Bulgaria. These demands had the advantage that, with the exception of Bulgarian Macedonia, all these territories were held by countries dominated by the 'reactionary imperialists' of the West. Thus Yugoslav imperialism coincided with the cause of Communist virtue.

Later events were to show that there was a conflict between Yugoslav nationalism and subservience to the Soviet Union; or, rather, that an unlimited patriotism on behalf of Yugoslavia was not compatible with an unlimited patriotism on behalf of the homeland of all toilers. But, for the time being, this was not outwardly evident.

Yugoslavia's relations with the two northern 'People's Democracies', Poland and Czechoslovakia, were strongly affected by economic considerations. From Poland Yugoslavia required coal, from Czechoslovakia various metallurgical goods and machinery. Treaties of mutual assistance, nominally directed against Germany or any Power associated with her, but actually directed against the Western Powers, were signed with Poland in March and with Czechoslovakia in May 1946. Relations with Czechoslovakia were less cordial in reality than they looked on the surface. The Yugoslav Communists deplored the elements of 'bourgeois democracy' that survived in Czechoslovakia until February 1948. Themselves *les plus purs*, they looked with impatient condescension on the weaker brethren. They felt—and many Yugoslavs who were not Communists shared their feeling—that the Czechs had done nothing to liberate themselves, and should now do something for those who had. Yugoslavia was setting forth on an ambitious and rapid plan of industrialization. She needed industrial equipment, and, until a good deal of reconstruction had been done, she would have little with which to pay for it. The Czechs could provide a good deal of this equipment, and the Yugoslavs felt that, for the time being, they ought to supply it on terms favourable to their more heroic Slav kinsmen. The commercially minded Czechs found these arguments unattractive. Pan-Slav rhetoric was a commodity that they would willingly provide; locomotives and machine tools were another matter.

Relations with Hungary were better than might have been expected. With Soviet occupation troops in their country, and with the stigma to wipe off of having been Hitler's last satellite, the Hungarian leaders could not afford to be intransigent towards the Yugoslavs. Under the Paris

Peace Treaty of 1946 Hungary was obliged to pay Yugoslavia reparations in commodities at '1938 prices'.[1] In March 1947 Yugoslavia made a far-reaching trade agreement with Hungary, designed to some extent to co-ordinate the two countries' economic plans. Hungary was in a position to provide a good deal of the equipment that Yugoslavia needed, and had less power to haggle than had Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav-Hungarian relations were also improved by the relatively good treatment granted by the Yugoslav Government to the Hungarian minority. Hungarians suspected of 'reactionary' sympathies were perhaps, in the first months after liberation, treated more drastically than Serbs or Croats suspected of the same crime. But, when once the new constitutional framework was in operation, the Hungarian inhabitants of the Voivodina Autonomous Region enjoyed equal status with Yugoslav subjects of Slav speech. In towns or villages where Hungarians were in a majority the administration was in the hands of Hungarian Communists, or of non-Communist Hungarians acceptable to the Communists. In December 1947 a Yugoslav-Hungarian treaty of alliance was signed.

Relations with Bulgaria were more complex. Ever since the 1880s Serbs and Bulgars had been *frères ennemis*. It is important to understand that, throughout the years of hostility and war, and throughout the briefer periods of relative friendliness, the relation was always ambivalent. A sense of brotherhood coexisted with fierce hatred, a belief in South Slav partnership with implacable rivalry for disputed territory. Even the relations of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist Parties had been marked by rivalry for Russian favour as well as by comradeship in a common revolutionary cause.[2] In the enthusiasm of liberation, many Communists and non-Communists in both countries were convinced that a new era had opened in their mutual relations. The establishment of Macedonia as a constituent republic in 'federal' Yugoslavia was to be a step towards a closer association between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Macedonia, as a favourite Communist slogan had it, was to be not an apple of discord but a bridge of understanding. But if it were once admitted that the Macedonians were a separate Slav nation, distinct from both Bulgarians and Serbs, the case for including in the Macedonian People's Republic that portion of Macedonia which Bulgaria had acquired in 1913, and which the Macedonians like to call 'Pirin Macedonia',[3] became extremely strong. Moreover, if Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were to be federated, it would become necessary to decide what relation Bulgaria was to have to the six

[1] Hungary's total liability for reparations amounted to $300 million, of which $100 million was to be divided between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (see above, p. 345).

[2] Barker: *Macedonia*, pp. 50–75.

[3] Pirin is the name of a mountain range in the south-west corner of Bulgaria, which was the one small area that Bulgaria had been able to retain out of all her conquests from Turkey in the First Balkan War (1912–13).

republics of Yugoslavia. Both these problems caused serious friction between Belgrade and Sofia.

In November 1944 the Yugoslav Communist Party's Central Committee prepared, and sent to the Bulgarian Communist Party, a draft agreement for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In the following month the Yugoslav Vice-Premier, Edvard Kardelj, led a mission to Sofia to discuss the plan. The Bulgarians were less eager for federation than were the Yugoslavs. They preferred a straightforward alliance between the two countries. But, when they agreed to discuss federation, an important difference appeared. The Yugoslavs suggested that Bulgaria should become the seventh republic in an enlarged Yugoslav federation: the Bulgars wished the federation to be formed by a union, on equal terms, of the two existing states—a Yugoslavia consisting of six republics and a Bulgaria consisting of one. Bulgaria, of course, had been an independent state for longer than any of the Yugoslav republics except Serbia, and had a larger population and area than any single one of them. On the other hand it could be argued that it was unfair that one nation should have the same status as three or more,[1] whose combined populations were about twice its own. Complete agreement was not reached, and the dispute was referred to Moscow. At the time of writing, in 1954, it was not known in the West what Moscow's view had been.[2] But the whole project was dropped when it became clear that the Western Powers objected to any union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Soviet Government were not willing to quarrel with the Western Powers on this issue. The opposition of the Western Powers was due to their interest in the security of Greece—which might be threatened by the emergence of a single powerful state on her northern border—and to their desire to prevent Bulgaria from escaping the consequences of her alliance with Hitler by joining an Allied state.[3]

The union of Pirin Macedonia with the People's Republic of Macedonia, within Yugoslavia, had been conceded in principle by the Bulgarian Communist leaders, but they had shown themselves in no hurry to realize it. They had argued that it could be achieved only within a common federal state of all the South Slavs. When federation was indefinitely postponed, they wished also to postpone the problem of Pirin Macedonia. During 1945 little was heard of the matter. Early in 1946 there was some internal trouble in Yugoslav Macedonia, for the President

[1] The number depends on whether the Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bosnian Muslims were to be regarded as 'nations' in the same sense in which Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes undoubtedly were.

[2] According to a statement by Aleksander Ranković, in a speech of 19 January 1949 to the Congress of the Communist Party of Serbia, Stalin decided in favour of the Yugoslav view (A. Ranković: *Govori i članci* (Belgrade, 1951), p. 239).

[3] Mosa Piade states: 'The Anglo-Americans, exploiting the situation that then existed in Bulgaria, prevented Bulgaria from concluding any treaties with foreign states' (see his *Izbrani govori i članci* (Belgrade, 1950), p. 236).

of the Macedonian Assembly, Antonov-Tsento, resigned from the republican Government, and in July he was arrested.[1] He was accused of working for a 'completely independent Macedonia'. In a speech in Skoplje on 2 August the Macedonian Premier, Lazar Kulishevski, declared: 'To raise the question of the union of Macedonia outside the borders of Yugoslavia means common provocation, and is against the independence and interests of the Macedonian people.'[2] If such plans had been fomented from anywhere outside Macedonia itself, it was hard to see from what quarter they could have originated if not from Bulgaria, where, for more than fifty years past, support for Macedonian 'independence' had been the usual camouflage for Bulgarian expansion in Macedonia. According to a Yugoslav account,[3] the Bulgarian Communist leaders, at the Tenth Plenum of the party's Central Committee, held on 6 August 1946, passed a resolution which accepted in principle the incorporation of Pirin Macedonia in the Macedonian People's Republic in Yugoslavia. The value of the resolution to the Yugoslavs, was, however, diminished, not only by certain reservations in its text, but also by the fact that it was never published and was apparently not even communicated to party members.[4] The problem was taken up again at the meeting of Tito with Dimitrov in Bled in August 1947. The Bulgarians stood by their view that the union of Pirin Macedonia with Yugoslav Macedonia should follow the establishment of the future Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. Tito was, however, able to extract a promise that the Bulgarian Government would permit full 'cultural development' to their Macedonian subjects. At the end of the year this promise was implemented when ninety-three teachers were sent from Yugoslavia to Pirin Macedonia 'to assist in the correct teaching of the Macedonian literary language and Macedonian history'.[5] Subsequent accounts, from both the Yugoslav and the Bulgarian side, show that the activities of the teachers did not bring agreement between Belgrade and Sofia nearer. When the breach between Belgrade and the Cominform became public six months later, the Bulgarian Government promptly expelled them.

It will be convenient to carry the story of Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation down to the eve of the breach between Yugoslavia and the Cominform. The visit of Dimitrov to Bled in August 1947, which improved Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in general, was followed in November by the signature of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty of alliance, the first concluded by any member of the Soviet bloc with an ex-enemy state. Apparently the Soviet Government were not informed of the treaty beforehand.[6] In January

[1] Barker: *Macedonia*, p. 101.
[2] Ibid. p. 102.
[3] Lazar Mojsov: *The Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communist) and the Macedonian National Question* (Belgrade, Borba, 1948), quoted ibid.
[4] Ibid. p. 103.
[5] Ibid. p. 104.
[6] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, p. 325.

1948 came Dimitrov's interview at Bucharest, on East European federation, which provoked an attack in *Pravda* of 29 January 1948. The Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments were ordered to send missions to Moscow.[1] Stalin now informed the two delegations that he would not have an East European federation, but would like to see three separate federations—Poland and Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.[2] The Yugoslavs were now much less eager to federate with Bulgaria. Friction between them and Moscow had by this time already become alarming. They realized that Bulgaria was much more extensively controlled by Moscow than was Yugoslavia, and that the inclusion of Bulgaria in the proposed new federation would thus give Moscow a much more effective means of pressure and control over the whole of it, including Yugoslavia. This was, no doubt, the reason why Moscow urged the federation at this moment. According to Kardelj himself, Stalin declared: 'The time is ripe. First Bulgaria and Yugoslavia should unite, and then they should annex Albania.'[3] After the return of the Yugoslav delegation to Belgrade, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party discussed the problem on 1 March 1948, and decided against federation with Bulgaria. A few weeks after this, Yugoslav-Soviet tension reached a critical stage.

Relations with Greece were affected by two factors—the civil war in Greece and its aftermath, and the Macedonian question. Even during the German occupation there had been friction between Greek and Yugoslav Communists about Greek Macedonia.[4] But, so long as there was hope that the Greek Communist Party would obtain power in the whole of Greece, the future Graeco-Yugoslav frontier and the future status of the Slav-speaking minority within Greece could be treated as minor problems. On this account, the Yugoslav Government refrained, apparently, from making any official demands on the Greek Government in regard to Macedonia. But, for the Macedonian nationalist enthusiasts of the Skoplje republican Government, the future of what they liked to call 'Aegean Macedonia' was far from a minor question. Speeches were made from time to time about the need to 'liberate' Aegean Macedonia from the Greek monarcho-fascist yoke. The truth was that, since the resettlement of the Greeks expelled by the Turks from Asia Minor in 1922, Greek Macedonia had ceased to be a Slav, or even a semi-Slav, territory, and now had a compact Greek population, with only an extremely small Slav-speaking minority; but this truth was quite lost on the Slav nationalists in Yugoslav Macedonia. In the exuberance of their newly found nationhood they were

[1] Ibid. pp. 324 seqq.

[2] Dedijer (ibid. p. 330) is the only authority for the revival by Stalin, in the spring of 1948, of a plan for Balkan federation.

[3] Ibid.

[4] See C. M. Woodhouse: *Apple of Discord* (London, Hutchinson, 1948), pp. 93, 182, 207; Barker: *Macedonia*, pp. 109–12.

indifferent to inconvenient facts. Their extravagances were useful to Greek anti-Communist propagandists and were embarrassing to Greek Communists, but their influence on the Yugoslav Government's policy should not be overrated. When the Greek civil war was renewed at the end of 1946 Yugoslav help was given to the Greek Communists as a whole, rather than exclusively to the Slav-speaking Communists of north-west Greece. It was not until some time after the Cominform's denunciation of the Yugoslav Communists that the Greek Communists were obliged to side with the Bulgarian Communists against the Yugoslav Communists, and to support a programme of 'Macedonian liberation' directed against Yugoslavia.

From the day of victory over Germany Yugoslavia's relations with the Western Powers deteriorated. The fundamental reason was ideological. The Yugoslav Communists regarded themselves as a heroic vanguard of the 'camp of democracy' against the 'camp of imperialism'. Indeed, they showed themselves more hostile to the West more quickly than did the Soviet Government itself.

But there was also a number of specific reasons for hostility. British action in December 1944 against the Greek Communists[1] caused genuine dismay in Belgrade, where it appears to have been thought that it 'was equally aimed against the People's Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia'.[2] Yugoslav claims to Trieste and to part of Austrian Carinthia led to bitter conflict with the West.[3] Here only two considerations in Yugoslav minds need be mentioned. In the first place, it was felt that Italy had done so much harm to Yugoslavia that she ought to be compelled to make some atonement. Having, herself, been ravaged by the war, she was in no position to pay reparations. By ceding Trieste and its neighbourhood, she could provide Yugoslavia with industrial resources of immense value for Yugoslavia's future economic development. Secondly, the Yugoslavs felt that the Austrians had behaved as cruelly to Yugoslavia as any other Germans. Austria had provided the Reich not only with Hitler and Kaltenbrunner, but also with two men who had held leading positions in the occupation of Yugoslavia—Neubacher and Glaise-Horstenau. It seemed incredible to the Yugoslavs that the Allies should support Austria against Yugoslavia. These arguments might have made more impression on Western statesmen if they had been put forward through diplomatic channels and in diplomatic language. By preferring press diatribes, imputation of evil motives, insults, boasting, and sabre-rattling, the Yugoslavs needlessly damaged their cause.

Two other grievances embittered Yugoslavia's relations with the West.

[1] See below, pp. 398 seqq. and *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, p. 523.
[2] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, p. 238.
[3] See below, pp. 470–6.

One was over the extradition of alleged war criminals. A considerable number of quislings were sent back to Yugoslavia, including the Serbian quisling Premier, General Milan Nedić. The Yugoslavs, however, interpreted the words 'treason' and 'war criminal' far more widely than Anglo-Saxon notions of law could permit. The Western Governments defended their principles; the Yugoslav authorities attributed their actions to sinister reactionary motives; and, among those individuals who eventually escaped, there were some who would be regarded as criminals on any showing. Chief among these was the Croatian quisling and mass-murderer, Ante Pavelić.[1] His escape created genuine and widespread bitterness in Yugoslavia. The second grievance was over the habitual flights of Western military aircraft across Yugoslav territory between Italy and Austria. Sensitive national pride, hostility about Trieste and Carinthia, and the obsession—common to all Communist Governments—with the security of the frontiers, combined to make the Yugoslavs attribute to these flights a sinister purpose of which they were innocent. Tension reached its climax when, on 9 August 1946, an American plane was shot down, with the loss of all its crew. The fury that this incident aroused in the United States was easy to understand, considering that the recovery of the Yugoslav economy was largely due to the help received from UNRRA and that the main contributor to UNRRA was the United States.[2] Relations with Britain were also poisoned by constant incidents on the frontier between Yugoslavia and the British zone of Austria. British soldiers who strayed, or were alleged to have strayed, a few yards into Yugoslav territory were taken to Yugoslav prisons, detained in unpleasant conditions for weeks or months, insulted, and in some cases maltreated. On one occasion a British officer was shot by a Yugoslav soldier.

Relations with the Soviet Union were outwardly excellent. A Yugoslav-Soviet treaty of alliance was signed in March 1945. Yugoslav spokesmen at the United Nations invariably supported Soviet actions. Beneath the surface, however, friction was growing. There were serious economic difficulties. Soviet economic experts spoke slightingly of Yugoslav plans for industrialization. Soviet proposals for the formation of Yugoslav-Soviet 'joint companies', similar to the companies created in Hungary and Rumania,[3] contained demands unacceptable to the Yugoslavs.[4] Soviet

[1] By 1950 Pavelić was safely established in Argentina. How he got there has never been made public, to the present writer's knowledge.

[2] According to the statement of Mr. F. LaGuardia to the United Nations Assembly in October 1947, Yugoslavia received from UNRRA aid to the value of $415 million. See also above, pp. 104, 106.

[3] For a fuller discussion of these joint companies see Margaret Dewar: *Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945–1949* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), pp. 62–66, 79–80.

[4] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, pp. 286–94. Companies were actually set up for air transport (*Justa*) and river shipping (*Juspad*).

goods exported to Yugoslavia were priced high, goods imported from Yugoslavia were priced low. Soviet officers antagonized Yugoslav officers with whom they worked by their arrogance and by their luxurious manner of life. Soviet security service men recruited spies among the Yugoslav population, especially among the railwaymen.[1] The Soviet Government pressed the Yugoslavs to accept, at extremely high prices, large numbers of Soviet films and books. The common character of all these actions was arrogance and contempt for a small allied nation, in short, 'imperialism', which all right-thinking Yugoslav Communists had hitherto associated with capitalist countries, and which, in practice, they usually attributed exclusively to West Europeans and Germans. The Soviet attitude towards Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, mentioned above, was alarming. After the discussions in Moscow with the Bulgarians in February 1948,[2] Kardelj was ordered by Molotov to sign a ready-made text obliging Yugoslavia to consult the Soviet Union on all problems of foreign policy. A month later there began the acrimonious correspondence that led to the Cominform denunciation.

The most important issue in Yugoslav-Soviet relations was that with which this section (viii) opened. Tito had built, in the course of the war of liberation, his own civil and military state machine. His new officers and administrators owed their careers to him. Their first loyalty was to him. The state machines of all the other 'People's Democracies' had been built by, or under the supervision of, Soviet 'military and political experts'. Moscow had the choice of working with Tito as an equal or of trying to turn him into a puppet. If treated as equals, the Yugoslav Communists would have proved loyal allies. There is no evidence that they were disloyal to the Soviet Union, and of sympathy for the West they showed not the slightest trace. But they would not accept the role of puppets, and their effective control over their own state machine made it possible to refuse the role with success. It seems that, for a time, Moscow decided to treat them as allies. Local Soviet agents behaved arrogantly, but the Soviet leaders declared their friendship. At the founding meeting of the Cominform, in September 1947, the powerful A. A. Zhdanov allowed the Yugoslavs fiercely to criticize the French and Italian parties, and he himself supported them, to the discomfiture of MM. Duclos and Longo.[3] During the following months Moscow changed its attitude. The change may have been a result of internal struggles within the Soviet Communist Party or of the decline of Zhdanov's influence.[4] By March 1948 Stalin

[1] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, p. 273.

[2] See above, p. 307.

[3] Dedijer, op. cit. pp. 304–5.

[4] The theory that Zhdanov stood for an extreme policy of Communist expansion in Europe, and was resisted by Stalin, who preferred more cautious tactics, is developed in Franz Borkenau: *European Communism* (London, Faber, 1953). It is true that Zhdanov was closely associated with the making of Communist policy for Europe, and that this policy encountered defeats during the

had decided to support his most arrogant representatives in Yugoslavia, and to humiliate Tito. But it was Stalin who was humiliated.[1]

(ix) Albania

By Hugh Seton-Watson

The Albanian Partisan Movement had closely followed, and had directly been influenced by, that of Yugoslavia. The revolutionary régime that emerged in Albania in 1945 was very similar to that in Yugoslavia.

The 'mass organization' of the Albanian régime was the Democratic Front—as the Liberation Front was renamed after the end of the war. Like its Yugoslav prototype, it was controlled by the Communist Party. The differences between the Yugoslav and Albanian régimes reflected the much greater backwardness of political and social development in Albania. Before the Italian conquest in 1939 Albania had had no political parties that deserved the name. At most there had been groups attached to individual landowners or to tribal chiefs. The Democratic Front included a few non-Communist guerrilla leaders and ecclesiastics—for example, the Muslim Bektashi abbot, Baba Faja. The ruling groups of the pre-1939 régime were solidly hostile to it, and it was resolved to destroy them. Many of these opponents escaped across the Adriatic; others were executed. The decisive blow was the land reform of August 1945, which broke up all large properties (estimated previously to have occupied one-third of the country's rather small area of arable land), set a maximum of twenty hectares per holding, and in the following years distributed about 300,000 hectares among 60,000 peasant families.[2] The leaders of the new régime came from the small number of younger intellectuals who had obtained a Western education in French, Italian, or Yugoslav universities. Some of these had been Communists already before 1939, and many more were attracted by the prestige of the Soviet Union and of the Yugoslav Resistance Movement. The working class and the bourgeoisie were negligible factors in Albania. The new régime was a partnership between professional revolutionaries sprung from the intelligentsia, and the peasantry, who, in Albania, were exceptionally backward and ignorant, even by Balkan standards. The appeal of the Movement to the masses was similar to that described in the case of Yugoslavia; it was partly patriotic and partly

winter of 1947–8 in the French and Italian strikes, and in the spring of 1948 in Finland. It is possible that these defeats played their part in convincing Stalin of the necessity of bringing the Yugoslav party to heel.

[1] For the quarrel between the Russian and Yugoslav Communist Parties and the secession of Yugoslavia from the Cominform see *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 160–7.

[2] Statement of Enver Hoxha to the Congress of the Albanian Communist Party in November 1948.

social. The Movement, like its Yugoslav prototype, offered prospects of a social New Deal, of economic modernization, and of dazzling new careers to new men of any social origin who proved themselves both efficient and ideologically docile.

The Government of Enver Hoxha was recognized by the three Allied Great Powers in November 1945. Before this there had been a British military mission in the country, and on 17 April 1945 an agreement had been signed, by which relief was to be given first by Military Liaison (an Anglo-American military organization), and then by UNRRA. On 8 May 1945 the United States Government sent a State Department official, J. Jacobs, to examine the situation on the spot. The American note granting recognition referred to the Yalta Declaration, and asked for assurances regarding a free election to a Constituent Assembly, freedom of movement for foreign press correspondents, and confirmation by the Albanian Government of all treaties and agreements between Albania and the United States that were in force on 7 April 1939.[1] The British note made similar references to freedom of elections and the press. The Soviet note did not make any stipulations.

The election was held on 2 December 1945. Owing to both Communist pressure and the general political conditions mentioned above, there were no opposition candidates. The official figures were that 92 per cent. of the electorate had voted and that 93 per cent. of the votes had been cast for the Democratic Front. The remaining 7 per cent. had been votes cast in the special boxes provided, as in Yugoslavia, to record opposition to the Government in general terms.

The new régime rapidly rid itself of the remnants of Italian influence. The 'Gramsci Division', composed of Italian troops which, after the surrender of Italy in 1943, had fought against the Germans on the Albanian Partisan side, returned to Italy on 2 June 1945, eight months after the Germans had evacuated the country. During this intervening period the inquiries of the Italian Government had met with evasion and obstruction. Before the troops left, however, Enver Hoxha published an Order of the Day extolling their valour in the common struggle.[2] Italo-Albanian relations remained unfriendly. They took a turn for the worse in November, when all Italian priests and nuns were suddenly expelled from Albania.[3]

More important in these years were relations with Greece. The Greek nationalists, who had come to the top after the defeat of the Communists, were determined to annex the southern extremity of Albania, which they called Northern Epirus. The population here was predominantly Albanian in nationality, but it was also predominantly Orthodox Christian in religion, and there was a local Greek minority, whose cultural influence

[1] *New York Times*, 11 November 1945.
[2] *Giornale del Mattino*, 2 June 1945.
[3] *New York Times*, 14 November 1945.

had always been greater than its numbers. This territory had long been claimed by Greece, and Greek troops had entered it in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, and had fought over it in their victorious campaign against the Italians in 1941. Now they claimed it as a reward for their services to the Allied cause, and they supported their claim by the dubious argument that the Albanians had 'fought beside the Axis'.[1] In reality, Albania had been a victim of Axis aggression in 1939, and the contribution made by Albanian collaborators to the Italian war effort had certainly been less than the damage done by Albanian resisters to the Axis. Incidents on the Graeco-Albanian frontier occurred in 1945, and reports reached Athens that the Hoxha régime was persecuting its Greek subjects. On 27 May 1945 a rally in Athens of Greeks from Northern Epirus passed a resolution asking for Allied troops to occupy the territory to protect Greek lives and property. In July the Greek Premier, Admiral Voulgaris, handed a memorandum to Allied representatives, asking for an Allied occupation of Northern Epirus until the Peace Conference should have decided its future. The request was not granted, and in November the Allies recognized Hoxha. The recognition caused a mass demonstration of protest in Athens, in which fierce attacks were made on Allied policy.[2] Graeco-Albanian relations remained bad thereafter, and took a further turn for the worse with the revival of the Greek civil war in the late summer of 1946, when Albania provided arms, food, and shelter for the Greek rebels.

Albanian hostility to the British Government increased steadily. It was due partly to Britain's support of the Greek Government, partly to Yugoslav influence, fundamentally to the general hatred felt by the Communists for the Western Powers. The refusal of the Albanian Government to accept, as First Secretary to the proposed British Legation in Tirana, an officer who had formerly served with Albanian Partisan forces in the war led to the decision, in April 1946, not to send a British Legation to Tirana at all. On 22 May Albanian coastal guns opened fire on two British cruisers passing through the Straits of Corfù. On 22 October there was a still more serious incident, in which two British destroyers were damaged in the Straits, with the loss of thirty-eight men killed and forty-five injured. The Straits had been twice cleared of mines since the end of the war, and it appeared certain that the mines which did the damage on this occasion had been laid by the Albanians. Exchanges of notes between the British and Albanian Governments took place through the British Embassy in Belgrade. The Albanian reply of 22 December was declared

[1] Interview given by the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, to the *New York Times*, 13 July 1945.

[2] It is curious to note that the *Daily Telegraph* estimated the crowd present at this demonstration at 50,000, the *New York Herald Tribune* at 100,000, and the *New York Times* at 150,000 (issues of 19 November 1945).

unsatisfactory by the British Government on 30 December, and the dispute was submitted by them to the United Nations Organization and to the International Court.

The United States Legation left Albania in November 1946, because the Albanian Government had not recognized their treaty obligations towards the United States which they had inherited from the pre-1939 period, and had thus failed to fulfil a condition for American recognition of the new Albanian régime that had been laid down in November 1945.[1] United States-Albanian relations became still worse in September 1947, when the Albanian Government saw fit to 'implicate' in one of their periodic spy trials the former director of the American technical school in Tirana, Harry Fulz. The school, which had probably been the best educational institution in Albania between the World Wars, was described as a centre of sabotage.

The dominant influence in Albania in these years was Yugoslav. The Yugoslav Communists had given help and advice to the Albanian Communists during the war of liberation. They also took their part in the economic reorganization and planning of Albania after the war. Albanian-Yugoslav relations were uneasily governed by the conflicting emotions of gratitude and resentment. All Albanians, Communist or not, were aware of the fact that 700,000 Albanians—about two-thirds of the total population of the Albanian state—were incorporated in Yugoslavia, both in the Kosovo–Metohija 'autonomous province'[2] and in the western fringes of Macedonia. These territories had been annexed to Albania by the Italians under the partition of Yugoslavia in 1941. During the war there had been hopes, even among Albanian Communists, that Tito would allow a 'democratic Albania' to keep part or all of this territory. The Marshal had decided against this, no doubt because he did not wish to antagonize Serbian or Macedonian nationalism. Economic problems also caused friction. Yugoslav-Albanian joint companies were created. A Yugoslav authority[3] claims that these were quite different from the imperialistic type of joint companies imposed by the Soviet Union on Rumania and Hungary, and unsuccessfully offered by the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia.[4] He argues that, whereas the Soviet joint companies were designed only to make profits, the Yugoslav-Albanian joint companies were designed primarily to develop Albania's productive forces. Yugoslav assistance was responsible for the construction of the first railway in Albania, from Durazzo to Elbasan, and Yugoslavia sent equipment for several factories. Yugoslavia did not draw her share of the profits of the joint companies, but reinvested it in them. Yugoslavia signed a treaty of alliance with Albania on 9 July 1946. This was followed on 27 November 1946 by an

[1] See above, p. 372.
[2] See above, p. 357.
[3] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, pp. 310–12.
[4] See above, p. 369 and note 3.

economic plan, which provided for the co-ordination of the two countries' respective economic plans, for a customs union, and for the equalization of the two countries' currencies. In 1947 Yugoslavia gave Albania a credit of 2 milliard dinars, and in 1948 a further credit of 3 milliard dinars. After the breach with the Cominform the Yugoslavs claimed that, in the period of operation of the November 1946 treaty, they had delivered to Albania goods to the value of 1,600 million dinars and had received from Albania goods to the value of only 150 million.[1] The Albanians, for their part, claimed, after the breach, that all that they had achieved for the reconstruction of their country had been done in spite of Yugoslav obstruction, and that the Yugoslavs had subjected Albania to 'colonial exploitation'.[2]

Foreign aid does not, of course, inevitably bring gratitude. However generous the Yugoslavs may have been, their mere presence was likely to excite resentment in a more primitive nation. The experience of the Western 'imperialist' administrators, whom the Yugoslav Communists so eloquently denounced, had been rich in examples of this. It seemed clear that the leadership of the Albanian Communist Party was divided between friends and critics of Yugoslavia. The chief friend was Koçi Xoxe, the Minister for the Interior. Kardelj, when asked his opinion about Albanian leaders by Stalin in 1947, replied somewhat naïvely that he thought that Enver Hoxha was 'good and honest on the whole, although he has certain characteristics of a *petit-bourgeois* intellectual', and 'lacks Marxist-Leninist training', but that 'the best and most consistent man over there is Koçi Xoxe, a worker, although he too lacks training'.[3] The disgrace of the prominent Albanian Communist Seyfulla Malleshova in 1946 was probably due to his opposition to the Yugoslavs. Ranković informed Stalin in May 1946 that Xoxe was the man most trusted by the Albanian Politburo, and that it had 'exposed some errors' for which Malleshova was responsible.

It seemed, on the scanty evidence available at the time of writing, that during the first two years the Soviet Government had left Albania entirely to the Yugoslavs, but that they changed their policy towards the end of 1947—at the time, that is, when they were changing their policy towards Yugoslavia. In December a Bulgarian-Albanian treaty of alliance was signed. Evidently this could not have been done without Soviet consent, as Bulgaria was completely controlled by Moscow. The Yugoslav reaction to the Bulgarian-Albanian treaty is not on record. At the beginning of 1948 Enver Hoxha asked the Yugoslavs to send two divisions to southern Albania to strengthen them in the event of a Greek attack. At this time

[1] *Borba*, 6 July 1948.
[2] Speech of Gogo Nushi to the Albanian Communist Party congress in November 1948.
[3] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, p. 313.

the Greek civil war was in full swing, and the Greek Communists were receiving substantial aid from Albania. The Yugoslav Government decided in principle to grant the Albanian request, and did so without previously consulting Moscow. This was held against them by Stalin in conversations in February 1948.[1] The Yugoslavs not unreasonably concluded that Hoxha's request to them had been instigated by Stalin for the purpose of embarrassing them.[2] In the February conversations, Stalin, as mentioned above,[3] had urged Yugoslavia to annex Albania after federating with Bulgaria. The explanation of this proposal is not absolutely clear. Probably at this time the Russians' optimum plan was to create a single Communist state in the Balkans. In the South Slav federation the more reliable, more docile, and more geographically accessible Bulgarians would be given a dominant influence. Through the Bulgarians Moscow would be able more closely to control, and in due course to purge and dominate, the whole federation, including Yugoslavia. It would be natural that Albania should be brought into the enlarged state. The Bulgarians could then establish their influence in the Macedonian republic, and ultimately rail communications could be opened up from Bulgaria across Macedonia into Albania (an old Russian design for promoting Russian expansion in the Balkans). The all-inclusive Balkan Communist state could give powerful support to the Greek Communists, and ultimately could become a serious menace to Italy.

This plan was made impracticable when Yugoslavia refused to accept the federation with Bulgaria. Now that Yugoslavia was casting loose from the Soviet bloc, it became necessary for the Soviet Union that Albania should be rescued from Yugoslav influence. Soviet policy therefore now supported all the anti-Yugoslav elements in Albania; Koçi Xoxe was disgraced and later hanged; and Enver Hoxha acquired merit, both in Moscow and among Albanian nationalists, by a hate campaign against the 'national enemy', the Serb.

The inadequate evidence available thus indicated that the breach between Yugoslavia and Albania, which marked the conclusion of the first post-war phase of Albania's history, was not a cause, but a consequence, of the breach between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

(x) Czechoslovakia: Spring 1945 to the Signing of the Peace Treaties, February 1947

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

On 3 April 1945 President Beneš arrived from London via Moscow to establish a provisional Czechoslovak Government in the town of Košice

[1] Dedijer: *Tito speaks*, p. 324.
[2] Ibid. p. 328.
[3] See above, p. 367.

in that part of Slovakia which had by then been liberated. The circumstances of the Slovak rising[1] in 1944 had compelled him to accept the claims of its leaders to Slovak autonomy, but, although Bratislava was liberated on the following day, he refused Slovak demands to establish the Government there, preferring to remain in Košice until his return to Prague. It has been seen that President Beneš was relatively optimistic about his relations with the U.S.S.R.; he believed that his country could and should work with Moscow in foreign policy, and he had adopted an attitude similar to that of the British Labour Party with regard to the need for extensive nationalization within the second Czechoslovak Republic.[2]

Beneš was accompanied by Czech and Slovak political exiles both from London and from Moscow: his policy towards Russia appeared to have prevented a conflict between them—there were, indeed, those who maintained that this second visit of his to Moscow had prevented a Communist-sponsored régime from forestalling him completely.[3] There were at any rate few rivals within the country to look askance at the returning exiles; resistance at home had been mainly inspired by Czech broadcasts from London, and its surviving leaders such as Zenkl, the former Mayor of Prague, had been imprisoned in German concentration camps.[4] Thus the President personified a national unity which was at that time a reality rather than a pretence. The expression of this unity was carried yet farther by the constitution of a National Front to embrace four Czech and two Slovak political parties, the Czech National Socialists,[5] Social Democrats, Populists (Catholic), and Communists, together with the Slovak Democrats and Communists. No other party, i.e. no outright opposition, was to be legally permitted, a decision which seemed difficult to square with the Western tradition represented by Beneš; it was allegedly justified on the ground that the first Republic had suffered from a plethora of parties, which, on the whole, was true.

A few days after his arrival in Košice President Beneš appointed a provisional Government which moved with him to Prague in May 1945. Fierlinger, a Left-wing Socialist and career diplomatist—he had been Czechoslovak Minister in Vienna and Berne, and, during the war, had represented his country in Moscow—became Premier. With him were two other Socialist Ministers, seven Communists (three of whom were Slovaks), three Czech National Socialists, three Populists, and three

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 602–3.

[2] Ibid. p. 595.

[3] See Josef Josten: *Oh My Country* (London, Latimer House, 1949), pp. 185–6. The Russian Ambassador, Zorin, also accompanied Beneš from Moscow to Košice (see *New York Times*, 7 April 1945).

[4] It is claimed that Zorin insisted that Pražak and Kutlvašr, who had led the Prague rising in May, should be dropped as 'unreliable' (see Josten, op. cit. p. 186, and Jan Stránský: *East Wind over Prague* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1950), p. 112).

[5] The party associated with the Masaryks and Beneš, Left-wing liberal in English terms.

Slovak Democrats. Jan Masaryk, who had consistently held the position of Foreign Minister in the exiled Government in London, continued in this office. He and General Svoboda, who had commanded the Czechoslovak troops attached to the Russian army and who now became Minister for Defence, were not members of any party, but Masaryk was associated with the Czech National Socialists, while Svoboda appeared to take his politics from his Russian brother officers. The Communists controlled the Ministries of the Interior (Nosek), Education (Nejedlý), Agriculture (Duriš), and Information (Kopecký), while a Slovak Communist, Clementis, became deputy to Masaryk. The leader of each party—Gottwald for the Communists—became a deputy Prime Minister.

Upon the formation of the provisional Government, the parties of the National Front signed a programme embodying their aims. The first part of this document was devoted to the prosecution of the war which was not yet ended, and it provided—*inter alia*—for Red Army instruction of the Czechoslovak troops. This so-called Košice programme based future Czechoslovak foreign policy upon 'the alliance of the State with the Soviet Union, and the determination to carry out vigorously a pan-Slav policy in Eastern Europe'. Both Czechs and Slovaks had a vaguely pan-Slav tradition behind them, a tradition always resented by the Poles who, again in 1945, constituted a stumbling-block in the Czechoslovak path. There was a series of disputed Polish-Czech frontier claims and, of course, a bitter quarrel over the riches of Teschen (Těšin, Cieszyn), the whole of which the Poles had acquired in 1938 and now hoped to keep. On 20 June 1945 both Poles and Czechs were summoned to Moscow to confer on the matter. On 6 July it was reported that Czech troops had replaced the Polish soldiers in formerly Czechoslovak Teschen.[1] At about the same time it emerged that Ruthenia, the eastern appendage of the first Czechoslovak Republic, was to be absorbed into the Republic of the Ukraine within the U.S.S.R. This piece of Russian intervention was neither wholly unexpected nor wholly unjustified, since the Ukrainian-speaking element in the population, which was by far the largest single ethnic constituent of it, was mainly Uniat Roman Catholic in religion, like the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and partly Eastern Orthodox, like the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union,[2] while the people as a whole had never been assimilated into Czechoslovak life.[3] But the change brought the Soviet frontiers across the Carpathians, to march with those of Slovakia and Hungary. Although the Czechs and Slovaks were the Russian army's allies, they, too,

[1] In the other small frontier districts claimed by the Czechs, the Poles, who were in possession of them, refused to be dislodged. Fierlinger publicly claimed the Kladsko (Glatz) region as late as 30 March 1946, but of course without effect.

[2] See *Survey* for 1938, iii. 124 and 128–9.

[3] The former Prague Government had done much for the economic development and education of Ruthenia but without creating much loyalty to Czechoslovakia.

found its behaviour within their country disagreeably primitive. Economically they paid only one large forfeit, the surrender of the uranium mines at Jáchymov (Joachimstal) to the U.S.S.R., in exchange, it was said, for the 'war-booty' of the synthetic petrol plant constructed by the Germans at Most.[1] In December 1945 both Russian and American troops evacuated the Czechoslovak Republic.

With regard to political and economic development within the second Czechoslovakia, the Košice programme referred to the separate Czech and Slovak nations. In accordance with earlier declarations the new dual Slav state would tolerate no non-Slav minorities; Germans and Magyars[2] were to be expelled unless they could prove that they had been active anti-fascists before or during the war. Special popular courts were to be established to try war criminals and collaborators whose property was to be confiscated. This latter provision applied to the majority of the Germans and Magyars, the former of whom had gladly collaborated with the Nazi authorities at any rate until late in the war. The confiscation was put into effect by decree in May 1945, soon after the President's return to Prague. Together with the elimination of the Nazi régime (which had taken over much Czech industry) and the disappearance of its Jewish victims, of whom a few had been important industrialists, this left much land and more industry ownerless. The way was thus paved for the intensification of earlier agrarian reform and for the nationalization of the key industries, of banking, and of insurance, in accordance with the Košice programme. At the same time the programme promised 'to support the private initiative of employers, tradesmen, and other producers'. It provided also for economic democracy through social welfare and self-governing workers' councils in industry, and guaranteed all the political freedoms. In the inter-war period administration in Czechoslovakia had been criticized as over-centralized; consequently it was now laid down that elected assemblies were in future to tackle local administration, and, until the necessary elections could take place, the anti-fascist national committees, which had formed themselves as German power collapsed, were to be responsible for local government. These committees later chose the electors of the Provisional National Assembly which met in October 1945.

During the summer of 1945 the President and an inner committee of the National Front governed the country by decree. UNRRA was particularly generous to Czechoslovakia,[3] yet inevitably the economic problems common to the whole of Europe at that time were the Czechs' main preoccupation. These and the general demand for radical reform

[1] Josten: *Oh My Country*, p. 55.

[2] See *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 157–8.

[3] Altogether Czechoslovakia received UNRRA goods to the value of $261,337,000. See above, pp. 104, 106–7.

were met in the first place by an attempt to carry the inter-war agrarian policy to its logical conclusion. A decree of 21 June 1945 was intended to implement the Košice programme with regard to the land, which was to be wrested 'once and for all from the foreign German-Magyar nobility and from all traitors'. The huge Schwarzenberg and Thun estates, which had survived the first Republic, and the farms of the Germans and Hungarians under sentence of expulsion, were to be allotted to Czech or Slovak settlers in plots not exceeding thirteen hectares. Forest land up to fifty hectares in area might be allotted to corporate bodies (including co-operatives), but was to remain under state control.[1] The land available was mainly in the border districts, and, since party interests affected the choice of the colonists, which was in any case to favour former exiles and Partisans, the strongest party was able to acquire influence over large agrarian regions, which became very much like Communist colonies.

The problem of industry was perhaps more fundamental to Czechoslovakia. Austria apart, Bohemia and Moravia comprised the only highly industrialized districts in the Danubian area, while it was generally agreed that a still backward Slovakia needed further industrial development. It has been seen that, when the Nazis were ousted from ownership, much Czech industry was left in suspense. Czech industrial plant, much of it dating from Habsburg days, was in great need of modernization. This applied to the heavy industry of Prague, Brno, and Plzeň, and still more to the small consumer industries, which had never really recovered from the depression of the earlier 1930s. All plans for nationalization, therefore, envisaged large-scale modernization and rationalization at the same time, a process which would in any case require to be financed by the state. Thus the three decrees of 24 October 1945 for the nationalization of Czechoslovak industry were based upon the need for extensive reorganization. Since banking and industry had, as in Germany and Austria, been very closely linked, it was logical to nationalize banking at the same time. On the other hand, only about 65 per cent. of all non-agricultural industry was nationalized, and a number of private and co-operative enterprises were left in existence. Indeed, although Ministers like Ripka regretted all nationalization from the outset,[2] the aim of that day was a 'three-cornered economy, based on private, co-operative, and public ownership'.[3]

At the time of the nationalization decrees, conditions in Czechoslovakia were more or less chaotic. The expulsion of the Germans had begun in earnest with a proclamation of 18 June 1945. After the Potsdam Conference, which accepted this expulsion in principle, action was postponed

[1] W. Diamond: *Czechoslovakia between East and West* (London, Stevens, 1947), p. 98.
[2] H. Ripka: *Le Coup de Prague* (Paris, Plon, 1949), pp. 34–35.
[3] Diamond, op. cit. p. 129.

pending a decision on where the Germans were to go, but it was arranged that from 25 January 1946 the majority should be sent to the American zone of Germany.[1] The Czechs had endured so much so passively since the Runciman Mission and the Munich Agreement that it was possible to understand why many of them ran amok at the expense of the Sudeten Germans in 1945. Numbers of the latter, in the first few months after the liberation of Czechoslovakia, were seriously maltreated or interned in Czech labour camps—or both—before they could escape. They were sometimes deliberately treated as the Nazis had treated the Slavs or the Jews—but with this difference, that relatively few of them failed to survive. What happened depended upon local bosses and Communist influence, and varied from place to place. Though they had long advocated the conversion of Czechoslovakia into a Czechoslovak national state, there is no doubt that Beneš and his colleagues deplored the early excesses, and would have wished to restrict the scale of the expulsions to a smaller proportion of the former German minority in Czechoslovakia.[2] The flight or expulsion of $2\frac{3}{4}$ million Germans, together with the loss of Ruthenia, made the second Czechoslovak Republic very different from the first. Not only were Czech and Slovak settlers brought into Northern Bohemia, but the population of the country was sensibly reduced, to the advantage of Slovakia, whose population now amounted to a higher percentage[3] of that of the Republic as a whole. Though some of the smaller Sudeten German industries had long ceased to be viable, the loss of German skilled labour, at a time when skilled labour was in the greatest demand, seemed to many people to be a catastrophic change in Czechoslovakia's economic structure. It must, however, be noted that, by the end of 1946,[4] when the expulsion of the Germans had come to an end, leaving some 200,000 of them in the country with the status of Czechoslovak citizens, Czechoslovakia seemed well on the way to economic recovery. Moreover, the shortage of skilled manual labour was attributable, not only to the expulsions, but perhaps at least as much to other causes, such as the seductions of the political and bureaucratic work provided by the post-war régime, the activities of the parties, and the clerical and other work created by

[1] In November 1947 Clementis announced that 'within the scope of the transfer permitted by Potsdam, Czechoslovakia has removed 2,251,000 Germans, of whom 1,464,000 have gone to the American zone and 814,000 to the Soviet zone'. About half a million had taken to flight before the expulsion had been decreed.

[2] In 1951 the exiled Sudeten German leaders (Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen) in Munich published a collection of records of alleged Czech atrocities in *Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen*, compiled with undeniably propagandistic intention. After the summer months of 1945 the physical maltreatment of the Germans seems to have ended, but many, apparently, were robbed of all their possessions before they were expelled.

[3] 28·8 per cent. by March 1947 (see *Statisticky Zpravodaj* for that month, p. 111). The Slovaks' birth-rate was notoriously higher than that of the Czechs.

[4] The last official transfer of Germans took place at Karlovy Vary on 29 October 1946.

nationalization and agrarian reform. There were also new and important national organizations, of Youth,[1] of the Farmers, and of the Trade Unions, all of which seemed to require an extensive personnel. Communist influence seemed to predominate in them all.

On 28 October 1946, the twenty-seventh anniversary of the foundation of the first Republic, the Provisional Assembly met.[2] It contained 200 Czechs and 100 Slovaks chosen by the national committees, in which the six parties were represented in almost equal numbers. The Assembly proceeded to approve the decrees which the Provisional Government had promulgated. Its main task, however, was to prepare for the election of a Constituent Assembly. This election was appointed to be held on 26 May 1946. Early in that year two new Slovak parties were admitted into the National Front. One was formed by the Socialists in Slovakia, whose break-away from the Communists was thus recognized. The other was the offspring of a Catholic revolt against the Protestant tone of the Slovak Democratic Party;[3] it was called the Slovak Freedom Party, and it offered a political refuge to many former members of the old Hlinka Party.

During the preparations for the elections a sharp dispute arose as to whether electors should be allowed to register a vote if they were not giving it to one of the eight National-Front parties. Curiously enough, the Marxist parties were in favour of this liberty, as against the other parties, who hoped to gain from its suppression. Finally the Assembly sanctioned 'white tickets' (votes not cast for any particular party, which represented dissatisfaction with the National Front) by 155 votes to 131.[4] The voting age was lowered from twenty-one to eighteen, and voting was made compulsory. When the election was actually held it was generally agreed by witnesses, differing widely from one another in political affiliation, that the voting was genuinely secret and free, and that democratic forms were correctly observed. The results were as follows:

Communists (Bohemia and Moravia)	2,177,033	2,695,915
Communists (Slovakia)	518,882	
National Socialists	1,298,917	
Populists	1,110,920	
Slovak Democrats	988,275	
Social Democrats (Bohemia and Moravia)	855,771	
Social Democrats (Slovakia)	49,983	
Slovak Freedom Party	67,575	
'White Tickets' or spoiled ballot papers	516,428	

[1] The Czech scouts refused to enter the new Youth Movement, and the old, very nationalist Sokol organization continued to prosper until penetrated by the Communists later.

[2] See Josten: *Oh My Country*, p. 62.

[3] The Protestants in Slovakia were a small but important minority, which was less autonomist in sentiment than the Catholic majority.

[4] Diamond: *Czechoslovakia between East and West*, p. 11.

This meant that the Constituent Assembly would consist of 114 Communists, 55 National Socialists, 46 Populists, 43 Slovak Democrats, 39 Social Democrats, and 3 members of the new Slovak Freedom Party. The two Marxist parties together (i.e. Communists and Social Democrats) would have a small absolute majority.

The non-Marxist parties were startled by the fact that the Communists had polled nearly 38 per cent. of the votes cast for the National Front parties and 35·5 per cent. of the total electorate. Czechoslovakia was proverbially the most advanced of the East European countries in social progress; in spite of her traditionally Russophile sentiments, which Munich and Stalingrad had fortified, she was the most Western and most closely linked with the West; and yet, in May 1946, she revealed the strongest Communist Party in the Eastern half of Europe. To those who showed surprise it was easy to reply that, precisely on account of her advanced industrial development, Marxist ideas were deeply rooted in Czechoslovakia, and that events since 1938 had combined to discredit the gradualism of the Socialists to the advantage of the Communist Party. After all, the same thing had happened, with less reason, in Italy and France.

There were, however, more particular reasons for the success of the Czech Communists in May 1946. Before the war the Czech peasants had habitually voted for the Agrarian Party, but this party had then collaborated with the Germans and had now been abolished. Local Communist influence, often exerted through the new 'United Society of Czechoslovak Farmers', gathered in some of these votes, and of course many of those of the new settlers in the borderlands; thus, for the first time, the Communist Party had considerable support outside the industrial areas. Within them, among the working people, Communist leaders who had organized resistance to the Germans (sabotage at first and then protection of plant against German destruction) had built up a new Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH); its executive committee (URO), presided over by Zápotocký, held its first congress in the month preceding the elections. Much emphasis had been laid on the spontaneous Soviet-like emergence of the ROH in 1945, and, indeed, much genuine enthusiasm was aroused by the idea of having a revolutionary organization as the basis of self-government in industry, instead of the smug and respectable trade unionism of the 1930s.

On the other hand, while the voting passed off correctly on election day, there could be no doubt that fear contributed to the Communists' success on 26 May 1946. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, was a Communist; and it was he who decided what names should be struck off the voters' lists for former collaboration with the Germans. At the beginning of 1946 special People's Courts began to try war criminals and collaborators, and

the notorious Karl Hermann Frank, whom the Americans had handed over to the Czechs, was hanged exactly four days before the election. In other, less clear, cases the Minister of Justice, the (Czech) National Socialist, Stránský, used his influence to check injustice; but the People's Courts, where lay and professional judges sat together, were semi-independent.

It was, however, only in the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia that the Communists had had their great success; there, indeed, they had won a full 40 per cent. of the votes. In Slovakia, on the contrary, the Democrats had gained nearly twice as many votes as the Communists; and here it was the Communists who were startled; for apparently they had expected to win over the Slovaks more easily than the Czechs. For this reason they had supported an almost separatist political (not economic) policy for Slovakia, with an occasional hint that Slovakia might be better off as a member of the U.S.S.R. In fact the Slovaks had been enjoying the best of both worlds, for they were fully represented in Prague, while they jealously reserved all control of Slovak affairs for the Slovak National Council[1] or Board of Commissioners at Bratislava. Inevitably anti-Slovak feeling revived among the Czechs, the more so in view of Slovakia's war-time relations with Germany. By way of protest against the new dual system, which seemed to give as much weight to the Slovaks as to the Czechs, although there were still more than twice as many Czechs as Slovaks in the Republic, the Czechs proposed a tripartite administrative division of the country into three provinces: Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. This was, however, an obviously artificial device, since Bohemia and Moravia were no more different from one another than Warwickshire and Kent.

After the election of May 1946 the representation of the Democrat Party on the Slovak Board of Commissioners became nearly twice as large as that of the Communists; and, from this time on, the Communists turned against Slovak autonomy and became the sternest upholders of the authority of the central Government at Prague. They now took up the complaint, which had hitherto come from the Czech National Socialists, that the Slovak Democrats included too many former followers of Hlinka and Tiso[2] who had merely taken refuge within the new party. This, of course, was true, though the Communists would have welcomed the same people willingly among themselves. But now Communist policy pushed the Czech National Socialists into an anti-Communist alliance with the Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats; and the Communists then turned round and taunted the Beneš–Masaryk party for keeping company with fascists and collaborators. Few people, probably, in any part of the

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 603–4.
[2] Many of them still in administrative positions and outwardly 'leftist'.

country condemned the execution of Tuka on 20 August 1946, but Tiso was awaiting a trial which was bound to divide Czech and Slovak sympathies.[1]

Meanwhile a new Government had been formed. It differed relatively little from its predecessor except for the slightly greater preponderance of the Communist Party, whose leader, Gottwald, naturally became Prime Minister in Fierlinger's place. The new Cabinet contained two more Communists than before, bringing the Ministries of Finance, Internal Trade, and Social Welfare under Communist control. To that of Education the National Socialist, Stránský, was now appointed, while another National Socialist, Drtina, succeeded Stránský at the Ministry of Justice. It was significant that this Government contained five instead of seven Slovak members.

The twelve months which followed the election of May 1946 [it has been said] was the happiest period of the restored Republic. Industrial production showed signs of rapid development; trade, especially with the Western countries, was growing apace, there was a good harvest, food was relatively abundant, and it seemed that the Communist Party was content with its leading position in the Government and was prepared to play the game of parliamentary politics according to the normal Western rules. The territorial dispute with Poland was put into cold storage, and only a quarrel with Hungary[2] marred the serenity of Czechoslovak international relations.[3]

If the magnitude of the Communist vote in the Czech provinces surprised the adversaries of the party, it did not at that time dismay them. On the whole, the mood of the new Constituent Assembly was optimistic, non-Communists believing that they would catch up with their opponents in the next elections in 1948. The first act of the Constituent Assembly was to re-elect Beneš as President of the Republic. Its next duty, theoretically, was to draw up a Constitution, but its immediate attention was directed to an economic plan. Although the Košice programme had made no reference to planning, it had been widely assumed, since the date of national liberation, that, in the circumstances of the period, both recovery and expansion would depend upon their organization by the state. The Government had acted upon this assumption from the beginning. Accordingly an Economic Council had been formed in 1945, consisting of the Cabinet Ministers with economic portfolios, the Governor of the National Bank, a representative of the Slovak National Council, the Presidents of the Trade Unions Council, the United Society of Czechoslovak Farmers and the Central Co-operative Association, and a Secretary-General; the

[1] See *Survey* for 1947–8, p. 174.
[2] Ibid. pp. 157–8.
[3] R. R. Betts: *Czechoslovakia*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, p. 180.

latter presided over a Central Planning Commission responsible to the Prime Minister. The actual preparation of a general plan was entrusted to a State Planning Office, the head of which was also a member of the Economic Council. The nationalization of banking and heavy industry in 1945 provided the basis for an official plan which was in fact published by the State Planning Office in 1946 in a volume entitled *The Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Republic*. With a Communist Premier in office, the outline of a plan was laid before the National Assembly on 5 July. The fully elaborated Two-Year Plan was then approved by it on 25 October. Three days later, on 28 October 1946, the anniversary of the opening of the Provisional Assembly and of the nationalization decrees, the President signed the Plan. It was to come into operation on 1 January 1947 and to run to the end of 1948.

This first short-term Czechoslovak plan was essentially a recovery programme. The general aim was only a 10 per cent. increase over the level of production in 1937, which had not been a particularly prosperous year; on the other hand, the reduction of the population spelt a loss of nearly 20 per cent. in industrial man-power since before the war, apart from the deterioration in skill. As in all East European plans at the time, the emphasis was placed upon the development of heavy industry and of power and transport. The textile and footwear industries, for which Czechoslovakia had been famous, were relatively neglected. It must not, however, be forgotten that these were still to a large extent in private hands; and it suited the Communists to let them decline, since they had depended on markets in the West—but markets which it might in any case be difficult to recapture at all adequately. The Plan allowed for the mechanization of agriculture, but provided for the more intensive cultivation of a smaller area than in 1937; agricultural production, therefore, was to increase only very slightly.

Slovakia had made considerable industrial progress during the war; for this reason, perhaps, the Communists over-estimated their influence there in May 1946. At all events their conception of regional or national autonomy was like that of the U.S.S.R. in combining a strong emphasis upon Slovakia as a separate cultural entity with a tendency to subject her economic life to large-scale directives from Prague or, indeed, from Moscow. In spite of the development of the Tiso period, Slovakia was still socially on the level of the rest of Eastern Europe rather than on that of Bohemia and Moravia. In other words, agricultural over-population called here for further industrialization; and this suited both Russian needs and Communist doctrine. After the elections of May 1946 Gottwald and his friends were all the more eager to press forward with the industrialization of Slovakia in order to increase their grip and at the same time to put an end to the chaotic state of conflicts there. Thus the Two-Year Plan,

when it came, provided for the investment of 70 milliard Czech crowns in the whole of Czechoslovakia, of which 22 milliard were to be devoted to the development of Slovakia,[1] its factories, its mines, and, particularly, its power stations.

The Two-Year Plan appears to have been launched with the general acquiescence of the Czechoslovak public and with some genuine enthusiasm apart from the official slogans. 'Anyone who has visited Czechoslovakia within the past year', Diamond wrote early in 1947, 'can bear witness to the fact that almost every action of the Government, of any institution, and of any individual is justified or condemned in terms of its bearing on the Plan—which seems almost to have assumed a personality of its own.'[2] Non-Marxists were often content to accept the necessity of a measure of this kind during the period of reconstruction; with a mixed economy like that of Czechoslovakia and with the increase of small individual holdings which agrarian reform had so far brought, they felt to some extent protected from a Marxist fate.

The evolution of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade encouraged these hopes. Until the early months of 1946 there was a widespread feeling that Czechoslovakia's role ought to be to supply the machinery of Eastern Europe and Russia: she was, it was thought, cut out to be Germany's heir in this respect. When, in April 1946, Ripka signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in Moscow, even he referred in his speech to the dangers of 'competitive variations' (meaning slumps and sudden shrinkages of demand) in world, i.e. capitalist, markets.[3] But the East could not supply the raw materials nor consumer goods which Czechoslovakia needed and Eastern currencies were of only a limited use. During 1946, indeed, Switzerland, who was now able to do a roaring trade in all directions thanks to her war-time neutrality, became Czechoslovakia's most important supplier and customer, while trade with Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States was not far behind that with Russia. In the first three months of 1947 trade with Russia fell temporarily behind that with the Western countries. Czechoslovakia's links with the West were thus seen to be expanding rather than contracting.

Perhaps, had it not been for the drought that the summer of 1947 was to bring, and the deterioration of the relations between Moscow and Washington, non-Marxist hopes might not have proved illusory. Be that as it may. As it turned out, the nationalized industries that were enjoying government support at this time tended to hit or to over-shoot their targets, while the building industry, for instance, which was still largely in

[1] H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 241.
[2] Diamond: *Czechoslovakia between East and West*, p. 158.
[3] Ibid. p. 139. See also R. R. Betts: *Czechoslovakia*, in Betts, ed.: *Central and South East Europe*, p. 174.

private hands, did poorly. Thus the Two-Year Plan strengthened the arguments of the Czechoslovak Communists and helped to weight the dice in their favour. In retrospect it is difficult not to regard the plan as a long step forward towards the complete socialization of the second Czechoslovak Republic.

PART III

GREECE, 1944–1946

By William H. McNeill

On 18 October 1944 the Greek Government of National Unity, headed by George Papandreou,[1] returned to Athens. But the end of their wartime period of exile was not to end their difficulties. A host of problems demanded from them the most vigorous and resolute action. But Papandreou's Government were incapable of vigorous and resolute action, since they were deeply divided against themselves. The division faithfully reflected the division in Greek society at large between a bouyant Left, organized into the popular front called EAM,[2] and an inchoate Right, many of whose supporters had been compromised by collaboration with the Germans. There can be little doubt that a majority of the population withheld active support from either extreme; but moderation did not, and perhaps could not, prevail in a time when the whole institutional framework of Greek society was near dissolution. Moral confusion, economic suffering, revolutionary action, and counter-revolutionary violence were the elements from which Greek history was compounded in the years immediately after the liberation from German occupation.

It was, however, not only the Greeks themselves who played a decisive part in their post-occupation history. At the moment when the Greek Government returned to Athens Churchill was in Moscow; and one of the results of Churchill's visit was an agreement between himself and Stalin which made Greece a British 'sphere of operations'.[3] Rather reluctantly, the American Government approved the arrangement. In reality, this agreement of October 1944 merely ratified an existing fact. Since the early years of the war British influence in Greek affairs had been of primary importance, and this affected the actions both of the Greek Government in Exile and of the Greek guerrilla bands.[4] On 26 September 1944, when the return of the Greek Government to Athens was imminent, British primacy in Greek affairs was confirmed and formalized by an agreement signed at Caserta. The Caserta Agreement had two essential

[1] For the formation of this Government on 2 September 1944, and the antecedent abortive meeting of Greek armed forces in Egypt in April, see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 683–5; Churchill, v. 470–88; vi. 96–102; U.S. edition, v. 532–52; vi. 108–14.

[2] These initials stood for *Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon*, that is, National Liberation Front.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 494–6; Churchill, vi. 198; U.S. edition, vi. 227.

[4] For an account of Greek affairs during the occupation period see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 678 seqq.

clauses: first, the two leading guerrilla organizations, ELAS and EDES,[1] placed themselves under the authority of the Greek Government in Exile; second, the Greek Government placed the forces at their command under the authority of General Maitland Wilson, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and accepted General Ronald Scobie as G.O.C. Forces, Greece.[2]

This legal basis for British influence in Greek affairs was reinforced by the military fact that only British troops landed in Greece on the heels of the retreating Germans.[3] Almost equally important was the fact that the frail fabric of the Greek Government of National Unity was largely a British creation, and that Papandreou had been chosen by British officials for his post as Prime Minister. The weakness of the Greek Government was patent to all, and their prospects of acquiring authority, prestige, and practical power were dependent on British moral and military support. Consequently, Papandreou faithfully consulted the British Ambassador, Reginald (later Sir R.) Leeper, about almost every matter of importance that came before the Greek Government for decision.[4]

One of the most pressing problems of liberated Greece was economic. A country in which the rural areas were devastated while the cities were poverty-stricken (though physically intact) required a prompt delivery of relief supplies if famine was not to follow in the wake of liberation.

[1] ELAS signified *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*, that is, National People's Liberation Army. It was the military arm of EAM and was by far the largest of the Greek guerrilla organizations. It had gained possession of Italian arms and equipment in Greece at the time of the Italian surrender in September 1943 (Churchill, v. 475; U.S. edition, v. 538). EDES signified *Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos*, that is, Greek Democratic National League. EDES guerrillas were confined to a small part of North-Western Greece, but somewhat ill-organized EDES civilian groups existed in the main towns of Greece, and some, especially in Athens, had co-operated with the Germans in the last days of the occupation.

[2] The text of the Caserta Agreement may be found in Woodhouse: *Apple of Discord*, pp. 306–7; *EAM White Book* (New York, Greek American Council, 1945), pp. 7–9; *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 349–51; cf. Churchill, vi. 248–9; U.S. edition, vi. 285.

[3] They arrived between 4 and 14 October 1944. A small contingent of American soldiers participated in the military relief organization, but the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had refused to send combat formations of American troops to Greece, in spite of a British request to that effect. It was a cardinal point in American military policy in 1944 and earlier to avoid any commitment in the Balkans. But on 26 April 1944 Churchill had had Roosevelt's blessing for the dispatch to Greece of a sufficient British force to preserve order after the Germans had left (Churchill, vi. 100; U.S. edition, vi. 112; cf. *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 289, 304–5, 385–6, 393, 478, 496 and note).

[4] Sir Reginald Leeper: *When Greek Meets Greek* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1950), p. 89 and *passim*. Leeper is very circumspect, with the result that the extent of his influence over Greek affairs is minimized in his account. Nevertheless, the reality peeps out clearly between the lines. It comes out still more clearly in Churchill's *Second World War* that, at least from April 1944 onwards, Churchill himself took a direct and vigorous personal hand in guiding the course of British policy towards Greece; that he was determined not to allow EAM to take over the government of Greece by revolutionary methods; and that he expected that the consequence would be a military 'show-down' between the British force in Greece and ELAS (Churchill, v. 478–88; vi. 64–67, 92–102; U.S. edition, v. 541–52; vi. 74–78, 102–14).

The destruction of communications within the country interrupted normal trade and made distribution of relief difficult; and the even more thorough destruction of the harbours interfered with unloading. These problems had been foreseen, and an Anglo-American military organization, Military Liaison or ML, had been established in order to bring relief to Greece in the immediate post-liberation period.

Before the Greek Government themselves could turn serious attention to economic matters, there were critical administrative and political issues that had to be settled. The administration which had existed under the Germans disintegrated at the time of liberation in nearly every part of Greece. Only in Athens did the city police and the body of civil servants remain as organized instruments at the disposal of the Government; but, before the will of the Greek Cabinet could become effective in the provinces, it was necessary to create a new body of officials. Actual day-to-day administration outside Athens fell into the hands of the Resistance organizations. In North-Western Greece, EDES bands took over the basic functions of government; in nearly all the rest of the country, EAM and its associated military organization, ELAS, kept public order, assessed and collected taxes, set out to punish collaborators, and established local authorities to handle local administration.[1]

EAM shared in the Government of National Unity in the sense that five (and later six) EAM representatives were members of Papandreou's Cabinet. But the leaders of EAM, in particular the Communists, who were the most active and influential element in the EAM coalition, did not really trust the other members of the Government of National Unity, and in practice the local administration of Greece was conducted independently of, and in many cases in a spirit of hostility towards, the newly arrived Government.[2]

It is difficult for an outsider to give an objective account of the spirit and aims of EAM as these manifested themselves in the six weeks that followed the liberation. One striking characteristic was the intense enthusiasm that EAM generated among its adherents by combining a hope

[1] During the occupation EAM had been notably successful in creating the framework for its post-liberation administration. (For details see L. S. Stavrianos: 'The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organization and Administration', *The Journal of Modern History*, March 1952, pp. 42–55.) When the Germans left, the EAM organization for the most part could simply come out into the open and take over from the demoralized officials who had served the Germans; and it was seldom necessary to resort to violence. As a result, Greece was surprisingly peaceable, at least on the surface, in the weeks immediately after liberation. EAM government was effective, and did not lack a widespread popular acceptance. Overt dissent was not tolerated, since any dissenter was, or could plausibly be, accused of being a collaborator. EDES acted similarly in its region of Greece, but its political organization was less effective, since it lacked the leaven of revolutionary enthusiasm which inspired the ranks of EAM.

[2] ELAS road blocks stopped traffic on the outskirts of Athens, and refused to allow government officials to pass without authority from EAM. This was true even of such seemingly neutral figures as engineers sent by the Ministry of Public Works to survey road damage.

of better things to come with a hatred of the old system which had brought such suffering to many Greeks in the past. The hated past tended to find embodiment in the person of the King; and EAM agitators laid fierce emphasis upon the demand that George II, King of the Hellenes, should not return to his throne. In the eyes of the Left, King George was identified with the dictatorship of Metaxas which had ruled Greece before the war; and it was also identified with social conservatism and with foreign intervention.[1]

A second point in EAM's public platform was the demand for the punishment of collaborators, which, in the circumstances, could easily be stretched to mean punishment of the groups and individuals who had dominated Greek political and economic life during and before the war. Unless a rather precise legal definition of the crime of collaboration could be agreed to, the punishment of collaborators could easily be transformed into a revolutionary reign of terror; and this was what EAM's opponents, both Greek and British, feared.

In October and November 1944 the bulk of EAM's following was composed (it seems clear) of people who took the public professions of the movement more or less at face value. The Communist Party of Greece was relatively small, and throughout the war it had played down the revolutionary theme. Yet Communists occupied a leading position in EAM and ELAS, and, in the light of later developments of similar 'Popular Fronts' in other East European countries, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that EAM, if it had come into power in Greece, would have evolved in the direction of an out-and-out Communist dictatorship.

At the time of liberation the British and those Greeks who distrusted EAM already believed that the National Liberation Front was simply a stalking-horse for Communist revolution. They discounted EAM's public professions of policy as half-truths deliberately camouflaging far more radical intentions. EAM leaders reciprocated the distrust. They believed that the British and the Greeks of the Right were seeking to bring the King back by force or by fraud, and that they wished to undermine and eventually to destroy the people's movement that EAM had created during the war. In such an atmosphere genuine co-operation was clearly impossible. The crucial question was whether one side or the other would give way without appealing to the arbitrament of force.

By an early date in November issue had been joined. The occasion was a dispute about how the Government should establish an armed force with which to sustain its authority in Greece. It was agreed on all hands that

[1] The Greek monarchy was a foreign institution, originally imposed by the Great Powers. The reigning family was of Danish origin, and King George himself was in all outward things more English than Greek.

the guerrilla 'private armies' should be supplanted by troops and police owing allegiance not to a party but to the Greek Government as a whole; but, when it came to the question of how the change should be brought about and by what steps, an inextricable collision of wills soon made itself manifest.

Full details of the negotiations within the Greek Cabinet and between the Greek Government and the British authorities over the future constitution of a Greek armed force had not been published at the time of writing.[1] As the Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party later said, the dispute over the armed forces was the occasion, not the cause, of the violence which broke out in December 1944,[2] and therefore it would not be profitable to enter into any detailed consideration of the manœuvres that preceded the open rupture.[3] Both sides stretched legality very thin. EAM and ELAS used the veiled threat of their military power,[4] and from at least as early as 30 November they began to take steps to bring that force to bear in Athens itself. These actions flouted General Scobie's authority over ELAS, which had been legalized by the Caserta Agreement.[5] On the other side, Papandreou and the British authorities interpreted the Caserta Agreement as empowering Scobie to order the dissolution of ELAS, even after the negotiations with EAM Ministers for such a dissolution had broken down.[6]

The dispute came rapidly to a crisis. On the night of 1–2 December the EAM Ministers resigned in a body from Papandreou's Cabinet. It seems

[1] By far the most detailed collection of documents is that published by EAM, the *EAM White Book* (cited above, p. 390, note 2). This collection is, however, edited to make a party case and cannot be relied upon to give a complete picture of what happened. It seems, however, to be accurate in what it does reproduce.

[2] See W. Byford-Jones: *The Greek Trilogy* (*Resistance–Liberation–Revolution*) (London, Hutchinson [*c.* 1946]), p. 225.

[3] There could be no doubt that British intervention in Greek affairs was very high-handed, though details of the successive efforts at compromise were in dispute between EAM and non-EAM authorities. For a detailed account see L. S. Stavrianos: 'The Immediate Origins of the Battle of Athens', *The American Slavic and East European Review*, December 1949, viii. 239–51; see also Churchill, vi. 250 seqq.; U.S. edition, vi. 287 seqq.

[4] The regular strength of ELAS was almost 50,000 men. This force was supplemented by a 'Reserve' of uncertain size which existed in the cities and was strongest in Athens-Piraeus (see Stefanos Sarafis: *Greek Resistance Army* (London, Birch Books, 1951), p. 276). Scobie's forces on the eve of the outbreak of fighting in Athens totalled about 10,000 men, of which about half were combat-trained (cf. McNeill: *Greek Dilemma*, p. 146).

[5] Certain ELAS regular formations were ordered to advance towards Athens on 30 November, and on 2 December the ELAS Reserve of Athens was mobilized. These acts were, of course, contrary to Scobie's will, and they infringed the provisions of his original operational order to which the Commander-in-Chief of ELAS had subscribed at the time of the Caserta Agreement. For an account of the movement of ELAS troops on the eve of the battle in Athens see Sarafis, op. cit. pp. 300–1.

[6] It was certain that the formalities of law were not observed, whatever interpretation might be put upon the decisions (or failures of decision) made by the Greek Cabinet; for no decree for the dissolution of ELAS was published in the official *Government Gazette* until after the battle had been joined. On this point see Sarafis, op. cit. p. 295; *EAM White Book*, pp. 34 seqq.

clear that what the EAM leaders expected and hoped to achieve was to bring Papandreou's Government down, and substitute for it a new coalition in which EAM would be able to exert a preponderant influence. To assure this outcome EAM organized a great demonstration, which duly took place on 3 December. EAM leaders also proclaimed a general strike to begin on 4 December.

In the face of these developments Papandreou and his remaining colleagues lost their nerve. They had no armed force at their disposal which could hope to compete with EAM's forces, nor did the political parties which they represented have the organization or morale to act as an effective counterweight to EAM. Only the British Ambassador and the British army could prevent EAM from rising to power in Greece; but, until the event, it was by no means clear that the British Government would dare to intervene on the scale necessary to accomplish that end.[1]

The first occasion for British action was not long delayed. On 4 December Papandreou decided to resign in favour of the aged leader of the Liberal Party, Themistocles Sofoulis. Before Sofoulis had come to grips with the all-important question of what should be EAM's representation in the new Cabinet, however, the situation was transformed by two telegrams from London. In the small hours of the morning of 5 December Churchill telegraphed to General Scobie telling him not to hesitate to act as if he were in a conquered city where a local rebellion was in progress, and adding that Athens must be held and dominated—with bloodshed if necessary.[2] On the same day he instructed Leeper[3] to oppose any change in the person of the Greek Prime Minister; and Leeper's power was never more strikingly demonstrated than in this instance. When, on 5 December, he told Papandreou of Churchill's views, Papandreou quickly resumed the office from which he had so nearly resigned. Meanwhile, the British had come openly and vigorously to the support of the Greek Government. On 4 December Scobie ordered ELAS to withdraw from a district round Athens before midnight, 6–7 December; and he threatened that any units which failed to comply with this order would be treated as hostile.

These British actions presented EAM with an unexpected problem. They were not prepared, either morally or militarily, for open battle with British troops. After some heated debate the Communists and their sup-

[1] It might, indeed, be questioned whether the British would have acted as they did had it been possible to foresee the eventual crisis. Until they were rudely disillusioned British officials were unanimously convinced that the Greeks would never fight against British troops, and that a mere demonstration of determination would bring EAM to heel. Yet, as early as 29 September 1943, Churchill, in a minute of that date to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (text in Churchill, v. 475; U.S. edition, v. 538), had contemplated the possibility that British troops accompanying the Greek Government in Exile on their return to Athens might have to contend with rioting in the capital or incursion from the countryside on the part of the opposition in Greece.

[2] Text of telegram ibid. vi, pp. 252 and 289 respectively.

[3] Text of telegram ibid. pp. 253 and 290 respectively.

porters persuaded the more moderate EAM leaders that resolute defiance of Scobie's orders was the only way out. This decision, reached during the night of 4–5 December, was profoundly influenced by the fate which had befallen the EAM demonstration of the preceding day. When the demonstrators had reached the centre of Athens on 3 December, and had broken through police cordons on to the central square of the city, they had been met by a fusillade of gunfire loosed at close range by the handful of police protecting the Police Headquarters building. Several people had been killed and many others wounded. The police had fired upon an unarmed crowd,[1] and had done so in front of British and American newspaper correspondents who, quite literally, had had a ringside view of the slaughter from the balconies of the Grande Bretagne Hotel. The shock of witnessing such panic brutality was tremendous, and most of the correspondents were transformed by the experience into sympathizers with EAM, if, indeed, they were not so already.[2] The affair gave EAM and ELAS good moral ground for a forward policy, and assured them of support and sympathy in Britain and America through the newspaper reports which were freely sent back by the shocked and startled correspondents.

During the night of 5–6 December ELAS units attempted to execute a *coup d'état* by seizing the government buildings in central Athens, thus depriving the Papandreou Government of any remaining shred of power. Presumably the plan was to present Scobie with a *fait accompli* before the expiry of his ultimatum of 4 December. But the attempt failed, and it failed primarily because British soldiers had been stationed as guards before the main government buildings as a token supplement to the Greek police. ELAS still apparently had instructions not to attack British soldiers, so the mere presence of a few British sentries sufficed to foil the EAM plan.

On the next day, 6 December, the British took the offensive. ELAS had disregarded Scobie's orders to withdraw from Athens, and, even though the ultimatum did not expire until midnight, Scobie ordered air attack on some of the ELAS strongholds in the park areas of Athens. This was intended as a military demonstration, designed to awe EAM/ELAS into a more conciliatory frame of mind. The effect was, however, just the opposite. R.A.F. planes destroyed some civilian houses when their rockets went astray from the target areas, and news of this attack helped to harden a will to resist to the end among the rank and file of EAM/ELAS. The moderates in the movement were unable to restrain those who argued

[1] The crowd was certainly angry and in a mood for violence; but it consisted mostly of women and children and old men. The reason was ominous enough: able-bodied men were absent because they had been summoned to join the ELAS Reserve units of their neighbourhoods; but this was not obvious to those who witnessed the affair at the time.

[2] Cf. Byford-Jones: *Greek Trilogy*, pp. 138–41.

that, in the new situation which had developed after 6 December, it was necessary to fight the British after all.[1]

Yet the decision came slowly and was always reluctant. For more than a week after 6 December ELAS restricted their operations to relatively minor affrays, waiting for a 'political' solution. They expected that the pressure of public opinion in Britain and America, combined with Russian diplomatic intervention on their behalf, would compel Churchill to withdraw from the exposed position in which he found himself as a result of the Greek crisis. But EAM/ELAS reckoned without knowledge of the agreement between Churchill and Stalin, which had assigned Greece to the British 'sphere of operations',[2] and, as long as Stalin stood by his bargain,[3] the force of public opinion in Britain, the United States,[4] and Canada[5] alone was insufficient to make Churchill retreat, though it did certainly give him pause.[6]

In fact, the military position of both British and ELAS forces was not suitable for real warfare. The main ELAS strength was far away in the north, and was not brought into the battle of Athens at all. British forces were scattered in small detachments in Athens and outside. If ELAS had been morally and militarily prepared to attack the British during the first week of December it seems very likely that they would have won a complete, or nearly complete, victory. But they were not prepared; and the period of uncertainty and half measures on their side between 1 and 15 December gave the British a chance to withdraw their scattered forces into relatively secure perimeters in Salonika, Patras, and Athens-Piraeus. Even when this movement had been completed the British were at first not able to fight more than defensively. Not until after 11 December were British combat troops ordered from Italy to Greece to reinforce Scobie's command, and it was not until 17 December that the British forces were in a position to undertake a serious offensive in the Piraeus area.

[1] Not all EAM leaders agreed. Alexander Svolos, for instance, refused to sanction the resort to open warfare which now was imminent, and withdrew from active participation in affairs. He did not make his withdrawal public until later, however, so that its moral effect was almost nil at the time. Cf. W. H. McNeill: 'The Outbreak of Fighting in Athens, December 1944', *The American Slavic and East European Review*, December 1949, viii. 260.

[2] See above, p. 389 and note 3.

[3] As Churchill certifies that he did (Churchill, vi. 255; U.S. edition, vi. 293).

[4] For the hostile reaction of the State Department at Washington and of the American press see ibid. pp. 255 and 292–3 respectively. Though Roosevelt had given Churchill his blessing in advance for maintaining order in Greece if necessary (see above, p. 390, note 3) he now proved unwilling to associate himself publicly with Churchill's policy (see Churchill, vi. 261–5; U.S. edition, vi. 299–304).

[5] See ibid. pp. 265–6 and 304–6 respectively.

[6] A debate on Greece in the House of Commons on 8 December 1944 shook the British Coalition Government more severely than it had been shaken at any time since its formation. Most Labour and some Conservative M.P.s abstained from voting as an indication of their disapproval of the Government's policy, and, although Churchill made the vote a question of confidence, thirty M.P.s voted against him (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 406, coll. 939–1010).

Thus it happened that, until about the middle of the month, each side held back, expecting the other to yield and permit a political compromise of some sort; and by the time when ELAS decided to stake everything on a grand attack—the night of 15–16 December—it was already too late for them to win outright military victory. Yet, even after reinforcements had arrived from Italy, the British were reluctant to use the full power of the weapons at their disposal; and until the end of the month they undertook only small, limited actions with a view to clearing critical lines of communication among the three sectors of Athens-Piraeus into which British forces had originally withdrawn.

When the military initiative passed to the British after the failure of ELAS's attack of 15–16 December Churchill's first resort was to negotiation. On Christmas Day he and Eden arrived in Athens, having come by air from London.[1] After consulting Leeper and Scobie and meeting Archbishop Damaskinos, Churchill summoned a conference of Greek political leaders, including leaders of EAM, under the Archbishop's chairmanship. This conference, which took place on 26–27 December,[2] broke up in anger without having reached any compromise that could end the fighting in Athens; yet, in spite of this failure, Churchill's trip was not fruitless. The conference did unanimously recommend that Churchill should be commissioned to ask the King of Greece to appoint a Regent, in the person of Archbishop Damaskinos, with a mandate to form a new government (excluding Communists) and to exercise the royal powers pending a plebiscite on the question of the future of the monarchy. It was a fact of equal importance that Churchill had taken to the Archbishop on personal acquaintance, and had become convinced that this appointment would be both a wise and a prudent step.[3]

Accordingly Churchill, after his return from Athens, interviewed the King of Greece and persuaded him, under threat of acting without him if necessary, to authorize the appointment of Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent.[4] The Archbishop was installed in his new office on 1 January 1945; and one of his first acts was to accept the resignation of Papandreou and his Government. A new Cabinet, headed by General Nicholas Plastiras, took office two days later, on 3 January.

These changes in the Greek political scene did much to undercut EAM. The establishment of a Regency made it clear that the King was not, after all, to be brought back by British bayonets; and as for the punishment of

[1] See Churchill, vi. 270–1; U.S. edition, vi. 311–13.

[2] See ibid. pp. 274–7 and 315–19 respectively.

[3] Before his visit to Athens Churchill had supported King George II of Greece in his refusal to appoint a Regent. The King's legal claim to reoccupy his throne as a matter of course was difficult to dispute, however unpopular such a return might be as a political act.

[4] At the Cairo Conference (November–December 1943) Eden had urged the King of Greece to agree to a Regency, but the King had declined (see ibid. v, pp. 476 and 539 respectively).

collaborators, Plastiras promised: 'My Government will act drastically.'[1] Plastiras himself was a figure well calculated to appeal to the republican and reformist rank and file of EAM. He was a stalwart republican who had made his reputation in the troubles after the First World War, when he had headed a Government which had sent King George into exile for the first time. Plastiras as Prime Minister thus seemed a living refutation of one of the main themes of EAM propaganda. Yet he was no friend of the Communists; and when he first set foot on Greek soil again, on 16 December 1944,[2] he made no secret of his belief that the Communists would have first to be brought to terms by military means before normal political life could be resumed in Greece.[3]

These political shifts were matched by a rapid change in the military sphere. On 27 December 1944 British troops began a major offensive, and were soon able to drive ELAS from the southern half of the city. After a pause for consolidation the British advance continued, and on the night of 4–5 January 1945 the ELAS High Command decided that withdrawal was necessary. ELAS proved able to conduct a rapid and skilful retreat during the next twenty-four hours, leaving Athens-Piraeus in British hands.

Pourparlers between Scobie and representatives of EAM/ELAS had taken place at intervals throughout the battle; and, when once the tables had been decisively turned in the first week of January, serious truce negotiations started. The result was an armistice, which came into effect at midnight of 14–15 January. By its terms ELAS evacuated a considerable area of Central Greece, a district round Salonika, and some outlying islands. In addition, an exchange of prisoners was agreed upon, by which ELAS undertook to return all British and Greek prisoners of war in exchange for an equal number of ELAS prisoners.[4]

The declared purpose of the armistice was to permit peace negotiations between EAM/ELAS and the Greek Government. Accordingly, a conference was arranged which produced the Varkiza Agreement, signed on 12 February 1945. This agreement was on the whole a victory for the Government, and for the British who had so powerfully backed them. ELAS agreed to disarm and disband, whereas the units of the Greek army, which had been formed in the Middle East and whose dissolution EAM/ELAS had demanded in the negotiations in November, were allowed to remain as the cadres for the new national army. In return, the Government undertook to guarantee civil rights, to raise martial law, to proclaim an amnesty for 'political' crimes committed after 3 December,

[1] The programme of the Plastiras Government, as set forth on 10 January 1945, may be found in Byford-Jones: *Greek Trilogy*, pp. 265–6.

[2] Plastiras, in his turn, had gone into exile in 1933 as a consequence of an abortive military revolt which he had undertaken in that year against the rising monarchist movement.

[3] Byford-Jones, op. cit. pp. 193–4.

[4] The text of the armistice terms may be found in Sarafis: *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 316–18.

and to purge the civil service and police forces of collaborators. The final article dealt with the matter of elections:

> At the earliest possible date, and in any case within the current year, there shall be conducted in complete freedom, and with every care for its genuineness, a plebiscite which shall finally decide the Constitutional question [i.e. the future of the monarchy], all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The representatives of both sides agree that, for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will, the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.[1]

It was upon the question of elections that Greek politics turned during the following eighteen months.

The battle in Athens between ELAS and the British had a profound significance for Greece. For one thing, EAM, as it had emerged from the occupation, was shattered. Moderates and men of good will, in general, had been alienated by the violence to which the Communist wing of the movement had resorted. It was not so much the decision to fight the British—though that alienated some—as the actions of ELAS itself in Athens and other parts of Greece which repelled all but the extremists. ELAS executed several hundred persons as collaborators—many of them humble, and, to all appearance, harmless individuals; and it did this after only the sketchiest sort of trial, and in some cases to the accompaniment of tortures and brutalities which shocked all who saw the corpses that were exhumed after the battle had ended. Instead of a reign of liberty, something resembling a revolutionary terror had arisen in the parts of Athens and Piraeus which ELAS had held.[2] In the provinces, too, similar, though less extensive, violence and oppression provoked revulsion as soon as the local population escaped from the pressure which ELAS had been able to exert.

The result was that when, in accordance with the Varkiza Agreement, ELAS duly surrendered the majority of its weapons and disbanded, a counter-revolution swept over the whole of Greece. Self-styled 'nationalist' organizations sprang up all over the country, and many of their adherents strove to imitate the deeds of ELAS by visiting vengeance upon the men who had formerly oppressed them. This reaction was accentuated by the nature of the military units which were at the disposal of the Greek Government. During the fighting in Athens, National Guard battalions had been

[1] Text of the Varkiza Agreement may be found in Byford-Jones, op. cit. pp. 266–9.

[2] The seizure of several thousand civilian hostages in the last days of the fighting was another and almost equally important manifestation of ELAS's illiberal spirit. The hostages were taken mostly from the wealthy and socially prominent families of Athens, and those who survived the forced marches to the north, as well as relatives of the hundreds who died or were executed when they could no longer keep up with the retreating troops, became a powerful and fanatical group who hardened the fear and hate of the Communists and their remaining sympathizers.

recruited from among the population within the British perimeter; and, as British troops won control over new sections of the city, fresh recruits were raised, district by district. Although the framework of conscription existed in law, in fact these battalions were mostly filled by volunteers; and they were animated by a violently anti-Communist spirit. As the Athens battalions moved into the provinces, taking over from ELAS, they showed scant respect for the civil liberties and promises of amnesty that had been written into the Varkiza Agreement. As a result, a 'rightist' terror replaced the former 'leftist' terror in many parts of the country.

This development displeased both the British and the Greek Prime Minister, Plastiras; but neither the one nor the other was able to do more than restrain some of the more extreme manifestations of the spirit of revenge and violence which animated the only organized bodies which opposed the Communists and EAM. It proved impossible to find a halfway house between the Communist revolutionaries and the anti-Communist 'nationalists'. The psychological and material basis for moderate government was absent.

Nevertheless, some progress was made. In building up a military force to support their power, the Central Government had the powerful assistance of a British Military Mission, which provided both training and supplies, and this Mission was able, in the course of the next six months, to replace the Athens battalions of the National Guard with better disciplined and more law-abiding units of a new Greek army. The task of finding civil administrators for the provinces was almost as difficult, and in this the Greek Government were thrown upon their own resources. Crippling lack of such essentials as paper and pencils was only slowly made good, and not until 1946 did anything like regular administration take shape in the whole of the country.

Meanwhile, fresh difficulties arose in Athens. Plastiras quarrelled with the British Military Mission over the question of the appointment of army officers. The British wished to make appointments depend on technical qualifications, a principle which in practice favoured royalist officers, since republicans had nearly all been weeded out of the Greek army after 1933 and 1935. Plastiras, on the contrary, wanted to appoint his personal friends and political sympathizers, a policy which the British Military Mission was able to oppose effectively.

A second source of difficulty for Plastiras was the absence of any organized popular support for his Government. The parties of the centre were weak and the republicanism for which Plastiras personally stood was quite unable to make headway among the population at large. It was under attack from two sides: from EAM for betraying the real cause of the people, and from royalists for opening the path to a second Communist *coup d'état*.

As a result of his difficulties with the British Military Mission and with the Greek politicians of the Right, Plastiras decided to resign on 7 April 1945. He was succeeded by a 'service' Government, headed by Admiral Peter Voulgaris. In theory the new Government was non-party, and indeed its Ministers were dissociated from political organizations. But Voulgaris was as incapable as Plastiras had been of checking the swing to the Right. Two main themes of propaganda sustained the nationalists. They developed ambitious territorial claims against Bulgaria and Albania, and directed a virulent tirade against the Bulgars, in particular, for their deeds in the parts of Northern Greece which had been annexed to Bulgaria during the war. The ideal of *Megáli Hellas*, Great Greece, was one that raised a powerful emotion in many Greek hearts; so much so that EAM was driven to put forward territorial claims to rival those of the Right—though EAM's attention was concentrated on Cyprus and Turkish Thrace, not on the territory of the new 'People's Democracies' of the northern Balkans.

The Right also emphasized the need for a king, to hold Communism in check. They presented the alternatives before the Greek people as a choice between King and Communism, and strove to identify the return of King George II with a return of the good old times, which, however difficult, had certainly not been as bad as those which had come to the country during and after the war.

Until May 1946 EAM and the Greek Communist Party were on the defensive, and perhaps even co-operated with the Government in hunting down one unrepentant ELAS band which refused to surrender its arms according to the Varkiza Agreement.[1] It is likely that at first the leaders of EAM and the Communist Party relied upon early elections to restore to them at least a part of the position that they had lost. Not until after Voulgaris had assumed the premiership did they reach the conclusion that elections would result in their further discomfiture if they were held before the reaction had worn itself out. As a result, after April 1945, instead of pressing for elections in accordance with the Varkiza Agreement, the Left made objections and tried to postpone them. After May 1945, when the leadership of the Greek Communist Party was reorganized, this legal policy was supplemented by a limited resort to 'self defence', i.e. by the formation of armed bands once again, on the pattern of the war-time ELAS.[2]

[1] Some ELAS arms were hidden, and not surrendered in accordance with the Varkiza Agreement. In addition, several thousand demobilized ELAS soldiers retreated into Yugoslavia and other neighbouring countries, where they remained concentrated in camps under something like military discipline. These facts gave colour to the suspicion that the Communists might try once again at some time in the future to seize power in Greece.

[2] Actually, very few such bands appeared in the summer of 1945, and they were withdrawn or disbanded in the autumn. It is likely, though unprovable, that the Greek Communists were

The Voulgaris Government had two main tasks: the preparation of elections and economic stabilization. Beginning in April 1945 UNRRA took over from Military Liaison the responsibility for bringing relief supplies to Greece, and the scale of deliveries increased as some of the physical obstacles to unloading and distribution, which had been so crippling during the first six months of the liberation, were overcome.[1] But inflation was rampant, and the Government failed to balance income and expenditure. In April 1945 the Voulgaris Government attempted to face the financial problem. An ambitious scheme of price fixing and rationing and a rough and ready form of direct taxation were decreed, but the administrative machinery for enforcing such controls could not be improvised. A systematic boycott coming from the merchants and capitalists on the Right, and from EAM and the Communists on the Left, made the effort come to grief in June.

This failure opened the door for renewed inflation and seriously discredited the Voulgaris Government. They suffered an additional blow in July, when the British election returned a Labour majority. Greeks universally believed that the new British Government would make a radical change in British policy towards Greece; and the expectation of such a shift, together with the unresolved economic difficulties, persuaded Voulgaris to resign early in August 1945. Fruitless efforts to form a coalition between the two principal 'traditional' parties, the Liberal (republican) and the Popular (royalist), followed; but, after a week of uncertainty, Voulgaris was persuaded to resume office with a slightly remodelled Cabinet.

The Admiral's purpose in resuming office with a 'service' Cabinet was to prepare for elections. In accordance with the Varkiza Agreement,[2] he issued invitations to Britain, America, France, and the Soviet Union to send observers to watch the impending elections and to see whether they were fairly conducted. The Soviet Union refused, perhaps for fear of setting a precedent for supervision of elections in other East European

discouraged from resorting to a new guerrilla war by the Russians, who, in 1945, were still seeking a *modus vivendi* with Britain and America which would divide Europe and the world between the Great Powers on an amicable basis (see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia,* p. 527). There is every reason to suppose that the resort to force in December 1944 had developed from the internal momentum of Greek politics, and had not in any way been approved or provoked by the Russians. The change in the leadership of the Greek Communist Party in May 1945 probably marked, though this cannot be proved, a reassertion of control over Greek Communist policy by international Communist organizations. At any rate, the subsequent action of the Greek Communists seems to reflect international changes, and can plausibly be traced back to Russian inspiration (see below, p. 407).

[1] See above, pp. 104–5.

[2] In this respect the Varkiza Agreement, in its turn, reflected the pressure of the Anglo-Americans, whose formula for the restoration of political normality in Europe had been set forth in the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. This declaration recommended the holding of elections under supervision in just such countries as Greece.

countries; the other three Powers accepted. The next question was the date at which elections should be held. Voulgaris found himself subjected to strenuous counter-pressures. The royalists demanded an early date, believing that this would enable them to win; the Communists and the republicans held the same belief, and argued that fair and equitable elections could not be held until after peace and tranquillity had been restored to the whole country.

In this situation, the advice of Britain (backed this time by the United States) was decisive. The British, after their experience of December 1944, had adopted a policy of 'hands off' in Greece, so far as the situation would permit. Leeper refused, at this stage, to give advice such as he had offered to Papandreou, and watched more or less passively the efforts of the Plastiras and Voulgaris Governments to grapple with the problems that confronted them. But, on the question of elections, the British did have definite views. They saw no likelihood of any marked improvement in the conditions of public peace until after a strong and popularly elected government had come into office; and the position in which Great Britain found herself as a consequence of the December affair—holding a sort of moral responsibility for the conduct of the Greek Government in the eyes of most of the world—was an uncomfortable one so long as the Government of Greece held office by no sort of popular mandate. Hence, when the question was referred to them, the British recommended the holding of elections at an early date, and combined this with an admonition to postpone the plebiscite on the question of the monarchy until passions had had time to cool.[1]

Deferring to the advice which had been offered by the Great Powers, Voulgaris announced at the beginning of October that elections would be held on 20 January 1946. This precipitated a new crisis, for EAM and the Liberal Party both declared that they would boycott any such election. When it became apparent that only royalists would vote, Voulgaris threw in his hand and resigned. A month of political crisis ensued; and, in spite of their disinclination, the British Government felt compelled to intervene once again. The Minister of State, Hector McNeil, came to Athens on 13 November and, after some heated and dramatic scenes, he installed Sofoulis, the leader of the Liberal Party, in power as Prime Minister, heading a Cabinet drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the Liberal Party.[2]

[1] The Regent paid a state visit to London in September 1945; and it was during this visit that the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, gave this advice. It was published to the world on 11 September 1945 in the form of a communiqué issued by the British, American, and French Foreign Ministers, who were gathered in London at the time for the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. For the text see McNeill: *Greek Dilemma*, pp. 178–9.

[2] This was not the outcome that McNeil had set out to attain. He had wished to install a coalition, but the royalists refused to join, and as a last resort McNeil fixed upon Sofoulis, as a

When Sofoulis assumed office in November the financial situation of the country was going from bad to worse; but it was not primarily to cope with this problem that he had been installed. Sofoulis found himself in a fundamentally false position. He knew that his party stood little chance at the polls, and he tried by various devices to postpone the elections as far into the future as he could. But British and American pressure was strong, and he was compelled to agree to hold the elections on 31 March 1946, in spite of his protests that the state of public peace was inadequate to assure a fair result. EAM responded to the new posture of affairs by declaring that all good democrats would abstain from voting; the royalists, on the other hand, energetically and enthusiastically embarked on an election campaign, and Sofoulis's party did its best to rival them.

The elections were duly held on 31 March 1946 under the watchful eyes of an Allied Mission more than 1,000 strong. The Mission later certified that the proceedings had been 'orderly and satisfactory', in spite of some irregularities in the voting lists and a certain amount of intimidation of voters indulged in by both Left and Right.[1] The result was as had been foreseen by Greek politicians of all persuasions. The royalists won a sweeping victory, with 231 out of 354 seats in the Chamber of Deputies; out and out republicans won only 51 seats; and parties which had hedged over the question of the monarchy won the balance. EAM claimed, on the basis of the fact that only 49 per cent. of the voters whose names appeared on the lists had actually cast ballots, that the whole affair was a fraud, and that the majority of the Greek people were on their side. This claim was manifestly false, for the lists contained the names of many people who were now dead, and of many others who had been displaced from their place of origin and therefore were unable to vote. The actual strength of EAM sympathizers can only be guessed. They probably totalled about 20 per cent. of the electorate, but, since they abstained from voting, in accordance with EAM's directions, this segment of Greek opinion found no place in the new Chamber of Deputies.

After the election Constantine Tsaldaris, the leader of the principal royalist Party, became Prime Minister. The first care of the new Government was to hasten the plebiscite which was to decide on the future of the monarchy. This was held on 1 September 1946, and resulted in 69 per cent. in favour of the return of the King, 31 per cent. against.[2] King

republican and as the head of a party whose following, at the time, was very small. This intervention, which was as high-handed as any that Churchill had undertaken, provoked the Regent into resigning, but after a few hours he was prevailed upon to resume his office.

[1] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Report of the Allied Mission to observe the Greek elections*, Cmd. 6812 (London, H.M.S.O., 1946), p. 23.

[2] EAM did not boycott this vote, and the figures thus did approximately represent the balance between royalist sentiment and the combined EAM and conservative republican sentiment as it then existed. But conditions were really not propitious for a fair vote. Most Greeks probably

George duly returned to his throne, arriving in Athens on 27 September 1946.

In a very real sense the long and impassioned debate over the future of the Greek monarchy, which dominated Greek politics from 1944 to 1946, was a red herring of monstrous proportions. The person and powers of the King were not such as to make any fundamental difference to the manner in which the Government met or failed to meet the problems confronting the nation; yet for two years this issue obscured all the more vital and pressing issues of policy that needed decision.

This became strikingly apparent after the election of March 1946; for, when the Tsaldaris Government came to power, it soon became obvious that the royalist parties had no programme that even attempted to cope with the problems confronting the country. Their advocacy of the cause of the King had obscured the fact that his return would not, of itself, solve anything. In general, the royalist politicians were not conversant with economic problems. Their only policy was one of *laissez-faire*; and the possession of political power meant for many of them simply an opportunity to grant official favours and perquisites to their personal friends and political supporters. The result was continued economic drift and mounting inflation. Loans from Britain and America seemed to the Greek Government the only hope of escape from the vicious circle; but neither the British nor the American Government were willing to grant credit without attaching strict conditions as to how it should be used. As a result, negotiations dragged slowly on, and only small, stop-gap loans were made to Greece during 1946.

Partly because of government policies (or lack of them) and partly because of the enormous intrinsic difficulties of the economic problems confronting Greece, the national economy at the end of 1946 was fully as precarious as it had been at the time of liberation; and the very substantial relief and reconstruction supplies which had been provided by UNRRA,[1] Military Liaison, private relief organizations, and governmental loans from Britain and America had not sufficed to do more than reduce immediate want and stave off economic disaster. Lack of a serious economic policy was matched by the ardent advocacy of a very foolish foreign policy. Tsaldaris and his supporters trumpeted Greek claims to Bulgarian and Albanian territory; so much so that it is easy to suspect a semi-conscious intention to divert discontent and public attention from the domestic to the foreign field. Tsaldaris himself went to the Paris Peace Conference (July–October 1946) with high hopes of imitating the diplomatic

voted not from inner conviction, but in the hope of managing to keep out of personal and national trouble. To many the King seemed to be an unloved but effective safeguard against Communism; others probably voted royalist simply to avoid trouble with the gendarmes or royalist armed bands.

[1] See above, pp. 104–5.

successes of his illustrious predecessor, Eleftherios Venizelos, by winning for Greece new lands to the north. But the Great Powers were divided on Greek territorial claims,[1] and Tsaldaris was forced to retire discomfited, winning only the Dodecanese Islands and the right to a fraction of Greek reparations claims from Italy and Bulgaria.[2]

The trend of events in Greece from December 1944 onwards had put Greece into dangerous opposition to the three 'People's Democracies' of the north. Petty frontier incidents occurred frequently, and the northern border of Greece was closed to all normal traffic. This situation was brought to the attention of the world in August 1946, when the Ukrainian delegate to the United Nations lodged a complaint against Greece, alleging that the actions of the Greek frontier guards reflected an aggressive policy of the Greek Government which constituted a danger to international peace.[3] After prolonged discussion, between 28 August and 20 September 1946, the Ukrainian complaint was dropped without any action being taken.[4]

The Ukrainian complaint and its handling by the Security Council were in reality incidents in the propaganda war which had broken out between Russia and the West; and possibly the timing of the complaint had also been arranged with an eye to bringing the Greek Government into obloquy at the time when the recrudescence of guerrilla activity in the country, organized and led by the Greek Communist Party, was beginning to assume a new and critical importance. New Communist bands appeared in northern Greece in May 1946, at first on a small scale; but by the end of the summer the movement had gathered force and it quickly became a matter of life and death for the Greek Government.

The reasons for the renewal of the guerrilla war in Greece in 1946 remained a matter of speculation at the time of writing. It is certainly true that political and economic conditions in Greece contributed powerfully to the guerrillas' success. The practices of agents of the Greek Government were oppressive, and any man known to have taken active part in the EAM/ELAS movement was marked out for official discrimination and ran the risk of suffering violence at the hands of various irregular

[1] See above, pp. 346, 348–9.

[2] Italy was obliged to pay reparations to Greece to the value of $100 million, and the Greek share of Bulgarian reparations was $45 million.

[3] Greek affairs had first come before the United Nations in January 1946, when the Russians had complained that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a threat to peace. The accusation was dropped, without any decision, in February. The Greek Government *per se* were not a party to this dispute, although their actions came under discussion (cf. U.N., Security Council: *Official Records*, 1st year, 1st series, no. 1, pp. 15, 72–132, 165–73).

[4] U.N., Security Council: *Official Records*, 1st year, 2nd series, no. 4, pp. 33–39; no. 5, pp. 145–9; no. 6, pp. 153–71; no. 7, 173–97; no. 8, pp. 200–12; no. 9, pp. 214–56; no. 10, pp. 260–81; no. 11, pp. 284–97; no. 12, pp. 300–21; no. 13, pp. 324–41; no. 14, pp. 344–64; no. 15, pp. 365–92; no. 16, pp. 393–422.

'nationalist' bands. This undoubtedly made recruitment to the guerrilla bands easier than it might have been under happier conditions. Besides this, the desperate economic plight of hundreds of thousands of Greek families encouraged young men to seek their fortunes, gun in hand, in the mountains. But there was good reason to suppose that the decisive factor that catalysed these elements of discontent was a deliberate decision of international Communist policy. In 1945, when Greek Communist newspapers had spoken of the need for active 'self defence', a few Communist bands had appeared, only to disappear again in the autumn. In contrast to this, in 1946, guerrilla groups were formed in May and went from strength to strength; and in many cases the core of these bands consisted of men returned from Yugoslavia or elsewhere—men who had retreated across the border when ELAS had been disbanded in the spring of 1945.[1] A certain amount of help in the form of arms and ammunition also came from the other side of the northern frontier of Greece; and the new Communist bands were regularly afforded refuge by Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian frontier guards. These facts make it seem almost certain that the revival of guerrilla activity in the summer of 1946 was the consequence of a high-level Communist decision which was able to control the action of all three of Greece's neighbours.[2]

As the largeness of the scale and effectiveness of the organization of the new guerrilla war became apparent, this new problem quickly eclipsed all others confronting the Greek Government. Economic difficulties were aggravated by it, and this in turn fed the guerrilla flame. Military counter-measures were not very successful. The morale of the Greek army was not attuned to civil war, and many a private person and private soldier decided to play for safety and to adopt a passive attitude until the outcome of the new struggle for the control of Greece had become clear.

This was the internal situation when, on 3 December 1946, the Greek Government lodged a complaint with the United Nations, on the ground that the support of the Greek guerrillas by Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria constituted a threat to international peace. The question came up for debate before the Security Council on 10 December; and on 19 December the Council resolved to send a mission to investigate Greek allegations on the spot, as well as the counter-allegations which had been advanced by Greece's northern neighbours.[3]

[1] For an account of one of these bands, see Frank Smothers, W. H. McNeill, and E. D. McNeill: *Report on the Greeks* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1948), pp. 150–66.

[2] The fact that May 1946 was the month during which open quarrels between Russia and the Anglo-American Powers broke out over Germany is another consideration pointing to the likelihood of there having been Russian inspiration behind the revival of the Greek guerrilla war.

[3] For the official records of the Security Council debate, see U.N., Security Council: *Official Records*, 1st year, 2nd series, no. 24, pp. 529–59; no. 25, pp. 563–83; no. 26, pp. 588–613; no. 27, pp. 615–36.

The Security Council's decision guaranteed that the critical state of Greek internal security would remain on the agenda of international public business; it did not, however, help to solve the problem of Greece itself, where a serious decline in the Government's morale was made worse by the inability of Great Britain to give Greece any further economic and military aid. It was not until March 1947, when President Truman announced his decision to come to the aid of the Greek Government in their struggle against the guerrillas, that a new chapter was opened in the troubled history of post-war Greece.[1]

[1] For the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947 see *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 13–19; for the situation in Greece during 1947 and 1948 see ibid. pp. 177–83.

PART IV

ITALY

(i) Liberated Italy: from September 1943 to February 1947

By Katharine Duff

(*a*) Introduction

After the Armistice of 3 September 1943[1] Italy was in the paradoxical position of being, on the one hand, a defeated aggressor, over whom the Allies exercised control by right of conquest, and whose victims expected due reparation to be exacted from her in the peace settlement, and, on the other, herself a victim of tyranny and aggression in process of being liberated. The Allies had offered Italy the opportunity to 'work her passage'[2] as a 'co-belligerent' against Germany—in fact, they had been most insistent that she should do so; and many Italians sympathized wholeheartedly with the Allied cause, while many others, who were indifferent or hostile to the Allies, were eager to wage their own war against Germans and Fascists, moved by patriotism or by Communism or by both motives combined. And yet, for most of the people of Southern Italy, co-belligerency came to mean surviving as best one could on a battlefield where Anglo-American armies composed of more than twenty races and nationalities were doing the fighting, while in the North the long months of waiting for arms and liberation convinced many of the resisters that the Americans and British were deliberately neglecting them for political reasons.

The truth was that, from the Anglo-American point of view, the immediate purpose of the campaign in Italy was not to liberate the whole peninsula as quickly as possible; the objectives were rather to secure bomber bases against Germany, to win prestige by the capture of Rome, to wear down the German forces and draw them away from France, and, so far as the British were concerned, to use Southern Italy as a springboard to the Balkans.[3] The campaign was planned as a subsidiary part of world-wide operations against Germany and Japan, and was often delayed because men and equipment were sent to other fronts, especially after the

[1] On the negotiation and signing of the Armistice see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 286–91, 297–303. On the German occupation of Northern and Central Italy, the Neo-Fascist Republic, and the Italian Resistance Movement see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 324–37.

[2] Churchill used this phrase in the House of Commons with reference to satellite states on 21 September 1943 (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 392, col. 89).

[3] On Allied grand strategy at this time see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia, passim.*

Americans had carried their point of leaving the Balkans alone and concentrating on the invasion of Western Europe.

From the long and painful ordeal of liberation the Italians emerged to face a peculiarly difficult task of reconstruction, since Italy was one of the poorest and most over-populated of the countries of Western Europe, and her political institutions had to be rebuilt from the foundations after twenty years of Fascism. It was hardly surprising that Italy's post-war mood should have been one of bitterness and disillusionment, and that Italians should have accused the British and Americans of having lured them to surrender with false promises of peace and prosperity.

(*b*) Anglo-American Policy and Pledges before the Armistice

Promises had undoubtedly been made to the Italians and some of them, in the circumstances, distinctly rash ones. Nor were relations between Italy and the Allies improved by the difficulty of harmonizing the various British and American views on policy towards Italy. An understanding was reported to have been reached at the time of the Quebec Conference in August 1943 that the British should have the larger share of control in the Mediterranean[1]—somewhat of a barren honour if the Balkans were to be out of bounds to them—but in practice, throughout this period, Allied policy was an uneasy compromise between the views of Churchill and Roosevelt and of their military and civilian advisers.[2] Public opinion, too, had to be taken into account, and while both Governments, especially the British, feared that the man in the street might object to the Italians being let off too easily,[3] those Britons and Americans who might be described as 'International New Dealers' were continually agitating for Italy to be allowed more food or more political freedom. The Italo-American community in the United States also had to be taken into account.

Before the Armistice the highly effective argument of 'flee from the wrath to come' had been supplemented in British and American propaganda and statements of policy[4] by inducements which inevitably encour-

[1] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1557; cf. remarks about the United States being 'a silent partner of the British' (Hopkins, quoted in Stettinius, p. 57); or 'the acquiescent tail of the British kite' (Sumner Welles in the *New York Herald Tribune*, 6 June 1945).

[2] On Allied policy towards Italy see Churchill, vol. v, chapters 3, 5, 6, 9, and 11, *passim*, and chapter 28, pp. 444–7; U.S. edition, vol. v, Book I, chapters, 3, 5, 6, 9, and 11, *passim*, and Book II, pp. 501–5; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1548–69; Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 743–6; Eng. edition, ii. 739–42; *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 286–92, 306–11, 403–4, 410, 415–18, 425–6, 523 seqq.

[3] e.g. Harry C. Butcher: *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1946; London, Heinemann, 1946), p. 390.

[4] Among the more notable of these statements were the following: Churchill's broadcasts of 23 December 1940 and 29 November 1942 (Winston S. Churchill: *The Unrelenting Struggle* (London, Cassell, 1942), pp. 27–31; and *The End of the Beginning* (London, Cassell, 1943), pp. 239–40); an address by Adolf Berle, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, on 14 November 1942, to

aged the Italians to hope that by abandoning Germany they might escape any further participation in the war,[1] and even that their war guilt might be condoned. The United States Government, for instance, had announced that from 19 October 1942 onwards Italian aliens, unlike the Germans and Japanese, would no longer be treated as enemies;[2] Churchill's broadcasts singled out Mussolini as the 'one man alone' responsible for the disgraceful and disastrous entry of Italy into the war,[3] and called upon 'the monarchy, the nation and the army' to 'take some care for the life and future of Italy';[4] and both American and British propaganda made a point of driving a wedge between the Italian people and their leader, as well as between them and Germany. A certain amount of contact was maintained with Italian exiles. After the fall of France the British had assisted some of these exiles in escaping to the United States and Latin America, where they helped to build up the Free Italy movement; and, later on, anti-Fascists were brought back across the Atlantic to stimulate the clandestine opposition inside Italy.[5] The 'Free Italians' were not granted any sort of recognition that could have improved Italy's position after the war, but such contact as there was no doubt helped to raise anti-Fascist hopes.

The policy of the British and American Governments towards Italy was influenced by their general ideas about the peace settlement as well as by the immediate needs of war, and here too the Italians could find grounds for hope. These peace aims had, it is true, their sterner side. The Allies clearly announced their intention of extirpating Fascism and punishing war criminals.[6] Roosevelt attached particular importance to the punishment of the 'Head Devil' and his henchmen, and Churchill had no objection to the Italians being made to surrender Fascist leaders, so long as no military advantages were forgone for the sake of this.[7] Nor could Italy hope to retain the territorial conquests of Fascism. By 1943 Ethiopia was

the Mazzini Society and Italian-American Labour Council (*Department of State Bulletin*, 14 November 1942, pp. 925–8); Roosevelt–Churchill message to Italy broadcast on 16 July 1943 (ibid. 17 July 1943, pp. 27–28); broadcast by Roosevelt of 28 July 1943 (ibid. 31 July 1943, pp. 57–58); message from Eisenhower to Italy broadcast on 29 July 1943 (*The Times*, 30 July 1943).

[1] e.g. Roosevelt's broadcast of 28 July, and Eisenhower's message of 29 July 1943. For an example of Italian hopefulness on this point see Massimo Salvadori: *Resistenza ed azione* (Bari, Laterza, 1951), p. 219.

[2] Address by the U.S. Attorney General, Francis Biddle, on 12 October 1942 (*New York Times*, 13 October 1942, extracts quoted in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1942–1943*, pp. 664–5); see also Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1548.

[3] Broadcasts of 23 December 1940 and 29 November 1942 (see above, p. 410, note 4).

[4] Broadcast of 23 December 1940 (see ibid.). See also Churchill, iii. 722; U.S. edition, iii. 806–7.

[5] Salvadori, op. cit. pp. 189–95.

[6] Roosevelt–Churchill message of 16 July 1943, and Roosevelt's broadcast of 28 July 1943 (see above, p. 410, note 4).

[7] Churchill, v. 51, 54; U.S. edition, v. 55, 58.

already lost,[1] and Great Britain and the United States had both recognized Albania's right to independence.[2] As regards the pre-Fascist Italian colonies,[3] the South Tyrol,[4] and Trieste,[5] however, no British or American pledges had been announced, except Eden's statement in the House of Commons on 8 January 1942 that the Senusi of Cyrenaica must never be allowed to come under Italian domination again,[6] and many Italians hoped, however unreasonably, for more favourable terms than those that were imposed in the end.

The two main promises relating to Italy's future as a nation were, first, that, after the Italians had repudiated Nazi Germany and their own Fascist leaders, 'a reconstituted Italy' might hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European nations,[7] and, second, that they would 'eventually' have the opportunity of 'choosing their own Government in accordance with the basic democratic principles of liberty and equality'.[8] These were pledges that could clearly be fulfilled and that were not likely to raise false hopes. Other promises, however, though made in all sincerity, were more liable to be misunderstood at the time or to be made impossible of fulfilment by later events which ought, perhaps, to have been foreseen more clearly. Berle's speech of 14 November 1942,[9] for instance, made liberation seem far too easy and painless, and his assertion that the United States did not mean to impose 'punitive' peace terms may have helped to create the illusion that Italy might not have to pay reparations or to give up Trieste. Roosevelt himself, on 28 July 1943, had made a point of the occupying Powers' intention of freeing Sicily from want.[10] When Eisenhower's message of 29 July 1943[11] was being prepared, the American Chiefs of Staff proposed that the General should offer the release of 'hundreds of thousands' of prisoners of war if Italy surrendered. After Churchill had objected to this, the offer was limited to an exchange of the prisoners held in Tunisia and Sicily for Allied prisoners of war in Italy;[12] and, later on, the Armistice terms required the release of Allied prisoners of war without any exchange at all. The propaganda which Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers addressed to Italy was lavish in its promises,[13] and

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Middle East in the War*, pp. 41–56.

[2] Statements by Hull on 10 December 1942 (*Department of State Bulletin*, 12 December 1942, p. 998) and by Eden in the House of Commons on 17 December 1942 (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 385, coll. 2114–15).

[3] See below, pp. 477–9; and *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 121–3.

[4] Details will be found in *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Eve of War, 1939*. See also below, pp. 458 seqq.

[5] See below, pp. 470 seqq., and *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 120–1.

[6] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Middle East in the War*, p. 397 and note 1.

[7] Roosevelt–Churchill message of 16 July 1943 (see above, p. 410, note 4).

[8] Roosevelt's broadcast of 28 July 1943 (see ibid.)

[9] See above, p. 410, note 4.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Churchill v. 55–56; U.S. edition, v. 59–60; Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 744; Eng. edition, ii. 740.

[13] Churchill, v. 51; U.S. edition, v. 54.

the original good intentions of the Allies, and more particularly the Americans, were typified by the printing of the Four Freedoms on the back of the occupation currency notes.

Unconditional surrender was required of Italy by the Casablanca declaration, for which Roosevelt was so largely responsible.[1] Eisenhower, when the time came for negotiations, felt that an offer of honourable terms would bring the Italians all the sooner out of the war,[2] but Churchill, who had originally suggested making an exception in favour of Italy, now concentrated on ensuring that the surrender should be so complete as to give the Allies a free hand for the next phase of the campaign. He was, however, the first to suggest that any Italian resistance to the Germans should be supported,[3] an idea which took shape in the Anglo-American reply to the Italian offer of collaboration made at Lisbon.[4] This insisted on unconditional acceptance of the Armistice terms, and laid it down that the modification of those terms in Italy's favour would depend on how far the Italian Government and people helped the United Nations against Germany; wherever Italians fought Germans, the United Nations would give them all the support in their power.[5]

(*c*) The Effects of the Armistice, and Allied Military Operations, 1943–5

The Armistice brought the Allies some, but by no means all, of the advantages expected from it. They were able to occupy much of Southern Italy, including the Foggia airfields, and also Corsica and Sardinia; and the Italian battle fleet obeyed their order to sail to Malta.[6] On the other hand, the Germans, who had begun to prepare their counter-measures as soon as Mussolini had fallen, gained control within a few days of more than half the peninsula, and snatched Mussolini out of prison to make him head of a quisling republic. Most of the 80,000 Allied prisoners of war were carried off to Germany, but over 10,000, thanks to the help which Italians of all classes risked their lives to give them, were able to make their way southwards through the enemy lines.[7]

At first the Allies thought it probable that the Germans would abandon the whole of Central Italy and withdraw to the 'Pisa–Rimini line' covering the southern slopes of the Apennines,[8] and, though these hopes were

[1] *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 268–72.
[2] Butcher: *My Three Years with Eisenhower*, pp. 372, 386.
[3] Churchill, v. 51–53; U.S. edition, v. 54–57.
[4] *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 297–8.
[5] Churchill, v. 94–95; U.S. edition, v. 105–6.
[6] The Germans sank the new battleship *Roma*, on her way to surrender, by means of a radio-controlled glider bomb launched from a manned aircraft (see *The Times*, leading article, 25 August 1953).
[7] Churchill, v. 166–7; U.S. edition, v. 187–8.
[8] See Butcher, op. cit. p. 391; Churchill, v. 120, 216–20; U.S. edition, v. 135–6, 243–7; Alan Moorehead: *Eclipse* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1945), pp. 28–29, 49–51.

disappointed, they were not quite without foundation. Jodl had, in fact, planned to align the most important of a series of defensive positions just south of the Apennines, and Hitler himself doubted for some time whether more of Italy than that could safely be defended. Even after Kesselring's successful exploitation of the Italian collapse had temporarily saved Rome for the Germans, the question was not finally settled till November, when Rommel, who, after his experiences in Africa, strongly favoured withdrawing northwards, was transferred to France, and his command was merged with that of Kesselring.[1]

The Allied forces entered Naples (already liberated by its own citizens) on 30 September, but were held up for many months by the strong line of German defences running through Cassino, and on the Adriatic coast their autumn offensive brought them no farther north than Ortona. In spite of the landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944, they did not overcome the German 'Winter Line' till May 1944. They entered Rome on 5 June and Florence on 12 August, but had not enough men or ammunition to break through the Apennines to the Po Valley and Liguria before winter set in. They took the field again in April 1945, and the Germans capitulated on 2 May.

(*d*) The Brindisi Government becomes a Co-Belligerent

The 'liberated Italy' that had come into existence in September 1943 consisted of the poorest and most remote part of the country; she could therefore do far less to help herself than she could have done if liberation had begun from the North, and she gave the Allies a first impression of squalor and backwardness. King Victor Emmanuel, accompanied by Marshal Badoglio, his Prime Minister, and his Chiefs of Staff, had left Rome early on the morning after the Armistice had been announced, and fled to Brindisi. The Government that had signed the Armistice could still, therefore, be said to exist. How far it could govern was a different question. No arrangements had been made beforehand to set up a temporary capital. Little could, indeed, have been done, considering how secret the Armistice had to be kept. Had the King and his advisers not feared that the Germans barred their way to the coast, they would have gone to

[1] Field Marshal Viscount Alexander of Tunis: *The Allied Armies in Italy from 3rd September, 1943, to 12th December, 1944* (Supplement to *London Gazette*, 6 June 1950, no. 38937), pp. 2891–2, 2899, 2900; Great Britain, Admiralty: *Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939 (–1945)*, 8 vols., mimeographed (London, H.M.S.O., 1947–8 [referred to hereafter as *Fuehrer Conferences*], vol. for 1943, p. 83 [these Conferences are also published in *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1938 (London, Clowes; New York, Macmillan)]; Paul Joseph Goebbels: *The Goebbels Diaries*, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner [referred to hereafter as *Goebbels Diaries*] (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1948), pp. 344–5; B. H. Liddell Hart: *The Other Side of the Hill*, enlarged and revised edition (London, Cassell, 1951), pp. 361, 367–9, citing Westphal; cf. Ermanno Amicucci: *1600 giorni di Mussolini* (Rome, Editrice Faro, 1948), p. 155; and General Francesco Rossi: *Come arrivammo all' armistizio* (Milan, Garzanti, 1946), p. 395.

Sardinia, and in any case they seem to have expected to return to Rome in a week or two, as soon as the Allies had cleared the city of Germans for them. As this prospect faded, an administrative machine had to be put together out of next to nothing, to cope with extraordinarily difficult conditions.[1]

How far the Allies should support a government headed by the King and Badoglio had, from the first, been a controversial point. Strong objections to both men were expressed both inside and outside Italy. The King was thoroughly compromised by his twenty years of acquiescence in Fascism.[2] At the time of the March on Rome in October 1922 he had refused to declare a state of siege, for fear of causing bloodshed and endangering the monarchy, and he had offered Mussolini the Premiership; and when, in 1925, opposition leaders had brought him evidence of Fascist responsibility for the murder of Matteoti, he had done nothing. Badoglio, though not an active Fascist, had been a 'yes-man' in regard to strategy as well as to politics, and the Left Wing counted him a 'reactionary'.

The chief supporter of the Brindisi Government among the Allies was Churchill, who was convinced that, for Italy, as for other liberated countries, a constitutional monarchy would be essential as a stabilizing force, a preserver of continuity, and a rallying-point for the loyalty of the armed forces; whereas any government formed by the leaders of the anti-Fascist parties—whom he described as 'aged and hungry politicians'[3] and as 'the *débris* of Italian politics'[4]—would be weak, unrepresentative, and a mere prelude to anarchy, civil war, or Communist dictatorship. Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs of Staff also wished to make use of the King's authority over his armed forces (which may have had real value in the case of the sudden order to move the fleet to Malta); and they were ready to accept any non-Fascist government that seemed to them capable of carrying out the surrender and the Armistice terms, of collaborating with the Allies, and of maintaining sufficiently good order to save the latter the trouble of administering the country themselves.[5] To Liberal and Left-wing opinion in both Great Britain[6] and the United States,

[1] For first-hand accounts of Italy under the Brindisi Government see Pietro Badoglio: *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale: memorie e documenti* (Milan, Mondadori, 1946), chapters xi–xx, and documents [translated as *Italy in the Second World War: Memories and Documents* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948)]; Benedetto Croce: *Quando l'Italia era tagliata in due* (Bari, Laterza, 1948) [translated as *Italy, the King, and the Allies* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1950)]; Agostino degli Espinosa: *Il Regno del sud, 8 settembre 1943–4 giugno 1944* (Rome, Migliaresi, 1946).

[2] On the King's life and reign see Domenico Bartoli: *Victor Emmanuel* (Paris, SFELT, 1946) [translated from the Italian]; Pietro Silva: *Io difendo la monarchia*, 3rd edition (Rome, Fonseca, 1946).

[3] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1564.

[4] Churchill, vi. 102; U.S. edition, vi. 115.

[5] Butcher: *My Three Years with Eisenhower*, p. 422; Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 743; Eng. edition, ii. 739.

[6] See 21 and 22 September 1943, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 392, coll. 112–13, 284, and 22 February 1944, ibid vol. 397, coll. 701–2.

however, support for the Brindisi Government looked like a repetition of the deal with Darlan,[1] and this point of view had an eloquent advocate very close to President Roosevelt in the person of Harry Hopkins.[2] Roosevelt himself, though holding no brief for monarchy as an institution, was prepared to tolerate the King and Badoglio for a while, but he looked forward to their being replaced as soon as possible by a government acceptable to the anti-Fascist parties.[3]

The solution adopted after the Armistice was to instruct Eisenhower[4] that the Brindisi Government, on condition of their declaring war on Germany, should be allowed to function as the Government of Italy, a co-belligerent[5] with the Allies, but guided and supervised by an Allied Commission. The Italian people would retain the right to choose their own form of democratic government, but not until the Germans had finally been driven out. It was Churchill who took the lead in proposing to make Italy a co-belligerent, in a memorandum of 9 September to Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staff;[6] and this was followed up by the broadcasting on 10 September of a joint message from Roosevelt and Churchill calling upon Badoglio and the Italian people to fight alongside the British and Americans,[7] and by the arrival at Brindisi on the 13th of an Allied military mission headed by General Mason-MacFarlane. The directive to Eisenhower, however, was not dispatched till 22 September, and by that time Eisenhower had sent a strong recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in favour of admitting the Brindisi Government as a co-belligerent, and Churchill had both made a statement in the House of Commons and once more put the case to Roosevelt.[8]

The next step, however, was not Italy's declaration of war, but the signing of the full Armistice terms[9] by Eisenhower and Badoglio, on board the battleship H.M.S. *Nelson*, at Malta on 29 September. These terms had been drafted by the British at the end of July, but on Churchill's advice a shorter version[10] had been used in Lisbon and Sicily to expedite the negotiations. The 'short Armistice', over and above its strictly military clauses, conferred plenary powers on the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and bound Italy to accept political, economic, and financial terms to be presented later on, so that the Italians had already, as it were, signed a

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 376–84, and *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 245–58.

[2] Sherwood: *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 743–4; Eng. edition, ii. 739–40.

[3] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1550.

[4] Directive of 22 September 1943 (Churchill, v. 169; U.S. edition, v. 190–1; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1550–1).

[5] In the First World War the Allies granted the Czech and Polish armies co-belligerent status.

[6] For text see Churchill, v. 119–21; U.S. edition, v. 134–7.

[7] U.S.A., Department of State: *The United States and Italy, 1936–1946* (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1946), Dept. of State Publ. 2669, p. 68 [referred to hereafter as *United States and Italy*].

[8] For text see Churchill, v. 167–9; U.S. edition, v. 189–90.

[9] See Cmd. 6693, pp. 4–10.

[10] Ibid. pp. 3–4.

blank cheque on which the 'long Armistice' filled in the figures. Roosevelt would have preferred that the long Armistice should not be signed, in order to leave Eisenhower free to act as circumstances might require; and it was Churchill who insisted on signature and even enlisted the support of Stalin to this end.

The Armistice Agreements not only provided for disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization, and for the occupation of as much of Italy as the United Nations might need; they put the whole of Italy and her resources at the disposal of the United Nations for use in their operations against Germany.[1] Foreign and internal trade, banking, and production were subjected to United Nations control, and the press, radio, cinema, and theatre to censorship; while the political clauses of the long Armistice demanded the surrender of Mussolini, his chief associates, and any other war criminals sought by the United Nations, the disbandment of Fascist organizations, the suppression of Fascist ideology, the repeal of anti-Semitic and other discriminatory laws, and the release of political prisoners and sympathizers with the United Nations.

The long Armistice terms had been handed to General Zanussi, the second Italian representative to arrive in Lisbon, and they were alleged to have reached General Roatta, Chief of Staff of the Army, in Rome on 5 September, accompanied by a note from General Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, stating that these terms might be 'modified' if Italy collaborated with the Allies.[2] Badoglio nevertheless asserted in his memoirs that he knew nothing about these terms till a few days before he went to Malta, and that they constituted an ungenerous and dishonourable alteration of the terms previously signed. The main objections which he expressed at Malta were that the long Agreement, unlike the short one, used the phrase 'accepted unconditionally', and that the German occupation had made it impossible to fulfil many of its conditions.[3] After the Agreement had been signed, Eisenhower gave Badoglio a letter[4] to the effect that the Agreement was based on the situation obtaining before Italy had begun to co-operate with the United Nations, that some of its conditions had already been fulfilled or invalidated, and that the terms might be modified on grounds of military necessity or of Italy's co-operation. An additional protocol was in fact signed on 9 November 1943,[5] but this merely strengthened the references to unconditional surrender and to the handing over of war criminals. It also made the U.S.S.R. a party to the Agreement.

[1] For an Italian estimate of the help thus given see Italy: *Memorandum sulle questioni economico-finanziarie connesse col Trattato di Pace* [1946], pp. 37–40.

[2] Giuseppe Castellano: *Come firmai l'Armistizio di Cassibile* (Milan, Mondadori, 1945), p. 161; Paolo Monelli: *Roma 1943*, 5th edition (Milan, Mondadori, 1948), pp. 378–9.

[3] Badoglio: *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*, pp. 132–3, 145–6; cf. Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1571.

[4] Cmd. 6693, pp. 10–11.

[5] Ibid. pp. 11–12.

The Armistice terms were not published until 6 November 1945. The State Department would have been willing to publish them as early as December 1943, but the United States War Department, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the Foreign Office in London feared that this would play into the hands of German propaganda and give the Italian opposition an unfair weapon against their Government. The Italians not only resented this secrecy, but came to suspect that the terms were more onerous than they really were. It was rumoured that Italy had agreed to cede free zones in her chief ports—and even Pantellaria or Sicily—or to supply 2 million workers for the reconstruction of Allied countries, or to accept permanent Anglo-American control over banks and heavy industry. Unfavourable conjectural comparisons were even drawn with the published texts of the Soviet Union's Armistice Agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania.

As soon as the long Armistice had been signed Eisenhower invited Italy to declare war. The King, hoping to strike a bargain for equipment for the army and the return of the troops in Sardinia, withheld his consent until 10 October, and it was not until the 13th that the declaration of war was presented to the German Ambassador in Madrid.[1] A statement issued on the same day by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin[2] accepted Italy as a co-belligerent, but declared that this would not affect the Armistice terms, which could be adjusted only by agreement between the Allied Powers, in the light of the amount of help that Italy gave them. The statement also noted that the Brindisi Government, in the proclamation which they had that day issued to the Italian people,[3] had pledged themselves eventually to submit to the will of the people. Another three-Power declaration,[4] issued after the Moscow Conference of 19–30 October,[5] dwelt even more strongly on the rooting out of Fascism and the revival of democracy, and urged that the anti-Fascist parties should be brought into the Government as soon as possible. Behind the scenes at Moscow, however, the Soviet Government, who had thus publicly associated themselves with this gesture in favour of Italy's political freedom, were insistently demanding a third of the Italian fleet as war booty.[6]

(*e*) The Allied Control Organizations

Allied control over Italy was exercised through three organizations: Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (which dropped the three last words of its title in October 1943 and was known as AMG); the Allied

[1] Text of Badoglio's message to Eisenhower in *United States and Italy*, pp. 69–70. On 13 July 1945 it was announced that Italy would consider herself at war with Japan as from 15 July.
[2] Ibid. p. 71.
[3] Ibid. p. 70.
[4] Ibid. p. 75.
[5] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 328–37.
[6] Ibid. pp. 332–3, 364.

Control Commission (ACC); and the Advisory Council.[1] 'AMGOT', which had been devised, and put into effect in Sicily, before Italy became co-belligerent, ruled directly in the name of the occupying Powers.[2] Its civil affairs officers followed the Allied armies up Italy to restore and maintain order and essential services, in the interest primarily of those armies, but also, so far as military necessity would permit, of the civilian population; and its multifarious activities ranged from distributing food and repairing sabotaged power-stations to reopening schools and universities, protecting works of art,[3] and purging the administration of Fascists.

The Allied Control Commission,[4] on the other hand, worked through the Italian Government, instead of taking its place. It came into being on 10 November 1943 to act as the channel of communication with that Government for the United Nations and all other states; to supervise the carrying out of the Armistice terms; and to make Italy's man-power and other resources available for the Allied war effort. It maintained regional and local officials throughout that part of the country which was not under AMG, the so-called 'King's Italy', thereby dividing Italy perhaps too much into watertight regional compartments, even as regards food. Without its approval no legislation might be enacted nor any official appointed, even to minor posts in the country. The headquarters organizations of AMG and ACC were amalgamated in January 1944, but the two different forms of control were maintained. The United States and Great Britain bore an equal financial and legal responsibility for AMG and ACC, and the staffing of these organizations was supposed to be more or less on an equal basis. By April 1945, when AMG and ACC had a headquarters staff of 300 and a total strength of 1,304 officers and 2,808 men,[5] more than half of the officers and men were British. The first Chief Commissioner of ACC, Major-General Kenyon A. Joyce, an American, was succeeded, first by an Englishman, General Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane, in January 1944, and then by another American, Admiral Ellery Stone, in June 1944. A French observer and a number of Soviet observers were attached to AMG/ACC.

The boundaries of the 'King's Italy', which at first included only Apulia and Sardinia, were enlarged as the Allies advanced. The Government was allowed to move to Salerno in January 1944, and to Rome on 15

[1] On Allied administration see Allied Commission in Italy: *Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission in Italy, July 10, 1943, D-Day Sicily, to May 2, 1945, German Surrender in Italy* (Rome, U.S. Army, Public Relations Branch, 1945) [referred to hereafter as *Review of AMG*].

[2] See directives of 31 May and 10 June 1943 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre (Hajo Holborn: *American Military Government, its Organization and Policies* (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 114–18).

[3] See below, pp. 448 seqq.

[4] On the constitution and working of ACC see *Department of State Bulletin*, 6 August 1944, pp. 137–8; 1 April 1945, pp. 539–42.

[5] *Review of AMG*, pp. 69, 71.

July, though the city and the surrounding country remained under AMG till 15 August. From 16 October 1944 onwards the dividing line followed the southern boundary of Tuscany and continued through Umbria and the Marches to the Adriatic. Most of Tuscany and the rest of Umbria and the Marches were transferred to the Italian Government in May and June 1945; Emilia, the province of Lucca, Apuania, and the port of Ancona on 5 August; Piedmont, Lombardy, and most of Venetia on 15 September; and the communes of Naples, Pisa, and Leghorn, and the islands of Pantellaria, Lampedusa, and Linosa on 31 December. Venezia Giulia and the province of Udine remained under AMG till the last Allied troops left in December 1947.

The Advisory Council, a product of the Moscow Conference,[1] had its seat first in Algiers and then in Italy, and consisted of representatives of the three Great Powers, and of the French National Committee, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The Council would seem to have been devised in order to bring the Soviet Government more closely into touch with Italian affairs, and to placate the French, Greek, and Yugoslav Governments in Exile, who had been somewhat alarmed by Italy's promotion to co-belligerency; and it had the power to make recommendations on the co-ordination of Allied policy, as well as to deal with current non-military problems. The question of liberalizing the Brindisi Government, for instance, was referred to it, but, on the whole, it met comparatively seldom and had little to do.

(*f*) The Italian Armed Forces in the War against Germany

Of the three Italian services the navy was the only one to escape the German occupation almost intact. To supplement the Armistice Agreements, which had been drafted without consulting him,[2] Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, signed a special agreement on the employment of the Italian fleet and merchant navy with Admiral De Courten, Italian Minister of Marine, on 23 September 1943.[3] By this agreement, four (afterwards six) cruisers, eight destroyers, and about forty torpedo boats, corvettes, and smaller craft remained in active commission under the Italian flag, and were used to escort convoys, sweep mines, keep up contact with occupied countries, and so on.[4] The agreement required Italian submarines to be immobilized

[1] For text of Moscow communiqué see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943–1944*, p. 228; see also Churchill's speech of 21 September 1943 in the House of Commons (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 392, col. 99).

[2] Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope: *A Sailor's Odyssey* (London, Hutchinson, 1951), pp. 560, 572.

[3] Cmd. 6693, pp. 12–14.

[4] Badoglio: *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*, pp. 252–5; Cunningham, op. cit. p. 573; *Review of AMG*, p. 78.

for the time being, but some of them were reported to have been used during the autumn of 1943 to supply the British troops in the Aegean Islands, and groups of them were afterwards stationed at Bermuda and Colombo. The Cunningham–De Courten Agreement also provided that merchant shipping, though remaining under the Italian flag, should be merged in the Allied shipping pool. An additional agreement of 17 November 1943,[1] which was probably connected with the Soviet demand for Italian warships and which evoked a written protest from De Courten,[2] entitled the United Nations to dispose of Italian ships otherwise than as stated in the Cunningham–De Courten Agreement, and to man Italian merchant ships with other crews than those provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine.

Italian air crews carried out regular flights over the German lines of communication in the Balkans, and dropped supplies to the Yugoslav Partisans. The air force could only muster 200–300 obsolete aircraft in the south at first, but from July 1944 onwards Allied aircraft were made available, and by the end of the war five of the fourteen Italian squadrons were equipped with these.[3]

With some gallant exceptions,[4] the Italian army, ill-armed, ill-led, and war-weary, made very little resistance to the Germans after the Armistice. Four divisions were already in Southern Italy, and more men were called up, but desertions were very common.[5] On the other hand, the many anti-Fascists who were eager to form volunteer units were not encouraged by the Allies.[6] The Allied military mission reported that the Italian troops round Brindisi were only fit to serve in labour battalions, the Italian garrisons in the Dodecanese made a poor showing, and the Allies were never in touch with the troops in Corfù and Cefalonia who did resist the Germans and who paid for it by being shot after surrendering.[7] General Alexander, the Allied commander in Italy, was sceptical of the value of Italian combat troops,[8] and, in spite of Badoglio's continual appeals that Italy should not be denied the means of 'working her passage' as promised, the number of these was strictly limited. Even the divisions from Sardinia and the Dodecanese, which had never been disbanded, were

[1] Cmd. 6693, pp. 14–15.

[2] Ibid. p. 15.

[3] Badoglio: *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*, pp. 141, 256–9; G. Valentine Selsey: *Italy Works her Passage* (London, British-Italian Society, 1945); *Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Italian Campaign, 12th December 1944 to 2nd May 1945* (London, H.M.S.O., 1951), p. 12.

[4] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 331–2.

[5] *Review of AMG*, p. 76.

[6] Badoglio, op. cit. p. 209; Croce: *Quando l'Italia era tagliata in due*, 9, 31 October, 3, 13 November 1943; Degli Espinosa: *Il Regno del sud*, p. 124.

[7] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 324; Churchill, v. 170–1; U.S. edition, v. 192.

[8] Alexander: *The Allied Armies in Italy from 3rd September 1943 to 12th December 1944*, pp. 2889, 2892, 2895.

turned into labour battalions and their equipment was given to the Yugoslav Partisans.[1] A 'motorized group' of about 5,000 men went into action in December 1943, suffered heavy casualties in its first engagement,[2] and was then withdrawn from the front. It was reorganized as the Italian Liberation Corps, numbering about 22,000 men, which fought well in the summer campaign of 1944 and was expanded into six 'combat groups' (about 50,000 men in all), several of which took part in the final advance into Lombardy.[3] The rest of the 300,000 men in the Italian army were employed in clearing mines, unloading ships, bringing up supplies by mule and lorry, and other non-combatant, though often dangerous, services. Army casualties from the Armistice till 31 August 1945 were 20,616 killed, 11,682 wounded, and 17,171 missing.[4] Besides the labour battalions of the regular army, 335,000 civilians worked for the Allies in the docks and the supply and repair depots, and many of the prisoners of war in British and American hands volunteered to become 'co-operators', that is non-combatant auxiliaries who were allowed somewhat more freedom than prisoners.[5]

(*g*) Internal Politics

(1) *The Anti-Fascist Parties and the King, 1943–4*

Throughout Italy, on both sides of the battle-front, the political resurgence which had preceded the fall of Mussolini continued to develop,[6] independently of the shadow Government of Brindisi. At the time of the Armistice a number of parties had already been revived or newly founded. The Socialists, who had been the chief party of the Left when Fascism came into power, with a large following among the poorer peasants of the North and Centre as well as among industrial workers, and whose former history of conflicting reformist and extremist tendencies was to repeat itself in post-war politics, had now a powerful rival in the Communist Party.[7] The Party of Action, founded early in 1943, but inspired by the earlier

[1] Badoglio: *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*, pp. 239–51.

[2] Croce: *Quando l'Italia era tagliata in due*, 24 December 1943; Degli Espinosa: *Il Regno del sud*, pp. 89–90; Stefano Jacini: 'La crisi dell'esercito italiano', *Nuova Antologia*, February 1946, pp. 145, 146, 147; Moorehead: *Eclipse*, p. 59.

[3] The adventures of a small unit of Italian parachutists attached to the British army are described in Carlo Bonciani: *'F' Squadron*, tr. John Shillady (London, Dent, 1947).

[4] Jacini: 'La crisi dell'esercito italiano', loc. cit. p. 147. *Review of AMG* (p. 77) puts the number killed at 11,000. Casualties for all three services from 1940 to the end of the war (according to a statement by Luigi Gasparotto, Minister for Post-War Relief, to the Consultative Assembly on 4 March 1946) were: army: 220,000 killed and missing, 125,000 wounded; navy: 25,750 killed and missing, 5,928 wounded; air force: 6,530 killed and missing, 2,875 wounded.

[5] Jacini, loc. cit., puts the number of these at 278,000.

[6] On politics in Liberated Italy see Muriel Grindrod: *The New Italy* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947), pp. 18–31, 34–39; Elizabeth Wiskemann: *Italy* (London, Oxford University Press, 1947), chapter ii.

[7] See below, pp. 430–3.

Giustizia e Libertà movement founded by Carlo Rosselli,[1] was the party of the universities and the intellectuals. It continued the Mazzinian tradition of republican and anti-clerical liberalism, combined with a more modern interest in economic and social reforms, and it showed an ingenuous readiness to believe that, when once Nazism and Fascism had been defeated, a free government and a policy of radical reforms would create a new Italy, cleansed from all the contamination of the past. To the older parties, the Actionists were apt to seem the *enfants terribles* of the anti-Fascist movement, but their war record was second to none. The pre-Fascist *Partito Popolare*—a Catholic, but not clerical, party of the Left Centre—had found a successor in the Christian Democrat Party, which was to become one of the three major parties of liberated Italy, but was to move much farther to the Right than its predecessor.[2] On the Right Centre were the Liberals, who championed *laissez-faire* economics and political liberty with an equal fervour more characteristic of the nineteenth century than of the mid-twentieth; this was the party not only of the philosopher Benedetto Croce, but also of men of property. These five parties, with a small Left Centre group called the Labour Democrats, which did not function in the North, made up the alliance that had helped to organize the plot against Mussolini, and, after the Armistice, had formed Committees of National Liberation[3] in all parts of Italy occupied by the Germans.

The King had insisted on excluding all these parties from Badoglio's first Government, which had, indeed, refused to recognize the legal existence of any political parties; and when, under compulsion from the Allies, he invited the six parties to join the Brindisi Government, they all refused to do so, as long as he remained King. For the next six months Italian politics were dominated, and the parties deeply divided among themselves, by the question of the abdication of the King, of the future of the monarchy, and of the form in which the royal prerogative should survive, if the King did abdicate, till a plebiscite could be taken for or against the monarchy after the war.[4] Some Christian Democrats and Liberals were Republicans and some Monarchists, but many Monarchists wished the King to abdicate, as the last chance of saving the dynasty. The Socialist, Nationalist, and Communist Parties all took the Republican side, but, from the first, the Communists showed themselves much less intransigent than the other two parties.

New figures entered the political scene with the return of exiles from the

[1] Salvadori: *Resistenza ed azione*, pp. 55–59.

[2] See below, pp. 429–30.

[3] These will be referred to as CLN(s), the initials of the Italian form of their name, *Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale.*

[4] See Ivanoe Bonomi: *Diario di un anno, 2 giugno 1943–10 giugno 1944*, 2nd edition (Milan, Garzanti, 1947), *passim*; Raffaele Cadorna: *La Riscossa: dal 25 luglio alla liberazione* (Milan, Rizzoli, 1948), part ii.

United States, among them Count Carlo Sforza, Foreign Minister in 1920–1 and one of the leaders of the Free Italy movement. When seeking permission from the United States Government to come to Italy, Sforza had declared his intention of supporting Badoglio's Government until the Germans had been driven out of Italy;[1] and on his way through London he had an interview with Churchill, who was left with the impression that Sforza could be counted on to co-operate with Badoglio and with the King. While still in America, however, Sforza had spoken in favour of the King's abdication, and, when once he had arrived in Italy, he refused first Badoglio's offer of the Foreign Ministry and Deputy Premiership and then the King's offer of the Premiership itself. Churchill, from then on, considered him unfit for office.

Croce, and other anti-Fascist leaders of the South, were prepared to join the Government if the King abdicated in favour of a regency governing in the name of his six-year-old grandson, the Prince of Naples. This proposal was favourably received in Washington, but not by Churchill, and Roosevelt fell back on Eisenhower's suggestion that, if the King would not abdicate (which he was most unwilling to do), Badoglio's Government should remain in office till Rome had been freed. British and American journalists, and political warfare officers, however, were often much more in sympathy with the Opposition than with the Government, while Allied broadcasting and the messages of good will received by the Italian political leaders from abroad revealed the strength of feeling outside Italy against the King and Badoglio.

The Churchill–Roosevelt controversy over the Brindisi Government broke out again in the New Year. At the time of the Anzio landing, on 22 January 1944, the State Department recommended that the King should not be allowed to return to Rome and that the 'Liberal forces' should be left free to set up a representative government at once. Churchill insisted that the Allies should support the King and Badoglio till something better could be found to take their place; he once more warned Roosevelt against the Opposition, especially Sforza; and on 11 February, when it was clear that no quick victory was to be expected any longer at Anzio, Roosevelt told Churchill that the United States would do nothing to bring about political changes till the military situation had improved enough to risk disaffection in the Italian forces.

The six parties, at a Congress held at Bari on 28–29 January 1944, had publicly demanded the immediate abdication of the King, the formation of an anti-Fascist coalition, and the convening of a Constituent Assembly as soon as the war was over. When they requested Allied support for this policy, not only General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the new Supreme

[1] Sforza to Badoglio, 23 September 1943, repeated in a letter from Sforza to Berle (quoted by Churchill in the House of Commons on 8 December 1944, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 406, col. 937).

Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, but also the United States Government, were in favour of granting it. Moreover, the King, on 20 February, agreed to a new proposal that, instead of abdicating, he should delegate his powers to his son as Lieutenant-General;[1] and this decision was immediately communicated to the British and United States Governments, though it was kept a close secret in Italy, apparently because the King was still insisting that his abdication should not take place until he had returned to Rome.

On 22 February Churchill dashed the hopes of the six parties by yet another declaration in the House of Commons, backing the King and Badoglio,[2] whereupon Italian Communists, Actionists, and Socialists arranged demonstrations of protest in Naples. The United States Government, however, told their representatives in Italy that Churchill's speech need not be regarded as a final rejection of the six parties' request, but that the agreed Allied reply must be awaited from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[3] Roosevelt and Churchill argued the matter for another month without coming any nearer agreement; and on 24 March Hull referred it to the Advisory Council.

The British representative on the Advisory Council eventually agreed that the King should be told that the time had come for him to withdraw. The deadlock was not ended, however, until the Soviet Government had intervened. After Roosevelt, on 3 March, had caused a nine-days' wonder by revealing the proposal to place Italian warships at the disposal of the U.S.S.R.,[4] it was announced on the 14th that the Soviet Government had agreed to reopen diplomatic relations with Italy. Since neither the Soviet nor the Italian Government had communicated, before this announcement, with the Allied Control Commission or with the Advisory Council, the State Department protested. Molotov's explanation was that Russia had been insufficiently consulted about the treatment of Italy. Great Britain and the United States did not immediately restore full diplomatic relations with Italy, but they did go so far as to appoint Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Alexander Kirk as their High Commissioners and special representatives in the Advisory Council, which was now moved from Algiers to Italy. Kirk also held the personal rank of Ambassador. An even greater political sensation followed the return to Italy on 28 March, after many years spent in Moscow, of Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary of the Italian Communist Party. On 1 April the Communists proposed that the six parties should join the Government at once, whether the King abdicated or not. As the other parties had no alternative but to agree, the Lieutenancy-

[1] Croce: *Quando l'Italia era tagliata in due*, 22 February 1944.
[2] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 397, coll. 690–1.
[3] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1552–6; Field Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya: *Eight Years Overseas* (London, Hutchinson, 1950), pp. 201–3.
[4] See above, p. 418.

General plan was made public on the 6th, and was officially proclaimed on the 12th, with effect as from the date of the liberation of Rome. A six-party coalition took office on 24 April, Badoglio remaining in office as Premier and Foreign Minister.[1]

(2) *The 'Hexarchy', 1944–6*

The liberation of Rome on 4 June brought with it a change of government, as well as the transfer of power from the King to the Crown Prince on 5 June. The CLN at Rome refused to serve under Badoglio, and its chairman, the Labour Democrat Ivanoe Bonomi, became head of a new coalition Government formed from the same six parties. Churchill was not easily persuaded to agree to the change, and an even more awkward situation arose over the proposed appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister, for Mason-MacFarlane's veto on this appointment was immediately disavowed by the United States Government. Sforza then took office as Minister without Portfolio.[2] A pledge to observe the as yet unrevealed terms of the Armistice was required of the new Ministers.[3]

Four Governments held office between June 1944 and the elections of June 1946. The formation in December 1944 of Bonomi's second Cabinet, which included Communists but neither Socialists nor Actionists, was the occasion of yet another British veto on Sforza, which, coinciding as it did with political troubles in Greece[4] and in Belgium,[5] helped to bring about one of the sharpest Anglo-American differences of opinion of the whole war.[6] After the liberation of the North, Ferruccio Parri of the Action Party, one of the most distinguished Resistance leaders, who was backed by the great though short-lived authority of the North Italian CLN, formed a six-party Cabinet much farther to the Left than Bonomi's; but a revolt by the Liberals and his own lack of experience as a political leader forced him to resign on 24 November, and on 10 December the Christian Democrat leader, Alcide De Gasperi, remodelled the 'hexarchy' on more conservative lines, especially in regard to economic policy.

The 'hexarchy' had certain obvious disadvantages: parties had equal representation in the Cabinet irrespective of their real strength, and were so neatly balanced that for some time an orthodox economist was responsible for general economic policy at the Treasury, while a Communist was in charge of revenue at the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the 'hexarchy's' term of office covered the last grim year of war and the almost more heartbreaking period which followed, when reconstruction was just

[1] *United States and Italy* (pp. 219–22) records the names of all those who held office in Italian Governments from July 1943 to December 1945.

[2] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1563, 1564–5. Sforza did not become Foreign Minister till February 1947.

[3] Bonomi: *Diario di un anno*, 7 June 1944.

[4] See above, pp. 394 seqq.

[5] See below, p. 542.

[6] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 523–6.

beginning under great difficulties, and when old abuses were creeping back to mock the high hopes of the Resistance Movement. The most ominous feature of this time was the growing tension between Left and Right, which owed quite as much to the inescapable facts of poverty and social injustice as to Communist agitation. One of the first problems which had to be tackled was the demobilization of the Partisans. A great number of these, perhaps as many as half a million, had helped the Resistance Movement only occasionally or had joined it just in time for the final revolt or even later; but about 200,000 men and women had served in the movement long and responsibly enough to rank as 'combatant partisans'.[1] The Government was not very generous towards them, or prompt in dealing with their grievances;[2] and the Left Wing insisted on a large number of them being drafted into the auxiliary police or into the army (though the military authorities were most unwilling to take them, fearing Communist infiltration). Many Partisans were glad enough to go back to civilian life, if they could find work, but the movement had, of course, its terrorists and gunmen. Moreover, a great deal of its equipment was never handed over to the Allied or Italian authorities, and was believed to have been stored away by the Communists and by the Right-wing Partisans all over Northern Italy.

Until local elections could be held, mayors (*sindachi*) and communal committees were appointed by the prefect of each province, who selected them from among members of the six parties in agreement with the CLNs. The prefects themselves, however, were appointed by AMG or the Italian Government as the case might be, and some of them were professional civil servants, who had had nothing to do with the local Resistance Movement. AMG was alleged even to have appointed some men of this type to replace Resistance leaders who were acting as prefects or, worse still, to have appointed men who had a questionable record in regard to Fascism. As a first step towards re-establishing normal parliamentary government and preparing for the elections, the Government convened a consultative assembly (*Consulta*),[3] and this held its first meeting in Rome on 25 September 1945. Members of the *Consulta* were nominated by all the political parties, not only those represented in the CLNs by the trade unions and professional associations, and by the ex-servicemen's organizations; and membership was also conferred on certain anti-Fascist members of former Parliaments. Besides the *Consulta* and Communal Committees, however, the network of CLNs in the provinces and communes formed virtually another provisional administration, which had

[1] *Corriere della Sera*, 1 September 1946. For the official definition of a 'combatant partisan' see Legislative Decree of 21 August 1945, no. 518.

[2] Cadorna: *La Riscossa*, pp. 235, 269–70, 290–1, 291–2.

[3] *Legislative Decree*, 30 April 1945, no. 168.

always been quite independent of the King and Government. By agreement with the Allies, the central committee for Northern Italy had, indeed, governed Lombardy from 25 April till AMG took over in June 1945.[1] Communists, Socialists, and Actionists, the dominant parties in the CLNs, hoped that the committees might be granted wide executive, legislative, and even judicial powers till the elections; but, as a compromise designed to allay the fears of the Right, it was agreed in June 1945 that, even before the elections, the CLNs should have only advisory powers, and that after the elections they should survive only as a link between the parties. In July 1946 it was decided to dissolve them altogether.

Regional separatism had also to be reckoned with. In Sicily a separatist movement headed by Andrea Finocchiaro-Aprile had, apparently, been making advances to both the occupying Powers, with the encouragement of certain Sicilian-American civil affairs officers.[2] The Italian Government eventually banned the movement and found themselves compelled to send out troops against separatist bands in December 1945 and January 1946. A similar movement existed in the Valle d'Aosta.[3] In general, too, many Italians felt that the time had now come for making a change in the highly centralized administration that had been imposed by the Piedmontese when the many and diverse regions of Italy had been unified in the nineteenth century—a centralization which had made Fascist control easy and which had been greatly extended by the Fascists. By the end of 1946 Sicily,[4] Sardinia,[5] and the Valle d'Aosta[6] had all been granted special regional institutions. The cases of the South Tyrol, which had its regional as well as its international aspect, and of Venezia Giulia are described below.[7]

More recently the Italian Constitution of 1948 divided the whole country into nineteen regions endued with legislative as well as administrative powers. The Christian Democrats, though formerly strong supporters of the principle of regionalism, were, however, in no haste to risk setting up Communist states within the state. Legislation actually establishing regional institutions was long delayed, and, at the time of writing, regional self-government was not yet functioning anywhere except in Sicily, Sardinia, the Valle d'Aosta, and a region comprising the South Tyrol (Alto Adige) and the Trentino.

[1] Cadorna: *La Riscossa*, pp. 176–7.

[2] G. R. Gayre: *Italy in Transition* (London, Faber, 1946), pp. 148–51, 152–3, 180; Salvadori: *Resistenza ed azione*, p. 220.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 337; see also below, p. 457, and see also 'Autonomy in the Val d'Aosta', *The World Today*, June 1946, pp. 256–68.

[4] Legislative Decrees, 28 December 1944, no. 416; 1 February 1945, no. 50; 15 May 1946, no. 455 (Statute for Sicily).

[5] Legislative Decree, 28 December 1944, no. 417.

[6] Legislative Decrees: 7 September 1945, nos. 545, 546; 15 November 1946, no. 355; 11 November 1946, no. 365.

[7] See below, pp. 463 seqq.

(3) *The Elections of 1946 and the Establishment of the Republic*

Elections for the Constituent Assembly and a referendum on the monarchy were held on 2 June 1946.[1] Of the 552 seats in the Assembly, the Christian Democrats won 207 (8,083,208 votes); the Socialists 115 (4,744,749 votes); and the Communists 104 (4,342,722 votes). The National Democratic Bloc, which included the Liberals, won forty-one seats; the Action Party (which had already begun to split up, and finally dissolved itself in December 1947), only seven; while no less than 1,209,918 votes and thirty seats went to Guglielmo Giannini's mushroom party, *L'Uomo Qualunque*, i.e. 'The Common Man', which set out to appeal to much the same lower middle-class elements as had been enticed by Fascism in 1919–22.[2] Communal elections were held in March–April 1946, except in the large towns (other than Milan), which did not go to the poll till October–November, and in the South Tyrol and Venezia Giulia. The same three parties that headed the poll in June dominated these elections, and the Communists and Socialists, who in many places stood as allies, won most of the large towns. The *Qualunquisti* did well in Rome and in the South in the autumn, but thereafter sank into obscurity.

The referendum produced 12,717,923 votes for the republic and 10,719,284 for the monarchy.[3] The size of the minority may have owed something to the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel on 9 May in favour of his son. The North tended to vote Republican, and the South Monarchist, but the detailed voting figures for each region showed a much larger Republican vote in the South than had been expected. King Umberto's reluctance to accept the proclamation of the republic immediately after the provisional announcement of the result of the referendum caused a certain amount of tension, until, under Government pressure, he finally left the country on 13 June. The change of régime was completed quite peacefully. On the 28th the Constituent Assembly elected, as Provisional Head of the State, Enrico De Nicola, a Neapolitan lawyer, and a non-party man.[4]

(4) *The Challenge of Communism, 1946–7*

De Gasperi returned to office on 12 July, with a Cabinet which included Communists and Socialists as well as Christian Democrats and two or

[1] See also 'Republic versus Monarchy in Italy', *The World Today*, July 1946, pp. 297–313. For a summary of the Electoral Law see Grindrod: *The New Italy*, pp. 99–101. Women voted on the same terms as men.

[2] Election figures, ibid. p. 46.

[3] See documents on the referendum and change of régime in *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 1946, no. 134, pp. 1449–55.

[4] For the text of the Constitution drafted by the Assembly, and in force from 1 January 1948, see *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 27 December 1947; English translation in *Documents and State Papers* [periodical, published by the U.S. Department of State], vol. i, no. 1, April 1948, pp. 46–63. See also 'The New Italian Constitution', *The World Today*, July 1948, pp. 307–16.

three other non-Marxists; and the Communists remained in office nearly a year longer. Nevertheless, Communists and Christian Democrats were already taking up their positions for the 'cold war'. The Christian Democrats, as the party standing farthest to the Right among the larger parties, had attracted many voters who sought a middle way between Communism on one side and Fascism or extreme Conservatism on the other, but also many of those who saw danger chiefly on the Left.[1] Anti-Communism became the strongest, and almost the only, link between the vested interests of small as well as of large employers and landowners at the one end of the party and the reformers and poorer people at the other. A division soon showed itself, for instance, over the urgent and important question of agrarian reform. Catholics with a bent for democratic politics and social reform were not so strong in Italy as in France (De Gasperi himself was an outstanding exception), whereas many of the intellectuals of the moderate Left could not bring themselves to accept a Catholic party and came more and more to feel that they were being crushed between the black millstone and the red.[2] Voters of the humbler and less politically minded sort, especially in the country, were much slower in taking sides, and on an election Sunday saw nothing wrong or even odd in voting Communist on their way to Mass. The Church intervened against Communism in the elections of 1946, and it involved itself still more deeply in party politics during and after those of 1948. In July 1949 it declared Communists liable to excommunication. And, though Christian Democracy still denied that it was a clerical party, it came, after 1948, to depend for much of its constituency work on Catholic Action—a lay association under clerical direction—just as it depended on the richer people among its members for much of its income.

The Italian Communist Party,[3] with 1,762,056 members in December 1945, and 2,125,000 in June 1946,[4] was the largest Communist party outside the Soviet Union, though the French Communists polled about a million more votes in the 1946 elections. Membership was open to 'all honest workers . . . independently of race, religious faith, and philosophical convictions'.[5] Intellectuals, Catholics, women, ex-service men, ex-Fascists, all were made welcome; and the success of the party among some of the peasants is shown by the fact that the regions which in 1946 had most members in proportion to their population were Emilia, a rich agricultural

[1] On the development of the Christian Democratic Party after the liberation of Italy see Mario Einaudi and François Goguel: *Christian Democracy in Italy and France* (Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1952), *passim*.

[2] Bernard Wall: 'The Italian Review', *The Nineteenth Century*, September 1950, pp. 174–5; Arturo Carlo Jemolo: *Italia Tormentata* (*1946–51*) (Bari, Laterza, 1951), *passim*.

[3] On Communism in Italy see Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Aldo Garosci: *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1951), parts i and iii.

[4] *Unità*, 15 September 1946.

[5] Einaudi and others, op. cit. p. 202; see also pp. 214–16.

region with many poor peasants and landless labourers, and Tuscany, where, though there was much less poverty, the peasants looked to the Communists to bring about an agrarian reform that would make them owners of their farms instead of share-croppers.[1] Piedmont was strongly Communist; Lombardy, Socialist. Only one-fifth of the Communist Party's members came from the South in 1947, only one-eighth in 1946 and 1948.[2] Marxist orthodoxy was at first so much slurred over that in April 1945 one of the party's chief intellectuals, Professor Concetto Marchesi, was reported to have publicly described Communism as an economic and social programme without dogmas, and dialectical materialism as 'the dross of Marx'.[3]

The Communist Party had, indeed, inherited from its early days—and especially from one of its best organizers and thinkers, Antonio Gramsci, who had died in a Fascist prison in 1937[4]—a comparatively free-thinking strain, which reappeared in many of the intellectuals who joined it during or soon after the war. Two or three years later a sterner view seems to have been taken of 'supporters of "freedom of opinion" and "freedom to commit errors" '.[5] Some revealing disquisitions on the role of free discussion within the party in adapting the 'living doctrine' of Marxism to the special circumstances of each country at any particular moment,[6] and on the technique of 'harmonizing' members' minds with the party directives, were to be found in the Communist press and congress records of the time.[7]

The rapid growth of the Communist Party during the years 1943–6 was easy to explain. The clandestine organization which it had kept in being through most of the Fascist period gave it a flying start in the Resistance Movement, while other parties were losing good men through sheer inexperience. Communist courage and efficiency, which did so much to help liberate Italy, at the same time built up a great reputation for the party; and the same qualities, coupled with unscrupulous and ruthless manœuvres against any possible rival, won for it a dominant position in the Resistance Movement,[8] where the three Left-wing parties often acted

[1] For analysis of membership figures see *Unità*, 6 January 1946.

[2] Mario Einaudi: 'The Italian Land', *Social Research*, March 1950, p. 28, quoting Celso Chini: 'L'Organizzazione del partito nel momento presente', *Rinascita*, August-September 1949, p. 395. About one-third of the population of Italy lives in the South, including Sicily and Sardinia. In the elections of June 1953 for the Chamber of Deputies, however, the Communists polled 1,894,808 votes in the South, out of a total for the whole country of 6,122,138, a gain of 1,127,705 votes over their poll in the South in April 1948 (*Unità*, 14, 28 June 1953).

[3] R. Lombardi: 'Una mano tesa minacciosa', *Civiltà Cattolica*, 5 May 1945, p. 156.

[4] Einaudi and others: *Communism in Western Europe*, pp. 167–9, 228.

[5] Ibid. p. 203, quoting a statement of 25 September 1948 by Luigi Longo, Deputy Secretary of the Party.

[6] Longo at Party Congress, 3 January 1946 (*Unità*, 4 January 1946).

[7] Ibid. 1 December 1946.

[8] Cadorna: *La Riscossa*, part iii, and appendixes.

together against the others. The Garibaldi brigades, Communist-led but open to non-Communists, were an excellent means of recruiting and training for the party the militant members who were so essential to the party's activities, democratic or undemocratic.[1]

After the war the Communists acquired merit in local administration and in social welfare. It was they, for instance, who started an admirable scheme for boarding out children in the country. Their leaders, when in well-paid official jobs, handed over their salaries to the party (which granted them a comparatively small living allowance) or, if they had private wealth, made generous contributions to the cause. For instance, two Communists who held office at this time, Fausto Gullo and Luigi De Filpo, were rich landowners from the South, but the first was known to have given several million lire to the party, and the second, to have handed over several of his farms to his tenants.[2] In the Italy of 1944–7 many people came to feel that the Communists were the only party able and willing to help them, whereas the Socialists had had their day.[3]

The Communists, however, were far from posing as social revolutionaries; they often showed themselves more moderate than the Socialists and Action Party, and preferred keeping a foothold in the Government to staking their fortunes on a bold reconstruction policy. They expressed themselves cautiously about agrarian reform and nationalization,[4] and even about the proposed capital levy. Like other Communist Parties, they repeatedly expressed the most unexceptionable sentiments on the subjects of peace, of national unity and independence, and of freedom and respect for human personality, and frequently held some opponent of theirs up to execration for betraying those ideals; but at the same time they made constant use of the technique of exploiting fear and hatred as mass emotions. Communist terrorism was still continuing in 1946, particularly in Emilia and Romagna, though it was less violent than it had been in 1945 and than it was to become in 1947–8, and was also not without provocation from terrorists of the Right.

Until 1947, in fact, the Communists sought power through national unity. They promoted non-party organizations—the Association of Partisans (ANPI), the Youth Front, and the Union of Italian Women—and gained control over them from within. Through their alliance with the Socialists they also eventually gained control over the General Confederation of Labour, which had originally been founded on an all-party basis. They sought an understanding with the Christian Democrats, who would

[1] For a description of the manner in which Communists, without actually using force, compelled villagers to join a general strike see Alan Moorehead: *The Villa Diana* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1951), pp. 31–34.

[2] *Risorgimento Liberale*, 2 April 1947.

[3] e.g. Bonciani: '*F*' *Squadron*, p. 104.

[4] See economic programme in *Unità*, 26 June 1946.

have none of it, and a complete fusion of the Communist and Socialist Parties. The Communist-Socialist pact for unity of action dating from 1934, which the Communists had more than once disregarded in order to snatch some immediate political advantage for themselves, was replaced on 27 October 1946 by another agreement which tied the two organizations much more closely together. The common aims specified in this new pact were innocuous, but the political leverage which it gave to the Communists was not. This was too much for the Socialist minority who objected to fusion, and in January 1947 Giuseppe Saragat and others seceded and formed the Italian Socialist Workers' Party, while the rest of the party remained under the leadership of Pietro Nenni and continued to co-operate with the Communists. Nenni's Socialists and the Communists survived a reconstruction of De Gasperi's Cabinet in February 1947, but went out of office in the following May. The Communist Party lost popularity for a time at the end of 1946, owing to its readiness to appease Yugoslavia over Trieste, and its membership increased little, if at all, from 1947 onwards.[1] Nevertheless, it was still a formidable body, as events in the new phase of Italian politics which opened in 1947 were to show.

(*h*) The Punishment of Fascists and Collaborators and the Administrative Purge

A Legislative Decree of 27 July 1944[2] authorized the prosecution of (1) Fascists of the highest rank who bore a special responsibility for establishing and maintaining the régime, and for Italy's entry into the war and defeat; (2) less prominent, but politically active, Fascists, especially those who had joined the party in its earliest days, who had organized political terrorism, or who had themselves committed crimes, and had been shielded by the régime; (3) those who had collaborated with the Germans after the Armistice.

During the next few months a number of Fascists, war criminals, and collaborators were brought before the High Court set up as a result of the above decree. The most spectacular of these trials was that of Roatta (as ex-Chief of Military Intelligence), Filippo Anfuso (formerly Ciano's private secretary, and, at the time of the trial, Ambassador in Berlin), Francesco Jacomoni, ex-Viceroy of Albania, and twelve others. This trial took place between January and March 1945, and, in it, the Fascist régime as a whole was, as it were, put into the dock on charges of waging aggressive

[1] In October 1946 it was 2,166,000 and, in March 1947, 2,243,000 (*Unità*, 7 January 1947; *Risorgimento Liberale*, 30 March 1947). By 31 March 1951 the membership was 2,580,765, but this included 463,000 in the Communist Youth Federation which was not founded till 1949 (Einaudi and others: *Communism in Western Europe*, p. 200) and which accepted members from the age of fourteen, four years before they could join the party. By 31 March 1954 the party had 2,030,690 members and the Youth Federation 377,112 (*Unità*, 15 April 1954).

[2] No. 159. For the many other decrees on this subject see *Gazzetta Ufficiale, passim.*

wars; of sabotage and terrorism during the Spanish Civil War (including plans for germ warfare); and of complicity in the murders of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Barthou in 1934[1] and of the well-known anti-Fascists Carlo and Nello Rosselli in 1937.[2] In the course of this and other trials the Court passed several sentences of death and many long terms of imprisonment; but many of the accused were in hiding, or still at liberty in the North, and Roatta escaped during his trial. The ordinary courts, too, were slow in dealing with the lesser Fascists. The Communist and Socialist press clamoured for retribution against all public enemies, not excepting the late régime's friends in big business, who were enjoying a new lease of life as war profiteers; and feeling ran so high that at the trial of Pietro Caruso, ex-police chief of Rome, the mob murdered one of the witnesses, a former prison governor.

The climax came with the liberation of the North in April 1945.[3] About 30,000 cases of collaboration were referred to special assize courts, each consisting of one professional judge, assisted by 'people's judges' chosen by lot from lists compiled by the CLNs.[4] These courts passed more than 200 death sentences during the ensuing six months;[5] but many more Neo-Fascists and collaborators than this were put to death, either by being shot as soon as captured, or after trial by the revolutionary equivalent of Judge Lynch. How many perished in this way is uncertain. The figure of 300,000,[6] much quoted by the *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, was probably much too high, and that of 1,732 murders and disappearances between 25 April and 5 May 1945 (given by Mario Scelba, Minister of the Interior, in June 1952),[7] too low. Partisan headquarters in Piedmont ordered the killing of all members of the Neo-Fascist volunteer forces who were captured; and, though this order was countermanded by Partisan general headquarters in Milan,[8] this was too late to prevent many executions. In any case the wave of violence lasted till some time past midsummer. Press reports in 1945 mentioned 9,000–11,000,[9] or even 20,000,[10] political murders; 2,000 death sentences passed by the Partisan tribunal in Turin by 5 May;[11] the discovery of corpses every morning for weeks on the outskirts of Milan;[12] prison-breakings and lynchings; riots and strikes when sentences were considered too lenient; the settling of private scores; and the murder of fugitives for the sake of their valuables.

Moderation and expediency, however, gradually prevailed. Sentences

[1] See *Survey* for 1934, pp. 537–77.
[2] For a note on the re-trial of the case in October 1949 see *Survey* for 1939–46: *The World in March 1939*, p. 174, note 1.
[3] Cadorna: *La Riscossa*, pp. 265–6.
[4] *Chicago Daily News*, 15 September 1945.
[5] *Manchester Guardian*, 16 November 1945.
[6] *Giornale d'Italia*, 27 February 1945.
[7] *Popolo*, 25 June 1952.
[8] Cadorna, op. cit. pp. 247–8.
[9] *Chicago Daily News*, loc. cit.
[10] *National Zeitung* (Basle), 9 July 1945.
[11] *Giornale del Mattino*, 8 July 1945.
[12] *Popolo e Libertà*, 15 June 1945.

were reduced or reversed on appeal, escapes were winked at, and thousands benefited under the amnesty of 1946.[1] (By 1952 Partisan terrorists were being brought to trial, and no more than 315 Fascists remained in prison.)[2] The period of disfranchisement for politically active Fascists ended on 31 December 1952, and, long before that, it was possible for a man like Achille Lauro, the Naples shipping magnate, who had never actually held high rank in the party, to return to politics as a Monarchist demagogue. The *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, a Neo-Fascist movement, unblushingly proclaiming itself heir to Mussolini's Italian Social Republic, was founded as early as December 1946, and, by its own account, attracted 127,000 members before it had been in existence a year.[3]

The purge of the civil service and professions[4] was meant only to penalize active and influential Fascists, or veterans of the *squadrista* period, and to spare the many who had joined the party simply to get or keep their jobs. At first a considerable number of civil servants, officials of public corporations, and others were suspended from work, but the procedure of investigation gave much scope for obstruction and legal ingenuity, and Right-wing influence was strongly in favour of leniency. The decrees of 1944 were watered down in 1945–6, until most of the 1,874 civil servants who had been dismissed, and the 671 who had been compulsorily retired, had been reinstated, and all lesser penalties had been waived.[5] In the end, only a few hundred civil servants out of 800,000 were removed from their posts.

The Legislative Decree of 27 July 1944 also empowered the state to confiscate any increase of capital acquired since 3 January 1945 by any Fascist who had held public office or been active in politics, or by his near relatives or business partners, failing proof that this had been legitimately acquired. Eventually it was announced that the state would receive about 20,000 million lire (£22 million) from the fortunes of more than 500 Fascists,[6] but, here also, legal loopholes were, perhaps, easy to find.

(*i*) The Relaxation of Allied Control

The Italian Government, as early as 27 December 1943, had asked leave to announce their wish to adhere to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and this was followed in February, and again in April 1944, by requests for full Allied status. The British opposed both these concessions as being likely to impair Allied freedom to control Italy during the war,

[1] Legislative Decree of 22 June 1946, no. 4.
[2] *Popolo*, 25 June 1952, quoting Scelba, Minister of the Interior.
[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 17 November 1947.
[4] Legislative Decrees of 27 July 1944, no. 159, and 23 October 1944, no. 285.
[5] *Popolo*, loc. cit.
[6] *Evening Standard*, 28 December 1946, quoting Mauro Scoccimarro, then Minister for Finance.

and to impose territorial and other sacrifices on her in the peace settlement. The Americans argued the question of adherence to the Atlantic Charter with the British for three months, but took the same view as the British did about Allied status, partly with an eye to French, Greek, and Yugoslav reactions.

Hull, however, on 23 August 1944 replied not unsympathetically to a request from Bonomi that the Armistice terms might be modified. Churchill's visit to Italy in that same month convinced him that the Italian Government ought to be granted some mark of confidence, if not actually a preliminary peace; and the Roosevelt–Churchill statement issued from Hyde Park on 26 September[1] announced impending concessions with regard to the Allied Control Commission, diplomatic relations, economic relief,[2] and other matters. The Allied Commission dropped the word 'Control' from its title as from 25 October 1944, and replaced more and more of its military officials by civilians. Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident in the Middle East, succeeded Alexander as its Acting President on 10 November. Next, an Allied *aide-mémoire* of 24 February 1945[3] informed the Italian Government that control over day-to-day administration would be exercised only where Allied military interests required it; ended the Allied veto over legislation and official appointments, other than a few appointments of military significance; and announced the withdrawal of the Commission's local and regional staffs, except for certain liaison officers and technical experts, and the closing down of all regional offices in the 'King's Italy' by 1 April. The Commission's headquarters remained open till 31 January 1947, after which its functions were transferred to Allied Military Headquarters.

The *aide-mémoire* of February 1945 also stated that Italy would in future be granted facilities for secret diplomatic correspondence (excepting, however, the use of undeposited cyphers), on the understanding that the Italian Government would keep the Allies informed of their negotiations with other governments. On 26 October 1944 the United States Government had announced their intention of re-establishing full diplomatic relations,[4] and the two Ambassadors, Kirk in Rome and Alberto Tarchiani in Washington, presented their letters of credence on 8 January and 8 March 1945 respectively. The British, however, merely gave their High Commissioner the personal rank of Ambassador and did not restore full diplomatic relations till the Peace Treaty had been ratified.

[1] Press release in *Department of State Bulletin*, 1 October 1944, p. 338; see also a broadcast by Roosevelt of 12 October 1944 (ibid. 15 October 1944, p. 432).

[2] See below, p. 442.

[3] Cmd. 6693, pp. 16–18; see also a statement by Macmillan in *United States and Italy*, pp. 111–17.

[4] *Department of State Bulletin*, 29 October 1944, p. 491.

The Yalta Conference brought no encouragement to the Italians, and they also resented their exclusion from the San Francisco Conference and the United Nations.[1] At the Potsdam Conference (in July 1945) and during the following autumn the United States proposed the revision of the Armistice Agreements in return for Italy's co-belligerency.[2] The Italian Government were willing to conclude agreements on all matters concerning the occupation; but the Soviet Government refused to agree to Italy's being treated differently from Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The Conference of Foreign Ministers in May–June 1946 agreed upon a revised Armistice Agreement abolishing the Allied Commission and certain military controls and authorizing direct Italo-British and Italo-American agreements on the guarding of the lines of communication through Italy by British and American troops, but apparently the Italian Government did not respond to this suggestion. A few weeks later the Paris Conference began work on the Peace Treaty.[3] This was signed on 14 February 1947, and the last of the occupation troops were withdrawn in December 1947.

(*j*) Prisoners of War and War Criminals

Of the 1½ million[4] Italians who were prisoners of war or 'military internees' by the end of the Second World War, 558,000 were in British and American hands.[5] Of these, 18,000 had been repatriated by April 1945 for reasons of age, health, or special qualifications,[6] and the repatriation of the rest, though delayed by lack of shipping, and by British reluctance to lose agricultural labour, was completed early in 1947. By that time, 635,000 of the men interned by the Germans in 1943 had returned from Germany, and 90,000 from the Balkans.[7] The most tragic case was that of the 100,000 men missing in the Ukraine after the Soviet winter offensive of 1942–3. Soviet broadcasts early in 1943 spoke of many thousand prisoners, but when repatriation began in 1945–6, the official Soviet total of Italian prisoners to be returned was only 21,065, of whom 8,552 had been in German, not in Soviet, hands;[8] and on 27 February

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 615, 743.

[2] See Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 74–75, 129; *Nuova Antologia*, November, December 1945, January, February, and June 1946. Cmd. 6693 (pp. 18–20) sums up the changes in the Armistice régime down to November 1945.

[3] For text and maps see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, 10th February 1947*, Cmd. 7481–2 (London, H.M.S.O., 1948) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 7481–2]; see also below, pp. 455–6.

[4] 1,478,000, according to the statement by the Minister for Post-war Relief referred to above, p. 422, note 4.

[5] *New York Times*, 26 November 1946.

[6] *Review of AMG*, p. 89.

[7] *New York Times*, loc. cit.

[8] Ibid. 1 January 1949.

1947 the Italian Minister for National Defence definitely stated that 94 per cent. of the prisoners had died in Russia, mostly during the first half of 1943.[1] Even this, however, did not stifle all hopes that some of the men might still be alive in labour camps.

The trial and punishment of war criminals was yet another example of Italy's anomalous position. The British Military Courts dealt with crimes against Italians as well as against Allied nationals, and, in consequence of their findings, one German general was sentenced to death and another to ten years' imprisonment,[2] while Kesselring himself, and his subordinates Generals von Mackensen and Maelzer, were sentenced to death (afterwards commuted to life imprisonment) for ordering the massacre of 335 hostages at the Fosse Ardeatine outside Rome and, in the case of Kesselring, also for issuing reprisal orders against civilians.[3]

On the other hand, no less than 1,204 Italian war criminals and 69 suspects were listed by the United Nations War Crimes Commission; 170 criminals and 9 suspects were charged by Great Britain and the Dominions; 179 criminals and 11 suspects by Greece; 764 criminals and 42 suspects by Yugoslavia; 80 criminals and 5 suspects by France; and 8 criminals and 2 suspects by Ethiopia.[4] The only Italian name in the long lists of the more notable convicted war criminals which appeared in the War Crimes Commission's own *History* of its proceedings was that of General Nicola Bellomo, shot in 1945 for the killing of recaptured British prisoners of war,[5] but Allied Courts tried a number of other Italians for crimes against prisoners of war, and other death sentences were passed and carried out. Italians were tried in Corsica (all *in absentia*) and in Greece for offences against the civil population, and one was executed in Norway for crimes committed when working with the *Sicherheitsdienst*. Mussolini himself, and others whose surrender might have been demanded, were summarily executed by the Italians themselves, or were tried by Italian courts. Other 'wanted' men, however, not only survived, but held official appointments. The Ethiopian list began with Badoglio; the Yugoslav list included General Taddeo Orlando, Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Defence in 1947, and Achille Marazzo, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior in that year. Both Governments made repeated applications to the Allied Powers for the surrender of the war criminals on their lists; but without success.

[1] *Osservatore Romano*, 28 February 1947.

[2] U.N. War Crimes Commission: *The History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War* (London, H.M.S.O., 1948), pp. 525, 528; see also pp. 47, 350–2, 374–5.

[3] U.N. War Crimes Commission: *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals* (London, H.M.S.O., 1949), viii. 1–14.

[4] U.N. War Crimes Commission: *History*, p. 511.

[5] Ibid. p. 524.

(*k*) Economic Reconstruction[1]

Even before the war, Italy's economic position had been a precarious one. The birth-rate, formerly one of the highest in Europe, had fallen, in spite of Fascist policy, from 29·8 per thousand in 1921–5 to 23·3 in 1936–40 (by 1950 it had fallen to 19·2), but, even so, there were likely to be 400,000 or more new mouths to feed every year for some years to come.[2] Already a living had to be found for over 40 million Italians in a country slightly smaller than the British Isles (including the whole of Ireland), and much less productive, for Italy contained little coal or other minerals, and her soil, except in the best parts of the Po Valley and other favoured areas, was often of poor quality, arid, or exhausted. Italy depended on imports for part of her food supplies, even (in most years) for some wheat, for most of her fuel and fertilizers, and for much of her industrial raw materials. Her exports, with which she paid for those imports, consisted of manufactured goods for which fuel and materials had to be imported, and of fruit, vegetables, wine, handicraft goods, and other specialized national products which were apt to be among the first commodities to be affected by restrictions in importing countries; while the gap which remained in her balance of payments was filled by emigrants' remittances and by the earnings of shipping and of the tourist industry. Italy was, therefore, one of the countries most at the mercy of changes in world prices and in the economic policy of other countries.

Mussolini's efforts to lessen Italy's dependence on foreign trade (and at the same time to prepare her for war) had expanded industry, but this without making it more productive. Production had come to cost more, because the new autarkic processes were not economical, and quality had tended to deteriorate. In agriculture, wheat-growing had been encouraged at the expense of livestock and of the fertility of the land. The standard of living had fallen,[3] and the budget had been in deficit from 1929–30 onwards. After three years of war the accumulated deficit amounted to 280,000 million lire, the note circulation had risen from

[1] On conditions during this period and their economic background see Great Britain, Board of Trade, Commercial Relations and Exports Department: *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Italy, February 1951* (London, H.M.S.O., 1951) [referred to hereafter as *Italy, February 1951*]; Italy, Ministero dell'Industria e del Commercio: *Piano di massima per le importazioni e le esportazioni industriali dell'anno 1946–1947* (Rome, Ministero dell'Industria e del Commercio, 1946) [referred to hereafter as *Piano di massima*]; Istituto per gli Studi di Economia: *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938–1947* (Florence, Vallecchi, 1949); Italy, Ministero per la Costituente: *Rapporto della Commissione Economica presentato all'Assemblea Costituente* (Rome, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1947) [referred to hereafter as *Rapporto della Commissione Economica*]; Grindrod: *The New Italy*, pp. 58–79; and the reports on Italy appearing from time to time in the *Foreign Commerce Weekly*.

[2] Census of April 1936: 42,994,000 (Italy, Istituto Centrale di Statistica: *Compendio statistico italiano* (Rome, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1946), p. 15); estimate for 1950: 46·5 million (frontiers of 1947) (*Italy, February 1951*, p. 2).

[3] *Rapporto della Commissione Economica*, Part II, vol. i, p. 18; *Piano di massima*, p. 49.

25,300 to 96,400 million lire,[1] retail food prices stood at five times the level of 1938,[2] and a lack of fuel and supplies was handicapping industry.[3] The bread ration—and many people could afford to eat little else but bread or *pasta*—was the lowest in Europe, and often unobtainable. The Fascist Government had been slow and unsystematic in imposing controls, and corrupt and incompetent in administering them. The luxuries still available for those who could afford them astonished those who arrived in Italy from countries where a strict 'war economy' was in force. Nor were the Italians accustomed, or inclined by temperament, to accept controls, especially when there was obviously not enough to go round; and the black market was therefore already busy.

Liberation, from which the Italians had expected better times, left them poorer, colder, and hungrier than before. Till 1945, indeed, food was scarcer, and prices higher, in the South than in the North, even though currency inflation was much greater in the latter. The South, cut off from the much more fertile North, had first one and then two great cities to feed, much of its own agricultural land was fought over, and its roads and railways, never the equal of those in the North, had suffered much more damage. The Allied armies had the first claim, not only on such transport as they themselves had brought into working order, but on supplies, services, and buildings; and the Allied soldier, whose high standard of living the Italians could not but compare with their own, spent his money as freely as the Germans had before him. All costs of occupation fell upon Italy, and the Allies printed their own occupation currency, for a short time in 1943 in the form of 'gold seal dollars' and 'British military pounds', then in the form of 'Allied military lire' (am-lire); and 90,000 million lire of this latter currency had been issued by March 1946,[4] when the Italian Government assumed responsibility for providing lire. The very sight of am-lire was a reminder of a financial burden of occupation that did not exist in the North, where the Germans used Italian notes; and the fixing of the rate of exchange at 100 lire to the dollar and 400 to the pound sterling, attributed to the British Treasury's desire to keep down expenditure, was criticized from the first, and this not only by Italians, as devaluing the lira too much. Inflation was soon far beyond the control of the Allied or the Italian authorities, and by the end of the war retail food prices in Rome were over thirty times what they had been in 1938.[5]

War damage was widespread[6] and was particularly severe in north-

[1] Bruno Foa: *Monetary Reconstruction in Italy* (New York, King's Crown Press for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1949), p. 13.
[2] *Review of AMG*, p. 121.
[3] *Piano di massima*, p. 43.
[4] Grindrod: *The New Italy*, pp. 76–77.
[5] Foa, op. cit. p. 15.
[6] For estimate of war damage see ibid. pp. 22–25; Italy: *Memorandum sulle questioni economico-finanziarie connesse col Trattato di Pace*, pp. 16–29; *Piano di massima*, pp. 18–27.

eastern Sicily, the Salerno and Anzio bridge-heads, and the zone, stretching from coast to coast, of the Winter Line battles and the advance on Rome; and also in those towns and villages of Tuscany and the Marches where the Germans had fought delaying actions when retreating upon the Gothic Line. Nearly 2 million inhabited rooms were destroyed, and 4½ million more damaged,[1] in a land that already suffered from overcrowding. In the Liri valley alone, 100,000 people were homeless.[2] Nearly 2 million acres of agricultural land south of the Apennines were flooded, mined, or used for airfields.[3] As regards the bombing and shelling of buildings, roads and railways, the Allies, being both the attackers in the fighting and the masters of the air, were probably responsible for an actually greater amount of damage than the Germans, but the latter systematically and maliciously wrecked and looted as they retreated. In Naples, for instance, they not only wrecked the gas, electric, and water services (as they usually did when leaving a town) and the port, but they also left time-bombs in the central post-office and other places, as if on purpose to kill and injure civilians, and they set fire to the university buildings. They put nine-tenths of the electric generating capacity in Central Italy out of action, and carried off skilled workers, machinery, foodstuffs, rolling-stock, and lorries, and even the radium belonging to the University of Bologna. Northern Italy, thanks to the German collapse, escaped demolitions and long-contested battles; and, in spite of Allied bombing, only 6 per cent. of its industrial capacity was destroyed, as compared with 23 per cent. in the South.[4] Industry was, however, at a standstill for lack of fuel and raw materials. Another form of war damage which was doubly regrettable during the post-war years of high freight rates was the loss of about nine-tenths of the Italian merchant fleet, formerly the sixth largest in the world (3½ million gross registered tons).[5] It should also be remembered that, though Italy suffered less damage than Poland or the Ukraine, she had less power to recover, being much poorer in natural resources.

Liberated Italy was kept alive in 1943–5 by supplies brought from overseas by the Allied armies. No less than 2½ million tons of these supplies had been landed in Italy by the spring of 1945, including 1,496,000 tons of food, more than half of which had been procured from Great Britain and the Dominions, or by Great Britain in the Middle East.[6] In all, this 'military relief programme', which officially ended on 31 August

[1] Foa: *Monetary Reconstruction in Italy*, p. 23.

[2] *Review of AMG*, p. 54.

[3] C. Grove Haines: 'Italy's Struggle for Recovery, an Allied Dilemma', *Foreign Policy Reports*, 1 December 1944, p. 224. Jacini's article in *Nuova Antologia* (see above, p. 422, note 2) reckons the area of minefields throughout Italy as half a million acres (pp. 150–1).

[4] See articles in *Italia Libera*, 16–20 November 1945.

[5] *Italy, February 1951*, pp. 83–84.

[6] *Review of AMG*, pp. 92–93; see also *Department of State Bulletin*, 8 October 1944, p. 382; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1569.

1945 although shipments actually continued for some months after that, supplied Italy with 5,953,700 tons of supplies worth about $490 million.[1] The Allies did what they could to facilitate production and the distribution of supplies inside Italy. They also performed some remarkable feats of emergency civil engineering, such as the restoration of the port of Naples to some sort of use within a week. But it was not the business of AMG/ACC to undertake more reconstruction than was strictly necessary, either directly for the needs of the Allied armies or to prevent actual disease and unrest among the Italians. Allied plans had to be made more with an eye to the immediate saving in shipping space than to the lasting interests of the Italians, and much of the increased output achieved was reserved for the Allied armies. In any case, setting Italy's economy back on its feet was a task far beyond the powers of AMG/ACC.

Seeking financial assistance for reconstruction, the Italian Government applied for Lend-Lease in the summer of 1944, and sent a mission to New York in the winter of 1944–5 to negotiate private loans. Both attempts were unsuccessful, but on 10 October 1944[2] Roosevelt made public an offer to credit Italy with the dollar equivalent of the lire issued as pay to the United States troops, and with the proceeds, in dollars, of remittances from the United States to Italy and of Italian exports to the United States. As the United States Treasury, throughout the occupation, had set aside the equivalent of am-lire spent on pay and on supplies for the army obtained in Italy, a credit could be granted within the powers of the Executive, without committing the United States Government to recognition of Italian claims that they should become financially responsible for these am-lire. This first credit eventually produced $164 million corresponding to army pay (of which Canada contributed $4 million), and $53 million from private remittances by the end of 1945.[3] The British Government took no part in the scheme, as they felt that the time had not yet come to encourage reconstruction in Italy; this would, in their belief, be ill received in Great Britain, and would give the liberated Allied countries an excuse to ask for more help for themselves. As before, too, the British Government did not want to establish precedents that might affect the final settlement.[4]

Deliveries of goods for civilian consumption and for reconstruction were increased during the autumn of 1944. The Allied Commission made a survey of industry, hastened the repairing and derequisitioning of factories, and allocated more of their output to the Italians themselves; but these first steps towards reconstruction could not save Italy from a second

[1] *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938–1947*, p. 447.
[2] *Department of State Bulletin*, 15 October 1944, p. 403.
[3] Foa: *Monetary Reconstruction in Italy*, p. 38.
[4] Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1566–7.

hungry winter. The bread ration remained at 300 grammes a day for the South, and at 200 for Rome and Central Italy. Agitation for larger shipments of food grew louder in the United States, and the divergence between British and American policy became head-line news in America early in January 1945, when, by leakage from the State Department, the columnist Drew Pearson obtained the text of a British *aide-mémoire* of 22 August 1944 expressing objections to beginning reconstruction at once, and published extracts from this document emphasizing British unwillingness to send food to Italy.[1] Roosevelt made a reassuring statement to the effect that more food would be sent; and Hopkins and Stettinius, when visiting Naples on their way to Yalta, discussed this question, as well as the even more thorny one of Italian internal politics, with the British authorities on the spot. Alexander, according to Stettinius, was doubtful whether more shipping could be spared for the carriage of food to Italy.[2]

Meanwhile, however, the Allied Commission and the Italian Government (at the instigation of the Commission's British chairman, Macmillan)[3] had drawn up a joint plan of essential imports for 1945 covering (*a*) relief, to be paid for out of Allied military expenditure, and (*b*) reconstruction, to be paid for out of the dollar credit. Industries of value to the Allies were still to have priority, and armaments industries were to be rehabilitated only to the extent required to supply the Allies on the Italian front or elsewhere; but otherwise Italy was to be free to import as much material for reconstruction as funds and shipping would allow.[4] An Italian technical delegation was sent to Washington; and another joint plan, providing for no less than $1,100 million worth of imports, was drawn up for 1946.[5] The Italian industrial reconstruction plan for 1946–7 alone required $690·3 million worth of fuel, raw materials, and equipment, the estimated freight charges on which amounted to $308 million more.[6] Imports ordered under the plan of 1945 began to reach Italy in May 1945. Another year was to pass before enough could be shipped to bring about an economic revival, but, even on this inadequate scale, the imports exhausted the first am-lire credit before the end of 1945. The United States supplemented the credit with a grant of $134 million from the Foreign Economic Administration under a scheme which, though not formally Lend-Lease, used Lend-Lease funds. Other forms of economic and financial help from the United States in 1946–7[7] included: the extension of the am-lire credit by $150 million, the equivalent of what had been

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 January 1945, p. 29; *New York Times*, 5 January 1945.
[2] Stettinius, pp. 57–58.
[3] *The Economist*, 24 November 1945.
[4] *United States and Italy*, pp. 109–10; see also *Nuova Antologia*, February 1945, p. 160.
[5] Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 272.
[6] *Piano di massima*, pp. 271–5.
[7] Foa: *Monetary Reconstruction in Italy*, pp. 35–40; *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938–47*, pp. 447–51, 459–61.

spent on Italy in supplies and services for the American troops (Canada also extended her am-lire credit); long-term credits for the purchase of surplus war stores, perhaps to the value of a further $178 million;[1] credits from the United States Maritime Commission of $62 million, for buying Liberty freighters and tankers; credits from the Export-Import Bank of $25 million for cotton, and $4 million for tobacco; more than $100 million of medium-term loans to industry from the same bank; and about $375 million of UNRRA help. Added to about $370 million already given in military relief, this made up a total for 1943–7 of about $1,800 million, of which about $1,100 million was given to Italy outright. In addition to this, ships seized in United States waters in 1941 were returned, and the United States Government undertook to replace with Liberty ships about 180,000 tons of Italian shipping lost in the service of the United Nations. Much help, too, was given by individual Americans, both to their own friends and relatives and through American Relief for Italy, founded in April 1944. Most of the $78 million worth of relief from private sources which reached Italy in 1944–6 came from the United States, one-third of it in the form of private parcels.[2] It was regrettable, but characteristic of the social tension of these years, that American help at this time, and later, under the Marshall Plan, should have come to mean to the Italian Left, to a large extent, help for Italian capitalists. The American experts in Italy were, indeed, themselves perhaps inclined to overlook the social or political aspects of the economic problems on which they were called in as advisers.

Great Britain, for her part, contributed about $95 million of the military relief expenditure and nearly $90 million through UNRRA; and she added $7 million worth of assistance to the Foreign Economic Administration's grant.[3] The British Government made £45 million worth of supplies and services available to the Italian forces from September 1943 onwards, and after the war they handed over surplus war stores with an inventory value of £75 million to the Italian Government.[4] By an agreement of 17 April 1947[5] on post-liberation debts and claims, Great Britain credited to Italy the sterling value, reckoned at £26,250,000, of goods, services, and Italian currency provided by Italy for certain branches of military expenditure. This credit was set off against the value of the surplus stores, of the goods and services made available to the Italian forces, and of other

[1] According to an Italian source Italy received supplies valued by the United States at $368 million, and was granted a $160 million credit repayable in twenty-five instalments from 1951 (Libero Lenti: 'Riflessioni sulla politica dell' ARAR', *L'Industria*, 1947, no. 3, p. 316).

[2] *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938–1947*, pp. 450, 461.

[3] Foa: *Monetary Reconstruction in Italy*, pp. 35, 36.

[4] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Financial Agreements between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, Rome, 17th April 1947*, Cmd. 7118 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947) [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 7118], p. 10.

[5] Ibid. pp. 7–10.

items amounting to £12,200,000; and the balance was settled by an Italian payment of £8 million. Great Britain, like the United States, waived her claim to reparations against Italy. British assistance to Italy was estimated at $600 million, as compared with $2,000 million from the United States.[1]

In 1946–7 the main channel of relief and reconstruction was UNRRA.[2] A $50 million scheme for providing medical supplies and relief for children, expectant mothers, and non-Italian displaced persons was authorized by UNRRA's Council in September 1944, despite Yugoslav and Ethiopian objections, and came into operation in 1945–6. This was followed by the authorization in August 1945 of a full relief programme, on equal terms with the liberated Allied countries. The only contrary vote came from Yugoslavia, but the scheme afterwards met with temporary opposition in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate. Deliveries to Italy got fully under way in the summer of 1946 and continued till the end of 1947, by which time Italy had received 10 million tons of supplies, of the value of $418 million ($570 million with freight and insurance).[3] China and Poland alone received greater amounts of UNRRA relief. UNRRA, working jointly with the Italian Government, also organized schemes for the manufacture in Italy of cheap textiles and clothing, and for rehousing,[4] while the medical supplies that it brought opened up new possibilities for the control of malaria.

The Italians themselves, meanwhile, were tackling reconstruction with conspicuous energy and resourcefulness, but too often in the spirit of 'every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost'. The farmers, who courageously and laboriously brought the battlefields back into cultivation, sold their crops on the black market regardless of the Government's requisitioning scheme. The first buildings to be replaced were seldom those of most value to the community; housing for the poor, for instance, was an unattractive proposition when costs were so high. UNRRA goods passed from one speculator to another. When De Gasperi succeeded Parri as Premier in December 1945, with Professor Epicarmo Corbino, an economist of the old school, as his Minister for the Treasury, internal economic policy took a definite turn towards *laissez-faire*, and the proposal to call in and exchange the currency and impose a capital levy, which the Parri Government had been considering, was shelved. On the other hand,

[1] *Italy, February 1951*, p. 3.

[2] On UNRRA's work in Italy see above, p. 107; UNRRA: *Report of the Director General to the Council* (Washington, 1944–8), especially *Report . . . for the period 1 July 1947 to 31 December 1947 and summary of operations 9 November 1943 to 31 December 1947*; Woodbridge: *UNRRA*, ii. 257–94 and *passim*; 'UNRRA's Work in Italy Helps "Make Wheels Turn"', *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, 1 June 1946, pp. 16–17, 54–6. For text of agreements with the Italian Government of 9 March 1945 and 19 January 1946 see *Gazzetta Ufficiale*.

[3] UNRRA: *Report . . . 1 July . . . to 31 December 1947*, pp. 203, 204.

[4] See above, p. 107.

the De Gasperi Governments of 1945–7 did maintain the existing, and ineffective, controls on prices, the wheat subsidy, the restrictions on the dismissal of redundant industrial workers (about 100,000 of whom were kept on the pay-roll),[1] the forty-hour week, and the sliding scales of wages, based on the cost of living, that had been agreed upon between employers and workmen's representatives under official mediation on 6 December 1945.

Export as well as import trade[2] was carried out through the Allied Commission till 31 July 1945, after which the Commission still retained control over commercial policy, and, indeed, vetoed the Italo-Swiss agreement of August 1945, on the ground that it gave Switzerland too favourable a settlement of the Italian arrears of debt. United States imports from Italy were dealt with for a time by the United States Commercial Company, while, as regards exports, Italy was classified, from 11 September to 10 December 1945, among the few countries for which individual licences were required, but after that she was placed on the same footing as most of the Allies and neutrals. British exporters and importers were at liberty to make contracts with Italians as from 10 September 1945. On the Italian side, the Government handled all foreign trade till 15 February 1946, when private trading was resumed under a system of licensing and exchange control.[3] Already, in January 1946, the lira had been, in effect, devalued to 225 to the dollar by the introduction of a premium of 125 per cent. for import and export transactions; and from March 1946 exporters were allowed to keep half the proceeds of exports to countries with which clearing agreements were not in force (which included the United States and most of the sterling area), on condition that they should use this currency themselves to pay for imports or to sell to other importers within the next two months.

Some of what had been Italy's chief markets up to 1940 were now wholly or partly closed—Germany, for instance, Italy's former African colonies, the Balkans, and the rest of Eastern Europe. Great efforts were made, with at least temporary success, to develop trade with Argentina, the Middle East, Pakistan, South Africa, Australia, and notably with the United Kingdom, where Italy soon built up a large sterling balance.[4] For imports, however, Italy had come to depend on the United States to the extent shown in the following table:

[1] *Italy, February 1951*, p. 7.

[2] On foreign trade see *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938–1947*, chapter xi; on the commercial agreements of 1945–7 see ibid. pp. 426–7, 431–5.

[3] Summary of regulations in *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, 27 April 1946, pp. 32–33.

[4] Agreements signed on 17 April 1947 (Cmd. 7118, pp. 11–14) dealt with the liquidation of sterling balances, and with the release of Italian assets held by the Custodians of Enemy Property. The assets already liquidated were formed into a fund for the payment of lire debts incurred before 11 June 1940.

Percentage of Foreign Trade[1]

	Exports			*Imports*		
	1938	*1946*	*1947*	*1938*	*1946*	*1947*
Europe . . .	51·7	47·4	57·8	62·7	31·6	27·4
Germany . .	19·1	0·7	1·0	26·7	0·8	1·1
United Kingdom .	5·6	13·1	9·1	6·5	18·4	4·5
United States . .	7·5	13·7	6·3	11·9	51·3	44·6

Life was somewhat less hard for the Italians in 1946 than in 1945, but not much. The bread ration was provided only with difficulty, though there was always bread to be had at the 'free' as distinct from the 'legal' price, and, even in 1947, food consumption was well below the already inadequate level of 1939–40.[2] Italian industries were beginning to revive, first silk (which was in demand in the United States); then cotton and wool, which benefited by contracts from British firms, who for a time supplied enough raw material to pay for their orders as well as to have them carried out. A general revival of industry depended on imports of coal, which were hindered in 1946 by the strike in the United States and did not reach the pre-war level till the summer of 1947. By that time industry was working at three-quarters of its pre-war capacity, but the sellers' market abroad was coming to an end, and the crisis over the convertibility of sterling involved Great Britain, one of Italy's best customers. Moreover, the scramble for goods and hard currency, large government expenditure, deficit finance, and high costs of production (still further increased by the steps taken to relieve unemployment) had combined to produce a second wave of inflation which was eventually checked when the then Minister of the Treasury, Professor Luigi Einaudi, reversed Corbino's policy and severely restricted credit.

In spite of the help that they had received and of their own efforts, the Italians were still at the mercy of the first post-war economic emergency, and their basic problems were as formidable as ever. Not only had there never been less than 1,600,000 to 2 million unemployed since the war,[3] but there were probably nearly as many people under-employed, redundant factory workers, for instance, or peasants who only had work for part of the year, and that at very low wages. How was industry to be modernized, and what, in an era of mass production and import restrictions, was to

[1] *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938–1947*, pp. 481, 482.

[2] Ibid. p. 410.

[3] *Italy, February 1951*, p. 137; *Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana 1938–1947*, pp. 19–28. The attempt was also made to find work for Italians abroad, and emigration agreements were concluded in 1946 and 1947 with Belgium, France, and Argentina (ibid. pp. 28–33); see also 'The Franco-Italian Migration Agreements', *International Labour Review*, May 1947, pp. 395–402; 'Post-war Man-power Problems in Europe', ibid. June 1947, pp. 501–5; Attilo Oblath: 'Italian Regulation of Emigration', ibid. October 1947, pp. 408–25.

become of Italy's many small factories and handicraft workshops? Would the much talked of agrarian reform ever be carried out, and how could this be done so as to satisfy both the peasants' demand for land of their own and the country's need for the best and most productive farming? These and other questions still remained unanswered.

(*l*) The Protection of Holy Places, Historical Monuments, and Works of Art[1]

Among the treasures of which the war deprived Italy and the world were the Mantegna frescoes at Padua and the Church of St. Clare at Naples, both destroyed by Allied bombing, and the Cathedral at Benevento. Pisa was a no man's land for weeks, and the frescoes in its Campo Santo were disfigured by fire. The Allies bombed the Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino in the mistaken belief that the Germans were occupying it and, as it turned out, to their own hindrance;[2] and the mosaics of Sant'Apollinare in Classe at Ravenna would have been in some danger, had not Colonel Peniakoff (commander of that celebrated special service unit known as Popski's Private Army) proved by reconnaissance that the tower of the church was not a German observation post. The Germans, when in retreat, blew up bridges, campanili, city walls, and whole villages, often without any military justification at all. It was they who deliberately burnt both the library of the Royal Society of Naples (as a reprisal for the shooting of German soldiers) and also the state archives of Naples and the pictures from the Museo Filangieri, which had all been evacuated to a villa near Nola; and it was they who blew up the medieval bridges at Verona five days before their army capitulated, and most of the Florentine bridges in August 1944. Hitler (who had expressed the hope that he would be able to visit Florence again after the war), when ordering this demolition, spared the Ponte Vecchio as being the 'most artistic' of the bridges,[3] but, to block its approaches, a third of the medieval quarter of the city was destroyed.

Nearly every town and village in Italy, indeed, suffered damage of some kind, if only to the lesser picturesque buildings with no claim to fame, which give any land so much of its charm and character. Most of the well-known works of art, however, were preserved. The Italians in charge of them, with only a few regrettable exceptions, did all in their power to

[1] See also British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives, and other Material in Enemy Hands: *Works of Art in Italy, Losses and Survivals in the War* (London, H.M.S.O., 1945–6); Frederick Hartt: *Florentine Art under Fire* (Princeton University Press, 1949), Rodolfo Siviero: *Seconda mostra nazionale delle opere d'arte recuperate in Germania* (Florence, Sansoni, 1950), and *Sulle opere d'arte recuperate in Germania* (Rome, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1948).

[2] See statements by Kesselring and the Abbot of Monte Cassino (*Berliner Börzenzeitung*, 18 February 1944; *Völkischer Beobachter*, 25 February 1944); General Mark W. Clark: *Calculated Risk* (New York, Harper [1950]), pp. 311–24; Liddell Hart: *The Other Side of the Hill*, pp. 373–4.

[3] Hartt, op. cit. p. 46.

protect them beforehand, and restored them, when damaged, with amazing devotion and skill, searching through the debris under tottering walls, piecing together frescoes from hundreds of tiny fragments, and even diving into the Arno to recover broken statues bit by bit.

The danger to works of art, and the question of how far it was justifiable to spare them at the risk of men's lives, troubled many British and American minds at this time.[1] In an order of 29 December 1943,[2] Eisenhower laid down the principle that the Allies must respect works of art 'so far as war allows. If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men . . . the buildings must go'; but the excuse of 'military necessity' must not be used 'where it would be more truthful to speak of military . . . or even of personal, convenience'. Before the invasion, committees of experts in Great Britain and the United States, as part of a general plan for protecting European works of art, had prepared lists of buildings which must, if possible, be spared from bombardment and be put out of bounds to troops when the country was occupied. The bombing of Venice, for instance, was entirely forbidden, and only once were bombs dropped in the Lagoon. The railway at Florence was bombed, without any artistic monuments being hit.[3] The fine arts officers attached to AMG visited artistic monuments as soon as possible; made contact with the Italians who were in charge of them; advised the Allied authorities as to their protection against war damage and looting; and defended them against the bulldozers of Allied engineers bent on clearing up debris without delay, regardless of whether ruined buildings might not still be capable of restoration, and of what valuables might not still be recovered from the rubble. AMG advanced funds for emergency repairs when these could not otherwise be provided. Allied troops were not entirely innocent of looting and doing damage, but on the whole they behaved well—particularly the Indian Division.

The Germans, too, had an organization for the protection of art, the *Kunstschutz*, and some of them, Professor Heydenreich of the *Kunstschutz* in Tuscany, for instance, and Wolf, the German Consul in Florence, were true friends to Italian art at this time. 'Protection', however, included looting on the grand scale. German publicity made much of the rescue by the Hermann Göring Division of the great store of works of art and antiquities at Monte Cassino, but passed over the fact that pressure from the Vatican Secretariat of State was needed before these treasures were

[1] Cf. 9, 16 February 1944, H.L. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 130, coll. 738–55, 813–62; *New York Times*, 9 October 1943, and 7 February 1944, and a series of letters to *The Times* in the first fortnight of February 1944.

[2] See *New York Times*, 16 February 1944; this was followed by an order by Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lieut.-General Bedell Smith, giving instructions on the protection of works of art, and the prevention of looting; see also 16 February 1944, H.L. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 130, col. 850.

[3] On the special case of Rome see below, pp. 451–3.

handed over to the Italian Government to be deposited in the Vatican City, and that no less than thirteen cases of them, including pictures by Titian, Raphael, and Breughel and antiquities from Herculaneum, were kept back and presented to Göring himself. Moreover, before the Germans left Tuscany in July–August 1944, the *Kunstschutz* itself removed about 700 works of art, among them about a quarter of the best pictures and statues in the Florentine collections, to an unknown destination. Works of art were also taken from the Museums of Faenza, Forlì, and other cities of Northern Italy. After months of uncertainty the Florentine loot was found stored in the South Tyrol. It had been taken there inadequately packed, along roads in constant danger of air attack. It was said that Himmler had given secret orders that it should be destroyed rather than be left behind if the Germans had to leave the South Tyrol—orders that were only countermanded because the group of secret agents of the Resistance who specialized in the defence of works of art had learnt of them and had induced the *Kunstschutz* to protest. Much of the contents of Göring's thirteen cases of treasures turned up in the great salt-mine cache at Alt Aussee in Austria, which would also have been destroyed by the SS if Austrian miners had not warned the Allies in time.

Even before the war Nazi connoisseurs had shown an interest in Italian art, a taste which Mussolini, who considered art unmanly and would gladly have sold any picture in Italy, had more than once gratified, regardless of the regulations governing the export of works of art and of the protests of his own art experts. After the fall of France Hitler offered to return the works of art carried off by Napoleon, if only Italian officials would be less obstructive, and though Bottai, the Fascist Minister for Education, rejected this remarkable proposal, it was impossible to prevent an ever-increasing flow of works of art to Germany, some bought by the Nazis, some presented to them by the Duce or by Ciano. In November 1941 alone thirty-four cases were dispatched to Göring, and in the following year he acquired pictures from a Florentine collector in exchange for nine French impressionist pictures, seven of which had obviously been stolen from Jews. Many of the exported works of art were German, Dutch, or Flemish, some were not even of the first order, but many were Italian or antique, among them such masterpieces as the Lancellotti Discobolos.

The deposits of works of art in the South Tyrol, being within the jurisdiction of AMG, were brought back to Florence in July 1945, but it was not so easy to recover those taken to Germany and Austria.[1] Nations which, unlike Italy, were entitled to reparations, claimed compensation for their own losses, and the Italians themselves made difficulties about

[1] Ardelia R. Hall: 'The Recovery of Cultural Objects Dispersed during World War II', *Department of State Bulletin*, 27 August 1951, pp. 337–44.

returning the nine impressionist pictures to France. Eventually, just over a thousand paintings, statues, and other objects, stolen from museums and galleries, and a number of church bells were returned to Italy in August 1947. The Bavarian *Land* Government and German art experts fought hard, not without support from some of the officials of the American Control Commission, to have the works of art purchased by or given to Germany before 1943 kept in Germany, on the ground that they had been legitimately acquired.[1] A first instalment of these was returned to Italy in November 1948, and a second in 1949; but, even then, eighty-four works of art, nearly all stolen or illegally exported from Florence, were still in Munich, and no less than 693, some from private and some from public collections, were still missing.[2]

Note on the Bombing of Rome

'O Roma nobilis, orbis et domina
cunctarum urbium excellentissima,
. . . .
te benedicimus—salve per secula'.[3]

'Ye sacred ruines and ye tragick sights,
Which onely doo the name of Rome retaine,
Old moniments, which of so famous sprights
The honour yet in ashes doo maintaine;
Triumphant Arcks, spyres neighbours to the skie,
That you to see doth th'heauen it selfe appall,
Alas, by little ye to nothing flie,
The peoples fable, and the spoyle of all'.[4]

From the point of view, not of the medieval pilgrim or the Renaissance poet, but of those responsible for planning Allied military operations in 1943–4, Rome, though not a city of great industries, was one of Italy's chief railway centres, while the Government offices and the various headquarters of the Italian and German armed forces situated in the city were also desirable and legitimate targets for bombing. Among the general public in Allied countries there were those who, encouraged by part of the press, wished their governments to show no hesitation in bombing Rome, arguing that the bombing of Allied cities was ample justification, and even that the wish to spare its ancient monuments and works of art implied a callous want of sympathy with the bombed-out poor of London or Coventry. 'Rome, to the Romans', so ran a resolution laid before Churchill by the Eastbourne Chamber of Commerce, 'is no more beautiful than

[1] *Messaggero*, 6 January 1949; *Die Zeit*, 2 December 1948.
[2] *Osservatore Romano*, 3 September 1952.
[3] Pilgrims' hymn of the ninth century A.D. (Stephen Gaselee, ed.: *The Oxford Book of Medieval Latin Verse* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 39).
[4] Edmund Spenser: *Ruines of Rome: by Bellay*, Sonnet 7, lines 1–8.

Eastbourne to the Eastbournians.'[1] Fortunately, however, Allied Governments adopted a more civilized policy. Apart from the scruples that they may have felt about destroying part of their own inheritance of Western civilization, mere political expediency prompted them to harm the monuments and holy places of Rome as little as might be, for fear of the reactions of large and well-organized sections of public opinion throughout the world, including their own countries.

In Article 24 of the Lateran Treaty of 11 February 1929 the Holy See declared the Vatican City to be, in all circumstances, neutral and inviolable territory,[2] and, though its status had not been formally recognized by other Powers besides Italy, it was respected throughout the war by the Allies, though not by the Germans, who kidnapped members of the Italian Resistance Movement from Vatican territory. As for the rest of the City of Rome, the British Government, according to Vatican sources of information, had stated, in answer to inquiries from the Pope soon after Italy entered the war, that they recognized the sacred character of Rome, would, if possible, avoid bombing it, and, in all circumstances, would respect religious monuments and buildings.[3] Their public statements on the subject, however, were to the effect that they were entirely free to bomb Rome, and would do so as heavily as they were able, if the course of the war required it.[4] They had also undertaken to bomb Rome if the Axis bombed Cairo. The United States Government were more sensitive to possible reactions at home and abroad, less influenced by military considerations, and less careful not to involve themselves in concessions that might protect their enemies as well as the Eternal City.

Nothing came of an exchange of views between the British and United States Governments and the Vatican in November 1942—January 1943 on the possibility of neutralizing Rome.[5] In consequence of pressure from the Vatican some of the Axis military staffs were induced to leave the city, but other military objectives remained, and on 19 July 1943 Allied aircraft bombed the Tiburtina railway yards and seriously damaged the Basilica of San Lorenzo in Verano half a mile away.[6] The inner suburbs of Rome were raided again on 13 August. On the next day the Badoglio Govern-

[1] *Daily Mail*, 12 February 1943.

[2] See *Survey* for 1929, pp. 465–6; D. A. Binchy: *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (London, Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941), pp. 295–8; L. Oppenheim: *International Law*, 7th edition (London, Longmans, 1952), ii. 246; see also Herbert Wright: 'Status of the Vatican City', *American Journal of International Law*, July 1944, pp. 452–7; and ibid. *Supplement*, p. 201 for text of Declaration of 7 June 1944 on the Continued Neutrality of the Holy See.

[3] Camille M. Cianfarra: *The Vatican and the War* (New York, Dutton, 1945), pp. 241–2.

[4] e.g. in Churchill's speech of 30 September 1941, H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 374, col. 318.

[5] Ciano: *Diario* (*1939–43*), December 1942, *passim*, 2, 12 January 1943; Hull: *Memoirs*, ii. 1560–3.

[6] Letter from the Pope to his Vicar-General in Rome, deploring the raid (*New York Times* and *Stampa*, 22 July 1943); Vatican broadcast of 24 or 25 July (*The Times*, 26 July 1943).

ment declared Rome an 'open city'; and so it continued to be described after the Germans had gained control of it on 10 September. In 1940 and 1941 Brussels, Paris, Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana had all been declared 'open cities', but only when the enemy was at their gates; and the term was, in fact, unknown to international law,[1] though Article 25 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague (Land Warfare) Convention of 18 October 1907 forbade the bombardment of 'undefended' towns.[2]

In any case, the Allies never agreed that Rome should be treated as an 'open' or 'undefended' city. Their aircraft raided it again on 28 December 1943, and thereafter at frequent intervals until the Germans were driven out. Railway yards and the airfields in the neighbourhood of the city were the chief targets, but many civilians were killed, injured, or made homeless, mostly in the poorer districts. No harm was done to the centre of Rome, or to the Vatican City—though at some distance outside Rome the grounds of the Pope's summer residence at Castel Gandolfo were bombed, with loss of life among refugees sheltering there—and no building of historical, religious, or artistic importance was seriously damaged except San Lorenzo.

(ii) The Territorial Provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy

By Margaret Carlyle

(*a*) Introduction

The protocol of the Potsdam Conference of 17 July to 2 August 1945 laid down that the first task of the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., France, and China at their meeting in London in September 1945 was 'to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe'.[3] The Council decided to start with the Italian treaty, and on 13 September the discussion of the British draft treaty began. The opposition of the U.S.S.R. to the views of the Western Allies showed itself in the first days of meeting, and as time went on it became clear to the ordinary reader of the press that the questions of Trieste, the South Tyrol, and the former Italian colonies were not going to be dealt with on their merits or as issues between Italians, Austrians, Yugoslavs, Libyans, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis, and other peoples directly concerned, but were going

[1] Cf. *The Times*, 16 August 1943.
[2] Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 100, p. 354.
[3] Cmd. 7087.

to be battlegrounds in a struggle for world power between the West and the U.S.S.R. Italy was revealed as being a border state between the Western world and the Slav world, and the U.S.S.R. gave full support to Yugoslavia's claim to Trieste in the hope of thus securing control over a commanding site at the head of the Adriatic. The suggestion of various forms of trusteeship over the former Italian colonies seemed also to offer to the U.S.S.R. a chance of obtaining at last a long-coveted place in the Mediterranean—a Russian hope which did not fit in with Western views of Western interests in the Mediterranean and of Italy's strategic importance in that sea. As for the South Tyrol, the Big Four were all of one mind in being reluctant seriously to consider the possibilities of righting the injustice that had been done here in the peace settlement after the First World War, presumably because each of them was anxious not to risk losing a point in the current power-game between East and West by alienating Italy, when it was evident that Italy had a heavier weight than Austria had to throw into the scales of the political balance.

Apart from this conflict of views between East and West the problem of an Italian peace settlement was complicated by the oddness of Italy's political standing. Italy had declared war on Germany on 13 October 1943, and reference to this was made in Article IX of the Potsdam Protocol: 'Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan.'[1] On 22 February 1944 Churchill said in the House of Commons: 'These Italian forces have co-operated with us to the best of their ability',[2] and again on 24 May: 'The Italian Government . . . is doing all in its power to aid the Allies in their advance.'[3] These comments were remembered by many Italians, while they tended to forget their recent Fascist past and ignored reminders like that given them by Churchill in his broadcast to the Italian people on 28 August 1944: 'When a nation has allowed itself to fall into a tyrannical régime it cannot be absolved from the faults due to the guilt of that régime.'[4] It must, however, be remembered that finer spirits in Italy, like Signor Parri, who was Prime Minister in September 1945, did recognize this responsibility. Parri declared that, though he expected the peace terms not to be punitive, in view of Italy's record since 1943 and of the fact that Italy had a part to play in the reconstruction of Europe, it could not be expected to be a peace of absolution: the Italian people would have to pay for their responsibility.[5]

The Yugoslavs, for their part, were bitterly opposed to what they re-

[1] Cmd. 7087.

[2] H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 397, col. 690.

[3] Ibid. vol. 400, col. 768. Cf. also the statement made by Bevin in the House of Commons on 20 August 1945 regarding the Council of Foreign Ministers and an Italian peace treaty (ibid. vol. 413, coll. 288–9, 291).

[4] *The Times*, 29 August 1944.

[5] *Italia Libera*, 8 September 1945.

garded as unwarranted Western favouritism towards a country which had not only waged savage war on Yugoslavia but had ill-treated the Yugoslav minority under Italian rule during the twenty years between 1919 and 1939. They considered that the Western Powers were not giving to the claims of Yugoslavia the consideration due to a country which had made such immense sacrifices in a cause that was common to the West and to the U.S.S.R.

In all these circumstances it was hardly surprising that little agreement was reached during the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers from 11 September to 2 October 1945. In regard to Italy's frontiers it was decided that there should be no change in the frontier with Austria, that minor rectifications only should be made in that with France, that the frontier with Yugoslavia should be settled in the main on ethnic grounds, and that a Free Port under international control should be set up in Trieste. It was also decided that Italy was to lose her African colonies, and that these were to come under the Trusteeship provisions made by the United Nations, but there was no agreement on the form that the trusteeship was to take.

The second meeting of the Council, which lasted from 25 April to 16 May 1946, was even less conclusive. The deputies of the Foreign Ministers had been at work since October 1945 on the treaty and had sent Boundary Commissions to examine the Franco-Italian and Yugoslav-Italian frontier problems on the spot, but the Ministers could reach no agreement either on the difficult problems of the Yugoslav frontier, particularly that of Trieste, or on the future of the former Italian colonies.

When they met again, from 15 June to 12 July 1946, sufficient agreement was reached to justify convening a conference of representatives of all the countries concerned; this conference was to meet on 29 July 1946 and was to consider the draft treaties prepared by the Council and to draw up recommendations. The Council agreed on the line proposed by the French for the Italo-Yugoslav boundary and on the creation of a Free Territory of Trieste—though no one thought this an ideal solution and no agreement was reached on the form of its administration. They also agreed that the Dodecanese Islands should be restored to Greece, but they could not agree on a form of trusteeship for Italy's former African colonies and could only recommend that the decisions about them should be deferred for a year.

When the Conference met in Paris on the date agreed it had before it a draft treaty[1] containing the articles on which the Council of Foreign Ministers had reached agreement and the text of the alternative pro-

[1] Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Draft Peace Treaty with Italy Prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers for consideration by the Peace Conference of Twenty-one Nations meeting in Paris on the 29th July 1946*, Cmd. 6892 (London, H.M.S.O., 1946).

posals where there had been no agreement. The members of the Council were committed to the support of proposals on which they had agreed, but all other members of the Conference could submit modifications or make new proposals. The battles over the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and the régime to be set up in Trieste were particularly long and fierce and enabled the protagonists of both sides to present their case yet again in great detail. The following sections attempt to give some account of the problems presented by the various territorial questions.

(*b*) The Franco-Italian Frontier

The Council of Foreign Ministers had agreed during their first meeting in September 1945[1] that alterations in the Franco-Italian frontier should not amount to more than minor rectifications. The 1939 frontier was that fixed by the treaty signed at Turin on 24 March 1860, in which Cavour had honoured his secret agreement made with Napoleon III at Plombières in June 1858 by ceding Nice and Savoy to France in return for French military aid in 1859 which had borne fruit in the expulsion of the Austrians from Lombardy. No serious claim for the return of these provinces had been advanced by Italy, but the French remembered how, on 30 November 1938, the Italian Fascist parliament had shouted for the surrender of Nice, Corsica, and Tunis to Italy.[2] The French also remembered the base attack made on them by Italy in 1940 and were determined to strengthen their strategic position on the frontier, which ran through a sparsely populated Alpine region, but from which they hoped, as a result of rectifications, to gain command of the approaches to the Po valley.

The rectifications, demanded and obtained by the French, affected four sections of the frontier:

(1) the Col of the Little Saint Bernard Pass;
(2) the Mont Cenis plateau;
(3) the Mont Thabor–Chaberton district;
(4) the upper valleys of the Tinée, Vesubie, and Roia, generally referred to as the Tenda–Briga area after the names of the two main villages in the district.

(1) *The Col of the Little Saint Bernard Pass*

Rectification here involved an area of about 15 square miles, containing no villages or population except for the inhabitants of the hospice, which was over the summit on the French slope of the pass. The French claimed that the alteration here was necessary in order to give them better strategic control over the approaches to the frontier from the Valle d'Aosta, and in

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 696–701.
[2] See *Survey* for 1938, i. 164–5.

particular over the road up from Pré S. Didier, and to prevent the Italians from overlooking French fortifications.

(2) *The Mont Cenis Plateau*

The alteration of the line here gave France control over important hydro-electric supplies. The Mont Cenis lake passed to France, and with it the control of the water supply to the big Italian power-station of Venaus, while the Gran Scala power-station was transferred to France.

(3) *The Mont Thabor–Chaberton District*

The alteration in the line here was purely strategic in effect; it eliminated certain salients which according to the French constituted a threat to Briançon.

(4) *The Upper Valleys of the Tinée, Vesubie, and Roia*

The alterations in the frontier here were more extensive and more complicated, because they involved not only strategic and economic questions but also the political allegiance of some 4,000 to 5,000 people, mostly Alpine shepherds. The line drawn here by a joint Franco-Piedmontese commission in 1861 followed in the main the boundary between Piedmont and the Arrondissement of Nice, but from Collalunga to a point south of Breil on the Roia it departed both from the boundary and from the watershed along the higher range of hills and followed an approximately parallel line, running south and east along a lower ridge, in order to allow King Victor Emmanuel II still to enjoy his chamois-shooting on both slopes of the hills under his own flag. The transfer of this stretch of wild mountain country to France was of no importance to Italy, but farther south along the Roia valley there were several power-stations, including that at San Dalmazzo, which supplied power for the Ligurian railway system and for industry in Genoa, Savona, and Imperia.

Considerable bitterness was created in Italy in 1945 and 1946 by the French assertion that the inhabitants of this frontier area, who spoke a French dialect, wished to become French citizens. A similar assertion which was made in regard to the Valle d'Aosta failed to carry conviction. An active committee of Val d'Aostans made it clear, both in Rome and to the Allies, that the inhabitants of the valley were loyal Italians, although they were French-speaking. The Val d'Aostans were granted by the Italian Government a large measure of local autonomy, and this was later confirmed in the Italian Constitution of 1948, but the scattered peasants of the Roia valley had no one to put their case either for or against union with France, and in 1945 there were reports of considerable pressure being put on them by the French military authorities.

The Council of Foreign Ministers recognized that the information

available about this area was scanty, and at the end of April 1946 they sent a small Commission consisting of representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, to make inquiries on the spot. But the wishes of inarticulate mountain people cannot be discovered in the course of a visit of only two or three days' duration by strangers, and in any case—as the Italians pointed out in Paris—the conclusions of a Commission which included a representative of one party to the claim could not be regarded as unprejudiced. The Commission not unnaturally reported in favour of the French claim, which was accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers on 27 June 1946.

None of these frontier changes involved any serious material loss to Italy, apart from that of the power-stations,[1] but they had an adverse effect on the relations between the two countries; and, although Italy's behaviour in 1940 justified the French claim for greater security, it is doubtful whether the advantages that France obtained were worth the cost to her in Italian bitterness.

(*c*) The Italo-Austrian Frontier

(1) *Introduction*

In 1945 Italy's northern frontier province of Alto Adige,[2] better known outside Italy as the South Tyrol, was one of the few places in Europe where a community that was an ethnic minority in the state under whose sovereignty it found itself not only constituted the great majority of the local population in its own area but also immediately adjoined the territory, across the international frontier, that was inhabited by the rest of the people of the same nationality. The Italian census of 1921, the last to give figures for distribution of the population by language, showed that 90 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Alto Adige were then German-speaking, and at the time of the plebiscite on migration to the German Reich, held on 31 December 1939, the Italian Government had admitted that 229,500 persons, or about 82 per cent. of the population, were German-speaking.[3] This population had been handed over to Italy by the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919,[4] and there was a strong feeling in Great Britain, as well as in Austria, that an injustice had then been done and that the peace settlement after the Second World War offered an opportunity for revision of the Treaty.

[1] By Article 9 of the Peace Treaty France undertook to give Italy, under a bilateral agreement, guarantees securing her hydro-electric supplies in the Mont Cenis and Tenda–Briga areas. These guarantees were given in Annex III to the treaty (see Cmd. 7481, pp. 10 and 57–61).

[2] The province was known as Bolzano after 1926 but reverted to the name Alto Adige in the Constitution of 1948.

[3] The plebiscite was also held in certain districts of the provinces of Trento, Udine, and Belluno which contained an additional 37,485 German-speaking inhabitants.

[4] See *H.P.C.*, iv. 280–7.

The desire for revision had been strengthened by Italy's treatment of the German-speaking minority during the inter-war period.[1] Italy was bound by no treaties for the protection of minorities,[2] such as were signed by lesser states in 1919, and she had a bad record of tyrannous behaviour, which had shown itself as early as 1919 and had become much worse as soon as Fascism had come to power in 1922. Vigorous, though unavailing, efforts had been made to stamp out the German language, partly by educational measures, partly by installing Italian-speaking officials in all administrative posts, and partly by settling an alien population, drawn to a large extent from the over-populated regions of South Italy, in the towns, particularly in Bolzano (Bozen) and Merano (Meran).[3]

In 1919 Italian claims had been based largely on Italy's strategic needs. In 1945 the strategic argument was reinforced by pointing to the character of the inter-war economic development of the province, while the Austrian counter-claim was still based on the undisputed desire of the South Tyrolese for reunion with the rest of the Tyrol inside Austria.

(2) *The Strategic Situation*

In 1939 the frontier lay on the Brenner and along the high Alps east and west of the pass. The Italians maintained that this was the natural frontier between Austria and Italy, and that history proved that Italian security depended on the maintenance of this line as Italy's frontier. This Italian thesis was, however, open to question. The region of the Alto Adige had been inhabited by a German-speaking population since the sixth century, when the Baiowarii (Bavarians) had occupied the modern Austrian *Land* of Tirol-Vorarlberg and had flowed over the Brenner into the South Tyrol. The province of Trento, lying to the south, had been occupied at about the same date by the Lombards and had therefore remained of the same language and culture as the rest of Italy, whose originally German-speaking Lombard conquerors had been assimilated by their Italian subjects, and the gorges between the Italian-speaking and the German-speaking part of the basin of the River Adige (Etsch) were, in fact, a greater physical obstacle than the Brenner Pass on the Etsch–Inn watershed. After the break-up of the Carolingian Empire, which had embraced both Bavaria and Lombardy, the Tyrol was governed by its own feudal Counts until their dominions passed by marriage to the Habsburgs in 1363, from which time the Tyrol remained a Habsburg possession (eventually an Austrian crownland) with its capital at Innsbruck, until

[1] *Survey* for 1927, pp. 185–201.

[2] Cf. Mussolini's speech in the Italian Senate on 10 February 1926 when he said: 'I declare explicitly that the alien population of the Upper Adige is absolutely excluded from the category of those minorities which were the object of special agreements in the peace treaties' (*Corriere della Sera*, 11 February 1926; Benito Mussolini: *Scritti e discorsi* (Milan, Hoepli, 1934), v. 277).

[3] For a fuller account see *Survey* for 1927, pp. 188 seqq.

1919. In 1803 the Habsburg crownland of the Tyrol was enlarged by the addition of the Italian-speaking province of Trento, which, till then, had been an autonomous prince-bishopric of the Holy Roman Empire, and thereafter, in the later nineteenth century, the Trentino became one of the focuses of Italian irredentist claims against Austria, and was justly united with Italy in 1919.

Thus the Italo-Austrian frontier had never stood on the Brenner before 1919, and there were good grounds for holding that a strong strategic frontier might have been found farther south, where the deep Salorno gorge formed a natural barrier, following in the main the Italian provincial boundary between the Alto Adige and Trento—a line which also coincided, except for a few enclaves, with the ethnic boundary, and which followed the watershed between the Upper Adige on the north and east and the Noce on the south and west.

(3) *The Ethnic Situation*

More than 50 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Alto Adige were engaged in agriculture; the lateral valleys—of which the two largest are Val Venosta (Vintschgau) and the Valle Pusteria (Pustertal), where there were only villages—were almost wholly Austrian in culture as well as speech; and this Cis-Alpine German-speaking population also had a strong sense of unity with the Tyrolese on the northern side of the frontier. Of the 229,500 inhabitants recognized in 1939 by the Italians as being German-speaking approximately 166,500, i.e. 73 per cent.,[1] opted at this time for migration to the German Reich, and the detailed figures showed that any considerable vote in favour of remaining in Italy was confined to inhabitants of the towns, particularly Bolzano with its new industrial population, which had been italianized during twenty years of Italian rule. The agricultural population consisted largely of peasant-owner families who had been settled on their farms for centuries in a prosperous Alpine countryside largely devoted to dairy-farming and fruit-growing. To these people the plebiscite presented a terrible choice of alternatives, and the size of the vote in favour of the acquisition of German nationality and migration to the Reich indicated the strength of the people's hatred of Italian rule. Only 12 per cent. of the German-speaking population voted for retention of Italian citizenship, and though the Italians claimed in addition the 15 per cent. of non-voters it seems probable that many of these were people who abstained because they could not bring themselves to vote for leaving their ancestral home, in spite of their dislike of Italian rule.

About 70,000 of the 166,500 who voted for migration to the German

[1] If the isolated German-speaking enclaves in Trento, Udine, and Belluno are taken into the reckoning, 69 per cent. of the German-speaking population voted for migration.

Reich actually left Italy, but most of these were from the towns of Bolzano, Merano, and Bressanone (Brixen). Only a small number, consisting mainly of landless agricultural workers, left from the country districts. In the few cases where a landowning family moved, one member at least of the family remained behind to keep the farm.[1] Many of the migrants returned to the South Tyrol in the wake of the German army during the war, after Northern Italy had come into Germany's power as a result of the partial failure of Italy's attempt in 1943 to break away from the predominant partner in the Axis; others followed after the collapse of German resistance in Northern Italy in May. Italian determination to keep the Alto Adige was strengthened by the strong pro-Nazi sentiments of many of its inhabitants, but the Italians failed to understand that this regrettable state of feeling in the province was to a large extent the result of Italian oppression for more than twenty years.

(4) *The Economic Situation*

The strongest point in Italy's case for retaining the Alto Adige was the economic development of the province during the twenty years between the wars and the importance of this development in the economy of Italy as a whole. Hydro-electric power is Italy's most important raw material and is the life blood of the North Italian industrial towns. By 1939 the Alto Adige had become one of their main sources of power, and the station at Cardano sull' Isarco near Bolzano was the most powerful in all Italy, producing 612,633 kwh. in 1942. There were other important power-stations at Bressanone, at Ponte Gardena between Bolzano and Bressanone, and at Marlengo near Merano, and smaller stations scattered over the province. In addition to the completed stations Italy had plans in 1939 for the construction of others, on some of which work had already started before Italy's entry into the war. Austria was prepared, if the territory reverted to her, to export hydro-electric power to Italy and even to consider the possibility of giving Italy extra-territorial rights in the areas of existing power-stations, but further development by Italy, which was more important for her than for Austria, who had plenty of other sources of supply, might then have been difficult if not impossible.

Industrialization in the Alto Adige had not been confined to the construction of hydro-electric power-stations. A considerable development of the chemical and aluminium industries, in particular, had taken place in Bolzano, where the great Montecatini firm had various factories. But it is important to remember that these undertakings were of little interest to the German-speaking population, most of whom remained occupied in

[1] A more detailed account of the Hitler–Mussolini Agreement of 1939 will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Eve of War, 1939*; see also *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 85–86. For documentation see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 85–94.

agriculture. Industry was controlled by Italians and it employed mainly Italians, many of them from the over-crowded South, and the chief industrial product, hydro-electricity, was used for the benefit of the factories of the Lombard plain.

(5) *The Italo-Austrian Agreement of 5 September 1946*

The Council of Foreign Ministers, at their first meeting in September 1945, issued a statement to the effect that there would be no change in the Italo-Austrian frontier. The Austrians were greatly distressed by this refusal even to allow consideration of the case for the return of the South Tyrol to Austria, and the Foreign Ministers eventually agreed to consider the possibility of minor rectifications in the frontier. A proposal was put forward to draw a line about half-way between the Brenner and the provincial boundary between the Alto Adige and Trento, which would have given the purely German-speaking northern valleys to Austria while leaving the towns of Bolzano and Merano, together with the most important power-stations—though not the head waters of their supplies—in Italy. This line would also have given Austria the railway line along the Valle Pusteria (Pustertal) connecting Lienz in the East Tyrol with the Brenner and the North Tyrol. This proposal, in its turn, was rejected by the Ministers. They wanted, nevertheless, to obtain some form of agreement between Italy and Austria and to impress upon them their importance to each other. Article 10 of the Italian Peace Treaty consequently ran as follows:

1. Italy shall enter into or confirm arrangements with Austria to guarantee free movement of passenger and freight traffic between the North and East Tyrol.
2. The Allied and Associated Powers have taken note of the provisions (the text of which is contained in Annex IV) agreed upon by the Austrian and Italian Governments on September 5, 1946.[1]

This last agreement, arrived at in Paris, was divided into three sections. The first promised complete equality of rights to the German-speaking inhabitants of the province of Bolzano (Alto Adige) and of the neighbouring bilingual townships of the province of Trento; the second stated that the population would be granted the exercise of autonomous legislative and executive regional power; the third promised that the provisions relating to options in the Hitler–Mussolini agreement of 1939 would be revised, that an agreement would be concluded for the mutual recognition of university degrees, that a convention on transit between the North and East Tyrol would be drawn up, and that efforts would be made to expand trans-frontier traffic.

Action taken by Italy after 1946 went some way towards carrying out

[1] Cmd. 7481, pp. 10–11; for the Agreement with Austria see ibid. pp. 61–62.

this agreement, but the German-speaking population was not wholly satisfied with the Italian interpretation of the most important provisions—those which promised to this ethnic minority a measure of legislative and executive regional autonomy. The Italian Constitution of 1948 did recognize Trentino–Alto Adige as one of five regions in Italy with special regional statutes, but as this region included the Trentino as well as the Alto Adige, there was an Italian majority in the population of the region as a whole. The powers of local government within the autonomous region that were granted, under the Statute, to the province of Bolzano (where the majority of the population was German-speaking) were narrowly limited.


(*d*) The Italo-Yugoslav Frontier

(1) *Introduction*

The revision of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier—involving, as it did, the disposal of Trieste and of the peninsula of Istria—presented the most complicated of the problems that had to be dealt with in the Italian Peace Treaty. The Yugoslavs had undoubtedly been unjustly treated in the settlement after the First World War, and in 1945 they were the allies of the Powers fighting against Germany and, till 1943, against Italy too, and were the special protégés of Russia. The situation was made more difficult by the fact that part of the area in question had been occupied in May 1945 by troops of the Western Allies and part by those of Yugoslavia, who was one of the claimants to the territory.

Before 1918 the whole Region of Venezia Giulia, as it was afterwards called under Italian rule, had lain within the frontiers of the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary. Since the fifteenth century the eastern frontier, first of the Republic of Venice and then of the Kingdom of Italy, had run more or less due north from a point at the head of the Adriatic a few miles west of the mouth of the river Isonzo, but, to the east of this line, the city of Trieste and the coast towns of Istria had been Italian in population and culture ever since the date of their romanization, although, as a consequence of the *Völkerwanderung* after the collapse of the Roman Empire, the inhabitants of the countryside right up to the gates of the towns had come to be Slavs—Slovenes round Trieste and in the country north of it, Croats in Istria. After 1866, when Venetia was united to the new Kingdom of Italy, after having been under Austrian rule since 1814, Trieste, which then still remained under Austrian rule and which had been under Habsburg sovereignty since 1382, when it had placed itself under the Dynasty's aegis,[1] became the chief focus of Italian irredentism and was the most important item in the bargain made by Italy with the

[1] The Austrian part, which included everything except Fiume, had constituted an Austrian crownland called the Küstenland.


Tarvisio
Pontebba
R. Save
Jesenice
Piedicolle
Cividale
Udine
Gorizia
R. Isonzo
Cervignano
Monfalcone
Duino
TRIESTE
Capodistria
Pirano
Rovigno
Route 15
POLA
Arsa
Albona
Idria
Ljubljana
Aidussina
Postumia
San Pietro
San Maria del Risano
San Giovanni di Pinguente
FIUME
KRK
CHERSO
International Frontier 1914
International Frontier 1939
Railways
Morgan Line
British Proposal
American Proposal
French Proposal
Soviet Proposal
ZONE A
ZONE B
Free Territory of Trieste
Coal
Bauxite
VENEZIA GIULIA
0 5 10 15 20 MILES
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 KILOMETRES

Powers of the Triple Entente in the secret Treaty of London in 1915.[1] In 1919 the Italians had held that the severity of the fighting on their eastern frontier during the late war had strengthened their claim based on the secret treaty.

Venezia Giulia had always been important, both as a strategic area and as a zone of communication between Central Europe and the Mediterranean. Within its boundaries were the lowest passes, east of the Rhône valley, over the mountains between the Mediterranean and the interior of Europe, and this comparative ease of transit accounted for the prosperity of Trieste in the days when it was the chief port of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Indeed, even after the rise of national feeling had begun to draw the Triestini politically towards the Kingdom of Italy, the economic livelihood of Trieste was still bound up with the survival of the multi-national monarchy whose existence ensured the freedom of Trieste's communications with her commercial hinterland. The break-up of the Habsburg Dual Monarchy did, in fact, rob Trieste of the economic role that was her geographical birthright; yet the disappearance of the unfriendly Great Power that had hitherto towered over Italy's north-eastern frontier did not make the strategic importance of Venezia Giulia diminish in Italian eyes.

The frontier-line which Italy had obtained as a result of the various agreements made between 1920 and 1924 had been determined mainly by strategic considerations.[2] It ran from Monte Forno on the Austrian frontier along the crest of the Julian Alps, which is the watershed between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and thence approximately south-south-east across the lower uplands of the porous, barren, limestone Carso (Karst) to within about a mile of the sea at the head of the Quarnero gulf, where it turned eastward for a few miles so as to place within Italy the railway line from Italy to Fiume and the ex-Hungarian port of Fiume itself. The frontier reached the sea between Fiume and Sušak, which were separated by a small river. Italy had also acquired certain islands in the Adriatic, among them Cherso (Cres) and Lussin (Lošinj) in the north, Lagosta (Lastovo) and Pelagosa much farther south, and the small enclave of Zara on the Dalmatian mainland. Strategically this frontier had given Italy every military and naval advantage over Yugoslavia. South of the Julian Alps the frontier had run on the Yugoslav side of the watershed and had thus given Italy command over the lines of approach from Yugoslavia, while the possession of Pola and the islands had secured for Italy the naval command of the Adriatic.

[1] See Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, signed at London, April 26, 1915*, Cmd. 671 (London, H.M.S.O., 1920).

[2] For an account of the Adriatic controversy between Italy and Yugoslavia down to the signing of the Rapallo Treaty on 2 February 1921 see *H.P.C.*, iv. 296–337, and for the settlement of the Fiume question 1921–4 see *Survey* for 1924, pp. 408–22.

The frontier had taken no account of the ethnic situation in the area and had left some 400,000 Yugoslavs on the Italian side of the line; and in this area, as in the Alto Adige, the Italian inter-war record had been a bad one. Yugoslav schools had been suppressed; Italian had been made the exclusive language for official business; and, after the signing of the Lateran Pacts in 1929, there had been a restriction even of the ecclesiastical liberties of the Yugoslav population, which, like the Italian population, was Roman Catholic; thenceforth, all priests in Venezia Giulia had to be Italian subjects and to be able to speak the Italian language.

After the collapse of Italy in 1943 the Germans had taken over the administration of Trieste and had made the city the centre of the *Gau Adriatisches Küstenland*;[1] but during 1944 the Yugoslavs had gradually won command of the mountainous parts of Venezia Giulia, and, in concert with the Communist Italian Partisans, had maintained a secret organization in Trieste. In February 1945, at Belgrade, Field Marshal Alexander had made an oral agreement with Marshal Tito that the mainland of Venezia Giulia should be under the command of the Western Allies, but in late April 1945 Yugoslav forces had advanced across Istria and on 30 April had attacked the German garrison of Trieste. The Germans, however, had refused to surrender to the Yugoslavs, had held out for two days, and had surrendered to New Zealand troops on 2 May. Meanwhile, on 30 April, Churchill had obtained Truman's concurrence in a policy of insisting that Trieste should be held by British and American forces;[2] Truman confirmed his stand in stronger terms on 12 May,[3] and he held to this position, though not without some discomfort, against counter-pressure in Washington.[4] In Venezia Giulia there had been a period of tension, lasting for seven weeks, during which Trieste and its neighbourhood had been occupied by both Alexander's forces and the Yugoslavs; but at last, under the Duino agreement of 20 June 1945, the Yugoslav army had withdrawn behind the so-called 'Morgan line'.[5] This had secured for the Anglo-American forces the occupation of Trieste, of a narrow belt of territory including road and rail communications northwards to the head of the Isonzo valley, and of a small enclave including Pola at the southern tip of Istria, while it had left the Yugoslavs still in control of a great part of the disputed area, including the coast towns of Istria.

This was the local situation when the Council of Foreign Ministers came to consider the question of Italy's eastern frontier, which—till Yugoslavia's repudiation of the Soviet Union's hegemony in 1948—was to be one sector of the frontier between the Western and the Russian half of the world.

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 96.
[2] Churchill, vi. 480–1; U.S. edition, vi. 551–2.
[3] Ibid. pp. 483–4 and 554–5 respectively.
[4] Ibid. pp. 485–7 and 556–9 respectively.
[5] See map, p. 464 above.

Yugoslavia claimed the whole of Venezia Giulia, including Trieste, principally on the ground that the great majority of the inhabitants were Yugoslavs; the Italians admitted that the country districts were mainly inhabited by Yugoslavs, but claimed that the frontier ought nevertheless in the main to follow the 'Wilson line'[1] of 1919, which would have left to Italy the important mineral deposits of Istria in addition to Trieste, Gorizia, and the Istrian coast towns. The difficulties of the problem were increased by the fact that information about the area was inadequate and out of date, and that such information as existed was suspect to one or both claimants. In September 1945 the Council decided to set up a Four-Power Commission of Inquiry (France, Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.) and on 28 February 1946[2] it appointed a Commission to go to Venezia Giulia, to make a survey of conditions on the spot, and to propose a frontier which should be 'in the main an ethnic line leaving a minimum population under alien rule', though account was also to be taken of economic and geographic features.

(2) *The Ethnic Situation*

In 1919, when the possibility of making the frontier follow the ethnic line had been under consideration, it had proved possible to plot this line out. It left the pre-1918 Austrian frontier at a point north-west of Gorizia, passed just north of Gorizia, circled the city on the east, and then ran southwards till it reached the sea at Duino, east of Monfalcone; it then re-entered the mainland a few miles farther east, skirted Trieste closely, while leaving the city on the Italian side, and ran on south through Istria, at an average distance of seven to eight miles from the west coast of the peninsula, to the sea south-south-east of Pola. The only considerable concentrations of Yugoslavs on the Italian side of this line were in Gorizia, Trieste, and Pola, and in each town they were decisively outnumbered by the Italians. The only large groups of Italians left on the Yugoslav side were in Lussin, Fiume, and Zara.

But in 1945 the situation was not so clear, though the main features were the same. It was not known whether, and, if so, how far, the ethnic distribution of the population had changed since 1924, when the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty of Rome had given Fiume to Italy. The last census figures showing language distribution were those of the Italian census of 1921;[3] but these figures were not accepted by the Yugoslavs, and undoubtedly they overstated the number of the Italians and understated that of the Yugoslavs in some areas. The only other figures available were those of the 1910 Austrian census (the 1910 Hungarian census for Fiume) which probably slightly exaggerated the number of the Yugoslavs. In

[1] See *H.P.C.*, iv. 298–302.

[2] *The Times*, 2 March 1946.

[3] In Fiume a census had been taken by the municipal authorities on 1 January 1925.

spite of its antiquity, this was the census finally adopted as a basis by the Venezia Giulia Commission.

The territory in question fell—excluding Zara and the islands—into three main areas, Gorizia–Gradisca, Trieste, and Istria; and, for these, the 1910 census gave the following figures:

	Italians	*Serbo-Croats*	*Slovenes*	*Others*	*Total*
Gorizia–Gradisca . .	90,156	187	214,798	22,477	327,618
Trieste	118,959	2,403	56,916	51,232	229,510
Istria	160,131	140,966	57,319	41,451	399,867

A more detailed examination revealed the complexity of the problem. In the Gorizia–Gradisca area Gorizia, even in 1910, had contained an Italian majority—14,812 Italians as against 10,868 Yugoslavs—but the population of the district, excluding the city, had been predominantly Yugoslav; 70,062 Yugoslavs and only 2,774 Italians. In Istria the coast towns had been inhabited mainly by Italians—Capodistria by 9,340 Italians as against 2,432 Yugoslavs; Pirano by 12,173 Italians as against 2,327 Yugoslavs; Rovigno by 10,859 Italians as against 120 Yugoslavs; Pola by 30,900 Italians as against 19,941 Yugoslavs—but the population of the interior had been overwhelmingly Yugoslav. Fiume had been a case apart; it had been developed in the second half of the nineteenth century by Hungary, who had encouraged Italians to settle there, with the result that, by 1910, the Italians in Fiume had numbered 24,212 and the Yugoslavs 15,687, out of a total population of 49,806. Trieste, like Gorizia, had been a town with a large Italian majority surrounded by a Yugoslav population which had extended right into the suburbs of the city.[1] In Lussin and the islands there had been 9,884 Italians and 10,094 Yugoslavs, and in Zara 11,477 Italians and 7,108 Yugoslavs. Thus the whole of Venezia Giulia had contained approximately 488,800 Yugoslavs.[2]

(3) *The Economic Situation*

Apart from the special problems connected with the commerce and industry of Trieste, a frontier determined solely by ethnic considerations would have caused serious economic difficulties in 1946. During the inter-war period Italy had invested a considerable amount of capital in Venezia Giulia, and the raw materials of the region, water-power, bauxite, coal, and mercury, were of importance to a country as poorly supplied with raw materials as Italy was.

Moreover, the Italians had developed the potential hydro-electric re-

[1] The intricate problem of Trieste is treated separately on pp. 470–6 below.

[2] In arriving at this estimate, 1,000 Yugoslavs have been deducted from the figure of 15,687 Yugoslavs in Fiume in 1910 in view of the small area of Fiume that had been surrendered to Yugoslavia by Italy in 1924.

sources in Venezia Giulia as elsewhere; new power-stations had been built in the Isonzo valley and others had been in process of erection, or had been planned, before the war, with a view to meeting the increasing demands of industry in Venezia Giulia. On the other hand, rather more than half the power required in the region was carried by high-tension lines from stations in the Veneto to a large transformer station at Opicina in the hills just north of Trieste, and the power derived from the Isonzo stations was mostly absorbed by the railways and industries in the eastern parts of the region and in Istria.

The mineral deposits in Istria were probably more important to Italy than the water-power of the Isonzo. Much Italian capital had been sunk in the Arsa coal-mines in eastern Istria. Mussolini had expended great energy in asserting the importance for Italy of Arsa coal, particularly in the period of the sanctions that had been imposed on Italy during the Italo-Abyssinian war of 1935–6, when British coal supplies to Italy had been cut off. But in fact Arsa coal was of very poor quality and hardly worth the cost of transport; most of it went by sea to Trieste for use as bunker coal, and it was only valuable because of Italy's dearth of home-produced coal from other sources. By 1942 the Arsa mines were supplying about 1 million tons a year, i.e. one-third of Italy's total coal production.

The bauxite deposits of Istria were, however, very valuable: they supplied about half Italy's total production, and bauxite and water-power were the two basic raw materials for one of Italy's important industrial products, aluminium. On the other hand, Italy had other bauxite deposits, not fully worked, notably those on the Gargano peninsula in Apulia, and the Istrian mines were in the heart of the Yugoslav-inhabited areas. The mercury mine at Idria was valuable to Italy, but she had a plentiful alternative source of mercury in Monte Amiata, south of Siena.

In this limestone region water supplies were important, and the supplies for Gorizia came from springs in the hills to the north-east of the town in the Yugoslav-inhabited countryside; similarly the water for the Italian towns of north-west Istria came from the springs of San Giovanni di Pinguente and of Santa Maria del Risano, both situated in Yugoslav-inhabited territory.

Local communications in Istria were mainly by sea and road, though there was also a railway line from Pola to Trieste which ran through Yugoslav-inhabited territory. But, with the development of motor traffic, the road from Pola to Trieste, which ran through western Istria, had become quite as important as the railway, so that no serious hardship would have arisen from allotting the railway to Yugoslavia and the road to Italy. Railway communications in the northern part of the disputed area were of much greater importance, for they constituted Trieste's life-lines connecting the city both with the North Italian plain and with Central Europe.

Freedom of traffic over these railways was essential for the development of the Free Zones of the port, on which so much of its prosperity had depended and must continue to depend. The most important lines out of Trieste were the line via Postumia to Ljubljana, Vienna, and eastern Austria, and the line via Monfalcone and Cervignano to the North Italian plain. A third line ran via Gorizia and Piedicolle to Salzburg and Prague; this was the most direct route linking Trieste by rail with north-west Austria and Southern Germany, but it was a single-track line with steep gradients and it had not been electrified. A fourth line, also single-track but electrified and with less steep gradients than that via Piedicolle, followed a rather circuitous route via Udine and Pontebba to Tarvisio.

(*e*) Trieste

(1) *Introduction*

The hard core of the problem of Venezia Giulia was the disposal of the city and port of Trieste. The geographical position of Trieste, at the head of the Adriatic and at the foot of the passes traversed by overland routes to Central Europe, had been most favourable to the trade of the port as long as Trieste had been the chief port of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and had consequently enjoyed unobstructed access to an extensive and productive hinterland. In this setting, Trieste's prosperity and population had increased rapidly during the nineteenth century, and particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The Oesterreichischer Lloyd (after 1919 the Lloyd Triestino) Shipping Company had been founded in 1836; great insurance companies had been established between 1831 and 1838; and the main railway line from Vienna and Graz via Ljubljana had been carried through to Trieste in 1857. In 1719 Trieste had been made a free trade port; and in 1891, when this status had been abolished, two free zones, administered by the *Azienda Magazzini Generali* (Bonded Warehouse Company), had been established. These had been maintained when, in 1918, Trieste had passed to Italy. As a port, Trieste had also the great advantage of possessing a natural deep-water harbour; there were eight fathoms of water at the moles of the pre-1900 basins, and there was even greater depth in the Vittorio Emmanuele Basin.

(2) *The Ethnic Situation*

Trieste had been predominantly Italian in population and culture since Roman days, but, since its incorporation in 1382 in the dominions of the House of Habsburg, the population had come to be a mixture of Italian, Yugoslav (Slovene), and German-speaking elements, with the Italian-speaking element preponderating. From the eighteenth century onwards

the population had increased rapidly; between 1880 and 1930 it had nearly doubled—rising, within this half-century, from 131,000 to 250,000—and the increase had been due largely to immigration, Italian from the west and Slovene from the east. The 1910 Austrian census showed that there was then still an Italian majority in Trieste—118,959 Italian-speaking Austrian subjects, 59,319 Yugoslav-speaking, 11,856 German-speaking, and 38,597 aliens, of whom 29,439 were Italians from the Kingdom of Italy (*regnicoli*). The number of Italians in Trieste had undoubtedly increased and the number of Yugoslavs diminished by 1946 (the Italian census of 1921 gave the figures as 202,382 Italians and 18,150 Yugoslavs, plus 8,307 Yugoslavs from Yugoslavia), but this fact was relatively unimportant for the purposes of the Four-Power Commission, since neither Yugoslavia nor her supporters sought to deny that the ethnic composition of the population of the city was predominantly Italian. Their claim rested on other grounds, among them the recognized fact that Trieste was an enclave in a Yugoslav-inhabited area which extended right into the outskirts of the city and had stretched thus far ever since the sixth century.

(3) *The Economic Situation*

The changes in the economy of Trieste resulting from the First World War had been great. Not only had Trieste previously been the chief port and shipbuilding centre of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but customs tariffs and railway rates had been so arranged as to make it advantageous for the interior of the Austrian Empire to conduct its foreign trade through Trieste rather than through North Sea and Baltic ports in the German Reich. This policy of the Imperial Austrian Government had been a very important factor in the city's prosperity, for the portage of the overland traffic from Trieste over the watershed between the Adriatic coast and the Danube basin had made the railways serving Trieste more expensive to build and maintain, in spite of the comparatively low altitude of the passes, than those serving such rival ports as Hamburg, Danzig, Stettin, and Gdynia, which were linked with the interior by long river valleys in which railways could be built easily and cheaply to supplement the natural waterways. The successor states of the Danubian Monarchy that had come into existence after 1918 had been free, in choosing their ports, to take account of the comparative costs of transport, and they had also been inclined, where possible, to select ports lying within their own territories for the same partly non-economic reasons that had previously led the Austrian Imperial Government to favour Trieste (and the Hungarian Royal Government to favour Fiume). The consequences of these changes had been very unfavourable for Trieste, and the Yugoslavs argued in 1946 that under Italian sovereignty Trieste could never flourish because of the rivalry of other Italian ports, and that only its inclusion in Yugoslavia, its

'natural hinterland', could restore its prosperity. This was a much over-simplified and partly untrue explanation of the decline in Trieste's trade. While it was true that part of the Italian trade through Trieste had been artificially fostered during the inter-war years, Trieste was Italy's only deep-water port in the Adriatic, and even Venice could not be a complete substitute for it. The chief reason for the decline in Trieste's trade during the early 1920s was to be found, as already suggested, in the break-up of the Austrian Empire and the economic collapse of Central Europe, while, later in the 1920s, Germany's bid to capture the Central European trade, by granting to the Central European successor states cheap freight rates to the North German ports, had aggravated Trieste's difficulties.

The Yugoslav contention that Yugoslavia was the real hinterland of Trieste was not borne out by the trade statistics, either by those of the time when parts of Yugoslavia had belonged to the Austrian Empire or by those of the inter-war years. In spite of Italy's encouragement of the Italian trade, nearly three-quarters of the rail-borne trade of Trieste in 1937 had still been with countries other than Italy: at that date Austria had accounted for 34 per cent., Italy for 27 per cent., Czechoslovakia for 20 per cent., Hungary for 7½ per cent., and Yugoslavia for only 5½ per cent. About 25 per cent. of the sea-borne trade had been with Italian ports, the rest being mainly with the Levant and more distant regions.

The value of the port to its non-Italian users depended largely on the free port facilities which it provided. By 1939 two additional Free Zones, the Punto Scalo Legname (timber depository) and the Punto Santa Sabba (oil refineries), had been added to the two main zones established in 1891, the Punto Vittorio Emmanuele and the Punto Duca d'Aosta. In the Free Zones various processing industries were carried on, and these industries, together with the handling and trans-shipment of their materials and products, brought prosperity to Trieste. There was no evidence that Italian control of the port had restricted its commercial usefulness or had caused undue discrimination in favour of the controlling Power or for the benefit of any one state.

Italy had made an important contribution to Trieste's welfare in the industrial field. Between the wars the construction of Italian warships and passenger liners had benefited the city's main industry, shipbuilding, which had employed about 17,000 people directly; a steelworks employing 1,000 people had been established; and after 1931 an Italian duty on the import of refined petroleum had stimulated the growth of a great refining industry at Trieste. This growth of industry, which by the late 1930s employed 60,000 wage-earners (perhaps two or three times as many as earned their living from the trade of the port directly), was a continuation of a pre-war trend, and was not wholly due to artificial stimulation by Italian official policy, although both trade and industry, and particularly

the important insurance business, were closely bound up with the Italian economy.

(*f*) The Report of the Four-Power Commission to the Council of Foreign Ministers

In spite of the agreement by the Western Powers to use the 1910 Austrian census, no agreed decision on an Italo-Yugoslav frontier was reached by the Four-Power Commission, and in May 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers was presented with a map showing not one but four proposed frontier lines.[1] All three Western lines left Trieste inside Italy. The lines submitted by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States were nearly identical, and they corresponded closely to the ethnic line of 1919 described above.[2] This pair of lines would have left the smallest numbers of each population under alien rule—roughly 115,000 Italians in Yugoslavia and 70,000 Yugoslavs in Italy. Moreover, very many of these people—the Yugoslavs of Trieste and the Italians of Fiume and Zara—were industrial workers who could have been exchanged if so desired much more easily than land-workers, particularly small peasant-owners. The Russian line allotted almost all the territory claimed by the Yugoslavs, that is almost the whole of Venezia Giulia, to Yugoslavia. The French line left the smallest total number under alien rule, if the two minorities were added together. But this might be regarded as following the letter rather than the spirit of the Commission's instructions. Many more Italians were left by the French line under Yugoslav rule than Yugoslavs under Italian, and all the Italian coastal towns of Istria were left on the Yugoslav side of the line.

The Russians, in the person of Molotov, accepted the Yugoslav view that any division of 'the Julian March'—i.e. the inter-war Venezia Giulia—would be disastrous for its economic welfare. He maintained that, since the majority of the inhabitants of the region, taken as a whole, were Yugoslavs, the whole region, including Trieste, ought to go to Yugoslavia. He admitted that the majority of the Triestini were Italians, but supported the Yugoslav view that Yugoslavia alone was in a position to use Trieste for the benefit of the Julian March and the neighbouring countries. If the Julian March was the body, Trieste was its head.

The Western Ministers opposed this view, partly on the ground that it ignored the Council's joint decision of September 1945 to find a frontier which would be in the main an ethnic line leaving the minimum population under alien rule: the Russian line would have placed more than half a million Italians in Yugoslavia, while leaving hardly any Yugoslavs in Italy. They also pointed out the fallacy of the Yugoslav economic thesis about Trieste. Bevin suggested that Trieste was not so much the head of

[1] See map, p. 464 above.

[2] See above, p. 467.

the Julian March as the mouth for a number of countries; he urged that Trieste should be left to Italy, but that the settlement should implement the Council's agreement of September 1945 that there should be a Free Port at Trieste under international control.

One alternative to the attribution of Trieste to Italy or to Yugoslavia had been considered, and this was the establishment of an International Territory. The Western Allies had been inclined to regard this plan as a counsel of despair; they could not forget the unhappy outcome of the inter-war experiment at Danzig, and no amount of skill in the drafting of a diplomatic instrument seemed likely to avoid the dangers or overcome the difficulties of setting up, at Trieste, an international state. Nevertheless, on 1 July 1946, the Council of Foreign Ministers gave up the attempt to adjudicate between the rival claims of Italy and Yugoslavia to Trieste, accepted the French line as the western frontier of Yugoslavia, and agreed to set up an International Territory.

(*g*) The Free Territory of Trieste

The battle over the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and over the fate of Trieste was renewed at the Peace Conference, which was held in Paris from 29 July to 15 October 1946, and which gave the Italians and the Yugoslavs the opportunity again to state their case. The two countries were united on one point: their dislike of the proposal to set up a Free Territory of Trieste. The Italians resented the loss of a great Italian town and were genuinely afraid that the creation of the Territory would in fact result in the establishment of Yugoslav control over the head of the Adriatic, particularly in view of the fact that the French line gave Italy a frontier north of Trieste which, in the Italian view, it would be impossible to hold against enemy attacks. The Yugoslavs were also aggrieved. They considered that their sufferings in the Allied cause had earned them a reward, and that, on the other hand, the Italians had forfeited any right to consideration owing to their ill-treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Italy. The national issue between Italy and Yugoslavia, however, was not all that was at stake. Power-politics of world-wide dimensions were involved; and, on the strategic question, the Italian view was correct. The possession of Trieste and the control over its railway communications would carry with them the strategic control over the lowest passes between Central Europe and the Mediterranean; and this was an asset that would have an appreciable weight in the balance between the Western Powers and the Soviet bloc.

In spite of the Italian and Yugoslav protests, the decision reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers was not modified, and Article 21 of the Peace Treaty established the Free Territory of Trieste with frontiers as

defined in Article 22.[1] The Territory was carved out of the area which had been intended by the experts who had drawn the French line to be left inside Italy.

The Free Territory covered an area of some 310 square miles and had a population of about 345,000, of whom more than 260,000 lived in the city of Trieste and its immediate suburbs. Over 70 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Territory were Italians. The Territory produced virtually no food, no raw materials, and no consumer goods, and was therefore entirely dependent on outside sources for the raw materials of its main industries. The account already given of the economic position of the city of Trieste indicates its dependence after 1918 on trade with Italy and the importance of a local industry that was closely interwoven with Italian industry elsewhere.

The conflicting views of East and West regarding the future of the Territory, and their fears of outside interference in its affairs, were obvious during the discussions of the Sub-Commission set up by the Paris Peace Conference to draw up a Statute for the Territory.[2] Both sides paid lip service to the need to establish democratic control, and provision was made in the Statute for a Popular Assembly to be elected by the people of the Territory, and for a Constitution to be adopted by a Constituent Assembly. But the controlling authority was to be the Governor, who was to be appointed by the United Nations Security Council after consultation with Italy and Yugoslavia and whose tenure of office was to depend on the approval of the Council. The overwhelming importance of the office of Governor was made clear by the failure of the Security Council to agree to accept any of the candidates proposed.

Italian sovereignty over the Territory ended on 15 September 1947, when the Peace Treaty came into force, but the Provisional Régime prescribed in Annex VII to the Treaty[3] could not be put into effect owing to the inability of the Security Council to agree on a Governor. The territory remained under Allied Military Government as provided for by Article 1 of the Provisional Statute—British/United States Military Government in Zone A, Yugoslav Military Government in Zone B, the two zones into which the Territory had been divided by the Morgan Line laid down in the Duino Agreement of 20 June 1945.[4] The conditions under which Military Government was carried on in the two zones were very different. From May 1945 to September 1947 Zone A was administered on the same lines as other Italian regions. Military Government, as such, was regarded by the Western Powers as a caretaker government bound by international

[1] See Cmd. 7481. pp. 15–17.
[2] For the Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste see ibid. pp. 63–74.
[3] See ibid. pp. 74–77.
[4] See above, p. 466 and map, p. 464.

agreement to administer the area under its control in accordance with Italian law and to make use as far as possible of the existing structure of government. But conditions in the frontier region were difficult; there were few local officials and no police force; local elections were not held until 1949, and British/United States Military Government had to contend not only with the hostility of the Yugoslavs in Zone B but with a strong Communist Party, including Italians as well as Yugoslavs, in Zone A. This party provoked a large number of strikes and attempted to exploit the post-war depression of Trieste, thus increasing the difficulty of setting the Zone's economy on a reasonably good footing. Practically the only traffic through the port during the years 1945–7 consisted in the import of relief stores for Austria, and inevitably British/United States Military Government was forced both before and after 15 September 1947 to foster the economic relations between Trieste and Italy in order to promote the revival of industry, which offered the only hope of reducing the city's heavy burden of unemployment.

Yugoslav Military Government in Zone B was not restricted by any idea of acting as a caretaker. From 1945 onwards the Yugoslavs put in train a process of assimilating the administration of their zone to that of Yugoslavia, particularly in the field of justice, where people's courts were substituted for the Italian courts administering Italian law. After the creation of the Territory in September 1947 this process continued in Zone B, so that its administration followed the same lines as that of the areas of Venezia Giulia that were incorporated in Yugoslavia under the terms of the Peace Treaty.[1]

(*h*) The Italian Colonies in Africa

The end of the war found the administration of the Italian colonies in the hands of British Military Government except in the Fezzān, where the French had been in control since its conquest by General Leclerc in 1942–3. Churchill had stated the British Government's view on Italy's claim to recover the colonies as early as 21 September 1943: 'The Italian . . . Empire has been lost—irretrievably lost.'[2] In September 1945 the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed that there could be no question of Italy's retaining her colonies, but they reached no decision as to the future of these colonies. Like Trieste, the colonies were a point of focus for international rivalry; the Ministers agreed that they should come under the Trusteeship provisions laid down by the United Nations, but the question of the form which trusteeship should take—whether it should be an international trusteeship, or a trusteeship held by one country—aroused great controversy. All the Western Allies were opposed to any suggestion that

[1] Details of the 1954 settlement in Trieste will be found in the *Survey* for 1954.

[2] H.C .Deb. 5th ser., vol. 392, col. 87.

the Soviet Union might become a trustée for one of the colonies or even a member of an international trusteeship consortium, since in either capacity she would obtain access to the Mediterranean. At the same time the Americans were suspicious of British 'imperialist' ambitions, while the French were unwilling to see any advance towards independence in those parts of North Africa which adjoined their own North-West African protectorates and dominions.

In consequence of the inability of the Ministers to agree on the future of the Italian colonies, Article 23 of the Italian Peace Treaty merely stated that 'Italy renounces all right or title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland',[1] and provided for their continuing under the existing administration pending their final disposal, which was to be determined by the Governments of France, Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. within one year of the coming into force of the treaty. In the event of their being unable to agree, the question was to be referred to the United Nations.[2]

Very soon after the signature of the Armistice between the Allies and Italy in September 1943,[3] the Italian Government had sought to draw a distinction between the pre-Fascist Italian colonies—Eritrea, Somalia, and Libya—and the conquests made by Italy under the Fascist régime, and had maintained that they had been encouraged by Great Britain to acquire Eritrea in 1884 and Somalia in 1889. They never attempted to answer the British argument that Italy had shown herself unworthy to own any colony, and they were apparently unable to appreciate the effects on the local inhabitants of nearly twenty years of Fascist misrule. The Italians also attempted to persuade the world that their main reason for desiring colonies was their genuine need to find a solution for the admittedly grave Italian problem of over-population. This argument made no impression on informed opinion, for, when Ethiopia was left out of the reckoning (as it rightly was), there was no Italian colony that, even at an economically burdensome cost per family, could support more than a few thousand European settlers, a negligible number in comparison with Italy's net natural increase of 400,000 annually. Italian statesmen were well aware of this fact, and were therefore greatly to blame for allowing public opinion in Italy to be misled on the subject, with the result that bitter feelings were aroused in the minds of uninformed Italian citizens, against the British in particular.

It was, however, true that the acquisition of Eritrea, Somalia, and even

[1] Cmd. 7481, p. 17. Ethiopia was never considered to be a former Italian colony, but was treated as an independent country to which special pledges were given by Italy in Articles 33–38 of the treaty (ibid. pp. 19–20).

[2] This was what eventually happened (see *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 121–3, and *Survey* for 1949–50, pp. 539–55).

[3] See above, pp. 409 seqq.

to some extent of Libya had been different in character from the later Fascist conquests. The Italian occupation of Eritrea and Somalia had been prompted by nationalist and imperialist ambitions which had not been markedly different from, or more blameworthy than, those of other empire-building European countries in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Italian Government of the time had been moved by the desire to show that Italy, who had been so recently united, was already a country of which serious account must be taken. In Eritrea until the 1930s the policy of the Italian Government, though somewhat old-fashioned, had been reasonable and unprovocative. The number of Italians settled in the country had been small, between 4,000 and 5,000, and they had not been allowed by the Italian Government to dispossess the natives living on the productive highland territories, where alone any large-scale European settlement would have been possible. A few Italians farmed bits of the lower slopes of the hills, and there was a small cotton plantation in the west, but there were no organized settlements of peasants. Most of the Italian residents in Eritrea were officials, and the only appreciable economic value of the colony to Italy was that it provided a means of access for trade with the rich interior of Ethiopia. The whole situation had changed when Italy had begun to make her preparations for war on Ethiopia. From 1935 onwards about 70,000 Italians had been sent into Eritrea—road-builders, motor-mechanics, officials, and soldiers—to develop this excellent base for a war of aggression against Eritrea's inland neighbour.

Somalia, again, was undoubtedly a colony that had been acquired for the sake of prestige. It was largely inhabited by nomad or semi-nomad peoples, and the climate made it quite unsuitable for European settlement or for peasant cultivation. Until 1931 there had been only about 1,600 Italians in the country, mainly managers of large plantation-type estates producing bananas and cotton, and the colony had been kept going only at the cost of substantial financial aid from Rome.

The attempted Italian colonization of Libya had likewise proved unremunerative. Both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were naturally poor countries, and the fruit and vegetables produced in the oases were only enough for local consumption. The chief source of prosperity of both countries was trade with the interior of Africa, and the expansion of agriculture undertaken by the Italians had been very expensive, had depended on a guaranteed market in Italy, and, worst of all, had been achieved only by evicting previous Arab cultivators from their lands. In Tripolitania the earliest colonists had been settled on small plots bought from the Arabs or assigned as concessions from the not very extensive state domains; but, after the rebellion which had begun in 1922 and which had been followed by Graziani's war of suppression in 1922–30, Italy's policy had changed and there had been an enormous increase in the

amount of the domain lands obtained partly by purchase, partly by confiscation of land belonging to rebels, and partly by an assertion of the state's right to the ownership of undeveloped land.

In Cyrenaica the tenacity of the Senusi's resistance had been answered, on the Italian side, by a resort to methods of barbarism. The tribesmen had been driven out of the comparatively fertile lands of the Jebel Akhdar and the tribal structure had been destroyed. Mass settlements of Italian peasants in Cyrenaica had been started in 1933 with the establishment of four villages on the Jebel; by 1940 there were twenty-four settlements in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica together, and a resident Italian population of about 100,000, and there were further plans for settling 50,000 more colonists. Undoubtedly the Italians had done much for the economic improvement of both countries. Excellent roads had been built by them, both east to west along the coast and also southward from the coast into the interior; ports had been enlarged, water-resources had been surveyed and aqueducts constructed, and improvements had been made in native cultivation. But the Italian colonization had been carried through here only by the seizure of large tracts of the better agricultural land from the lawful native owners and by the forcible transfer of large numbers of the Arab population to poorer lands. In this respect there had been a difference in the Italian treatment of the Libyan population in Tripolitania and in Cyrenaica. In Tripolitania considerable areas of cultivable land had been left to the Libyans, but in Cyrenaica all the best lands had been taken for the Italian settlers.

(*i*) The Dodecanese

The cession to Greece by Italy of the Dodecanese Islands, which Italy had occupied in 1912, was never seriously opposed during the negotiations for the peace settlement after the Second World War, though the Russians withheld their assent for a time. Article 14 of the Italian Peace Treaty stated that Italy ceded them to Greece and that they were to be demilitarized.[1]

The population of the islands—Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto (Karpathos), Casos (Kasos), Piscopes (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), Cos (Kos), and Castellorizo—was almost wholly Greek. In 1939 there were a few Spanish-speaking Sephardi Jews in Rhodes, a few Turks in Rhodes and Cos, and a few Italian immigrants, particularly in Rhodes, but the rest of the inhabitants were Greek in language and political feeling and were adherents of the Eastern Orthodox Church. From 1522 until 1912 they had been under Ottoman rule,

[1] Cmd. 7481, pp. 12–13.

under which they had enjoyed a considerable measure of local administrative autonomy and had suffered no persecution of their ancestral Greek language and sentiment. In 1912 Italy had made war on Turkey and had seized first Stampalia, then Rhodes, and later all the other islands, except Castellorizo. The Italo-Turkish Treaty of 1912 had stipulated the evacuation of the islands by Italy when Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were evacuated by Turkey. The Turks had fulfilled their part of the contract by duly evacuating Libya; but, at the moment when Turkey had intervened in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, Italy had still been in occupation of the Dodecanese, and, by the secret Treaty of London concluded on 26 April 1915 between Italy and the Entente Powers, Italy had been promised 'entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands, which she is at present occupying', and this promise had been confirmed in Article 15 of the Treaty of Lausanne concluded on 24 July 1923 between Turkey and her opponents in the First World War.

The Italians had treated their Greek subjects in the Dodecanese as badly as their Yugoslav and Austrian subjects in Venezia Giulia and the Tyrol, particularly in their inequitable and oppressive policy of ousting the Greek language from its legitimate role as the local medium of education and administration. In the Dodecanese, Italian had been the official language of the courts, and in 1937 it had also been made the official medium of education, and the teaching of Greek had then been confined to the higher forms of the schools. The Italians had also attempted to tamper with the Greek Orthodox Church in the Dodecanese, and, in particular, had tried to detach the local church from the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Thus the case for the union of the Dodecanese with the Kingdom of Greece on the score of the nationality and the political aspirations of an overwhelming majority of the population was reinforced by the bad record of Italian administration of the islands during the period of Italian rule.

PART V

WESTERN EUROPE

By Viscount Chilston

(i) France

(*a*) Perpetuation of the Historic Division of the Nation

When General de Gaulle entered Paris on 26 August 1944 hopes were high that his coming heralded the liberation of France, not only from her four years' bondage to the Germans, but also from her own unhappy past. Never, perhaps, since the days of Joan of Arc had the ancient nation burned with such a genuine fervour for complete renascence. Yet, in the end, in spite of enormous labours and ceaseless debates, the Fourth Republic differed very little from its predecessor, and, worse still, the old schisms which for generations had rent and paralysed France were seen—in spite of the temporary unity found in resistance to a foreign enemy—to have emerged from the war only deeper and less bridgeable than heretofore. Any changes which came about in the political landscape were due, not so much to any new constitutional machinery devised, as to the natural evolution and regrouping in stronger formations of forces which had been part of the French scene since the First Revolution. Thus, the most readily discernible change was the reduction of the pre-war plethora of political parties to a few, huge, well-disciplined 'monoliths'. Indeed, this simplification rapidly became accentuated to such an extent that soon Right and Left confronted one another across a gulf which each had helped to widen by absorbing those fringes of the Centre which were nearest to it. But, meanwhile, in the vital Constitution-making period immediately following the war, the very fact that the monoliths were so evenly balanced and so strongly marshalled made it impossible for the new Constitution to be much more than a compromise.

These two main features of the French post-war scene—the aggravation of the old rift between Left and Right and the emergence of the monoliths—were, of course, only two aspects of the same problem. It is true that the Communist Party was the first monolith to appear, and that its challenge inevitably evoked a response in the formation of strong counterbalancing forces. On the other hand, the Communist Party would not have been able to emerge from the war in such great strength had not the old rift, so far from being bridged by the common ordeal of war and occupation, in fact been widened by it.

But the nation would have been courting self-destruction if it had not

sought to generate a moderating force to offset these extreme tendencies. Indeed, the birth and meteoric rise of the new moderate Catholic party, the MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*),[1] raised hopes at first that it would meet this need. But, until the appearance of strong and avowedly Right-wing forces, the MRP had perforce to play the part of Right Wing in the preponderantly Left-wing atmosphere of French politics immediately after the war. Meanwhile, its efforts on the one hand to be progressive and to preserve the old revolutionary, crusading spirit of the Resistance, whose child it was, and, on the other, to be conservative and maintain its link with the politically suspect Church and with the equally politically suspect de Gaulle, lost the MRP much support as the mood for compromise and moderation gradually wore off. The third, though always the weakest, of the monoliths which dominated the post-liberation scene, the Socialist Party, was unable by itself to assume the role of moderator for similar reasons. For the Socialists lost heavily to the Communists through their collaboration with and contamination by the 'clerical reactionary' MRP, and yet also lost many votes to the MRP when they sided too much with the Communists. Both these potential Centre parties, therefore, progressively lost weight to their own detriment and to the benefit of either one or the other of the extreme parties. Indeed, for a time it seemed as if the nation were bent upon bringing about the clash of these extremes, and, through it, its own destruction. But fortunately the instinct of self-preservation brought into existence the so-called 'Third Force'. This was an amalgam and buffer composed of those Socialists, Radicals, and MRP members for whom the Communist Party was still too far to the Left and for whom de Gaulle's Rally[2] was still too far to the Right; and it was thereafter able to carry on the government of France at a crucial juncture in world affairs with an adequate degree of popular support derived from the conviction that either of the alternatives must mean civil war.

Not until the glamorous spell of the Resistance had evaporated and the formidable figure of de Gaulle, who had symbolized it, had withdrawn into temporary retirement, did it become clear that the war had not only brought about surprisingly little change, but had made even plainer what should have been plain before: that the essential political conflict was still a class conflict—though, even as such, it had always had several cross-cutting facets. Thus, though it was a conflict to a great extent simply of middle class versus working class, it was also one of urban working class versus rural working class, and partly of higher bourgeoisie versus lesser bourgeoisie. But now the terms of the conflict had changed as well. During the war the Communists had seemed to have won almost a monopoly of patriotism, through the pre-eminent place which they had held in the Resistance Movement. Undoubting, a great part of the peasants and

[1] See below, p. 504.

[2] *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF): see below, pp. 508–9.

workers had followed their competent lead against the invader. But formerly it had been the bourgeoisie who had had almost the monopoly of patriotism—in fact it had been their best card. In the war, however, the bourgeoisie found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. If they collaborated with the Germans they were obviously guilty of the crudest lack of patriotism; yet, if they joined the Resistance, they threw themselves into the arms of the Communists as well as rendering themselves technically disloyal to the constituted authority of the state—even though that was the Vichy Government.

Those of the French bourgeoisie who had chosen obedience to Vichy, without in any way actively collaborating with the Germans, had often little more with which to reproach themselves than mere passivity or lack of judgement; but the fact that they were indeed reproached—and this often by people who were more seriously implicated than they were, and who now cast stones at their neighbours in order to distract attention from themselves—was one of the tragedies of the French post-war situation. On the other hand, the mental anguish of many bourgeois who had joined the Resistance was, after the end of the war, probably just as great; for they discovered that, in the laudable desire to sink political differences in the country's hour of danger, they had delivered themselves into the hands of the Communists, who were bent upon ending for ever, when victory should come, the bourgeoisie's special influence and commanding position in the public affairs of the nation. At first, however, the new MRP party seemed to offer to such as these a rallying point and an instrument for the pursuit of their ideals, and this accounted for the MRP's astonishing success in the early post-war elections. In the beginning, moreover, the slide to the Left had been so general that the MRP looked almost like a party of the Right. But when the essential 'leftness' of even the MRP became apparent, a large section of the bourgeoisie transferred its support to the new parties of the Right, which began to arise in response to the growing demand—the PRL,[1] the Gaullist Union,[2] and ultimately, de Gaulle's anti-Communist 'Rally', the RPF.

If the bourgeoisie had for long—perhaps too long—occupied a commanding position in France, this was not less true of the peasantry, who represented between one-quarter and one-third of the total active population and of the voters.[3] In spite of rivalries on general lines between town and country, these two classes, exaggerating and unduly prolonging their original role as the true heirs of 1789 and defenders of individual liberty against tyrannical governments, had grown accustomed to call the tune

[1] *Parti Républicain de la Liberté*: see below, p. 506.

[2] See below, p. 507.

[3] It is admittedly very hard to generalize about the peasantry, which actually fell into several well-defined different categories. Hence the efforts to form a 'peasant party' or 'peasant front' always failed, owing to the impossibility of finding a political programme to suit every one.

in the affairs of the nation. What is more, the economic structure of France was something of an anachronism in a highly industrialized modern Europe: the system of taxation made it possible for the bourgeoisie and the peasants to evade paying their due share to the state or even virtually exempted them from liability altogether; and, at the same time, prejudice against industrialization or modernization inclined them to deny their capital to industry.[1] The prevalence of small peasant ownership meant a general reliance on cash rather than on cheques as a medium of exchange. This in turn meant that it was easier to levy excise taxes on widely used products than to collect a direct income tax. Again, the dependence of the Government on excise taxes meant that in times of economic stress they must resort to borrowing to increase their revenue, and this in turn could lead to inflation. At the same time the corresponding prevalence of small commercial and industrial enterprises and the immunity of shopkeepers from the obligation of keeping or producing accounts not only created similar difficulties for the Government but impeded the introduction of modern methods of industrial production.[2]

Unfortunately the principal sufferer from the indirect taxes and inflationary finance which the Government found themselves obliged to adopt was the very class which France most needed to encourage both for her moral and for her material health—the urban and industrial workers. Filled with a sense of social injustice, and seeming to themselves to bear most of the burdens and receive least of the rewards, these grew increasingly rebellious and turned to the Communist Party as the party that was pledged to the destruction of the privileged class. At the same time it should be remembered that these feelings of resentment between one economic or social group and others were mutual. If the urban workers resented the failure of the peasants to meet their full share of governmental expenses and the spectacle of their eating and drinking well (even in times of economic depression) while the urban workers went hungry, the peasants, for their part, equally resented the advantages enjoyed by the urban workers in the forty-hour week, paid vacations, &c., by comparison with their own ceaseless toil. Similarly the attempt to extend the provisions of progressive legislation to the whole population led to resentment on the part of the privileged or non-wage-earning classes and roused their hostility towards the whole social security system. Indeed, the very fact of labour's emerging after the liberation with a strong organization and a moral advantage over the discredited forces of the employers made the latter

[1] The French public preferred to invest (if it did not keep its money in the mattress or a stocking) in government bonds rather than in industrial enterprises.

[2] On the other hand, it must be admitted that because industrialization had been thus impeded a balance had been maintained between the urban and rural economies which in most other European countries was nothing but an agreeable memory, and France had remained nearly self-sufficient in the production of foodstuffs.

inclined to be all the more rigid and intractable. Hence there ensued not only a greater political polarization and a greater decline of civic sense—every social group and class tending to be self-centred and to concentrate on its own interests and miseries—but also a greater determination on the part of each to secure more effective organization of its own strength. Thus the rallying of the bourgeoisie round new parties of the Right, to offset the rallying of the workers to the Communists, only aggravated the centrifugal tendency of French politics.

Furthermore, this marshalling of far stronger forces of the Right than France had ever known in pre-war years sometimes led those organizing the new parties to overlook the failings of Vichyites, fascists, and other undesirables in the overwhelming desire to form an anti-Red 'front'. This in turn aggravated the split in the country and gave credibility to the notion, eagerly taken up and spread by the Communists, that all who opposed the latter were 'reactionaries'. No less extraordinary, however, was the way in which French supporters of the Communists overlooked the failings, the tergiversations, and the foreign affiliation of the Communist Party.[1] Probably one reason for the readiness of the French workers to overlook such *désagréments* was their instinctive feeling that in the past the fruits of their revolutions had always been snatched from them; that they had always been betrayed or side-tracked by leaders or associates who had not been truly representative of them and their interests. Moreover, the policy of seeking common ground with the Communists was the line of least resistance, a natural continuation from the war period when the Communists had not only fostered the spontaneous spirit of revolt against the past and against the reactionary Vichy régime, but had gone far to create the impression that they dominated the Resistance Movement which was the active expression of these feelings.[2]

As a final touch to the picture, at the time of the liberation the atmosphere was particularly conducive to extreme political opinions. First, material damage was much greater than it had been in 1918—not so acutely localized, but far more widespread. All the great ports were destroyed.[3] Secondly, the moral shock was obviously much greater: crushing defeat had been followed by occupation by the victors, and this had been worse for France than for other similarly afflicted nations because for centuries she had ranked as a Great Power—often the greatest

[1] The delusion was not confined to supporters of the Communists or even to Frenchmen. Thus the British weekly, *The Economist* (23 November 1946), could write: 'The notion propagated by Mr. Churchill that the French Communist Party is an obscure fifth column of Russian origin is of course grotesque. . . . [People] voted for the Communists because they believed they offered a new approach to life, and a doctrine of human values and belief in human organization. . . . [The Communists'] programme today is as far removed from Bolshevism as Paris from Moscow; what they want, they argue—and what they believe they can get—is Socialism by parliamentary means.'

[2] See below, pp. 490–1.

[3] See above, p. 39.

Power in Europe. Thirdly, there were certain inequalities of wealth and well-being, which, while they may not have been universal, were striking enough in individual instances or localities to provoke bitterness on a wide scale. In Paris and other cities, for example, there was a considerable minority of people who had profited by the war and the German occupation, and who, thanks to the black market, had hardly felt the pinch at all in the last four years. At the same time there were in the same towns masses of people who had only just been able to keep themselves alive. This abnormal inequality was the stuff of which revolutions are made, and, indeed, the rumours persistently circulating for months after the liberation about an impending Communist coup might have become a reality had it not better suited the Communist book to temporize.

(*b*) Pre-Liberation Trends

(1) *Political Trends and Constitutional Theories in Underground France and among the Free French*

Respect for de Gaulle's personal achievement must be all the greater when it is considered that he had to win acceptance not only from the Allies[1] but also from his fellow Frenchmen, both in France and outside, before he was able to realize any of his aims and ambitions for bringing his country back to greatness and stability. The greater part of his Odyssey up to the period with which the present study is concerned is recounted in another place.[2] If he was to attain his aims, it was essential for him to give evidence of his personal faith in democracy and of his genuine desire to restore democratic forms as soon as he had led the Committee of National Liberation back to their native soil. Even during the exile at Algiers a Provisional Consultative Assembly had been created (September 1943), consisting of 102 members; of these, twenty had been members of the pre-Vichy Parliament and the remaining four-fifths were leaders and members of metropolitan and North African Resistance Groups. The fact that the Allied leaders had for so long doubted whether de Gaulle was representative of any sufficiently large body of opinion in France to justify their recognition of him was not unconnected with the doubts of many Left-wing Resistance leaders about the sincerity of the General's republicanism. However, these doubts were eventually overcome, and the Resistance leaders agreed to accept the already widely acknowledged over-all leadership of de Gaulle at least until the soil of France was free again.[3] In return

[1] For American and British differences of opinion regarding the support to be given to de Gaulle see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 426–7, 476–7.

[2] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 434 seqq.

[3] Those who negotiated the agreement were said to be Jean Moulin, de Gaulle's personal representative in France and first president of the National Council of Resistance (CNR), and Pierre Brossolette, a prominent socialist in the General's entourage (see Gordon Wright: *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (London, Methuen, 1950), p. 32).

de Gaulle agreed to respect the wishes of the Resistance Movement regarding the future of France and her institutions.

After this, the most difficult immediate problem of policy for de Gaulle was the attitude to be adopted towards the Third Republic. A great many Frenchmen by now recognized that régime's defects and its responsibility in some degree for the catastrophe which had befallen their country. At first, when the Vichy régime was devoting much effort to reviling its predecessors, de Gaulle had not unnaturally felt that he could scarcely outbid it in this direction; moreover, in his desire to invest all his actions with an air of strict legality, he had pledged himself to a return to the Constitution of the Third Republic in his 'Brazzaville Declaration' of October 1940.[1] But in 1942, after the Resistance leaders had made clear the terms on which they were prepared to co-operate with him—which included the complete rejection of the Third Republic—he found himself obliged to abandon this position and to make a new declaration denouncing the Third Republic in the same breath as Vichy and promising a Constituent Assembly after the liberation for the purpose of fashioning a new Constitution.

The Third Republic was in truth unacceptable to both de Gaulle and the Resistance—but for entirely opposite reasons. Apart from the fact that the 1875 Constitution had really been designed to pave the way for a return of the monarchy, the quasi-English system of parliamentary government had always been alien to those historic French republican ideals which the Resistance claimed to represent. The true republican tradition was that of 'government by assembly', as typified in the Revolutionary Convention of 1792–5, with the executive and legislative functions fused in a one-house assembly, no President or Cabinet, the legislature choosing executive agents (commissars) to be mere instruments for carrying out its will. De Gaulle, on the other hand, was supposed to favour the American form of presidential government with its emphasis upon separation of powers. Actually, in the early days of the Resistance, even many leading Left-wing sympathizers (excluding, of course, the Communists) had been drawn towards the American system; but, by 1943, they had begun to repent of their momentary heresy and to tell themselves that a régime that was workable in the United States might not necessarily suit France. Indeed, the special circumstances in the United States whereby the presidential system had been superimposed upon a federal structure, which automatically limited the President's authority, were absent in France, where there would therefore have been greater scope for abuses of authority.[2]

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 446.

[2] After de Gaulle's Bayeux speech of 16 June 1946 (see below, p. 507) René Capitant produced (and published under the title 'Towards a Federal Constitution') a scheme intended to integrate de Gaulle's ideas of a strong executive with his new thesis of imperial federalism. It maintained the parliamentary system for metropolitan France, but combined it with a presidential system for

Moreover, Vichy's perverted example of the strong executive was not without its effect as a deterrent. For all that, the idea persisted in certain Resistance groups dominated by non-party intellectuals, who doubtless remembered and appreciated the true significance of the 'decree-laws' issued by Daladier and other pre-war premiers—namely, the real need for some strengthening of the executive to make even ordinary administration effective. These people were also in favour of a ready-made Constitution, to be drawn up before liberation; accordingly a *Comité Général d'Études* produced a draft embodying their ideas, for which they hoped to obtain universal acceptance before liberation.

But the Communists' entry into the constitutional debate early in 1944 extinguished any hope of developing a united Resistance programme on that subject. For they took a diametrically opposite view to the other parties and groups and insisted that past ills were due not to too much, but to too little, legislative control over the Cabinet. In support of their argument they cited the frequent occasions before the war when governments were accorded 'special powers', although, as just shown, those instances afforded much better proof of the opposite contention. They therefore demanded a Constituent Assembly at the earliest opportunity after liberation and began canvassing support for a single sovereign assembly as the *sine qua non* of any future Constitution. On the assumption that this meant that the Communists were likely to drop the mask of liberal democracy and stand forth in their true totalitarian colours in the not distant future, it became incumbent upon de Gaulle to underline his democratic probity, and at the same time to encourage the growth of adequate counterbalancing forces. Thus, though he had at first favoured the idea of replacing the old party system by a broad political *Rassemblement*, he shortly afterwards changed his mind and decided to encourage the revival of the old political parties, partly to give the lie to the notion that he planned a semi-fascist régime to offset the excessive influence of the Communists. Yet even here he was up against difficulties. In the pre-liberation Consultative Assembly the old political parties were represented in proportion to their relative numbers in the Chamber of Deputies on 3 September 1939, and, although these representatives of the old parties constituted, all told, no more than one-fifth of the new Assembly, the Resistance members still felt them to be superfluous and quite unrepresentative of any element in 'the new France'.

Indeed, many of the non-political members of the Resistance—apart from the 'leftists'—blamed de Gaulle for misjudging the situation in France

the French Union as a whole. The President would have had powers to appoint the Premier in France, as well as Premiers and Viceroys overseas, and would have become one of the most powerful figures in the world. Though de Gaulle did not give the scheme his blessing at the time, it was clear, when he made his statement to the press on 27 August 1946 denouncing the Second Draft Constitution (see below, p. 519), that he had adopted its principle.

on the eve of the liberation and for losing a supreme opportunity. They felt that in 1944 he could have remoulded France drastically, but bloodlessly, and that, by taking the lead in a revolutionary movement, he could have cut the ground from under the feet of the Communists. In any case, they felt that he had over-estimated Communist influence and had been apt to lump all the Resistance forces together as a dangerous Communist rabble—a view that was wide of the mark, as de Gaulle, in their opinion, would have discovered had he looked beneath the surface. It seemed, too, to these people, who for four years had dreamed of and fought for a new France, that de Gaulle was bent upon re-establishing the old social order rather than upon creating a new and better one; that even the progressive measures introduced by him—nationalization of the coal-mines, many banks, broadcasting, electric power, and airlines; and the confirmation of the pre-war nationalization of the aircraft industry and the railways—were rather in the nature of grudging concessions to a public opinion with which he was out of sympathy than heartfelt, spontaneous gestures.[1]

At the root of this misunderstanding probably lay the fact that, though de Gaulle was not really totalitarian in outlook, he was yet unable to perceive that true democracy is inseparable from political diversity, which tends to prevent any too great concentration of power in the hands of one section of the community. Thus he himself tried from time to time to bring political diversity to an end and to establish a unanimous democracy. Despite his temporary encouragement of the old parties he reverted to type in 1947 when he launched his Rally (or *Rassemblement*),[2] because, though primarily directed against the Communist Party, it was really designed to supersede all parties.

(2) *The Rise of the Communists*

In spite of the efforts of the Left Wing and even of merely liberal-minded people to depreciate it, de Gaulle's view of the Communist threat may well be felt to have been amply justified by the course of later events. It should be observed, moreover, that, before resorting to the extreme measure of launching his Rally, he had shown great patience and made sincere efforts to let moderation prevail by the old methods. He himself had endeavoured to encourage the formation of a powerful centre bloc to hold the balance between Left and Right, even if his more uncompromising lieutenants, like René Capitant, had from the first believed a clash between Left and Right to be inevitable and had wished to run ahead of the danger by mustering powerful anti-Red forces. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the Resistance was comprehensive and remarkably diverse in composition,

[1] See Claude Bourdet: 'The Battle for Post-war France', *Harper's Magazine*, April 1948.
[2] See below, pp. 508–9.

the fact remained that by the end of the war the Communist Party had succeeded in dominating and permeating a much larger part of it than their support in the country really warranted. This achievement must appear all the more extraordinary when the immediate past of the Communist Party in France is taken into account.

The party had made great progress in France in the 1930s in consonance with Moscow's policy of winning the support of the liberal bourgeoisie against advancing fascism. Moreover, ideology apart, and on the level of politico-military expediency alone, Soviet Russia was the only major ally to whom Frenchmen could look at a time when Britain's intentions still appeared so distressingly equivocal. Again, by dropping their openly subversive, international role in favour of an ostensibly progressive, national one, and by collaborating with the other reformist parties in support of the Popular Front Government of 1936, the Communists had vastly increased their following. The force and attraction of this new appeal on the part of international Communism were for these reasons particularly strongly left in France, and, despite temporary setbacks and several 'eye-openers', both before and after the war, it continued to exert a powerful influence on the destiny of France, rendering her a more fruitful field for Communism than many of her neighbours. Perhaps the most interesting and significant feature of this development lay in the fact that not only the working class but important sections of the middle class ultimately felt themselves drawn towards Communism. This tendency was really the obverse of that which inclined another large section of the community towards fascism, for this, too, had its roots in the widespread disillusionment during the 1920s and 1930s over the theory and practice of liberal parliamentarism.

Meanwhile, however, the Communist Party had suffered a sudden blow through the signing of the Hitler–Stalin Pact in 1939.[1] In France, as elsewhere, the party had no option but to approve, though an incredulous stupor fell upon its ranks. Then, immediately on top of this blow, came the war and the suppression of the party by decree. Nevertheless, the party preserved its hard core intact and continued to operate underground; it lost few important members, though its leader, Maurice Thorez, deserted from the French army and escaped to Russia. In this rather forlorn state its affairs remained until Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 transformed the scene for it again.

Now that Russia had been attacked, Stalin had declared the war—at first called the 'second imperialist war'—to be a 'patriotic war'. The Resistance Movement in France was dispirited and badly organized; the

[1] An account of the French Communists' opposition to the war before June 1941 will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Initial Triumph of the Axis*. See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 387–8. For the change of 'line' see ibid. p. 388.

Communists, though they had been, to outward appearance, temporarily in eclipse, were always potentially well organized. With amazing rapidity and energy they now seized control of a large part of the Resistance Movement, but without openly flaunting their party label, and, by organizing a number of 'non-party' groups (in which they held the key positions), they were able to form a 'National Front', including even members of the clergy and of the political Right Wing. Since they led, organized, and fought so well, not sparing themselves, there was little at which any other patriot could cavil. Moreover, Stalin's gesture in dissolving the Comintern (24 May 1943) seemed to show—as was intended—that there was no need to fear that the U.S.S.R. would meddle in future in the international affairs of her allies.

In the same month and year (May 1943) the *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR) was created to co-ordinate the activities of the various Resistance groups. The first president, Jean Moulin ('Max'), was arrested and killed by the Germans; he was succeeded by a man destined to play an increasingly important role in his country's affairs—Georges Bidault. The fact that Bidault was anything but a Communist certainly proved that the Resistance was not entirely dominated by that party; but the party did play a dual role in the CNR. While the Communists were operating indirectly through groups which they controlled ostensibly only for organizational purposes, they also maintained their individuality and independence as a distinct unit within the national movement, and thus preserved their 'soul' intact against the day when they must shed all camouflage and come forth again in their true colours.

Though many feared a Communist *coup d'état* in the chaotic interval between the expulsion of the Germans and the establishment of de Gaulle's authority, Moscow evidently did not judge the time yet ripe or else feared the military complications which such a move must bring about. At first, indeed, the Communists submitted to de Gaulle with a good grace, and even capitulated, though not without loud protests, when he disarmed the *milices patriotiques*[1] which they had organized to police France after the liberation. Their aim after the liberation appeared to be, not to prepare a *coup d'état*, but rather to work through legal methods and to assume the role of a great republican party, heir to a long and honourable French tradition.[2] With this in view, their propaganda was subtly adapted to different classes and sections of the community, and this so successfully that the party membership grew from 385,000 in 1944 to 1 million in

[1] See below, p. 495.

[2] 'It is a fact that a complex has arisen in the minds of a great many Frenchmen by reason of which the terms Communist Party, peace, liberty, patriotism, social justice, are most intimately associated and reciprocally evoke one another' (Jacques Fauvet: *De Thorez à de Gaulle, les forces politiques en France, étude et géographie des divers partis* (Paris, Édition Le Monde, 1951), p. 20, quoting A. Rossi: *Physiologie du parti communiste* (Paris, Self, 1948)).

1945.[1] The party was even content to accept a minor role in de Gaulle's Provisional Government, scrupulously avoided any direct criticism of him, and loudly proclaimed its desire to contribute to French recovery. This was something that it was in a special position to accomplish, thanks to its hold upon the workers, by stifling strikes and labour disputes and impressing upon the workers the duty to maintain high productivity. Thus, once again, as in the immediate pre-war phase, in its tactics the party was compelled to become nationalist instead of internationalist, constitutional instead of revolutionary, and opportunist instead of uncompromising.

Furthermore, until the fact of Moscow's intransigence in international relations became too flagrant to be blinked at, it was also fairly easy to represent Soviet foreign policy as the only peace policy and all others as being 'imperialistic'. Sympathizers recollected the Communist gesture of solidarity with the democrats against the Fascists and Nazis in supporting the Popular Front Government of 1936, and believed that similar gestures on the part of the Soviet Union had been wantonly rejected by the inept and prejudiced French and British politicians at the time of Munich and that this in turn had precipitated the war. More recently they remembered the spectacular contribution of the Communists to the Resistance against the German occupation. On the other hand, they conveniently forgot the interim in which the Soviet Union had made a pact with Hitler, or else, perhaps, they condoned it on the ground of the failure of their own and the British Government to show more understanding towards the Soviet Union. Indeed, if the creed that 'Stalin is always right' was essential for real party members, it also had the undoubted attraction, for the passively inclined sympathizer, of saving him from having to think for himself.[2]

(*c*) De Gaulle's Dictatorship

The *Gleichschaltung* of de Gaulle's Free French forces, coming from outside France, with the Resistance forces, which had for so long wielded a powerful influence at home, could scarcely have been expected to take place without some friction. Moreover, as has already been said, de

[1] The Communists now temporarily exercised a certain attraction upon that section of the peasantry which had always been ready to vote for the most dynamic party—which had voted for the Radicals down to the 1920s and for the Socialists in the 1930s. Communism also appealed to certain non-proletarian strata of society—to painters (e.g. Picasso), writers (e.g. Aragon), and scientists (e.g. Joliot Curie)—in some cases through its rational aspect (i.e. apparent logic) and in others through its irrational, emotional appeal or *mystique*. The prestige and position of such people were especially high in France, where individualism has always been so highly respected, and their weight was therefore an important addition to the party. On the other hand, of course, the adherence of such highly individualistic figures was a constant potential source of heresy.

[2] 'One may well deplore "the alien nationalism of the Communist Party". But it matters little to the worker in factory or field whether "his" party bears this character or not so long as he has the feeling that the interests of this foreign country and those of his own coincide, and still more if he has the conviction that they are merged together in a common class interest' (Fauvet: *De Thorez à de Gaulle*, pp. 5–6).

Gaulle's was a particularly delicate and ungrateful role in that he was regarded with suspicion both by the Allies and by the native Resistance. Yet, in spite of these embarrassments, he did not falter in his self-appointed mission and succeeded in becoming not only Head of the State in the crucial first months after the liberation, but also the pivot and, in a sense, the touchstone of French politics then and for long afterwards.

On 2 June 1944, four days before the Allied landings in Normandy, the Committee of National Liberation, set up in Algiers in the preceding year, adopted the title of 'Provisional Government of the French Republic'. But the Allied Big Three hesitated to recognize this transmogrification, being still sceptical of de Gaulle's popularity in France. As the invasion progressed, however, these doubts were dispelled, and on 11 July *de facto* recognition was accorded by the United States; this was followed on 22 August by a civil affairs agreement giving the French Provisional Administration authority over the selection of officials in the whole of the interior zone of France, while leaving the forward zone under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. On 23 October *de jure* recognition of the Provisional Government was accorded by all the Big Three.[1]

Having overcome the scruples and fears of the Allies, de Gaulle had next to strike the right balance in his Government between his own followers from London and Algiers and the men of the Resistance in France. He was ready to recognize that both had legitimate claims and aspirations, but inevitably he was inclined to lean more upon those whom he had trusted and who had trusted him in the years of exile. This tendency manifested itself in his first Government, in which more than half were Algiers men, to the dislike of the Resistance faction, which insisted upon a revision. In the resulting so-called 'Government of National Unanimity' (9 September 1944) there were still only nine men who had remained in France throughout the occupation, as against thirteen who had held office in the Algiers administration. Of course, most of the Algiers men were technically *résistants* also, so that the Resistance as a whole was very strongly represented, but their counterparts who had stayed in France could not feel that the Algiers men deserved so well as they, who had daily carried their lives in their hands—in many cases, for four years. However, the Government was in other ways broad-based. It contained such diverse elements as Jules Jeanneney, the venerable former President of the Senate, representing 'Republican Legitimacy'; Georges Bidault, former leader-writer of the Left Catholic *Aube* and President of the CNR, representing the Resistance; the Communist Charles Tillon; the Socialist Adrien Tixier; General Catroux; and René Pleven and René Capitant, two of de Gaulle's most devoted lieutenants.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Consultative Assembly, first set up in

[1] See Churchill, vi. 213–17; U.S. edition, vi. 244–9.

Algiers in 1943, was reorganized and enlarged to afford increased representation of the Resistance within France. The total membership was increased from 102 to 248, and the nineteen members of the National Council of Resistance (CNR) were added to the Assembly *en bloc*, while individual Resistance groups appointed their own representatives as well. It was significant that, while the number of representatives of the pre-war Parliament was increased from twenty to sixty, their selection was made strictly dependent upon their having been among those who had voted against the famous motion to give Pétain full powers in 1940.[1] Naturally this Assembly, having no mandate from the people, could not act as a proper parliament, but could serve only as an advisory body. It was required to give its opinion when called upon to do so by the Provisional Government, but the Government, though required on their side to consult it in matters of finance, were not bound by its recommendations, and retained full legislative as well as executive power in their own hands.

Indeed, for the next fourteen months—from September 1944 to November 1945—the Government of France was neither more nor less than a dictatorship—though one which was freely accepted, not arbitrarily imposed. De Gaulle's authority knew no bounds except those that he chose voluntarily to set to it, and his Ministers were his creatures, owing allegiance and responsibility to none but himself. In spite of this, de Gaulle's attitude remained entirely 'correct'. A fortnight after his arrival in Paris he promised that, as soon as France was entirely liberated, and all prisoners and deportees had returned, elections would be held for a Constituent Assembly.[2] But this meant also that there could not be any attempt to fashion a new Constitution for some considerable time, for the return of 2 million prisoners and deportees must inevitably be a long task. Indeed, in retrospect, and in the light of the prolonged and bitter controversy and disillusionment aroused by the struggle round the new Constitution and the body which was to fashion it, many Frenchmen came to wish that the General had not shown such a scrupulous regard for form, but had either restored the Third Republic outright or summoned a Constituent Assembly without delay. It could be argued also that in any case the period of dictatorship rendered necessary by the delay was likely

[1] The distribution of seats was as follows:

Former Parliamentary members	60
CNR	19
Representatives of Resistance groups within France	129
Representatives of Resistance groups abroad	28
Empire representation	12
	248

(see Buel W. Patch: *France in Transition* in *Editorial Research Reports*, vol. ii, no. 9 (Washington, 1945), p. 160). For the motion of 1940 see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 341.

[2] Speech at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 12 September 1944 (*Le Populaire*, 13 September 1944).

to exert a dubious influence upon the new republic and upon the deliberations out of which it was to be born.

The first test of de Gaulle's authority and prestige came over the delicate question of the status and ultimate fate of the irregular forces of the Resistance inside France familiarly known as the *maquis*,[1] or more officially as the FFI (*Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur*). De Gaulle had made the gesture of recognizing the FFI as an integral part of the French army on the eve of the Normandy landings. This certainly did not in the least alter the Germans' treatment of the *maquis*; but de Gaulle was blamed not for that, but for his failure to persuade the Allies to let the *maquis* have a greater supply of arms. Government circles in London and Algiers were accused —especially by the Communists—of *attentisme*. Actually, as de Gaulle pointed out to the Consultative Assembly (25 July 1944), seven times as many arms had been supplied in June and July as in any previous months; but the number of effectives of the FFI had—for obvious reasons—trebled in that time. Afterwards, it was perhaps natural that the FFI, having played an important and valuable role in behind-the-lines activities in the Allied invasion of France, should regard themselves as the nucleus of the new army of France and be reluctant to give their arms up. But de Gaulle already had at his disposal substantial forces from North Africa (mostly armed and equipped by the United States) and as a professional soldier he recoiled from the idea of building the new army from irregular and largely Communist-inspired guerrillas. Accordingly the Government decided to end the FFI's autonomy and to merge it into the army. This caused some outcry in the circles affected, but not so much as the decision to disband the *milices patriotiques* which was taken shortly afterwards (28 October 1944), without reference to the CNR. This was a direct challenge to the authority of the Communists, but the Government won, partly because they had the tacit backing of the bulk of the population, among whom the independent and sometimes terroristic activities of the *milices* were causing grave concern, and partly because the Communists themselves were still anxious to maintain the position that they had won as a patriotic, constitutional party.

Not unnaturally the question of the new French army lay very close to de Gaulle's heart. While the Resistance were vigorously defending against him their claim to provide the nucleus for this army, the General, in the wider sphere of the Grand Alliance, was equally vigorously pressing France's claim to take an active part in the last phase of the European war. Within a few weeks of his arrival in Paris he had reinstituted conscription, and various classes of young men were being called up for training. While the war lasted there were few objections to a very large share of the budget's being allotted to the armed forces, though the cost of

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 423–5.

maintaining 1 million men under arms was heavy for a country so disorganized. However, after the German surrender, protests against the continuance of this disproportionate allotment came not only from the Left—a quarter from which they might have been expected—but ultimately even from the 'party of fidelity', the MRP, which complained, in September 1945, that 2,700,000 Frenchmen were still in the armed forces or in service departments, while only 2,318,000 were engaged in reconstruction. This question was largely responsible for the crisis culminating in de Gaulle's temporary 'retirement' in January 1946.

De Gaulle's failure to tackle economic and financial problems during the crucial winter of 1944, when Frenchmen, in the first flush of liberation, might have put up with controls and austerity, was regarded by his friends and foes alike as a sadly lost opportunity. In this respect, indeed, France afforded a striking contrast to her neighbours, Holland and Belgium, where economic recovery from the impact made by the war was almost meteoric.[1] As in these other countries, the chief obstacle to economic recovery in France lay in lack of transport, through the destruction of railways and bridges, rolling-stock, locomotives, and shipping. The lack of transport in turn caused shortages of coal for fuel and for power to run industry and also lack of food in the cities. The fact that there were adequate supplies of food in rural districts was a cause of friction not only between town and country, but between class and class, because the black market continued to thrive comparatively unscathed. Meanwhile, as elsewhere, there was inflation of the currency, but, instead of adopting the drastic measures so successfully applied by the Dutch and Belgians, de Gaulle resorted to the palliative of raising wages by 30 per cent.—an increase which was quickly absorbed by the rising cost of living. When the Minister of Finance, Pleven, finally called in the inflated currency, it was too late, because he had refused to follow the Dutch and Belgian example[2] of immediately blocking bank accounts and imposing confiscatory taxation to hit the war profiteers. In effect, Pleven's measure amounted to no more than an exchange of notes.

In the realm of theory, however, de Gaulle started off in the most promisingly revolutionary style. On 12 September 1944, in his first speech in Paris after the city's liberation, he declared that in post-war France 'the great sources of common wealth will be exploited and directed, not for the benefit of a few, but for the advantage of all'.[3] In a speech at Lille on 1 October he declared that an '*économie dirigée*' was necessary; that it was 'no longer possible to allow the existence of those concentrations of interests known as trusts', and that 'the State should conduct the entire economic effort of the nation for the benefit of all, without necessarily

[1] See below, pp. 546, 552 seqq.

[2] See below, pp. 544, 562, note 2.

[3] *Le Populaire*, *Figaro*, 13 September 1944.

excluding private initiative and legitimate profit'.[1] An earnest of such intentions had already been given a few days earlier in the Government's decision provisionally to nationalize a certain number of coal-mines and to requisition the Renault factories.[2] The second of these two steps was a punitive measure of an exceptional kind, because the owner had been a 'collaborationist' under the occupation; but the Communists considered that the nationalization of the coal-mines should have been on similar lines—that is, outright expropriation of all the mines.

After this audacious start de Gaulle seemed to draw back, taking the line that a provisional régime was not competent to make fundamental changes in a nation's economic institutions. This caused much disappointment among the Left and the Resistance, who, in March 1945, brought renewed pressure to bear on him to carry out *réformes de structure*—in other words, nationalization of key industries—without delay. But de Gaulle put the building-up of national power first, and thought *réformes de structure* should at least await the election of a Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile, financial policy suffered from a difference of opinion between the Minister of Finance, Pleven, and the Minister of National Economy, Mendès-France (both later to become Premiers of France). The former inclined to 'classical' methods of *laissez-faire*, while the latter put forward a bold programme of drastic measures and controls designed to achieve economic stability and to accelerate recovery. After prolonged conflict Mendès-France resigned in disgust and Pleven took over his Ministry (April 1945). This ended the prospect of any really radical handling of current problems.

However, in a broadcast of 24 May 1945, after the local elections had indicated a marked Leftward trend,[3] de Gaulle promised that before the end of the year he would 'make decisions that will organically place in the hands of the state for the exclusive benefit of the nation the key industries—the production of coal and electricity . . . and also the control of credit, which will make it possible to direct the whole national economy'.[4] In

[1] See *France*, 2 October, *Figaro* and *The Times*, 3 October 1944. *L'Aube* (3 October 1944) said: 'At last here is something new. In his speech at Lille General de Gaulle surpassed in audacity the most audacious of our statesmen. He made a frontal attack on those great idols of the modern world—the trusts and capitalism.' But Marcel Bidoux, editor of *Le Populaire*, issued a warning (2 October 1944) that 'big finance' would stop at nothing to preserve their privileged positions. 'Already mysterious meetings have been held. It can even be said that a plot has been hatched against the régime.'

[2] See *Sunday Times*, 1 October 1944.

[3] The elections for municipal councils were held on 29 April 1945. They were the first municipal elections since 1935 and the first French elections of any kind in which women had exercised the franchise. Results were confused by the large number of coalition tickets and by the fact that some of the Resistance groups entered candidates not affiliated with the political parties. Nevertheless, a distinct Leftward trend was apparent.

[4] *The Times*, 25 May 1945. The latter part of the promise was implemented by the creation (under the law of 2 December 1945) of the *Conseil National du Crédit*, a consultative body presided

June he submitted to the Consultative Assembly proposals for state control of civil aviation and in July further proposals for a capital levy and a special levy on increases of wealth between 1940 and 1945. But even these measures fell far short of the desires of the Left. Blum, writing in *Le Populaire* (18 August 1945), said that the French people were dissatisfied because de Gaulle had 'failed to give them a clear programme for the present and a definite goal for the future'. The truth was that the General was being blamed for not being more in accord with the revolutionary mood of the moment, and was being reminded that his popular support rested upon his promise of profound social changes.

It was suggested at the time that de Gaulle's reluctance to embark upon radical social and economic changes was due to a fear of offending business or political opinion in the United States and of thereby compromising the chances of obtaining much-needed supplies of coal, food, and war materials.[1] But a more probable and simpler explanation is to be found, first, in his fundamental lack of interest in economic affairs and social problems, and, second, in his feeling that priority should be given to the rebuilding of the national power and prestige—'l'ascension vers la puissance', as he called it. His burning desire that France should again be a Great Power made him attach importance to rearmament and foreign policy, largely at the expense of reconstruction and home policy. His rearmament policy and its repercussions have already been mentioned; his foreign policy was at once more successful and less susceptible of misinterpretation. Indeed, its three main objectives could not but find favour with all French people and parties: the reconstitution of France as a Great Power; security such as to guarantee the safety of France in the future; participation in a world peace organization. Moreover, the main conditions of these requirements were adequately met. Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France; the Saar and part of Germany were allotted to her for occupation; and she gained representation on the Allied Control Council for Germany and on the Berlin Kommandantur, and also received a sector of Berlin to administer. Finally, she was given one of the five places in the Council of Foreign Ministers and became a member of the Security Council of the United Nations.[2]

One of the ways in which de Gaulle sought to restore his country to a front-rank role in world affairs was by endeavouring to make her a link

over by a member of the Cabinet, and with the Governor of the Banque de France as vice-chairman, which was endowed with certain powers for direct action through regulation of credit. In June 1945 there came into being also another extra-parliamentary advisory body, the *Conseil de l'Économie Nationale*, later superseded, under the Constitution of October 1946, by the *Conseil Économique* (see O. R. Taylor: *The Fourth Republic of France* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), pp. 60–62).

[1] See Patch: *France in Transition*, loc. cit. p. 172.

[2] For an account of the admission of France to these Councils see *Survey* for 1939–46: *America, Britain, and Russia*, pp. 477, 548–9, 593.

or an arbiter between the British and the Russians. Thus, immediately after assuming power in 1944, he went to Moscow and signed there, on 10 December 1944, a twenty-year treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.[1] On the other hand, the complementary step of negotiating a pact with Britain had to be postponed till Franco-British differences over Germany could be resolved, and was not finally achieved till more than a year after de Gaulle had left office.[2] The Russian treaty, apart from disarming de Gaulle's Left-wing critics, was undoubtedly in harmony with the general wish of the mass of the people. So, too, were his efforts to restore France to her former place as a Great Power. Indeed, if, after his return to France, there had been the slightest impression of his being tied to the apron-strings of a foreign Power, his period of prestige and authority would have been short. His very unpopularity in Washington and London, and his reputation there for being unaccommodating, stood him in good stead in his own country, whose recent sufferings and humiliations had induced in the people a like mood of assertiveness and independence.

(*d*) The Evolution of the Political Parties

(1) *State of Old Parties, Rise of New*

The most readily discernible change worked by the war upon French political life was the change in the character, size, and number of parties. Quite naturally, French political parties had always had a wholly different character from, for instance, British parties, but the most striking feature about them had been their number and their individual lack of effectiveness. It used to be said that in France the average politician felt that an ideal party would be one which included only himself plus enough voters to elect him to office. At any rate, there existed a plethora of parties often with virtually meaningless labels; parties which, when not frankly opportunistic, were often founded—and opposed to one another—upon comparatively trivial concepts and interests, rather than upon broad lines of doctrine or outlook. In the Chamber, therefore, where all these parties were represented in greater or lesser degree, it became necessary to make deals among them in order to ensure, if only temporarily, a working majority for the Government of the day. For the same reasons, changes of government seldom consisted of more than a reshuffling of Ministers in

[1] Churchill, vi. 226–7; U.S. edition, vi. 259–60. Stalin had kept Churchill informed, and had fallen in with his suggestion that the treaty should be a tripartite one, with Britain, as well as the Soviet Union and France, participating. The bipartite Franco-Soviet Treaty was concluded at de Gaulle's instance.

[2] The Treaty of Dunkirk was signed on 4 March 1947. Negotiations had begun in January on the initiative of Blum, who at that time was Premier, and who came to London specially for the purpose. For the text see Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between . . . the United Kingdom and the . . . French Republic, Dunkirk, 4th March, 1947*, Cmd. 7217 (London, H.M.S.O., 1947).

order to reflect fluctuations in the balance of opinion among the parties in the Chamber. The inherent weakness of the executive under the Constitution of the Third Republic was thereby increased, and governments, dependent upon the whims of the most diverse supporters, were rendered even more helpless and unstable.[1] However, there were certain corresponding advantages in these features. If governments fell easily they were at least quickly formed. The loose association of individuals inside a party and the correspondingly loose association of parties within a government fostered a type of brilliant, self-reliant politician so comparatively free from party ties that he could, at need, arbitrate on party disputes and preside easily over a coalition. The old order had the further advantage that, by constantly making compromise essential, it prevented the formation of massive, set, and irreconcilable blocs liable to discard democratic procedure in favour of force for the attainment of their ends. This was important for a nation which had so often been divided against itself.

By the end of the war most of the old French political parties were, in a greater or lesser degree, discredited, either on account of their identification with, and consequently supposed responsibility for, the events leading up to the war and the French defeat, or on account of the attitude of their members afterwards towards the Vichy régime, or for both these reasons. The second criterion for parties, as for individuals, was their connexion, if any, with the Resistance. A year after France's liberation, Léon Blum summed up this phenomenon in an article in *Le Populaire* (28 September 1945):

> The political parties have gained more or less favour with popular opinion according as they have been more or less impregnated with the spirit of the Resistance, or according as contact with elements of the Resistance has more or less modified their attitude.
>
> It is thus that I, for my part, interpret the setback of the radicals and of the old formations of the Right, and the striking advance of the MRP. The MRP is, in one sense, a conglomeration of old parties—the Catholic Right, the Centre Group—but it is one through all parts of which the radioactive current of the Resistance has freely passed.

On this test the Communist Party, which had held such a pre-eminent position in the Resistance Movement, was bound to emerge as the strongest

[1] One of the worst defects of this Constitution was the lack of any effective powers of dissolution. The procedure, provided in the Constitution of 1875, had been discredited at the outset by being used for partisan ends by Marshal MacMahon in 1877. It also required the consent of the Senate, which became increasingly unlikely, since senators thereby jeopardized their own entrenched positions. At the same time, it was always resisted by Left-wing elements in the Chamber as a threat to the control of the legislature over the executive. Hence a new government had no opportunity to gain a stable majority by appealing to the country. It had instead to rely on the support of the old Chamber. But it is probable that, as long as such a multiplicity of parties prevailed, no clearer issue could have been expected from general elections out of term than from the regular elections at the statutory periods.

of all, as, in fact, it did.[1] At the same time, the old Right-wing parties, such as the *Fédération Républicaine* and the *Alliance Démocratique*, which had never been very compact, inevitably emerged as the most seriously discredited and weakened, because so many of their leaders had rallied to Vichy. But even the great old parties of the Centre and Left suffered severe setbacks, not only because they bore the odium of having been in office on the eve of the war and defeat, but because even they could not pass the rigorous test of probity, in their demeanour towards Vichy and the occupation, that was exacted by the Resistance. Even the Radical-Socialist Party did not re-emerge untarnished, though in pre-war days it had enjoyed an immense support from small traders and independent peasantry, had held the balance in Parliament between Left and Right, and had always been ready to produce able Ministers for key posts in any coalition of the day. A high proportion of its parliamentarians had voted for Pétain in 1940, and, even though, later, many had repented, while some had even been killed or imprisoned by the common enemy, the Resistance record of the party as a whole was too insignificant to redeem the initial *faux pas*.

But, apart from these considerations, circumstances had changed to the disadvantage of a party constituted as had been the Radical-Socialists. Having always been a loose affiliation of personalities for election purposes rather than a closely knit organization, the Radical-Socialist Party could not, at first, hold its own alongside the big, strong, compact monoliths which had emerged in the post-war period. Without the venerable leadership of Herriot, who had been deported to Germany and did not return till mid-1945, its self-reconstitution as a party was necessarily a diffident and hesitant process. Moreover, events stultified its doctrines, for, although it had always been a reformist party, it had never been a revolutionary party—and the present mood was revolutionary. It was true that its opportunism twice led it even to contract an alliance with the Communists, based on a common distaste for de Gaulle's forceful personal leadership and for his hold on the country. But its persistent attachment to the concepts of nineteenth-century France and opposition to nationalization, or at least to the more extreme forms of planned economy,[2] eventually pushed it inevitably to the Right—all the more so after its 'Jacobinic' wing under Pierre Cot had sought and found close affiliation with the Communists, thus isolating the real core of the party and clarifying its ideology.

Next to its reformist zeal, the most striking feature of the Radical Party

[1] See above, pp. 489 seqq.

[2] The attitude of Mendès-France, Radical-Socialist Minister of National Economy in de Gaulle's Provisional Government, is the exception which necessitates some qualification of any generalization on this subject (see above, p. 497).

had been its anti-clericalism. But the old antithesis, religion versus democracy, had been blurred by the effects of the war, during which not only Catholics, but their priests and prelates as well, had swallowed their scruples and had joined forces with the most extreme elements of the Left in a common resistance to the invader and to his French tools. Indeed, after the war all parties were found to have slid to the Left, and even virtually conservative parties (like the MRP) were imbued with some degree of Socialism, though they were more inclined to stress spiritual and moral values than the real Left-wing parties, who were more materialist. Even a new monarchist party was moved by both opportunism and by fashion to style itself *Mouvement Socialiste Monarchiste*.[1]

Much more surprising, at first glance, was the wane of the Socialist Party, which, under the distinguished leadership of Léon Blum, had played such a dominant role in the years immediately before the war. Yet, like the Radical Party, the very fact that it had for so long participated in the control of affairs laid it open to recriminations about the country's unreadiness for war and about the mishandling of foreign policy, which could not but prove damaging to its prestige. Worse than this, more than half of the Socialist deputies in the old Chamber had voted full powers to Pétain in July 1940, although this party also had attempted to atone later by drastically purging itself to the extent of two-thirds of its pre-war deputies and senators and by achieving, as a whole, a very fine Resistance record. But there were even more fundamental reasons for the party's decline. In post-war France, with its revolutionary, extremist tone, the Socialists were bound to lose ground to the more dynamic, unscrupulous, and opportunistic Communists. Between the humanitarian Socialism of men like Blum and the totalitarian Communism of the post-war era there was indeed an unbridgeable moral abyss. The former thought in terms of the rights of man; the latter in terms of the unlimited rights of the state. Although the Socialists constantly reaffirmed their fidelity to the essential principles of Marxism, they nevertheless became more and more a reformist rather than a revolutionary party. Even in 1945 (at the Socialist Congress in August) Blum reaffirmed his belief in the international character of Socialism; yet, partly by inclination and partly by force of circumstances, it was he who, in France, had led it into the paths of nationalism—building up defence, forgetting the original creed of non-co-operation in defence and wars. He had decided that Socialism must achieve its ends by legal, parliamentary means, and that Socialism and democracy were indissolubly connected and that the one could not exist without the other. Still more sweeping were the claims made for the party by Daniel Mayer in *Le Populaire* (28 March 1946): 'The SFIO [*Section Française de l'Internationale*

[1] This party was founded in December 1944 and is distinct from the movement of the comte de Paris, the Pretender to the throne of France, which, in fact, disowned it.

Ouvrière: Socialist Party] is at the same time democratic and revolutionary, nationalist and internationalist.'

But such a laudable spirit of compromise was not in accord with the mood of post-war France, as soon became apparent in several ways.[1] Socialist influence in the trade unions dwindled until it could command little more than one-fifth of the votes in the Communist-dominated *Confédération Générale du Travail*; and this Communist domination of the unions was a process not so much of coercion as of persuasion through superior political skill. The French working man came by hard experience to identify Communist leadership with his own betterment, as, for example, in July 1946, when, by resolute leadership, the Communists won a 25 per cent. general increase in wages against the Government's freezing policy. Through their very tolerance of the forces on either side of them the Socialists ended by recommending themselves to neither and finding themselves ever more isolated and depleted. Thus, when a section of the party proposed a broad-based *Union travailliste*, another section objected that the admission to membership of bourgeois elements would drive the working-class element yet more irrevocably into the arms of the Communists. On the other hand, the hesitation to implement such proposals and the prolonged flirtation with the Communists alienated many Frenchmen of mildly Left-wing sympathies (who would formerly perhaps have rallied to the Radicals) and helped to swell the ranks of the new MRP party. The problem of union with the Communists was indeed a particularly agonizing one for the Socialists, because they still hugged the delusion that, since both were technically Marxian parties, there could not exist that immense gulf which had indeed opened between them during the last two decades.

In November 1944, on the occasion of the Socialist Congress in Paris, Professor Harold Laski reported that the Socialist Party in France were

> generally prepared for that unity if they could be convinced that, in the next few years, the French Communist Party would find its spiritual centre in Paris and not in Moscow. Delegate after delegate spoke to me of the way in which the working class was weakened by this fantastic division; but they were disturbed, as I think, rightly disturbed, by the way in which the Communist operates on one set of moral principles with other Communists, and another set which it is not easy to call ethical when he deals with people outside the party.[2]

Laski, at least, was aware of the moral abyss between the two Marxian parties, yet, like many another Socialist, he was loath to face the fact of

[1] Nor is it to be thought that it was necessarily in accord with the ideas of other Socialists—outside the circle of Blum, Mayer, and Moutet. Indeed, the lack of doctrinal unity among the Socialists themselves was another source of the party's weakness in this period (see Taylor: *The Fourth Republic of France*, p. 133).

[2] *New Statesman and Nation*, 25 November 1944. Cf. note 1 on p. 485 above quoting an extract from *The Economist*, 23 November 1946.

such a 'fantastic division'. He consoled himself, however, by reflecting that 'no one can doubt the living reality of the Socialist [movement] . . . it was impossible to mingle with the delegates and not feel that they are ready and eager for power'. Yet, here again, wishful thinking coloured his estimate, for the French Socialists were patently lacking in self-confidence at this time, especially since, like the Radicals with their Herriot, they had lost their guide and prophet through the deportation of Léon Blum, who did not return to France till the middle of 1945. However, in the very fact of the victimization of their leader by the Germans, as well as in his fine performance at the Riom Trial, both of which did much to blot out earlier disillusionments, the Socialist Party, as well as Blum himself, had certain initial assets whose value became manifest when Blum formed his highly successful 'caretaker' government in December 1946. This in turn led to his being succeeded by his fellow Socialist Ramadier, and it was not unconnected with the appointment of another veteran Socialist, Auriol, as first President of the new Republic.[1]

Because virtually all the pre-war parties—except the Communists—were weakened and discredited by the war and the occupation, there was a political vacuum ready to be filled at the end of the war, and this was done with considerable zest and success by a brand-new party[2]—the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP). The party had had a clandestine beginning during the occupation and had been conceived through the instinct of Georges Bidault and his friends (among whom Maurice Schumann and François de Menthon deserve special mention) that a new France would need a new party, founded on certain broad principles that made a permanent appeal to a large proportion of Frenchmen. First, it would be republican and would accept the legacy of 1789; secondly, without being at all professedly Catholic, it would have an attitude of respect towards moral and spiritual forces; thirdly, it would help in bringing to its logical conclusion the social and economic revolution produced by the development of machinery and the emergence of the proletariat—though this was to be done legally and without public disorder.[3]

When the new party was officially inaugurated in Paris in November 1944 a manifesto was adopted which affirmed its revolutionary aims. These included freedom of education, nationalization of key industries and credit, and the participation of the trade unions in the management

[1] See below, p. 521.

[2] That is, it was new in its present form; more precisely it was the amalgamation, expansion, and transformation of the pre-war Christian Social groups—the *Démocrates Populaires* and the *Jeune République*.

[3] The party organ, *L'Aube* (28 November 1944), declared that the new party 'sealed the union of all those who wish for the reconciliation of the traditions of the Rights of Man with Christian thought'.

of industry. For though the MRP enjoyed the support of the Catholic Church and of many Right-wing elements which endorsed its religious and educational policy, if not its social and economic ideas, the party was most anxious not to be identified with the idea of reaction, nor to be thought of as a 'Catholic Party'.[1] In the first phase of the war the vacuum in the French political scene was so large that the MRP could scarcely fail to gain immediate and immense support from many quarters; and, unlike most other parties, the MRP penetrated into all social strata from intellectuals to working class. The religious basis of its doctrine attracted many elements imbued with such feelings, including members of Catholic trade unions, while the boldness of its social outlook found favour with other large sections of the community. But its greatest recommendation lay in the fact that the spirit of the Resistance was manifest both in its personnel and in its doctrine. It also made much capital, at first, out of being the 'party of fidelity' to de Gaulle. After sheltering for a spell under the General's prestige the MRP decided that he had had his day and could in future only impede its advance as a progressive party because of his growing reputation of being a reactionary. But, to its dismay, it found that, as it broke off the connexion, the electorate began to turn its back on the party. When de Gaulle ultimately came forward with his own 'Rally', the movement away from the MRP was accelerated because many of its supporters now went over to him. This, in turn, seemed to impel the MRP to emphasize its differences with the General still more, presumably with the idea of stressing and preserving its own identity as a distinct political movement. But this, again, led to wholesale desertions, as well as to important individual resignations from the party.[2]

In order to offset its Gaullist and clerical connexion, the MRP collaborated with the Left Wing as far as it felt justifiable (and sometimes farther) both in the conduct of the Provisional Government and in the task of Constitution-making. But this, too, was a tight-rope-walking feat in which it sometimes lost its balance and sometimes nearly broke its neck. The Communists became progressively less accommodating and less congenial as partners, while at the same time the MRP's association with them frightened off an increasing number of the MRP's supporters. The Socialists, meanwhile, were far from being reliable allies, since they were haunted by the fear of offending their more extreme Left Wing by too close an association with the 'Gaullist-Catholic' MRP. The MRP did eventually, if belatedly, find the Communist-inspired First Draft of the Constitution more than it could stomach—even for the sake of compromise

[1] Conservatives scoffed at them as 'poissons rouges dans un bénitier', or as 'a party with a red head and a white tail'; Communists proclaimed that MRP really stood for 'Machine pour ramasser les Pétainistes', or 'Mensonge, Réaction, Perfidie' (Wright: *Reshaping of French Democracy*, p. 76).

[2] See below, p. 509. See also Taylor: *The Fourth Republic of France*, p. 108; Henry W. Shirmann: 'Political Forces in Present-Day France', *Social Research*, June 1948, p. 160.

and national unity. It accordingly left the Coalition and urged the electorate to reject the draft—which it duly did.[1] However, it sponsored the Second Draft, collaborated on it with the Socialists and Communists, swallowed many scruples in so doing, and, as became clear in the ensuing elections (November 1946), lost a great many supporters for its pains.[2]

As time went on another new party—the *Parti Républicain de la Liberté* (PRL)—began to assume a certain significance. The PRL was founded in December 1945 by a group of leading lawyer-politicians of the Right—Jules Ramarony, André Mutter, Joseph Laniel, and Frédéric Dupont—and it absorbed, either in whole or in part, the two most famous Right-wing groups of former days, the *Fédération Républicaine* and the *Alliance Démocratique*.[3] Until de Gaulle temporarily withdrew from public affairs in January 1946 the Right Wing in France was stagnant, disorganized, and unsure of itself, because it was not really sure what de Gaulle meant to do—although it probably felt instinctively that he was playing its game. Meanwhile, therefore, the limelight played solely upon the three main parties, which were historically all Left-wing parties, though for present purposes Communists, Socialists, and MRP became Left, Centre, and Right respectively. However, with the appearance of the PRL—a frankly anti-Communist party of the Right—the MRP found itself likely to become the Centre party, instead of the Socialists, who would now automatically be pushed farther to the Left, towards the Communists.

Moreover, the PRL, whose programme contained much the same mixture of progress-cum-conservatism as that of the MRP,[4] inevitably stole some of the MRP's thunder, because the MRP, being a member of the ruling coalition (which included Communists), could not be openly anti-Communist. Indeed, many of the MRP's supporters now felt that the PRL, rather than their own party, was defending the interests which they had most at heart. The PRL, for instance, declared itself firmly against nationalization, whereas MRP deputies voted in favour of it, regardless of the fact that many of their electors were opposed to it; and, apart from the Radicals, the PRL was the only party which offered a real, sustained, and comprehensive opposition to the First Draft Constitution. The PRL put forward its own draft and demanded a vote on it; but it was rejected by 286 votes to 37, with the MRP significantly abstaining.[5]

[1] See below, pp. 516–17.

[2] See below, p. 520.

[3] The other half of the *Alliance Démocratique* joined the *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines* (see below, p. 510).

[4] For a more comprehensive outline of the rather intricate stages leading up to the founding of the PRL see Taylor: *The Fourth Republic of France*, pp. 87 seqq. Among main points of its programme were: separation of powers, two-chamber legislature, strong executive. While being in general 'progressive' in its attitude towards economic and social questions the party opposed nationalization. It also favoured liberty of speech, thought, conscience, press, and education.

[5] 'Here at last is a conservative party with confidence in itself!', wrote the Paris correspondent of *The Economist* (9 March 1946), speaking of the PRL.

Nevertheless, at the general election for the second Constituent Assembly in June 1946,[1] the PRL committed partial *hara-kiri* by withdrawing from the election in thirty districts in order not to divide the anti-Communist vote, thus leaving the MRP with no competition on its right. The PRL therefore did not, in the long run, shift the balance of power among parties at all, nor have time effectively to change the voting behaviour of Frenchmen. In the result, indeed, the MRP emerged as the first party in France; but, in the light of this party's subsequent weakness—or obstinacy—over the Second Draft of the Constitution,[2] the PRL may well have regretted later its own self-abnegation.

A great blow was dealt to the MRP and the PRL by the formation of de Gaulle's Rally. Perhaps there had never really been enough common political ground between the leaders of the MRP and de Gaulle to render their marriage anything but one of temporary convenience. De Gaulle, indeed, had never aspired to be more than a passive partner in the union, although he was perhaps content at first that a party with such apparently congenial attributes should use him as its mascot. When they parted company it was the MRP, not the General, who was the loser.

From the very start, some of de Gaulle's followers had hoped that he would actively participate in the formation and leadership of a broad Gaullist *Rassemblement*, embracing all shades of opinion except the Communists at one end of the scale and the die-hard reactionaries at the other. But at first de Gaulle conceived of his role as simply that of a national symbol; he did not feel called upon to participate in the normal course of party politics or to attempt to influence their trends.[3] On 16 June 1946, however, the General emerged from his seclusion to make a significant speech at Bayeux on the prerequisites of the new Constitution, and his most devoted adherent, René Capitant, took this as his cue to form a party. Accordingly, there appeared upon the scene the 'Gaullist Union for the Fourth Republic', whose aim was to rally men of all parties who accepted the 'Bayeux Programme'[4] as a basis for the new France. The majority of de Gaulle's most prominent followers stood aloof from the Union, nor did he himself give it his blessing; he may have regarded it, however, as a useful *ballon d'essai*. From his personal point of view his caution was wise, for Capitant failed to sift the membership adequately, so that the Union became the refuge of many dubious, reactionary, and Vichyist elements,

[1] See below, p. 517.
[2] See below, pp. 518 seqq.
[3] See below, pp. 508, 514.
[4] The main points insisted upon by de Gaulle for a future Constitution were:
(1) a strong executive;
(2) a bicameral parliament—the upper chamber to represent territorial areas and professional and family groups;
(3) the French Union to be completely rebuilt on federal principles.
See also Wright: *Reshaping of French Democracy*, pp. 194–6.

thereby incurring the suspicion of being some kind of near-fascist league such as had become painfully familiar in pre-war days. Such doubts, coupled with bad leadership, rendered the Union ineffective and ultimately brought about its destruction. Moreover, originally the Gaullist Union was not really a political party, but a league, and, in that capacity, it contained members belonging to such diverse parties as the MRP, PRL, and *Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance* (UDSR). But, when the leaders of the Gaullist Union tried to make it more specifically political, difficulties arose because, while they, as a party, wished to reject both draft Constitutions, the MRP, as a party, collaborated on both drafts, and sponsored the second one to the bitter end.[1]

By the spring of 1947, therefore, both the domestic and the international stages seemed to be set for the re-entry, as a political leader, of a comparatively unsmirched de Gaulle. He had not hitherto committed himself on the Communist issue: like many other Frenchmen he had just striven for national unity and hoped for signs of better co-operation from the Communists—though he was no doubt less sanguine than some about a Communist change of heart. But now the American President, by the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, had given the signal for the opening of a world-wide counter-offensive against Communism, and in so doing had evoked a tremendous response from a frightened and helpless Europe. De Gaulle had now only to issue the call in France in order to have a good hope of being able to ride the tide against Communism at home and against Russia abroad. Accordingly, he declared that France could no longer be allowed to 'zigzag along the edge of an abyss', and assumed the leadership of a new movement, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF), with the declared purpose of building up nation-wide sentiment for constitutional revision. The new party did not, however, indicate clearly which were the articles in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic that it wanted to see altered. Its objections were perhaps necessarily vague, considering the width of the appeal which it was intended to have and its founder's reliance on *mystique*; but they were indicated in such slogans as 'a strong state', 'separation of powers', 'end to party anarchy', 'rally of France to herself', &c. Nevertheless, two familiar and highly characteristic features emerged: first, mistrust, or non-comprehension, of political division as the basis of true democratic government, and reliance on the popular referendum for the cutting of Gordian knots;[2] secondly, a predilection for the American presidential system.[3]

[1] See below, pp. 518–19.

[2] '. . . The present system, under which rigid and opposing parties share all the powers, must therefore be replaced by another, under which the executive power proceeds from the country and not from the parties, and in which every insoluble conflict is resolved by the people itself' (General de Gaulle: statement to the press, 14 April 1947).

[3] 'As to the Executive; the Head of the State must be elected in such a way that he is the

Within one month of its foundation the RPF had enrolled 1 million members, and in the municipal elections of October 1947 it won 38½ per cent. of the seats—more than half the MRP's former voters deserting to the Gaullist camp. The remnants of the Gaullist Union adhered *en masse*, the unfortunate Capitant being degraded to the ranks, while an ex-Socialist anthropologist, Jacques Soustelle, became Secretary-General. The former Communist André Malraux was also one of the General's closest collaborators in the movement. Indeed, as with other parties of authoritarian character, the strength of the RPF largely lay in an amalgamation of heterogeneous and, to some extent, once mutually hostile elements. The rank and file of the movement contained some of the same elements as had earlier sought salvation in the MRP, and afterwards in parties still farther to the Right, like the PRL, as soon as these parties had made their appearance. These elements were recruited from the clergy, the small bourgeoisie, and the well-to-do farmers. The clergy, in particular, joined the RPF in large numbers, though the landslide, even among them, was far from being complete. The common motive of these diverse recruits to the RPF was their antagonism to Communism—the enemy whom at last it was possible for them and for their leader to name and to expose.[1] Nor were the Communists slow to take up the challenge; they paid the RPF the compliment of forming *Comités de Vigilance* especially to combat its influence and activities. The movement likewise aroused the hostility of the Socialists and did not even find favour with the MRP,[2] who could not contemplate amalgamating with it after their long liaison with the Communists, yet dared not forswear their former patron saint to the extent of taking up arms against him. They therefore forbade their members to join the *Comités de Vigilance*. But, for better or worse, and despite all the MRP's gestures, the RPF automatically absorbed the latter's Right Wing and Centre, ate up at least two-thirds of the old Radical-Socialist Party, and blotted out the existence, as independent units, of the three extreme Right-wing parties. It thus emerged as the major and practically the only party of the Right; and the way was prepared for the ultimate division of French politics among three forces: Communists, Gaullists, and the so-called 'Third Force'.

The old centre parties had not been entirely content to be squeezed out of existence by the monoliths. There were still elements among them

representative, not of a group of parties, but of nothing less than France herself together with the French Union, in whose interests he must form a government in which certain Ministers have responsibilities of federal scope' (General de Gaulle: speech at Bordeaux, 15 May 1947 (*Le Monde*, 17 May 1947)).

[1] 'National unity is imperilled through the existence of a group of men whose leaders place above everything else the service of a foreign Power' (General de Gaulle: speech at Rennes, 28 July 1947 (*Le Monde*, 29 July 1947)).

[2] Robert Lecourt, chairman of the parliamentary MRP, wrote in *L'Aube* (29 April 1947): 'Le destin de Charles de Gaulle doit être de rassembler la nation, non d'en briser l'unité.'

which could not find a spiritual home either in the extreme parties of Left or Right, or even in the MRP, whose catholicism on the one hand and socialism on the other were both repugnant to the anti-clerical individualism of the old radicals. Accordingly, in April 1946, a Centre bloc known as the *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines* had been formed round the core of the old Radical-Socialist Party, together with the Independent Radical Party, the *Jeune République*, and the more moderate part of the Right-wing *Alliance Démocratique*.[1] To give this amalgam the requisite up-to-date Resistance flavour, elements of the leading Resistance party, the UDSR, had been induced to join. But it still had the faults which the old parties, like the Radical-Socialists, had had as individuals —that is to say, it was only a loose association of the parties to facilitate electioneering, but not a match in any real sense for the disciplined, streamlined parties of the day. It was not until two of these—the MRP and the Socialists—found themselves likewise in the no man's land between the extremist colossi that a more or less effective buffer bloc could be formed, with a better claim to the title of 'Third Force'.

(2) *De Gaulle and the Parties in the Struggle over the Constitution*

This rather rapid simplification of the structure of French political life was enhanced and accelerated partly by the new electoral system which de Gaulle had introduced and partly by the inevitable manœuvring attendant upon the creation of a new Constitution. The prevailing mood after the liberation favoured 'pure' proportionalism as the basis for France's future elections, though there were strongly entrenched minorities with other views. One minority, led by the Radical-Socialists, favoured a return to the Third Republic's 'Second Ballot' system;[2] another, led by René Capitant, favoured the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon system of election by mere plurality. De Gaulle, however, struck a compromise which at first seemed to please no one. This was a modified system of proportional representation based on that used in Belgium and Sweden, under which voting was for party lists, and votes cast for unsuccessful lists were lost—not, as in Weimar Germany, collected into a national pool.[3] The latter feature tended to favour any party with a strong local influence and gave some grounds for the complaint that the power of the well-to-do peasantry

[1] The rest of the *Alliance Démocratique* had been absorbed in the PRL.

[2] This system provided for a second ballot where no candidate received a clear majority in the first ballot. In practice it had redounded greatly to the advantage of the Radical-Socialists; it allowed a variety of parties or individuals to try their luck in the first ballot, with coalitions forming round compromise candidates (which the opportunistic Radical-Socialists were well suited to be) in the second ballot.

[3] See Taylor: *The Fourth Republic of France*, pp. 23–24, 26–30. But in those few constituencies which returned only one member the old system of *scrutin uninominal majoritaire* (one candidate elected by simple majority) survived from the Third Republic, which had likewise used two systems concurrently.

and small bourgeoisie was being perpetuated at the expense of the urban and industrial communities, and that the radical trend now sweeping France was being thereby frustrated. But its general effect was to slow down any trend towards either a two-party system on the one hand or any further increase of parties on the other. It therefore contributed to the growth of a new political pattern, with four or five strong party machines replacing the undisciplined and flexible formations of pre-war days. Indeed, to a large extent the new system virtually permitted the party leaders or party 'machine' to designate whomsoever they wished as deputies to parliament. The voter voted for the party, and the party designated the candidates to be elected.[1]

The second factor influencing the evolution of the parties—the constitutional struggle—was by no means solely of de Gaulle's choosing. The Resistance Movement was, as already indicated, strongly permeated by the Communists, and the Communists backed the popular demand for a new Constitution because, by doing this, they were able simultaneously to remove suspicions that they had unconstitutional leanings and to gain a chance of obtaining a Constitution which they could dominate and manipulate for their own ends. But de Gaulle also represented the Resistance, and he also supported the move for a new Constitution—or at least for some revision of the old one. This was partly because he was genuinely anxious to fall in with the wishes of the French people and needed to give the lie to innuendoes that he was aiming at a dictatorship, and partly because he saw in it the opportunity to revise those features of the old Constitution which had, in his opinion, so greatly contributed to France's recent eclipse. On the broadest lines, therefore, it could be said that there was a community of interests and purpose between the Communists and de Gaulle; but when it came to detail there was a yawning gulf. Each of these twin symbols of the Resistance possessed individually too much prestige and determination for one to swamp the other or for the pretence to be maintained for long that they necessarily had the same ideas as to how the renascence of France was to be achieved. So, after a brief attempt to play the parts temporarily imposed upon them, they relapsed into a natural, naked, mutual hostility.

The open struggle began when, on 31 May 1945, de Gaulle suddenly announced that, since the war was over and prisoners and deportees were returning, elections for a Constituent Assembly should be held as soon as possible, viz. in October of that year. Shortly afterwards, at a press conference, he suggested that, on the question how and by whom the future

[1] On the other hand, in a great many districts, especially the smaller ones, the name at the head of the ticket was of great importance—perhaps even more than the party label. Taken in conjunction with the exception mentioned in the preceding note, this differentiated the French from otherwise similar systems.

Constitution was to be made, there were three different schools of thought. The first school insisted that the 1875 Constitution was still valid and that all that was necessary was to elect under its provisions a Parliament which could, if it so wished, revise it; the second held that a completely sovereign Constituent Assembly should be elected to evolve an entirely new Constitution; while the third proposed that a 'corseted' Assembly with restricted powers and a limited term should be brought into being for the purpose, and that its limitations should be laid down by the Provisional Government and be ratified by means of a referendum. Though de Gaulle intimated that he himself was impartial, the Left were profoundly shocked, nevertheless, that he should still entertain for a moment the thought of a return to the Third Republic, and they also violently opposed the idea of a referendum. And then, very soon after this perfunctory gesture of impartiality, de Gaulle shocked the Left much more by quite uncompromisingly stating his own position and preference. On 7 July he told the Cabinet that he was resolved at all costs to prevent the election of a fully sovereign Assembly which might get out of hand and cause anarchy and chaos. Hence, his own choice was a Constituent Assembly limited by the verdict of a referendum, though, if the people expressed a preference—again through the referendum—to use the 1875 machinery, he would not stand in the way. In the former case the Assembly's term would be limited to seven months, and during that period it would not be able to overthrow the Cabinet. It would elect the new Provisional President, but would not be able to get rid of him thereafter.

Though the Left were naturally scared by these hints of presidential government, even the Communist and Socialist Ministers were still prepared, for the sake of solidarity, to give formal approval to the plan; but in the country at large protests were so loud that de Gaulle climbed down and allowed a third choice in the referendum—that of a fully sovereign Assembly. This might have mollified the Left had not de Gaulle made it clear that he was going to throw his personal weight into the scales in favour of 'corseting' the future Assembly. The veteran Socialist Vincent Auriol then produced a compromise plan, which was rejected by the moribund Consultative Assembly—no longer in a mood to hear anything of any referendum—but was adopted by de Gaulle, who was not bound by the Assembly's decision. The Auriol plan proposed that the President should not be guaranteed seven months' independence, but should be responsible to the Constituent Assembly throughout. On the other hand, in order not to weaken the executive too much, the Auriol plan provided that the Government should be subject to being overthrown only by a direct vote of censure taken in the Constituent Assembly after two days' notice; the mere defeat of a government proposal was not automatically to necessitate the Government's resignation.

Thus, on the whole, the first election campaign was fought not so much on the issue of what kind of Constitution there was to be, as on the issue of the character and powers of the body which was to evolve that Constitution. When the French electors went to the polls few of them had any clear idea as to the kind of Constitution which they wished to be brought into being by the men whom they were electing. Except for the Communists, all the new or reorganized parties had barely had time to evolve or readjust their doctrines. However, on two fundamental issues the three leading parties of the Resistance—Communists, Socialists, and MRP—held concordant views from the beginning; first, all insisted that France needed a new Constitution rather than a revision of the old one; secondly, all joined in rejecting the American presidential style of government. At the same time, as we have seen, the other great element of the Resistance, de Gaulle, had ideas, backed by considerable influence, which cut right across this apparent unanimity of the parties. This fact became abundantly clear in the results of the referendum, which took place simultaneously with the elections in October 1945.

The three great parties won a nearly equal number of seats in the Constituent Assembly,[1] and the Communists became the numerically strongest party by a narrow margin; but while 96 per cent. of the voters in the referendum rejected a return to the Third Republic, two-thirds of them ratified Auriol's plan for a modified 'corseting' of the Constituent Assembly and rejected the idea of an omnipotent Assembly. Thus, the significant fact was that, on one and the same day, the French people had voted their confidence in de Gaulle by referendum, and had made the Communists the strongest party in the state by their choice of deputies. Furthermore, neither de Gaulle nor the Communists would have been in this situation had it not been for the part that each had played, not only in leading the fight against the invader but, in their wholly individual and different ways, in giving a new impulse and a new vitality to French politics.

The extent of de Gaulle's personal victory was soon apparent when it came to forming a government. First, he formally handed his resignation to the newly elected Constituent Assembly and was at once unanimously re-elected Provisional President. Then he flatly refused a claim from the Communists that they, in virtue of having won more seats in the Assembly, were entitled to have first choice of the key posts in the Cabinet. The temperature rose, and the Communists repudiated any further allegiance to de Gaulle and demanded the presidency for their leader, Maurice Thorez. De Gaulle again proffered his resignation; but the MRP, who held a key position, refused to enter any Cabinet not headed by de Gaulle. Then, suddenly, all parties to the dispute seemed to be sobered by its dangerous implications and rapidly reached a compromise whereby

[1] Communists, 151 seats; MRP, 150 seats; Socialists, 139 seats.

Cabinet posts were to be 'equitably distributed' among the three parties. But it was significant that the Communists acquiesced in a cunning ruse of de Gaulle's whereby the Ministry of National Defence was split into two parts called 'Armaments' and 'Armies', and 'Armaments' alone were handed over to the Communists, while de Gaulle retained the title of Minister of National Defence, along with his presidential-prime-ministerial functions.

However, for all de Gaulle's apparent victory, a new phase had opened in which he was soon to find himself faced with the choice of forsaking his Olympian peak and descending into the arena of party politics or else withdrawing from politics altogether. Within a surprisingly short time he had chosen the latter course. Increasing quarrels between him and the Assembly over his financial and military policies, and his open dissatisfaction with the radical features of the Assembly's draft proposals for a new Constitution, culminated on 22 January 1946 in his 'definitive' resignation and 'strategic' retirement from public life. He was succeeded as Provisional President by the Socialist Félix Gouin; a three-party coalition was again formed, but de Gaulle's supporters were eliminated from the Cabinet.

De Gaulle had always hoped to see collaboration between the Socialists and the MRP, and, through this, the emergence of a central, moderating force in French politics. As a result of the election the Socialists held the balance; if they coalesced with the MRP they would have a clear majority over other parties, but if they coalesced with the Communists the majority would be even bigger. The Communists were naturally concerned to prevent the former combination and to bring about the latter. All this jockeying for position took place during the gestation period of the new Constitution, and, therefore, inevitably at its expense in the long run. Although the Constitution was not drafted by the Constituent Assembly as a whole, but by a special committee of forty-two, seats in this committee were assigned in accordance with the strength of parties, i.e. Communists twelve, MRP twelve, Socialists eleven, others seven. So here again the Socialists held the key position, though in a less enviable sense than might at first appear. Both Marxian parties agreed that the legislature should be unicameral, that the Premier should be elected by the Legislative Assembly, and that the President of the Republic should be stripped of all effective powers. On the other hand, the Socialists joined with the MRP to defeat the Communists in their attempt to make the future legislative Assembly all-powerful. The second cause of conflict with the Communists was the Socialist-MRP desire to write into the Constitution a 'party statute', with other devices designed to submit French political parties to a certain degree of control and, especially, to prevent anti-democratic parties from taking advantage of democratic liberties in order to stultify or destroy the new Republic.

Meanwhile, the Communists put heavy pressure on the Socialists to bring them round to a new recognition of their fundamental affinity with themselves, and by a shrewd public campaign they made the Socialists anxious not to be tarred as 'reactionaries'. At the same time the MRP became more exacting in its attitude towards the Socialists and more intolerant of the occasions when the latter supported the Communists. In the end, therefore, the Socialists gave in to Communist solicitations to shape a common constitutional policy (16 January 1946), and once again de Gaulle's hope of the formation of a centre bloc coherent enough to hold the balance was frustrated. Moreover, if an open breach and deadlock were to develop between Left and Right, France faced the prospect of either an outright Left-wing Constitution or none at all.

The Socialists were those who stood to lose most if the country were thus split, because, unless they could bridge the gap, they were bound to lose in stature by going over to one side or the other. This was apparent to Vincent Auriol, who tried with almost inexhaustible patience to reach compromises. Neither did the Communists really want the Constitution to founder; at least, they attached great importance to having their type of draft accepted by the country, as a mighty stepping-stone to power by 'legal' means. For the MRP, on the other hand, there might be distinct advantages in leading the fight against an unpopular Draft Constitution, and for this reason it was not afraid to force a show-down.

Hence, when the Socialists joined the Communists in throwing out a clause for testing the constitutionality of laws by referendum—a clause which had earlier been agreed upon between the MRP and the Socialists—the MRP brought matters to a head. When the Socialists and Communists refused to give way, the MRP refused any longer to sponsor the Draft Constitution (3 April 1946). A few days later, when a MRP amendment to make the Council of the French Union a second Chamber of Parliament was also defeated by the Communist-Socialist combination, the breakdown of three-party co-operation was complete. Auriol made desperate eleventh-hour attempts to patch things up between the parties and secure a compromise, but the Communists brusquely rejected his proposals. When, therefore, the Assembly met for the final vote on 19 April there was no longer any hope of unanimity over the Constitution, and the draft was passed by 309 to 249 in the teeth of the MRP.

As a result of having undergone an extremely radical, and even Marxian, pre-natal influence, the draft provided for a sovereign national Assembly as the sole legislative organ and swept away most of the traditional checks and balances on its power. So far from dividing legislature, executive, and judiciary, it made the second and third wholly dependent on the first. The Assembly was to be everything, and, inside the Assembly, things were to be so disposed that there would be no serious obstacles to the will of the

largest party. Furthermore, a 'Declaration of Rights' was appended to this Constitution which also aroused grave misgivings in certain influential sections of public opinion. For the Declaration did not guarantee the absolute right of property (it restricted this right in certain circumstances); it did not guarantee 'liberty of instruction'; and it did not give a flat guarantee of liberty of the press. The first of these omissions aroused fears of expropriation among owners of land, and caused the *Fédération nationale de la propriété agricole*, claiming to represent some 5 million farmers and peasant proprietors, to advise its members to vote 'No' in the referendum. The second brought the Church up in arms, declaring that no Catholic could accept the Constitution without a definite pledge safeguarding Church schools. The third could, of course, readily be interpreted as a major threat to democracy.

In face of so many challenges to their professed ideals, and in reach of so many potential levers for their own advancement, the reactions of the MRP might well appear inept and vacillating. The party was sincerely trying to drag the mass of conservative voters towards a more central position in which governmental stability and a progressive social policy could be simultaneously assured, but during these first months of Constitution-making it had little to record save a series of unreciprocated concessions. Chief among these were that the party should withdraw the demands that the Prime Minister should be appointed by the President of the Republic instead of by the Assembly; that minority parties should be assured of their due rights within the Constitution; that voting should be compulsory; and that the electoral law should be embodied in the Constitution so as to make alterations in it subject to a referendum. Again, for one reason or another, valuable months went by before the MRP threw down the gauntlet in the Assembly in support of the demand that there should be two Chambers, not one; yet, when they did, they gained a measure of support that obviously went far beyond their expectations as well as far beyond their numerical party strength, for they came within twenty-six votes of winning their amendment. Finally, anxious though they were to receive the Church's blessing and to attract the Catholic vote, they ended by accepting a compromise on the question of education. Since they could not persuade the Left to guarantee freedom of instruction outright, they assented to a Left-wing offer to drop out a phrase describing education as a public service. This omission meant, by implication, that Church schools would not be closed and that the current *modus vivendi* (operation of Church schools, but without subsidies) would be maintained. Nevertheless, the compromise nearly lost the MRP the support of the Church there and then, and probably was one of many shortcomings which did cost it that support in the long run.

The country had the final word on the Draft Constitution, and when a

referendum on it was held, on 5 May 1946, 53 per cent. of the electorate rejected the draft. This vote was in very large measure due to the influence of the two elements which those responsible for both Government- and Constitution-making—including the MRP—had consistently underestimated: de Gaulle and the Church. In the last stages, indeed, the MRP had campaigned vigorously against the draft. The Left had been overconfident, partly because France had never been known to vote 'No' in a plebiscite, and partly because of the results of the last elections; and the Communists had committed a strategic blunder by suggesting that it was time for France to try a government headed by themselves, and by reviving the old battle-cry of *Thorez au pouvoir!* This opened the eyes of many (especially Socialists) who had hitherto been deceived by the apparent 'correctness' of the Communist demeanour, but who now became convinced that the Communists had simply been trying to force through the kind of Constitution that would be most likely to facilitate their seizure of power in France. Thus the referendum, in the eyes of many, had turned into a plebiscite for or against the Communist Party. Yet, on the whole, there was little homogeneity about the vote against the draft. The electorate was confused by the fact that elections for a new Constituent Assembly followed on the heels of the referendum, and in many cases indignation at the failure of the Government to improve material conditions—especially the food supply—found a natural, if illogical, expression in opposition to the Draft Constitution.

(3) *The Second Round*

In spite of its earlier vacillations and eleventh-hour 'seeing of the light', it was the MRP who reaped the electoral benefit of the various currents of opinion which had combined to reject the First Draft Constitution. For, in the ensuing elections for a Second Constituent Assembly on 2 June 1946, it won 166 seats, thus supplanting the Communists in the role of being the strongest party. The MRP leader, Georges Bidault, also succeeded Gouin as Provisional President-Premier. The Communists dropped to second place, although, considering the fiasco of their tactics over the referendum, it was significant proof of their tenacity, good organization, and propaganda that they should have retained 146 seats. The Socialists paid dearly for their haverings between the other two great parties, for their representation declined to 127 seats. Exactly as in the referendum, 47 per cent. of the voters backed pro-Constitution candidates, i.e. Socialist or Communist, while 53 per cent. voted for those parties which had opposed the Constitution; but no single party in any modern French election had previously attained the MRP total of 28·2 per cent. of the popular vote.

Through its collaboration with the Socialists in the early days of Constitution-making, the MRP undoubtedly lost some conservative votes to various Right-wing groups,[1] but it more than recouped itself by absorbing a considerable proportion of the floating vote which hovered round the political centre. So far, indeed, the party had shifted its centre of gravity slightly away from the Right; and it was by no means sorry to move in this direction, now that de Gaulle's withdrawal from the scene had made this move feasible. Moderate elements, loath to fritter away their votes on small uncertain parties, were impressed by the Christian socialism, the solid appearance, and the scrupulously conducted election campaign of the MRP. Thus the tendency towards monolithism[2] was accentuated and accelerated.

It was with an eye to this section of moderate opinion, which had hoisted it into the first place in the state, that the MRP shaped its attitude to the Second Draft Constitution. De Gaulle, the Radicals, and the Right all demanded a fresh start. De Gaulle, in his Bayeux speech of 16 June 1946,[3] had gone so far as to outline what he considered should be the main features of any future Constitution. But the MRP unhesitatingly voted, along with the Left, to revise rather than to replace the First Draft, and, even if it inwardly sympathized with de Gaulle's ideas, it preferred for reasons of expediency to aim for the *juste milieu* in the way of a Constitution in order to satisfy all parties, except perhaps the extreme Left and extreme Right. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Committee unanimously adopted two changes which appeared to be implicit in the vote expressed in the recent referendum, although both these were curtailed by important reservations. First, though the bicameral principle was confirmed, it was expressly stipulated that the Upper House should not be authorized or enabled to overthrow governments. Secondly, the President of the Republic was given back the traditional right of naming the Premier, though the Left insisted that the Premier would have to be approved by the Assembly before he could proceed to form a Cabinet. Otherwise, the Second Draft did not differ very vitally from the First, and, although the executive was slightly strengthened, in the Second, as in the First, the last word was left to the Assembly.

The Second Draft was almost entirely the product of the joint efforts of the MRP and the Socialists. Consequently, just as had happened over the First Draft, when a vote was taken on it in the Constitutional Committee on 2 August 1946 one major party refused to sponsor it—only this time it was the Communists, who declared that 'the project exceeds the limits of reasonable compromise'. Soon afterwards came a rumble of thunder on

[1] In spite of an intensive campaign the PRL failed to improve its position—winning only thirty-two seats, as compared with its thirty-seven in the previous Assembly.

[2] See above, pp. 481–2.

[3] See above, p. 507, note 4.

the other flank. In a statement to the press on 27 August 1946 de Gaulle expressed his outright rejection of the new Draft and demanded much more substantial powers for the President and the Upper House. This caused great embarrassment in the MRP, who still liked to be known on the one hand as the 'party of fidelity' (to de Gaulle) and, on the other, as a progressive party. At the same time, it cut the ground from under the feet of the Communists, who could no longer pretend that the MRP was sponsoring a draft made to please de Gaulle and to facilitate his return to power. Great, however, was the resentment and disillusionment of the Socialists. But René Capitant was overjoyed, and the membership of his Gaullist Union soared in the expectation that de Gaulle would now make of it his personal party and instrument.

But in the end de Gaulle's intervention had the ironical effect of rallying all major parties in support of the Draft Constitution. It enabled the MRP to shake off the hypnotic influence of the General, to collaborate more freely with the Socialists, and at least to compromise with the Communists. At the same time the Communists chose to compromise with the MRP rather than run the risk of bringing de Gaulle back to power by a third Constituent Asssembly. But because the MRP did, in fact, hanker after bringing de Gaulle back as President of the Republic, and for this reason wanted to retain the secret ballot for the election of a President, and because the Communists were aware of this, the Draft nearly came to grief through a last-minute split. But the situation was once again saved by Vincent Auriol, who proposed that this and other controversial points should be omitted from the Constitution and should be left to be settled by the future legislature in 'organic laws'. Meanwhile, there was to be a 'gentlemen's agreement' that the First President of the Fourth Republic should be chosen 'in accordance with republican tradition', which meant, in effect, by secret ballot. The Assembly then passed the Draft Constitution by 440 votes to 106 (29 September 1946).

It now remained for the nation at large to pass its verdict on the Second Draft Constitution. But, before it did so, de Gaulle had another message for it. Twelve hours after the Assembly had adopted the Constitution, he made a speech at Épinal repudiating it completely and restating his own constitutional doctrines.[1] He was supported by the Radicals and the Right, and, of course, by the Gaullist Union. The MRP was again acutely embarrassed. It still sponsored the Draft and yet hoped that de Gaulle would not excommunicate it outright for so doing, and so lose it the votes of many Gaullists. It therefore tried to convey the impression that it thought it best to adopt the Constitution in order to stabilize the country, and then to proceed to revise it later, and that de Gaulle was in sympathy with this idea. But this idea was entirely repudiated by

[1] See Wright: *Reshaping of French Democracy*, p. 224.

de Gaulle in the press on 10 and 11 October; he said that the referendum was a vital question for the country. The adoption of this Constitution would mean anarchy in France. He declared that the Assembly had made the President a phantom, perhaps because of the fear that Charles de Gaulle might one day become President of the Republic. At this the MRP was put out of countenance, and there were some important resignations from the party. Simultaneously certain scandals came to light concerning corruption among politicians of the Left (including, allegedly, even Gouin). For a moment it seemed as if the tide might turn against the Second Draft Constitution, as it had turned against the First.

When the referendum on the Second Draft was held on 13 October 1946 it was adopted; but, nevertheless, the results were a striking testimony to de Gaulle's continuing influence and to the success of his strategy. He could now offer plausible evidence that 64 per cent. of all Frenchmen were hostile to the new Constitution; for, while 9 million had voted for it, 8 million had voted against it and 8 million had abstained;[1] and this was certainly not an enthusiastic endorsement. Many MRP voters had followed the General's advice and voted 'No', and the party now found itself at the cross-roads. One section was strongly in favour of going completely over to de Gaulle; these felt that the 'Yes' campaign had been a mistake and that the party ought to have no more to do with the Communists. However, the majority were in favour of holding to the same line as heretofore, even if this meant breaking with de Gaulle completely and consequently seeing the party diminish in size.

When the elections for the first parliament of the Fourth Republic were held, on 10 November 1946, the most striking result was not so much the slight setback to the MRP (it still won 162 seats), but the substantial advance of the Communists, who won 171 seats, and the fall, from a position of near-parity with the other two great parties, of the Socialists, who now sank to 102 seats.[2] This meant the disintegration of the Centre, and a step in the country's progress towards extremes. It is true that, for the moment, there was no coherent, true Right Wing, but the very fact of the Communists' formidable advance was bound to produce one by bringing all the anti-Communist forces together.

Meanwhile, out of fear of the Communists, and of the clash of extremes, there was born a desperate desire for moderation which temporarily redounded to the advantage of the shattered Socialists and ultimately led to the welding together of something like a buffer bloc. Bidault, who had

[1] At least part of the big abstention was no doubt due to confusion of mind, boredom, and inertia after so many elections and referenda in so short a time.

[2] At this election the Socialist Party lost ¾ million votes, and, in 1947, 50,000 of the hard core of the Socialist Party membership failed to renew their party cards. By the end of 1948, two-thirds of the party membership had dissolved, and the great Socialist newspaper *Le Populaire* had become nearly bankrupt.

held the three key posts of Provisional President, Premier, and Foreign Minister, took the preliminary step of resigning from the latter two in order to permit the National Assembly to fill them. Thereupon the Communists, as the largest party, put up Maurice Thorez as their candidate for Premier; but it was significant that he was unable to muster a majority of votes. A dangerous deadlock then ensued, and this was broken only on 12 December 1946, when the veteran Socialist leader Léon Blum was persuaded to emerge from retirement and to try to form a Cabinet. It was a measure of the mood of the moment that he received 575 out of 590 votes cast for the Premiership, and that he received the consent of both Communists and MRP to form a Cabinet composed entirely of Socialists to carry on the Government until the election of the President and the establishment of the first constitutional Cabinet of the Fourth Republic. Now, for practically the first time since the liberation, the Cabinet worked with a single heart and mind, which they applied firmly and consistently to the solution of current problems. A programme of economic stabilization through freezing wages and reducing prices met with general scepticism at first, but then, to the general amazement, Blum's call for an immediate 5 per cent. cut in prices actually brought results. When Blum left office the prestige of the Socialist Party, as well as his own, had risen sharply.[1]

The new Constitution[2] went into effect on 24 December 1946, and, since de Gaulle had announced that he would not compete, Vincent Auriol, Socialist chairman of the National Assembly, was elected first President of the Fourth Republic at a joint session of both Chambers on 16 January 1947. Auriol then selected his fellow Socialist Paul Ramadier to form a Cabinet. Ramadier endeavoured to broaden the old three-party coalition, which by now had worn a little thin, into a four-party coalition by the inclusion of the *Rassemblement des Gauches*,[3] but three months sufficed to wreck the quadripartite experiment. The pressure of outside events forced to the surface the fundamental divergences of outlook and allegiance between parties, which expediency, policy, and sentiment had temporarily obscured. Unrest was rampant in every corner of the French Union. Open rebellions broke out in Indo-China and Madagascar; unrest was developing in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; there were rumours of separatist movements even in Tropical Africa and in Tahiti. In accordance with their hypocritical policy of encouraging native nationalist movements, the Communists wanted to accept the rebels' terms at any price, while their colleagues in the Government (including even the Socialists) felt that, if any vestige of French influence were to be preserved, force must be met

[1] See above, pp. 502, 504.

[2] For an account of the constitutional struggle see Dorothy M. Pickles: *French Politics, the First Years of the Fourth Republic* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), pp. 33–46.

[3] See above, p. 510.

with force. However, the Communists, realizing the general unpopularity of their policy—it was the first time since the liberation that they had risked defying the main current of traditional national sentiment—did not yet force matters to a head on this issue, but chose a more popular cause for the actual show-down.

The Ramadier Government had carried on with Blum's stabilization policy, which entailed a long-term freezing of wages; but, while the programme seemed to be proving effective in stabilizing the currency, it showed itself less successful in reducing the cost of living. The workers began to feel that they were bearing the whole burden of the stabilization policy. A series of strikes broke out; the Communists supported the strikers and condemned the Blum plan; and eventually, after a grim struggle with Ramadier, they were forced out of the Government by him.[1] For the first time since the liberation the Communists had departed from their role of guarantors of the co-operation of labour, and had reverted to type as its leaders in rebellion; and, also for the first time since the liberation, the Socialists decided to stay in a coalition without the Communists and to risk the experiment of participating with the MRP in a Centre Government. But the one development was the natural corollary of the other. The new coalition—and the Socialist Party along with it—was greatly assisted by the Communists' dropping of the patriotic mask and by their growing tendency to align themselves openly with Moscow, and thereby to isolate themselves in French politics. Meanwhile, the newly promulgated Marshall Plan, with its promises of economic and financial salvation, had the double merit of providing the moderate democratic forces with a more auspicious atmosphere in which to develop their own plans for the welfare of France, and at the same time of forcing the Communists to reveal themselves in their true colours as the enemies of democracy.

But the future of the centre bloc was, for all that, by no means assured. The parties associated in it had been merely scared into collaboration and they were full of mutual suspicions and under constant threat of paralysing strikes instigated by the now outlawed Communists. If they failed to offer the country a practicable alternative, the future would obviously be fraught with great peril. But it was at this crucial juncture that de Gaulle decided that the time was ripe to step forward and offer at least one kind of alternative by launching his Rally of the French People.[2] Only then, when this creature of his will had grown over-night into such a mighty political force that a head-on collision with the Communist machine appeared as a fearfully imminent possibility, did the French nation's instinctive search for readjustment beget a more substantial centre bloc, known as the 'Third Force', to hold the balance.

[1] See Taylor: *The Fourth Republic of France*, pp. 163–4.
[2] See above, p. 508.

(ii) Belgium

(*a*) Introductory

The speed of Belgium's outward and material recovery after her liberation towards the end of 1944 was so remarkable by comparison with that of other ex-occupied countries that for a long time it tended to blind the casual observer to the gravity of the damage inflicted on her, directly or indirectly, by her defeat and subjugation. It was perhaps not until the 'Royal Question' came to a head six years after liberation that the effects of the occupation were fully appreciated. Indeed, outward appearances of political stability were bound to be deceptive until this question had been finally resolved; for, in a country so fundamentally divided in a number of different ways, the monarchy had an essential role to play as a unifying influence. When the throne was vacant or was the subject of discord or dispute, the state tended to separate into its component parts. What these component parts were and how far they overlapped one another will be discussed in detail in a later section.[1] Here it is only necessary to observe that the danger of an irretrievable split occurring between these mutually antipathetic forces was immeasurably enhanced by the action of the Crown in identifying itself with one of them, instead of remaining apart from and above them.

Moreover, in Belgium, as in neighbouring countries, the German occupation had left behind it a dangerous psychological legacy. For four years it had been patriotic to violate the laws, to use the black market, to sabotage, to destroy, to kill. People had been taught to be their own judges, their own police, their own executioners. It was difficult, after the liberation, for Belgians to remember that patriotism now consisted in respecting the law and obeying orders. German oppression and the incitements of Left-wing Resistance leaders at home, coupled with encouragement and promises from the exiled leaders in London, had fostered a demand for drastic social and economic reforms and a contempt for the rule of the pre-war conservative Government, which had now returned to carry on the administration of the country in the complacent spirit of 'business as usual'.

In France, where much the same spirit prevailed and much the same hopes had been entertained, the problem was simplified by the leadership of General de Gaulle; for de Gaulle had been, at first, the symbol of Resistance and even of revolution and he was still, after the liberation, a generally accepted focus of authority. The Belgian Resistance had thrown up no figure comparable in stature with de Gaulle. There was nothing revolutionary about the returning Belgian Premier, Hubert Pierlot; there was no Pierlot *mystique*. Pierlot was an honest, tired, and weak man who

[1] See below, pp. 536 seqq.

longed only to lead his country back to the 'good old days'. As the French paper *Le Populaire* (30 November 1944) wrote: 'C'est exactement si, en France, un Daladier gouvernait à nouveau notre pays ressuscité.' In the normal course of events, the King might have—and indeed should have—filled the role of national leader. As it was, the role may be said to have been partly filled by his brother Prince Charles. The King himself was disqualified from leadership by his refusal to identify himself with or to assist the Resistance, and by the other shadows cast upon his reputation. The Pierlot Government were no better qualified, since, as a result of their notorious wavering towards the Germans and towards the King at the moment of the occupation, they were unpopular and their authority was in dispute. In the case of other occupied countries, the sovereigns or governments might have been temporarily exiled, but their authority had remained unquestioned and they had been able to give guidance to their people during the years of trial.

It was scarcely surprising, therefore, if the natural scepticism of the average Belgian in political questions became magnified to such an extent as to render him intractable and suspicious of those who again tried after the war to slip over his head the bit and bridle of normal government. But, if the Belgians' scepticism and intractability made it a thankless task for their old masters to attempt to govern them, these qualities also gave rise to a healthy suspicion of any would-be new masters, however plausibly democratic their disguise. The Belgian nation as a whole was more solidly Catholic than the French, and the average Belgian had a much greater instinctive fear of Communism and saw through its manœuvres much earlier than the average Frenchman. German propaganda, during the occupation, about the Communist menace had undoubtedly had some effect, and, apart from this, some of the Belgian Resistance groups were of a decidedly Right-wing and anti-Communist complexion.[1] Moreover, the Communists were induced to show their hand, after the liberation, much earlier than was really politic from their point of view. Evidence that the Communists knew that they were not so sure of their ground in Belgium as in France is to be found in the difference in their reactions to two similar challenges in the two countries. When de Gaulle decided to disband the militia and to break the hold of the Resistance forces in civil life, the French Communists protested but gave in, content to bide their time;[2] when Pierlot took a corresponding step, the Belgian Communists felt that there was no time to lose, struck their blow, failed, and sank into decline.[3] The Pierlot Government's victory, however, was a Pyrrhic one, for they emerged from the struggle as much discredited as the Communists, and they succumbed to their injuries soon afterwards.

[1] See below, p. 540.
[2] See above, p. 491.
[3] See below, p. 542.

This episode might have been expected to produce some measure of political stability, based on government by the forces of moderation and orderly progress. But at this crucial juncture the Royal Question, already recognized as a skeleton in the national cupboard, came out into the open and thoroughly poisoned the political atmosphere anew. Hitherto, it had been a generally accepted principle that the monarchy stood above party politics, and the question of its continuance as an institution had never been called in question. The Catholic Party now openly identified itself with Leopold's cause, and, when the Van Acker coalition refused to sanction the King's return,[1] the Catholic Ministers left the coalition and voluntarily renounced the exercise of the large share of power to which they were undoubtedly entitled in virtue of the last pre-war election, and, still more, in virtue of the first post-war election. Being so powerful and yet not 'in power', the Catholic Party was bound to have a baneful effect on the efforts of those who, by their default, were obliged to carry on the government of the country. The Liberal, Socialist, and Communist Parties could not muster, between them, more than a bare majority in Parliament; the first two of these parties were very heterogeneous in their composition; and all three were united in little else but their opposition to King Leopold. A Government composed of members of these parties was therefore doomed to virtual impotence and was debarred from conducting a vigorous policy in any sphere; and, when at length the Catholics consented to take their due share of responsibility, the relief felt by their adversaries was not as unnatural as it might at first have appeared to be.

Meanwhile, both the Liberal and the Socialist Party had lost much ground, though the Socialists remained the second party in the country. The Liberal Party tended to lose on its Left to the Socialists and on its Right to the Catholics, while the Socialist Party tended to lose on its Left to the Communists. But the Communists in Belgium never attained to anything approaching the strength of the French Communists; they were not 'the Terrible Alternative' that they were in France. In France the political conflict might be said to be between Reds and anti-Reds, but in Belgium it might be described more accurately as being between 'rightist' Leopoldists and anti-'rightist' Leopoldists—the King having become identified with the Right through the Right's championship of him. The factor that made matters even worse for Belgium than for France—and was, indeed, as formidable, in its own way, as the spectre of Communism might have been—was the ethnical division of the country; for this did not cut across and mitigate the political division, but coincided with it to a degree which made the division of the nation along this double line of cleavage very deep and clear-cut.

[1] See below, p. 546.

(*b*) The Division of the Nation

(1) *Division on Racial, Linguistic, and Religious Grounds*

While the historic division of the French nation was primarily one of class, the Belgian nation was split by a racial and linguistic division, which coincided to a very considerable extent with a religious and cultural division and with certain territorial demarcations. The Flemish section of the community was solidly Catholic in religion, largely conservative in politics, and inclined to be anti-French in its orientation in regard both to foreign policy and to culture. The French-speaking, alias Walloon, section, on the other hand, tended to be anti-clerical in outlook, radical in politics, and pro-French in regard to foreign and cultural policy. Geographically, the Flemish-speaking part of the nation was solidly concentrated in the northern half of the kingdom, and the French-speaking in the southern half, with Brussels as a mixed but predominantly Walloon enclave on the Flemish side of the dividing line.[1] After the war these already serious causes of division were accentuated by the addition of the Royal Question; for the Flemings, almost to a man, supported King Leopold, whereas the Walloons, likewise almost unanimously, rejected him.

The most striking feature of the history of the conflict between these two parts of the nation was the gradual reversal of their respective roles. The change might be summed up by saying that at the beginning of the twentieth century there had been a Flemish Question, but that by the end of the Second World War there was a Walloon Question. In 1830, when Belgium had come into being as an independent state, the government had fallen into the hands of the bourgeoisie, whose age of power, heralded by the 'July Revolution' in Paris, had just dawned in Belgium, as in the rest of the Western world. At this time the Belgian bourgeoisie—including even most of those of Flemish origin—spoke French only. Such, indeed, was the privileged position of the French language that, in the early days of Belgium's independence, French alone was used in primary and intermediate education, in courts of law, in the army, and in the central administration. This situation changed gradually, but too slowly and too late to prevent the growth of a Flemish nationalist movement. This became increasingly powerful and, from about 1930 onwards, it assumed a definitely fascist character.[2] Meanwhile, it had secured equality of

[1] The frontier between French-speaking and Flemish-speaking Belgium ('la frontière linguistique'), which had remained virtually unchanged for centuries, ran roughly in a straight line from west to east to the south of Courtrai and Brussels and to the north of Liége. It did not correspond exactly with the frontier line separating the Flemish and the Walloon provinces.

[2] When once the greater part of the Flemish grievances had been satisfied, the aim of the Flemish nationalists lost its former definiteness. Some now wanted to form a Flemish state, and others a Pan-Netherlands state, uniting Holland and Flanders. During the Second World War those who collaborated with the Germans through the VNV (*Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond*—see

status for the Flemish language; and, since the Flemish population was increasing more rapidly than the Walloon, the Flemish language and *Weltanschauung* gradually became preponderant in the nation.

Now, therefore, it was the turn of the French-speaking Walloons to be the aggrieved party. The Walloons claimed that there could be no equality between *une langue de grande culture*, used throughout the world, and the language of a small community like the Flemings—a language which was not adequate even for commercial and scientific use. They maintained that they had not the same interest in learning Flemish as the Flemish had in learning French, and they demanded the exclusive use of French, at least in the administration and the schools in their own region. They also complained that their industries were tending to emigrate to Flanders, attracted by the port of Antwerp, by better communications, and by the increasing pre-eminence of the coal-mines of Flanders. (Formerly heavy industry had been situated exclusively in Wallonia, which had enjoyed a monopoly of coal-mining.) Finally, the Walloons complained of encroachments by Flemish agriculturists, whose larger families earned them larger family allowances and thus in turn enabled them to undercut Walloon labour by accepting lower wages. Indeed, at the root of the Walloons' grievances lay the fear of being numerically swamped by the Flemings and thus of finding themselves at a disadvantage in the political sphere, where, under the democratic system of simple majorities, they could easily be out-voted.

Under the occupation there had been both a Flemish and a Walloon party which had collaborated with the Germans and had been supported by them; and through their contamination of these two parties the Nazis had managed to foster and even to exacerbate the old racial antagonism in Belgium. All the circumstances which had led to defeat and occupation were the subject of bitter recrimination between the two peoples. The Walloons declared that it had been owing to Flemish influence that Leopold III had broken the alliance with France in 1936, that the Maginot Line had not been prolonged along the Belgo-German frontier, and that the war had thus found France and Belgium ill-defended.[1] It was also generally believed among the Walloons that the Flemings had fought only half-heartedly against the Germans and that some Flemish regiments had even acclaimed Hitler. Again, the Walloons claimed to have provided the backbone of the Resistance under the occupation, while Flemish collaborators with the Germans had been numerous. After the war the Walloons feared that the Flemings would again try to impose a pro-German and anti-French policy, and that it was this intention that prompted them to favour the return of the 'Germanophile' King.

below, p. 531, and *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 483–4) were prepared to envisage becoming a part or a satellite of Hitler's Teutonic Empire.

[1] See *Survey* for 1938, iii. 596–7.

Separatist or revolutionary tendencies had hitherto shown themselves only in the Flemish section of the population, but it was not altogether surprising to find a Walloon separatist movement launched barely a month after the initial liberation of the country (October 1944). The organ of this movement, *Le Gaulois*, urged the creation of a federal state composed of three autonomous regions: Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia; but other individuals and bodies put forward formulas expressing varying degrees of national self-assertion. The mildest of these was content with a mere measure of decentralization; it proposed the creation of a 'geographical Senate', composed of Flemings and Walloons in equal numbers, to offset the Flemings' majority in the Chamber. The more drastic proposals recommended either complete independence or union with France. In support of union with France it was argued that, as Belgium had failed in the role of a neutral buffer state, it was best for her to join her economic and military assets to those of France in order to make a thus reinforced France more capable of holding her own. Those who favoured complete independence feared the diplomatic complications of a Franco-Walloon *Anschluss*, and also considered that France was too highly centralized a state to be able to give proper scope to Wallonia's individuality.

Before the war the rise of Flemish influence and the decline of Walloon-Francophile influence had made it possible for King Leopold III, who was by inclination pro-Flemish and anti-French, to revive the old policy of neutrality, to repudiate the French alliance, and to foster good relations with Germany. Immediately after the capitulation of 1940 there had been considerable feeling in Belgium against both Britain and France, who were regarded in some quarters as having 'betrayed' Belgium by their inability to withstand the German onslaught. As the war progressed, however, this attitude changed, and, after the liberation, both Pierlot[1] and his Foreign Minister, Spaak, constantly reaffirmed that, in the words of the latter,[2] 'British friendship is the cornerstone of our foreign policy'. At the same time they insisted that France must resume her place as a Great Power and a strong neighbour.

Misrepresentation of the British action in helping the Government to quell disturbances in November 1944[3] led to a cooling of pro-British sentiment among the public, and this trend was sedulously fostered by the

[1] In an interview with a war correspondent of the *Observer* (29 October 1944), Pierlot is reported to have said: 'I would like to see very close co-operation between Britain, Belgium, Holland, and France, even in peace-time, for common defence. Our territory is too small for the reorganization of adequate defences. Our military bases would be reached too quickly by an attacking Power. We therefore need some sort of extension of our bases to the other side of the Channel. It would perhaps also be useful to Britain to have assured landing places in case of necessity and an organized bridgehead in the hands of some allies on the Continent to prevent the return of war.'

[2] Speech in the House of Representatives, 6 December 1944 (*The Times*, 7 December 1944).

[3] See below, pp. 542–3.

Belgian Left Wing. The Communists and an important group among the Socialists wanted to give a predominantly 'continental' orientation to Belgium's post-war foreign policy, and to develop close relations with the Soviet Union and with France (the latter was regarded in these circles as 'fit company' because she had hastened to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Union). France herself was openly wooing Belgium at this time, in the hope of obtaining Belgian support for her claims on Germany and for her plans to establish a regional community of European nations. This policy naturally did not meet with the approval of the Flemings, who not only hated Communism and the Soviet Union, but were always mistrustful of French political and cultural influence.

It was here that the part played by religion in emphasizing the division of the country could be clearly discerned. The Soviet Union and Communists were the frankly recognized apostles of atheism everywhere; but France, though so largely Catholic, was the traditional home of *libres penseurs* and *esprits voltairiens*, and these and their influence were, in the eyes of the devout Flemish Catholic, the hall-marks of French culture, perhaps even more as manifested in the French-speaking part of Belgium than in France itself. It was thus not surprising to find the Belgian Catholic Party (an essentially conservative party) drawing by far the greater part of its support from the Flemish section of the nation, and the Liberal and Socialist Parties tending to find the greater part of their supporters in the Walloon section.[1] Such generalizations, however, would require careful qualifications. It was, for instance, a generally recognized fact that practising Belgian Catholics far outnumbered the voters for the Belgian Catholic Party. The position had never been parallel to that obtaining in Holland, where the Catholic political party almost exactly reflected in the States-General the numerical strength of the Roman Catholics in the country. In Belgium the Catholic Party commanded perhaps one-third of the votes in a country where, on the most modest estimate, two-thirds of the population were believing Catholics. The great majority of the party's supporters were Flemings, but even in Flanders many Catholics supported the Liberal and Socialist Parties, and the proportion was higher in Wallonia. Again, some supporters of the Catholic Party were not practising Catholics, but approved of the party's conservative programme.

(2) *Division on Political Grounds*

The racial and religious aspects of the main political parties in Belgium had greater significance than their purely political attributes, which had

[1] At the February 1946 elections the Catholics gained an overwhelming victory in the Flemish part of the country (except round Bruges, where the personal prestige of the Socialist Van Acker gave the party a signal success), while the Left came off very well in the Walloon districts and even in Brussels.

become blurred in the course of time. When the war and the occupation ended there was a feeling in Belgium, as in France, that the existing parties represented little more than electoral habits and bore scant relation to the deeper trends of opinion.

This inadequacy of the parties and of their programme in the face of the challenges of modern life could not be explained without a brief examination of their respective histories. During the first fifty years of the life of independent Belgium there had been only two political parties in existence (the Catholic Party and the Liberal Party), and the principal subject of political strife had been the influence of the Church on education and on the political life of the country—the Liberals being in favour of a secular state in accordance with the ideas of the French Revolution. For the greater part of this period (which was also the period when the French language and the Walloon influence had been in the ascendant) the Liberals had enjoyed a parliamentary majority and had governed the country. There had followed a period in which the fortunes of the two parties were reversed. The Catholics had governed alone from 1884 to 1914; and, though the fortunes of the rival languages had not been correspondingly reversed at once, the Flemings had been able, in this more favourable atmosphere, to press their claims to equality with eventual success. Meanwhile the Socialist Party (*Parti Ouvrier Belge*, founded in 1885) had been consolidating itself into a powerful union of political, trade-union, and economic organizations, while the Liberals had been losing all hope of recovering a majority in the country.

Immediately after the First World War a reform of the Constitution had introduced universal male suffrage and had given the political life of Belgium a new turn. As a result the respective strengths of the Catholics and the Socialists had become almost equal, leaving the Liberals lagging far behind; and, since none of the parties had had a clear majority, Belgium had entered on a period of government by coalitions. Sometimes all three parties had been united, but more often—and especially when social and economic questions had been to the fore—Catholics and Liberals had held office together against a Socialist opposition. In the inter-war period all three parties had generally been united on the broader aspects of foreign policy. As regards defence policy, however, the Catholics had shown little enthusiasm for the Franco-Belgian military agreements; the Socialists had set their hopes on international collaboration and had opposed the increase of military burdens; while the Liberals had stood for a strong defence policy against the threat of German aggression.

The language question, too, had acquired an importance in this period that had been unknown in the years before 1914. Compulsory education and the extension of the franchise had stimulated the ambitions of the Flemings to obtain complete equality of language. On the other hand,

since the Germans had tried (though in vain) during the First World War to win the sympathy of the Flemish people by supporting their claims, these claims had come to be looked at askance in certain circles, particularly in the Liberal Party. At the same time the Flemish nationalist *Frontpartij*, which had opposed the French military alliance, and which had represented itself as an 'opposition Catholic party', had included in its ranks, in addition to certain *activistes* who had collaborated with the Germans in the First World War, a certain number of able intellectuals, under pressure from whom the Catholic Party itself had felt obliged to lay sharper emphasis on linguistic issues and on traditional mistrust of France.

The pro-German bias of the Flemish nationalist movement had become even more marked with the rise of Hitler, when the *Frontpartij* had given place to the *Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond* (VNV), an organization on an authoritarian basis which had drawn its inspiration—and its funds—more and more from German National Socialism.[1] On the other hand, at about the same time, another group of malcontents within the Catholic Party, under the leadership of Léon Degrelle, had broken away and had formed another fascist-inspired party—also financed by its foreign prototypes—known as the Rexist Party, which had recruited the majority of its supporters in the Walloon region.[2] Both these fascist parties had been specifically Catholic in their membership, and both had collaborated to the full with the Germans during the occupation. The anti-clerical elements in Belgium had thus been confirmed in their belief that Catholicism, religious and political, was identical with reaction. Before the war the Church had repudiated the doctrine of Rexism as being incompatible with orthodox Catholicism, but in Flanders the alarming progress of the VNV had caused the Catholic Party to adopt certain parts of the VNV programme and to ally itself with that party in local and provincial spheres. Thus Catholicism and reaction had come to be linked together more closely than ever in the Flemish section of the country, and the attitude of the Catholic Party to the Royal Question after the war carried this process still farther.

The Catholic Party's difficulties were to a large extent the result of the rigidly hierarchical organization which for so long had been imposed upon the very diverse elements which composed its membership. All authority had been concentrated in the hands of the older generation, and this had encouraged younger men to break away and form dissident groups like the Rexists and VNV. Even before the war the leaders of the party had recognized the problem and had tried to adapt the party's structure to

[1] There now also appeared the smaller but more openly fascist *Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen* ('*Verdinaso*'). See also *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 483, 498, note 2.

[2] For the history of the Rexist Party see *Survey* for 1936, pp. 36–37; *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 483 and note 1.

meet the needs of the different language groups and the conflicting claims of the different classes of society.[1] None the less, it had remained dominated by the old-fashioned ultra-Catholic, ultra-conservative element and had afforded little scope for the expression of the more democratic ideas of the younger generation.

After the war the Catholic Party made another and more determined effort to broaden its basis, rejuvenate its outlook, and free itself from the taint of fascism.

At this time the Belgians were inevitably influenced (though to a lesser extent than some other nations) by the current European tendency to get away from the conception of the 'confessional party', to keep narrow religious differences out of politics, and to found new parties based on broad Christian principles but adapted to more modern concepts of social and economic progress. In June 1945 a young Christian-Democrat group formed a separate party named the *Union Démocratique Belge* (UDB), and this new party tried to steal the Catholic Party's thunder by repudiating confessional ties and stressing the democratic aspect of its appeal. In August 1945, however, the Catholic Party changed its name to Christian Social Party (*Parti Chrétien Social*), thus shedding the constraining confessional label and hinting alluringly at concessions to current trends of socialization. Indeed, its declared purpose now was to be 'social' and progressive in its programme and Christian in its inspiration. It would oppose the domination of the national life by 'big business', but at the same time it would also oppose nationalization. It would oppose the class war and would uphold the concept of the family as the basis of the nation. It favoured equality between the two languages and rejected regional imperialism. It even denied to the Catholic Church, albeit most deferentially, any right of direction or tutelage, arguing that it was essential for Catholic political parties not to be given public ecclesiastical direction about matters which did not affect faith or morals. The case was elaborated in *La Revue Nouvelle* (November 1945) by a group of young Catholic writers, who urged that it would be positively advantageous for the Catholics to belong to more than one party and to offer to the electorate a choice of Catholic parties. But such ideas met with strong disapproval from the Church. The Primate of Belgium, Cardinal Van Roey, denounced the article. He declared that the whole strength of the Catholics would be lost

[1] The new Catholic bloc, as reorganized in 1936, had been composed of two practically autonomous parties, the *Katholieke Vlaamsche Volkspartij* (for the Flemish section of the country) and the *Parti Catholique Social* (for the Walloon section). In addition, each of these had been sub-divided into four groups representing the four main classes of society: an avowedly conservative upper-class group, a middle-class group, a peasant group, and a Christian-Democrat workers' group. These groups had different views on social questions, but, on the whole, they all accepted the idea of an occupational structure of the community and, in the last resort, they were always bound together by fidelity to the Catholic Church.

if they did not keep their unity, and he warned his flock against 'socialization', on the ground that the primary tactic of the Communist campaign was to try to divide the great Catholic majority, if possible along economic lines.[1]

On this last point the Catholic Party disregarded the Cardinal's admonitions with impunity, for it did 'socialize' itself to a certain extent, and yet this did not divide it.[2] From a critical standpoint the reform of the party could be regarded mainly as an attempt to cut the ground from under the Communists' and Socialists' feet by taking up the cudgels for the working man in the name of a more exalted and more ancient faith than that of Karl Marx. Yet, even from this standpoint, events proved the reform to have been beneficial rather than detrimental to the party's strength and unity. For, although the éclat of the party's reform was temporarily dimmed by the initial success of its offshoot, the recently formed UDB, the parent body soon regained its old authority and the offshoot rapidly withered. This was a victory for the Cardinal's conception of a single specifically Catholic party and a setback to the hope of a broad 'Christian front'.

On the other hand, the Catholic Party's hope of ridding itself of the fascist taint was largely stultified by its attitude to the Royal Question and to *incivisme* in general. In the first post-war elections in 1946[3] the total number of votes polled by the reformed Catholic Party corresponded very closely to the total number of votes polled by the Catholics, Rexists, and VNV in the last elections before the war. The party won the vote of former Rexists and VNV members or their sympathizers by its moderate attitude towards *incivisme* and *épuration*; it also won over some of the Liberals and others who sympathized with its attitude on the Royal Question. Thus, though in one sense the party was considerably strengthened, in another it was weakened; for the absorption of the former fascist elements to some extent offset the ascendancy of the young democratic wing on which it had founded its new appeal to the electorate.[4]

In January 1946 a youthful militant group of members of the Christian

[1] In this connexion, however, it is worth observing that actually the strongest opposition to the Church itself and to its influence came—by a venerable tradition reaching back before Communists and Socialists were thought of—from the Liberal Party. But theirs was a reasoned and intellectual enmity, as was to be expected from a party finding its support in the higher ranks of society; so intellectual, indeed, that the grounds adduced by the liberal University of Brussels for opposing King Leopold were that his second marriage had been solemnized in church before the civil ceremony had taken place. Yet, ironically enough, the King's *éminence grise*, Professor Jacques Pirenne, was a professor of Brussels University.

[2] See below, pp. 549–50.

[3] See below, pp. 547 seqq.

[4] Another source of embarrassment to the reformed party was the continuing patronage of the traditional organ of the old Catholic Party, the die-hard Brussels newspaper *La Libre Belgique*, which was completely out of tune with the declared new aspirations. Hence, at the national congress of the party in July 1946, a resolution was passed that 'le PCS [Christian Social Party] n'acceptera jamais le patronage d'un journal dont il ne serait pas politiquement et financièrement le maître'.

Social Party was organized under the stirring title of *La Relève*. Speakers at the inaugural meeting of the group spoke of 'une refonte de la société capitaliste' and 'la rechristianisation profonde de la masse'.[1] This was the field which the seceding UDB party had already tried to exploit. The members of that party intended that it should be they and not the Christian Social Party who should reap the benefit of the current trend towards Christian Socialism, as the MRP had reaped it so successfully in France; but in this the UDB leaders made a serious miscalculation. At the general election of February 1946 the Belgians showed unmistakably that they preferred to vote for the great traditional parties.[2] As an observer wrote: 'The completeness of its [the UDB's] failure has astonished its adversaries as much as those principally interested in its success. The UDB gave the impression up to the last moment of having a great many sympathizers, but these did not go so far as to vote for it.'[3] The failure of the UDB may have been due in part to its excessive emphasis on being a party of the Resistance, at a time when Belgians were already beginning to feel uneasy about a movement which insisted on a 'purge' so drastic that 330,000 people out of a population of 8 million found themselves charged with *incivisme*.

Just before the elections the President of the UDB, Antoine Delfosse, remarked[4] that 'the Socialists could have created the UDB had they not been embarrassed on their Left by the Communists', and this was a fair summing up of the position and condition of the Belgian Socialist Party after the war. The Socialists had become the second party in the country when universal male suffrage had been introduced in 1919, and they had soon succeeded in securing the adoption of their electoral programme calling for an eight-hour day and other rather elementary social reforms. After that, the party had had no very definite objectives, and the secession in 1923 of a small militant group, which had then formed the Belgian Communist Party, had thrown into relief the Socialists' abandonment of revolutionary Marxism. Later, the bankruptcy of the *Banque du Travail*, which the party had founded, had also inevitably caused it to lose much of its influence among the workers; this had become manifest in 1936 when Socialist politicians who had tried to address strikers had been shouted down. After the war the trade unions, which had hitherto been closely allied with the party, separated themselves from it and led an autonomous existence, pursuing a political line which, in general, was considerably more radical than that of the parliamentary Socialists.[5] This, in turn, led to an enormous drop in membership of the Socialist Party—from hundreds

[1] *Le Soir*, 8 January 1946.

[2] See below, p. 547 and note 2.

[3] *Le Soir*, 21 February 1946.

[4] In an interview given to *Le Soir* (6 February 1946).

[5] On the whole, the Walloon section of the Socialist Party was a good deal farther to the Left than the Flemish section.

of thousands to tens of thousands. The Socialist Party's electoral losses also reflected its decline: in 1932 it had had seventy-three deputies (out of 200); in 1936, seventy; in 1939, sixty-four; and the lost seats had gone to the Communists.

The Belgian Communist Party,[1] like its French counterpart, exerted an ever-increasing pressure upon the Socialist Party, whose strength it was thus sapping, to join forces with it. In January 1945, in view of the impending government crisis, the Communist Party proposed to the Socialist Party 'a fraternal exchange of views' with an eye to unity of action. In February it proposed a 'democratic coalition', and in August the formation of a *bloc d'action* and of an *entente électorale* in order to win a 'democratic majority' in Parliament. But, in spite of the Socialists' anxieties and embarrassments, their response was proud and disdainful,[2] and at the general election in February 1946 they emerged with a gain of five seats in the Chamber.[3] It is true that they lost some of their Left-wing voters to the Communists; on the other hand they scored considerable gains on their Right Wing from the Liberals.

The Liberal Party was peculiarly liable to be thus split, for it had a Right Wing which was the most reactionary element in Parliament, side by side with a progressive Left Wing. Before the war the Right-wing element had predominated to such an extent that, although the Liberals had often joined with the Catholics in forming a government, they had never at any time allied themselves with the Socialists—except in a three-party coalition. Representing the industrial and commercial middle class, as well as a certain type of intellectual, the Liberals were traditionally opposed to state interference in the economic and social affairs of the individual beyond the absolutely inevitable minimum. After the war, however, they realized the strength of the movement for social reform and made a bid for recognition as leaders of the movement. Thus, on the eve of the 1946 elections, their president, Roger Motz, announced in a press interview: 'In the matter of social legislation the Liberals have accepted the principles of Sir William Beveridge and President Roosevelt. Social security must, in their opinion, be extended to all citizens. With us at present it only takes account of wage-earners. It ought to become national.'[4] These gestures did not save the Liberal Party from a crushing defeat in the election in February 1946, but this defeat left the party still able to exercise a very considerable influence.[5]

[1] The rise of the Communist Party is described below on pp. 540–1.

[2] 'Le parti socialiste belge n'est pas une masse de manœuvre à votre disposition. C'est un grand parti, habitué à régler sa conduite selon les méthodes qu'il s'est librement tracées. Il n'a aucun motif ni aucun désir de s'en écarter au gré de vos convenances du moment' (*Le Monde*, 31 August 1945).

[3] See below, p. 548, note 1.

[4] *Le Soir*, 26 January 1946.

[5] See below, p. 548.

(3) *Division on the Royal Question*

When, in June 1945, King Leopold announced his intention of returning to the throne the Socialist Party and the majority of the Liberal Party tried to persuade him to abdicate, while the Catholic Party came out in favour of his unconditional reinstatement. Consequently, when the King decided for the time being neither to return nor to abdicate, and when the first Van Acker Government[1] introduced a bill to bar his return without Parliament's consent, not only did the six Catholic Ministers in the Cabinet resign, but the Catholics refrained from taking part in the government of the country for nearly two years. Soon afterwards (30 September 1945) the King issued a proclamation justifying his past conduct, but announcing that he would accept the verdict of the people, as expressed through a referendum.[2] The Government, however, firmly rejected this solution and insisted that Parliament was the final arbiter and interpreter of the nation's will. Their fear that a referendum might lead to all kinds of abuses and disorders, and might even perhaps end in civil war, was probably genuine. They did not want the monarchy to become an electoral and political issue, yet their opponents, most unwisely, seemed bent on forcing it to become such an issue, and on putting the blame for this on the Government.[3]

Yet, with the possible exception of the Communists, who were anyhow not yet prepared to show their hand, none of the leading figures in the first Van Acker Government, whether Liberals or Socialists, was anti-monarchical. Van Acker told his fellow Socialists in December 1945 that 'he was a monarchist and that in Belgium the monarchy complied with a necessity—that it was, in a sense, the cement of the country'.[4] Similarly, Roger Motz, the Liberal leader, wrote in July 1945 that, though the Liberal Party viewed the idea of the King's abdication with the deepest regret, in the higher interests of the country they considered it a lesser evil than his return in the existing circumstances. Motz also justly pointed out that there was not the least foundation for the impression which the Leopoldists

[1] Formed in February 1945, to succeed the Pierlot Government (see below, p. 545).

[2] See Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: *Recueil de documents établi par le Secrétariat du Roi concernant la période 1936–1949* (n.pl., 1950), pp. 671–3. See also below, p. 547.

[3] Reviewing his request for a referendum, the King wrote to Van Acker (16 January 1946): 'Everything must be done to prevent the principle of the monarchy becoming an issue in the electoral contest'; but in the same breath he went on to declare that 'the Government has made a front against the King with a violence unprecedented in our history', and suggested that the Government should publish its case against him and that he should publish his own case and documents (see Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: *Recueil de documents*, pp. 718–19). Moreover, his Secretary, Pirenne, broke the 'election truce' by calling a press conference (12 February 1946), allegedly to refute recently published calumnies of the King, and on behalf of the King he produced documents which inflamed passions again (see also *The Times*, 21 January and 14 February 1946).

[4] Speech to the Brussels Federation of the Belgian Socialist Party as reported in *Le Soir*, 24/25 December 1945.

seemed to be trying to convey—namely, that there was a plot against the monarchy as such. If it had only been a case of this, he said, the question would have been much easier; as it was, however, most of the adversaries of Leopold III were convinced upholders of the monarchy.[1]

The violence of the campaign on behalf of the King and against those who opposed him soon began to force the Government themselves, in sheer self-defence, to look for sinister motives behind this campaign. At the Socialist Party Congress in October 1945 Van Acker declared that 'all the Leopoldist propaganda is distilled in the Church schools [*écoles libres*] and in the convents', and that 'there are sincere Leopoldists, but it is clear that the neo-Rexists are re-forming under cover of the Royal Question and meditating a *coup d'état*'. He went on to assert that the reason for the aggressiveness of the Leopoldists lay in the fact that they had found powerful financial backers, who were able to pay their propagandists bigger salaries than those of Cabinet Ministers.[2] Thus, by insisting on regarding the personal opposition to King Leopold as a plot against the monarchy, the Leopoldists had ended by themselves incurring the suspicion of hatching a plot against the Constitution. By their injudicious behaviour they had awakened suspicions among their opponents that the King was attached to, supported by, and deeply involved with the forces of reaction, clericalism, and collaboration, and that, if he were allowed to return, these forces would flourish at the expense of those brought to light and symbolized by the Resistance Movement.

It was an unfortunate fact that, whatever he himself might say to the contrary,[3] the King had come to be regarded by a very large number of his subjects as, at best, the antithesis of Resistance. It had not been the capitulation of 1940 as such that had been the prime cause of the King's unpopularity in his own country.[4] On the contrary, the capitulation had made the King at first immensely popular—at least in Flanders. His unpopularity had arisen quite suddenly out of his second marriage, to a commoner, in 1941. This had shattered the popular ideal of him as an inconsolable widower, and his action had been considered unbecoming and almost frivolous at a time when the country was under the German yoke. Thus the original grounds for disapproval of the King were simple and sentimental, and it was on this basis—and not on that of the capitulation—that the later and intrinsically more serious charges were built up.

[1] Ibid. 1 July 1945.

[2] Ibid. 9 October 1945.

[3] In an interview with the correspondent of the *New York Times* (21 January 1946) the King said: 'Since 1940 the politicians have always tried to present me as a Catholic Conservative Monarch. My personal ideas are completely different. I am for progress and social reform. Ever since I succeeded my father I have tried to favour social reform. . . . If the people want me they can also have any type of government they desire, whether it be Conservative, Socialist, or Communist.'

[4] For the King's actions at the time of the capitulation see *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 475–8.

Thus, in a reply (19 January 1946) to the King's request for a referendum, Van Acker could state simply:

> Certes, le fait de la capitulation n'est pas ici en cause. Mais, en passant outre en mai 1940 au conseil de Ses Ministres unanimes, en Se constituant prisonnier, malgré leurs instances, et en Se refusant à poursuivre en territoire allié ou dans la colonie la lutte contre l'envahisseur, le Roi S'est exposé au reproche de méconnaître la Constitution et a profondément divisé le pays.[1]

But the Government themselves were in no position to throw stones on this score, as the King well knew. Indeed, he was alleged in some quarters to have threatened his former Ministers with public revelations about their activities in 1940[2] if they, on their side, did not retract their charges against him. However, in spite of the Pierlot Government's vacillations in 1940, it was naïve on the King's part to think that he could rehabilitate himself merely by discrediting them, if only because they were virtually discredited already.

The King himself was generally believed to have made a series of compromises with the enemy. He had gone to see Hitler, he had sent various telegrams of congratulation or condolence to, among others, the King of Italy, and to Pétain, after the Allied bombing of Paris. He had refused to allow himself to be rescued by the Resistance in 1944 and was said to have refused to help them; certain members of his court were reported to have had contacts with collaborationist journalists. But the main reproach was not so much in respect of what the King had done as in respect of what he had failed to do. It was his refusal to fill the role of national leader, for which he had been the most suitable, if not the only, candidate, that weighed most heavily against him in the scales of public opinion.[3]

Even if the King's conduct during the war and occupation had not been open to question, he would still have found himself in a somewhat delicate position after the war because he had identified himself with the Catholic conservative element which had been responsible for the country's pre-war foreign policy and which was now discredited on that account. Immediately after the liberation, progressive and anti-clerical elements were temporarily dominant, while the supporters of the King were reinforced by many persons who were suspected, justly or unjustly, of collaboration or *attentisme*, to the detriment, as we have seen,[4] both of his cause and of that of the Catholic Party.

The Royal Question, by emphasizing the coincidence between political and linguistic and religious division, made relations between Flanders and Wallonia worse, perhaps, than they had ever been. To put the case as it might appear to the more extreme elements on both sides: for the Walloons,

[1] Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: *Recueil de documents*, p. 720.
[2] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 480.
[3] See also above, p. 524.
[4] See above, p. 537.

Flanders was the home of Catholic reactionaries who wanted the return of an equally reactionary and even collaborationist King; on the other hand, for the Flemings, Wallonia was the home of a godless, revolutionary rabble who wanted to bring about the overthrow of the monarchy and the disruption of the state. Swiftly and inevitably a point was reached where, whichever way the Royal Question might be settled, the losers would regard the solution as a deep affront. If the King returned it would be regarded by all Belgians as a triumph for Flanders and a defeat for Wallonia, while, if he should not return, then all would interpret the result in the opposite sense.

(*c*) Political and Economic Developments from the Liberation to March 1947

(1) *The Pierlot Government and the Abortive Bid of the Communists for Power through the Resistance Movement, September 1944 to February 1945*

Brussels, and the greater part of Belgium with it, was liberated with unexpected swiftness by Allied troops on 3 September 1944. A few days later Pierlot and his 'London Government' returned from their long exile, justifiably uncertain of the reception which awaited them. The war was still in full swing, and little could be done except to summon a joint session of Parliament and to elect Prince Charles as Regent in the absence of his brother the King, who was still held prisoner by the Germans. With due regard to form, Pierlot handed his resignation to the Regent, but, since no elections were possible until the return of the deported Belgian workers (numbering about 500,000) and of the prisoners of war (about 60,000) from Germany, the Regent was obliged to ask Pierlot to continue in office. The Government was remodelled, and some attempt was made to broaden its basis by the inclusion of a representative of the Resistance Movement, and, for the first time in Belgium, of two Communists. The new Government also included seven Catholics, five Socialists, three Liberals, and one non-party member, and its composition thus corresponded closely with the results of the last general election in April 1939, when the seats secured in the Chamber of Representatives were (excluding the fascist parties): Catholics, seventy-three; Socialist, sixty-four; Liberals, thirty-three; Communists, nine; Independents, two.

All the principal political parties declared themselves willing to support this coalition Government, but the Left-wing groups added a qualifying proviso that they would maintain their support only so long as certain lines of policy were followed. The Government were faced with vast and complex problems, both political and economic: the extreme shortage of transport, food, and fuel; the currency situation and the threat of serious inflation; the punishment of traitors and the purge of collaborators from

public life; and the question of the future of the Resistance Movement. In the weeks following the liberation increasing criticism was directed against the Government by a section of the Left-wing parties and press for alleged dilatoriness in tackling economic problems and in dealing with collaborators. The Resistance Movement and the Communists, who had played a leading part in the Movement, claimed that the composition of the Government was still far from reflecting the evolution which had taken place in Belgian opinion since pre-war days, and they alleged further that members of the Resistance in Belgium were engaged in a struggle with highly placed industrial and financial collaborators.

In contrast to France, where the Communists' consciousness of their greater power enabled them to be easy-going at the outset, the Communists in Belgium adopted a truculent attitude from the moment of liberation, probably because they realized that their opportunity for strengthening and consolidating the power which they had won under the occupation would be short-lived and precarious. In Belgium the Communist Party had little influence before the war,[1] but here, as in France, Hitler's attack on Russia had given the Communists the chance to come forward and take control of a large part of the Resistance Movement. The German habit of describing as 'Communist wreckers' all the hostages and others whom they shot had strengthened the Communists' prestige in the popular mind. Moreover, the Germans had destroyed the ordinary trade-union organizations, and many of the local Underground workers' organizations had grown up under Communist influence. While the Communists had thus gained some ground among industrial and manual workers, their chief gain, temporarily, was in the ranks of the lower middle class, among the black-coated workers who had suffered heavily during the occupation.

The Belgian Resistance Movement differed from its French counterpart in having a Left and a Right Wing. The former, whose chief organization was the *Front de l'Indépendance*, was the more powerful of the two, and it was dominated by the Communists, while the Right Wing, the *Armée Secrète*, was under military influence. The Belgian, like the French, Communists set out to identify their cause with that of the Resistance Movement, and reacted with special vigour to any suggestion that the Resistance forces should be disarmed. Their inclusion in the Government did not move them to moderate their attacks on it. Two of their members were in office, but the party declined to accept collective responsibility. As the food position grew worse, Communist attacks on the Government for their failure to take quicker and stronger measures to meet the need grew

[1] The nine Communist deputies elected to Parliament in 1939 had all been from the towns of Brussels and Liége or from the industrial regions of the province of Hainault. Nine had been elected in 1936, but only three in 1932, and one in 1939. None had ever participated in the Government until 1944.

more bitter. Moreover, their campaign against the black market and for the purification of government services and for the arrest of collaborators was a campaign for and against just those things which had the greatest emotional appeal for ex-Underground fighters, and this undoubtedly enabled the Communists to extend their influence among many thousands of patriotic, energetic, self-sacrificing, but to a considerable extent politically uninformed, people—including a high proportion of the youth of the nation.

The first impulse of the traditional parties in the face of this challenge was to close their ranks and to grasp again at the monopoly of power which had been theirs in the past. In the first few days after the liberation a declaration of policy, to which the Communists were not invited to subscribe, was issued by the Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists. They formed their own plans for a new government, and the Communists had no part in them.[1] The more clear-sighted of the politicians, however, realized that, for some time to come, any government would be involved in great difficulties and be subjected to vigorous public criticism, and they agreed that, for their own sakes, it was necessary that the Communists should share the responsibility. It was for this reason that two Communists were included in the re-formed Pierlot Government. Moreover, through the Resistance Movement, the Communists had a virtual monopoly of armed force, for the Resistance had some 100,000 men under arms, whereas the Belgian police force numbered only about 10,000 and was unarmed, and the only Belgian trained army units were still engaged in the war. In these circumstances the Government thought it politic not to oppose the wishes of the Resistance beyond a certain point—sometimes even against their better judgement. For instance, they had intended to make use, for a time, of the existing food control organization, the CNAA (Corporation Nationale d'Agriculture et d'Alimentation) set up by the Germans, even though many of its members were suspect; but pressure from the Resistance was so strong that they had to purge the organization drastically, with the result that it almost ceased to function and the food situation deteriorated still further.

The Underground movements in occupied Belgium had been officially recognized by the Belgian Government in London as far back as 1942, and the debt owed to them for their part in the liberation had been repeatedly acknowledged by the Government since its return. But also immediately the need to control the Resistance Movement became apparent. Resistance groups were causing public anxiety in some districts by carrying out

[1] The Communist organ *Le Drapeau Rouge* (7 September 1944), in an article headed 'Tripartite not Dead', asked tartly whether the declaration meant that the three parties intended to maintain their monopoly of power. An editorial in the same issue suggested that the Resistance had been, above all, the work of new forces, identified these forces with the Communists, and demanded an early election.

requisitioning, arrests, and reprisals against collaborators on their own responsibility; moreover, it appeared that in some cases the Communists had been recruiting political supporters into the movement after the liberation. The Government prohibited these abuses, scheduled the eight Resistance groups which they were prepared to recognize, and laid down strict conditions under which these might bear arms when on duty.[1] Plans were made for the unification of the Resistance groups under the formal control of the Ministry of Defence and for their incorporation in the regular forces. Although the implementation of these plans was delayed by shortage of military equipment and of training facilities, by the end of October 1944 the Government were able to announce that volunteers from the Resistance for the army, auxiliary police, or gendarmerie and other public services would be accepted up to a total of 40,000.[2] The Resistance leaders, however, while agreeing to the desirability of incorporation in the regular services, differed from the Government as to the method to be followed; some sections of the Resistance wished to be able to join as units serving under their own officers and resented being asked to hand in their arms before they were accepted for the army.

A crisis was finally precipitated by the Government's action in cancelling the provisional status of the Resistance Movement and ordering the surrender of all arms by 18 November 1944. When protest meetings were banned, three Ministers—the two Communists and the representative of the Resistance—resigned. Meanwhile the Allied Command in Belgium had declared that, in the interests of its lines of communication, its forces would support the Government, if need be, in maintaining law and order. At the request of the Government British troops were, in fact, used to guard government offices, but, contrary to a Communist-inspired rumour, they were not involved in the one and only incident in which casualties occurred. Moreover, in spite of a few demonstrations and strikes, most weapons were handed in by the appointed date and the incorporation of Resistance volunteers in the regular forces proceeded smoothly.

This relatively trivial fracas put an end to the Communist bid for power, but it also sounded the death knell of the Pierlot Government, and put a severe strain on Anglo-Belgian relations. The Pierlot Government, in their difficulties, had been inclined to look to Britain for help. They hoped also for a permanent military alliance with Britain, which, they judged, would be both popular and helpful towards establishing the

[1] Speaking in Parliament on 3 October 1944, Pierlot said that, while there was, for the present, no question of dissolving the Resistance forces, whose contribution was still necessary, 'it is obvious that the formation of armed political groups who may try to impose their views by illegal methods and to influence the legal authorities, cannot be permitted'.

[2] Since the number of active members of the Resistance was estimated at about 60,000, the figure of 40,000 appeared ample, allowing for those who wished to return to their civil occupations.

Government in public esteem. But, unfortunately, their efforts to achieve these ends—or rather the form which these efforts took—had exactly the opposite effect. The Government and their supporters canvassed the notion that it was in Britain's interest to support a democratic, capitalist régime similar to her own. The British could help, they felt, by allowing sufficient food imports to bring about a general improvement in the food position and thus deal with the chief cause of public discontent. They could also help to meet the potential power of the Resistance by agreeing to supply arms and equipment, which would enable the Government to enrol many more members of the Resistance in the regular army and at the same time provide an instrument for maintaining order. But, before this happy state of affairs could be achieved, the British had been compromised in the eyes of the Belgian public by appearing openly in support of the régime. It was not appreciated that the British Commander, General Erskine, was acting in his capacity as the personal representative of the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, and it was an unfortunate coincidence that purely military considerations required, first, the curbing of independent action by the Resistance forces[1] and, later, the maintenance of order by a show of force, and that British troops happened to be those at hand for the purpose.[2]

In view of these circumstances there was some irony in the fact that the fall of the Pierlot Government (February 1945) marked a revulsion against British and in favour of American influence in Belgium. Another and perhaps even more cogent reason for this change was the economic dependence of Belgium on the United States immediately after the liberation, as a result of Belgium's need for credits and raw materials and of the American interest in the uranium deposits of the Belgian Congo. This dependence, coupled with the strength of the conservative opposition outside the Government and of the Liberal industrialists inside it, prevented Belgium from conducting a radical economic policy based on nationalization such as nearly all other West European countries were adopting.[3]

The Pierlot Government were undoubtedly discredited to some extent by the affair of November 1944 and by their general handling of the problems

[1] Churchill announced in the House of Commons on 8 December 1944 that on 28 October 1944 Erskine had handed a letter to Pierlot in which, with the authority of Eisenhower, he directed that all civilians in Belgium should be disarmed, and asked for the co-operation of the Belgian Government in this, adding that Allied forces would give any necessary assistance (H.C. Deb. 5th ser., vol. 406, coll. 931–2).

[2] In a statement on 1 December 1944 Erskine emphasized that British troops were not an instrument for the Belgian Government to call upon at any time or any occasion, and added: 'We are not here to prevent or stop political expression, as long as it does not interfere with our communications' (see *The Times*, 2 December 1944).

[3] The Belgian Socialists had long since ceased to have any definite economic programme (see above, pp. 534–5) and the Communists put membership of the Government before their desire for socialization.

relating to the Resistance and the purge, but at the same time there was considerable tacit support for their attitude towards these problems. In Belgium, as in other countries, the Resistance had outstayed its welcome, and its excesses had alienated from it much of the sympathy which it had formerly enjoyed. The law-abiding majority of the nation perceived the Communist inspiration behind these manifestations and also saw through the crude attempt of the Communists, in their hey-day, to destroy the whole capitalist system by treating all the employers as collaborators. Indeed, the much-denounced delay in the progress of the purge was largely due to the fact that the tribunals had to undertake the Herculean task of sifting the victims of indiscriminate arrest from the genuine cases of collaboration.[1]

The most successful purge conducted by the Pierlot Government was the courageous one of the currency carried out by the non-party Minister for Finance, Camille Gutt. At the date of the liberation the costs of occupation exacted by the Germans from Belgium amounted to a total of frs. 67,000 million.[2] Before the liberation the Belgians had realized that it would be necessary to take drastic steps to curb the resulting inflation, and, while the Government had still been in exile, secret consultations between Brussels and London had prepared the way for monetary reform (the new notes to be issued were actually printed in England).[3] Thanks to these preparations, Gutt was able to issue on 7 October 1944, within a month of liberation, a series of decrees aimed at limiting the effects of inflation. The method adopted was to block about 40 per cent. of the note issue and bank accounts, and to convert the amounts blocked into part of the national debt bearing interest at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Though not marketable, the sums blocked could be used in payment of taxes, including the capital levy soon afterwards imposed.

Gutt's action was the more courageous considering that it invited, and duly obtained, from the Communists the criticism that it caused hardship to those living on small savings, and therefore favoured the rich at the expense of the poor. But, on the whole, his motives were as much appreciated as his courage, and the widespread support which the measures

[1] The problem of defining and laying charges of economic collaboration was a singularly delicate one. Industrialists who had kept factories at work during the occupation could argue that, since unemployed workmen had been sent to Germany, closing their factories meant condemning workers to deportation. Again, even though a large proportion of manufactured goods went to Germany, a certain amount remained in Belgium and constituted the only supplies on which Belgians could draw. The Germans had also threatened to remove machinery from factories which refused to work. Cogent as were these arguments, there is no doubt they were sometimes stretched to cover cases of flagrant collaboration for baser motives. The big industrialists, moreover, had powerful friends to testify in their favour and could afford to engage the foremost counsel to defend them.

[2] L. H. Dupriez: *Monetary Reconstruction in Belgium* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1947), p. 3.

[3] Ibid. p. 17.

obtained was quickly found to be justified by their tangible and beneficial results.

Nevertheless, the less successful features of the Pierlot Government's régime—the food, fuel, and transport shortages—though largely outside the sphere of their control, soon outweighed the advantages accruing from their financial measures. Discontent with the Government reached a climax in January 1945. The crisis was precipitated by the Socialists, though there were malcontents even among the Liberals and Catholics. The Communists had not been noticeably inhibited from disparaging the Government even when they had been members of it, and, after they had left it (in November 1944), they cast off all restraint. In a last speech defending his Government (6 February 1945) Pierlot struck back at them. He declared that he had tried to work with Communist colleagues and had no desire to repeat the experiment—implying that it was the knowledge that they might have to be included in the Government again which made him disinclined to continue in office. On the following day he admitted that he no longer possessed the confidence of Parliament, and, without waiting for an adverse vote, he tendered his resignation to the Regent.

(2) *The First Van Acker Government and the Royal Question, February 1945 to February 1946*

The fact that the Regent called upon the Socialist Van Acker (who had been Minister of Labour in the late Government) to form a new government was a concession to the still strong leftward trend of public opinion. Van Acker and the Socialists, and even some of the Liberals, wished, as Pierlot had foreseen, to bring the Communists into the Government again, though it was generally agreed that a pledge of loyal support from the Communist Party was an essential prerequisite for their representation in the Government. Scarcely anybody, save the Communists themselves, defended the conduct of the party in striving to undermine the Pierlot Government during the period in which two of its members had held office. However, eventually even the Catholics so far overcame their reluctance to serve alongside the Communists as to join in the new Government of 'national union' which Van Acker formed, on 11 February 1945, with a membership of six Catholics, five Socialists, four Liberals, two Communists, and one non-party member.

Van Acker was faced with two immediate vital problems—the food situation and coal production—with which he proceeded to cope with energy and success. He himself grappled with the coal problem, while the improvement in the food situation was undoubtedly due in large measure to the organizing ability of the Communist Minister for Food, Lalmand—a fact which was naturally exploited to the full by Communist propaganda

and was not without its effect in bolstering up the party's declining prestige. As soon as these immediate problems had been solved, Belgium began to reap the benefits of the alleviations that had distinguished her war experiences from those of her less fortunate neighbours. In the first place, the Germans had not here, as elsewhere, removed or converted to war purposes any appreciable proportion of the national industry. Belgian factories had been allowed to produce on the spot for the German home market. Hence, at the end of the war, there was no problem of reconversion of industry. Moreover, Belgium did not need to use much steel—her principal product—for purposes of reconstruction at home, but was able to export it to earn foreign exchange, and she also had other means of acquiring considerable amounts of foreign currency. Throughout the war the Belgian Congo had provided much-needed raw materials for the Allied war effort, and the United States had bought large quantities of uranium at good prices. After the liberation, also, Belgium became the chief base for the Allied armies and Antwerp the chief port of entry for Allied supplies, and the country was thus able to build up a large credit account in pounds and dollars. Finally, although the flying bombs and Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive later did much local damage, the speed of the initial liberation had been so great that the country as a whole had suffered little devastation. As a result of all these factors, war-time controls could be abandoned and import duties lowered within a year from the liberation, and Belgium enjoyed an abundance which became the envy of Europe.

Into this happy and prosperous scene, like the skeleton at the feast, there stalked the Royal Question. The abundance remained, but the appetite soon fled. The King was free again, and he announced his intention of returning to the throne.[1] The Socialists had already made up their minds to oppose any such move, while the Liberals had preserved a more or less open mind. The King's announcement caused the Government to hand their resignation to the Regent (16 June 1945), and, two days later, both the Socialist and the Liberal Party[2] formally demanded the King's abdication. The Catholic Party leaders thereupon undertook to form a government. Meanwhile, however, the presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber had gone to St. Wolfgang near Salzburg to confer with the King, and had brought back an intimation from him that, for the present, he intended neither to return nor to abdicate.[3] Van Acker's Government accordingly resumed its functions, but without the six Catholic Ministers, who resigned.[4] This action on the Catholics' part, followed by the Government's own prompt action in passing a bill to bar the King's return to the throne without Parliament's consent, pledged the several parties

[1] Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: *Recueil de documents*, p. 568.
[2] Ibid. p. 583.
[3] Ibid. pp. 600–7.
[4] Ibid. p. 608.

irrevocably to the respective policies concerning this issue which they had adopted in this first moment of stress and emotion, and thus led to the perpetuation of an anomalous and unhealthy political situation.

The King's announcement, a little later (30 September 1945), that he would submit to the verdict of the people 'whatever it might be and by whatever legal means it might be expressed'[1] did nothing to alleviate the situation, since it soon became clear that he was bent upon the verdict being expressed by a popular referendum and that the Government were equally determined that the decision should be the prerogative of Parliament alone. Furthermore, since the first post-war elections were due to be held early in 1946, the whole problem could not fail to become an electoral issue.

(3) *The General Election of February 1946 and its Sequel*

In January 1946 the King renewed his request that the question of his return should be submitted to a referendum after the general election, whereupon Van Acker reminded him that Parliament had already decided that a referendum on the question was incompatible with the Constitution. But, in fact, the general election became a plebiscite on the Royal Question, because there was no other issue of the same magnitude and urgency, and because the parties had already aligned themselves on the basis of this issue.

As we have seen, the two main parties—the Catholics and the Socialists—held definite and opposing views on the Royal Question, and it was only by enlisting the often embarrassing support of the Liberals and the Communists that the Socialists could hope to hold the powerful Catholic Party in check. A measure of the Socialists' fears was to be found in Van Acker's refusal, manifestly on calculations of political strategy, to grant the vote either to women, who had never yet been enfranchised, or to the 300,000 persons convicted or suspected of *incivisme*, until after the general election. This was held on 17 February 1946;[2] and the result seemed to endorse Van Acker's estimate of the situation. About 1,400,000 votes were cast for the anti-King parties and 1,100,000 for the pro-King parties; but the disenfranchised *inciviques* amounted to about 300,000, and female suffrage would undoubtedly have added slightly to the vote for the King. The country thus proved to be very evenly divided.

The Catholic Party (or Christian Social Party, as it now called itself) emerged as by far the strongest single party in Parliament, holding almost

[1] Ibid. p. 673.

[2] At the Socialist Party Congress in October 1945, Van Acker said: 'On sait que les pays de l'Europe sont à gauche. De là la colère de la réaction, qui médite un plan indigne. Nous devons gagner la bataille. Nous ferons les élections sans les inciviques!' (*Le Soir*, 9 October 1945).

half the total number of seats both in the Senate and in the Chamber.[1] But, even so, it could not count upon enough support in Parliament to enable it to form a government pledged to the policy with which it had now identified itself. When the party's leader, De Schrijver, was called upon to form a Cabinet, he was unable to win the co-operation of the other parties because he insisted upon a referendum being held upon the Royal Question. After an abortive effort by Spaak to form a government, Van Acker was recalled and eventually succeeded (31 March 1946) in forming a Ministry consisting of six Socialists, six Liberals, and four Communists—with no Catholic representation at all.

This Government was, of course, quite unrepresentative of the true balance of parties in the country. At the same time it was practically powerless to follow a consistent policy of the kind which might normally have been expected from such a predominantly Left-wing coalition. The Liberals, who shared with the Socialists the privilege of holding the greatest number of posts in the Government, had much less right to them than the Communists, who held the smallest number. It was the Liberals who had been the real losers in the election. Unlike the other parties, they were split on the Royal Question, and in consequence many of their Right-wing members had voted for the Catholics and many of their Left-wing members for the Socialists. Their votes in both Houses were, however, essential for the maintenance of a bare majority over the Catholic opposition, and, considering the uncertainty of their attitude about the Royal Question and the persistence and the strength of their influence over certain sections of public opinion, it was felt expedient to buy, or at least to neutralize, them with the sweets of office. Before the election—and perhaps with some foreboding of eclipse—the Communists had invited the Socialists, Liberals, and UDB to join them in framing an electoral democratic front, but this had met with no response, each party preferring to fight under its own colours and with its own programme. Nevertheless, the fact that the Communists had gained fourteen seats in the Chamber

[1] The results of the general election of February 1946 were reflected in Parliament as follows:

	Chamber	*Senate*
Christian Social (Catholic) .	92 (gain 19 since 1939)	51
Socialist	69 (gain 5)	35
Communist . . .	23 (gain 14)	11
Liberal	18 (loss 15)	4
UDB	1	0

In the provincial elections a week later, the Christian Social Party won 344 seats and the Socialists 231, and this confirmed the trend and also increased the Christian Social majority in the Senate. Under the Belgian Constitution, in addition to the 106 Senators chosen in a general election, 46 were elected by the Provincial Councillors, and 23 by their fellow parliamentarians. Thus the ultimate strengths of parties in the Senate were: Christian Social 83, Socialists 55, Communists 17, Liberals 12.

compared with the Christian Social gain of nineteen, though the Communists' over-all strength was much smaller, seemed to point to a strengthening of the two extreme wings of Belgian politics, on the lines of what was then happening in France. Yet, in reality, the Communist Party's prospects were by no means improved, because the party was hamstrung from the moment of entering the coalition. Its supporters had obviously voted for it in hopes of far-reaching social and economic reforms, but, as the junior partner in a Government in which Liberal industrialists held key positions, it was powerless to carry out its mandate and consequently lost prestige to a very great extent.

What accounted for the undeniable success of the great Right-wing party and the comparative failure—and, what is more, passivity under failure—of the Left Wing? In the first place the Right Wing's attempt to steal the Left Wing's thunder (which was an almost universal post-war phenomenon) met with more success in Belgium than elsewhere. Nationalization was anathema among Catholics and Liberals, and it enjoyed only the most tepid support among the Socialists; but, apart from that, the programme of the reformed Catholic (Christian Social) Party was commendably progressive. It contained proposals for the representation of labour in every phase of the economy from the government level to industrial plants.[1] So long as the Royal Question kept it in voluntary exclusion from the conduct of public affairs, there was not much danger of the Christian Social Party being called upon to implement its pledges, and meanwhile it could enjoy the advantage over its adversaries—many of whom had had to default on their pledges—of being able to pose as an untried party of progress and reform. Even more important and significant, however, was the fact that the party's still strong confessional ties, far from detracting from, actually added to the new prestige and influence which it had gained through its political self-rejuvenation. In other words, as many Belgians still cherished the old attributes of the party as approved the new ones. A proof of this respect for tradition was to be found in the almost sensational failure of the Catholic dissident group, the *Union Démocratique Belge*. This party, as already noted,[2] had committed an error of judgement and timing in stressing its connexion with the Resistance; but it must also have committed a comparable error in overstressing its anti-confessional attitude.[3] Belgium as a whole was not good soil, as France and some other countries might be, for attempts to unite people on the basis of an acceptance of Christian ethics. To canvass the fundamental tenets of Christianity in Catholic Belgium was almost to commit a solecism.

[1] Each plant with more than twenty workers was to be required by law to have labour co-operating with management. State intervention was to make possible, through subsidies if necessary, the improvement of physical conditions in factories. Joint boards, representing the state, labour, ownership, and management, would control affairs.

[2] See above, p. 534.

[3] See above, p. 532.

The UDB, however, did win the doubtful and constitutionally quite unwarranted privilege of being admitted, like other minority parties, into the Government; for Van Acker selected two of their deputies to fill two of the vacancies left by the six Catholic Ministers who resigned in the summer of 1945.

The reformed Catholic Party, by its judicious blend of progress and traditionalism, enhanced by a complete freedom from governmental responsibility, could thus make an effective and wide appeal to the electorate. But it was not judged solely by its social and economic programme —and its actions seemed to show that it did not intend to be so judged. These aspects of its policy soon became entirely subordinated to and eclipsed by its attitude to the Royal Question.

The King had persisted doggedly in his demand for a referendum— or rather for what he preferred to term a *consultation nationale*, since 'referendum' implied a vote with legislative force, which might have stampeded the Government prematurely. He persisted also in his proposal for a publication of relevant documents on both sides. Both of these suggestions had been repeatedly rejected by the Government, when suddenly, in May 1946, the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate (Gillon and Caulewaert) decided to make a bid to solve the Royal Question on their own account. They proposed the setting up of a special non-parliamentary commission (to be composed mainly of lawyers) to examine and report on the King's activities during the war as revealed in the documents held by both sides. The King agreed to the plan, but the Cabinet rejected it, declaring that the negotiations had been initiated without their consent, that the proposal was unconstitutional—Parliament being the only authority competent to make any investigation—and that the non-parliamentary character of the proposed commission would only increase the suspicion that some of the facts were being concealed.[1] The Catholic Party then proceeded to table a bill for a *consultation nationale*, while in July the King set up a commission of his own, consisting of nine prominent Belgians 'to ascertain (*établir*) his attitude since 1936'.[2]

On 9 July the Van Acker Government was defeated by one vote on a motion demanding that the big economic collaborators should be dealt with more vigorously. After a prolonged period of crisis, the veteran Socialist leader Camille Huysmans formed a Cabinet on 1 August of much the same complexion and composition as its predecessor, except for the exclusion of Van Acker. Spaak remained Foreign Minister. This Government lasted till March 1947. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1946, the Catholics had begun to change their tactics, declaring that they were ready to collaborate with other parties in the government of the country, without prejudice to their views on the Royal Question, but in hopes that

[1] See Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: *Recueil de documents*, pp. 724–30. [2] Ibid. pp. 734–6.

by collaboration some solution might emerge. As an earnest of their good faith they withdrew the bill for the *consultation nationale*. But the opportunity for them to stage their come-back did not occur for some months yet, and in the meantime disorders resulting from clashes between Leopoldists and anti-Leopoldists became more frequent and disturbing. In March 1947 the four Communist Ministers in the Cabinet resigned over the question of the discontinuance of subsidies to the coal-mines and the raising of the price of coal, and this brought about the resignation of the Prime Minister on 12 March. The Regent now requested Spaak, the Foreign Minister, to form another coalition government, and Spaak complied; but, this time, it was a coalition of Catholics and Socialists, excluding the Communists and Liberals. It consisted of nine Catholics (Christian Social Party), eight Socialists (of whom Spaak was one), and two non-party experts. The two ruling parties were represented in the Chamber by 162 deputies, as against forty representing the opposition.

Surprise was felt at the time that the Communists should have deliberately brought about the fall of a government in which only exceptional circumstances had given them any share at all. In retrospect, it seemed probable that their action had been one manifestation of a world-wide change in Communist policy, precipitated at that time by the change in American policy which found expression in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid. (In France, too, scarcely two months later, the Communists left the government coalition on a similar issue and made little further pretence of acting constitutionally.)[1] Thereafter, the Belgian Socialists, like their French confrères, shook off the spell of Communist influence and became willing to collaborate with the Right Wing in the Government.[2]

The volte-face of the Catholics, on the other hand, had been predictable since the control of the party's policy had shifted from the conservative wing, which had been predominant before the war, to the democratic wing, which had existed before the war but had not exercised much influence over the formulation of policy. In spite of the absorption by the party of a large number of former fascists, the influence of the democratic wing continued to prevail and was probably responsible for the new resolve to work for the King's return by purely legal and constitutional means, instead of by the dangerous rabble-rousing methods hitherto employed. Thus, in a sense, Communists and Catholics had reversed their roles: just when the former had tired of acting constitutionally, the latter had decided to begin to do so. Unfortunately for the country it was too late to rescue the King's cause from the least respectable among his

[1] See above, p. 517.

[2] The Belgian Socialists were far less extreme and on the whole far less susceptible to Communist influence than the French Socialists; yet their small but powerful Left Wing had hitherto been resolutely opposed to any co-operation with the Catholic Party.

supporters. The Communists were now no longer hampered by holding office; they were free to brawl in the streets with the rougher Leopoldists; and attempts by the Catholic Party to raise the issue to a more dignified level were in large measure frustrated. All this perpetuated the tension and greatly increased the risk of civil war.

(iii) The Netherlands

(*a*) Introductory

The Netherlands emerged from the ordeal of war and occupation in much worse shape than either France or Belgium, and her physically greater devastation might well have rendered her morally more fertile soil for domestic strife and for Communism. Nor were her problems confined to domestic economic recovery and political overhaul. Her relations with an empire sixty times her own size and scattered over the world had become both controversial and critical. In the search for solutions of her post-war problems the nature of Holland's traditions and institutions and the character of her people played a decisive part.

The pattern of Dutch political life at the moment of the German invasion had been dangerously rigid and outmoded, and many progressive-minded people both inside and outside the country prophesied before the liberation that the nation would relapse into that pre-war pattern and, later, even believed that it had done so. Yet, in spite of the strain of the Indonesian question and the difficulties arising out of the general impoverishment of the country, the years immediately following the war compared favourably with the pre-war years on the crucial point of there being a reassuring absence of political extremism. This was largely due to what may be termed the preventive policy adopted by the Queen and her Government, both while in exile and after their return to their country. Indeed, in this connexion, the importance of the personal influence of the Queen and her direction of policy can scarcely be over-estimated.

In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, the Communists had been able to entrench themselves strongly by playing a prominent role in the Resistance Movement. But the Queen and her Government thwarted the Communists' exploitation of this initial advantage by drawing members of the Resistance Movement into their counsels at an earlier stage and with a better grace than other exiled Governments, and they went still farther by anticipating the aspirations of the resisters in matters of constitutional, economic, and social reform. By these means they were able to detach the more moderate Left-wing elements from Communist influence.

In the Netherlands, indeed, the biggest shadow which lay across the path was not Communism but the question of the recalcitrant colonies in

the East Indies.[1] This question was at once the touchstone of domestic politics and the main hindrance to economic recovery. Indeed, in Holland itself the view was almost universally held that the country could not live without Indonesia. Yet, at the same time, it was widely recognized that the old colonial style of government must be revised and could not be restored. These feelings were reflected in the sphere of politics. Parties of the extreme Right wanted an energetic and repressive policy in Indonesia, the Centre vacillated, and parties of the Left, according to their complexion, proposed solutions varying from 'dominion status' to independence for the islands, though many supporters of the Left-wing parties did not fully endorse the line taken by their leaders on this question. It was realized that, without Indonesia, only intensive industrialization could save Holland; yet to industrialize a country which possessed hardly enough coal for her ordinary domestic needs presented a conundrum that was hard to solve. Holland could not spare the foreign currency to import more than a small amount of coal, and it was this dilemma which gave rise to suggestions that she should annex part of the German coalfield adjacent to her pre-war frontier.[2] However, an alternative solution was sought, and ultimately found, in the economic union with Belgium and Luxembourg, known as 'Benelux'.

(*b*) The Problems facing the Dutch Government on their Return from Exile

The Dutch people, at the time of their liberation in the spring of 1945, were almost prostrate after the terrible winter that had followed the Allied setback at Arnhem in the autumn of 1944. Not only had Dutch hopes of the rapid eviction of the occupying German forces been frustrated by the failure of the Allies to bring off their coup, but German reprisals on the Dutch population had included measures which brought the whole country near to starvation point, and that point had actually been reached in some areas, notably in Rotterdam.[3] To these hardships was added the flooding of considerable areas of fertile land as a result of defence measures taken by the Germans during the last phase of the fighting in Holland, which did not end until the first week of May 1945.[4]

In the event, recovery from the effects of the flooding, which, at the

[1] An account of the Indonesian question will be found in the *Survey* for 1939–46: *The Far East, 1942–1946*, pp. 240–58.

[2] In July 1945 the Netherlands Government addressed a note to the Great Powers asking for special consideration for their country in view of the exceptionally heavy damage inflicted by the Germans. In this connexion they claimed reparations, and even a slice of German territory, though opinion in Holland was much divided on the latter point.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 505–6.

[4] Allied forces entered Holland from Germany at the beginning of April, and the whole country had been freed by 6 May.

time, seemed almost the worst of the many disasters that had befallen the Dutch, was far more rapid than had been expected, and it was other consequences of the war that had the most serious long-term effect in slowing down Holland's recuperation. As an over-populated and essentially agrarian country, Holland had depended before the war on nearby urban markets for selling her produce and earning foreign exchange. Her most important nearby market had been the Ruhr; her second most important had been Britain. But now, for different reasons, neither could afford to buy Dutch produce. Holland's prosperity had also depended to a large extent on the profits earned by the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam; but two-thirds of their traffic had been German transit traffic, and that also, for the time being, was non-existent.[1] Even more serious was the trouble over Indonesia, for one-sixth of the country's wealth had been invested in the East Indies and 15 per cent. of the national income had been derived from that source. The threatened loss of the colonies was, therefore, naturally looked upon by most Dutchmen as being a serious threat to their standard of living, which had already been greatly impaired by the Germans' despoiling of the country, by the costs of an army of occupation of some 100,000 troops, and by the fact that the population had increased very rapidly during recent years and was still increasing at the rate of a quarter of a million a year.[2] It was not surprising that the Indonesian question should be a topic of burning domestic concern, and that even some Netherlanders who wanted a radical, progressive policy at home should, at least tacitly, support repressive measures in the colonies. Foreign observers who were shocked by what they deemed to be unrepentant imperialism failed to make allowances for these considerations.

In regard to domestic politics, there could be no doubt that in Holland, as elsewhere, there was a widely felt aspiration for something new—a reluctance to see the political life of the liberated country settle back into its pre-war grooves. Resistance to the invader had brought Socialists, Liberals, Catholics, Protestants, and others of diverse political views into one camp, and the members of the Resistance Movement were anxious that the national unity achieved in their ranks should be projected into the political life of the future. Progressives of all parties and faiths wished to make an effort to unify existing political groups into one effective party for the prosecution of social and economic reform within the existing structure of the state. Similarly, within the trade union movement, there was the impulse to replace the several existing sectarian unions by one

[1] During 1948 the economic recovery which was taking place in Western Germany was reflected in the first signs of a real improvement in Holland.

[2] The population of Holland had increased during the war by some 600,000, whereas that of Belgium had increased by only 100,000.

union for each industry[1] and to bring each industry under the control of a council on which employers, workers, and Government would be jointly represented. At the same time, some of the progressive young Catholics canvassed the idea of rebuilding industry on a corporative system, looking to Portugal rather than to Fascist Italy for their model, but emphasizing that in any case the result must be democratic. To this end they were prepared to unite with Protestants and with all who accepted Christian principles, but not with atheists—which, to all intents and purposes, meant the Communists.

There were thus hopeful signs of an accommodating attitude on the part of many diverse groups, including elements of the confessional parties, towards the progressive aspirations of the people as a whole; but at the same time there were rumours just before the liberation that the Government in Exile were disturbed by the swing to the Left in Dutch opinion (which was represented as far greater than events proved it to be)[2] and were not taking adequate steps to meet the situation. Statements by the Government that elections would have to be postponed for many months owing to the destruction of voting lists evoked special criticism.[3] Many of these reports of a widening gulf between Dutch opinion at home and the Government in London were probably inspired by the Dutch Communists, who saw the ground being cut away from under their feet by the 'Christian-Social' progressives, and were anxious to provide themselves with ammunition for their own campaign.

In the controversy over the date of the first post-war elections the general disorganization of records was not the only reason for postponement. The political parties were in a state of flux, in which an early election would inevitably have given an imprecise and even unfaithful reflection of the popular will. It was true, however, that the provisional phase before elections could be held was unsatisfactory and awkward. Early in February 1945 new blood had been infused into the Gerbrandy Cabinet in London by the addition of five new members from the partially liberated homeland, and on 16 May 1945—that is as soon as final liberation had been achieved—a new Government had been formed by Professor William

[1] In December 1945 the NVV (equivalent of the British Trades Union Congress), the RKW (Roman Catholic trade union organization), and the CNV (Protestant trade union organization) concluded an agreement to act jointly in negotiations with employers.

[2] See, for instance, a report in *Reynolds News*, 4 February 1945, that 'an opinion poll in the liberated areas of Holland shows that Left-wing parties have the support of 86 per cent. of the people, the Centre parties 10 per cent., and the Conservatives 2 per cent.' Cf. the result of the first post-war elections in May 1946, given on p. 561 below.

[3] According to the *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 April 1945, the postponement of elections on these grounds was 'regarded by Dutch Left-wingers merely as a pretext for the Conservative forces to maintain themselves in power after the Liberation and prevent any structural reforms'. It was also stated that opinion in Holland was dissatisfied over the 'reshuffling' of the Gerbrandy Cabinet in London in February 1945.

Schermerhorn, the leader of the Netherlands People's Movement (the characteristic new political force born of the Resistance which was in its turn to engender the Labour Party)[1] with Dr. Willem Drees, a Socialist member of the Lower House and also a former Resistance leader, as Minister for Social Affairs. This interim Government represented the new forces in the country, but it confronted a pre-war States-General, which, though purged of collaborators, represented the old parties in proportion to their pre-war strengths.

In any case, owing to the circumstances of Holland's liberation, the process of restoring national sovereignty was necessarily much slower here than in other countries. The conditions for the handing over of control had been laid down in an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in May 1944[2] and had been proclaimed by Queen Wilhelmina and General Eisenhower on 9 October 1944. The terms of the agreement came into force in the different parts of the country as they were progressively liberated. During 1944 a Civil Affairs Administration and a Military Administration had been created by the London Government, and, subject at first to the over-all *de facto* authority of the Allied Supreme Commander, these bodies continued to exercise control until the ending, by Royal Decree on 4 March 1946, of the 'Special State of Siege'. Even then the total liquidation of the Civil Affairs Administration was a gradual process. Its functions were taken over only gradually by the regular departments of state.

During the first months after the liberation the Civil Affairs Administration had kept in close touch with a Council of Trustees which had been organized by the Resistance Movement to represent its interests and to advise the Government after their return from London. This Council, whose members included Catholics, Social Democrats, and Protestants but no Communists, was the first representative institution to assume its functions after the liberation in May 1945. In July 1945 a second step towards the restitution of normal constitutional processes was taken with the appointment by the Schermerhorn Government of a Supreme Advisory Committee composed of forty-three members of the old political parties, together with Resistance leaders. This Committee set up a small Parliamentary Purging Commission to investigate charges of collaboration against members of both Chambers. After this Commission had completed its task and a list of members of the States-General who had passed the test had been issued on 24 September 1945, a joint meeting of the two Chambers was held in November 1945. This was addressed by the Queen, who recommended measures for reconstruction and for revision of the

[1] See below, p. 559.
[2] See *The Times*, 17 May 1944.

Constitution—advising, in particular, that Indonesia should be granted autonomy within a Dutch Commonwealth.[1]

(*c*) The Resistance Movement and Communism

After the liberation, and the return of the Queen and the Government in May 1945, the Dutch authorities—governmental, civil, and military—at once gave proof of their willingness to co-operate with the former Underground groups and to give them as large a share as possible in the work of public administration and home defence. Trusted personalities who had the confidence of the Resistance Movement were appointed to act as officials attached to the Dutch Military Administration and as military commissioners in important cities and regions. Others were invited to sit on advisory commissions, which were consulted by the civil and military authorities on matters of policy and on practical steps to implement policy. This applied particularly to the process of 'purification'. Moreover, the responsible leaders of the Resistance Movement were themselves anxious to assist in promoting orderly courses, and showed themselves fully conscious of the limits which must inevitably be set to the part that members of the Movement could play. An article in the Resistance organ *Het Parool* (December 1944) provided a striking example of this realistic understanding of the situation: 'An illegal movement which, apart from the completion of its task, continues to act as an independent power and to formulate claims as such, becomes easily a state within a state. We need only look towards Belgium to realize what this may mean.'

A third factor in this happy development was the speedy and smooth absorption of the fighting units of the Resistance in the regular military machine. From these units were formed the 'shock' and 'guard' troops who constituted the 'Netherlands Forces of the Interior' operating under the command of Prince Bernhard and forming part of the Allied forces acting under the Supreme Allied Command. Semi-militarized units were also formed, and these were attached to the Netherlands Military Administration, while others acted as auxiliary police forces. Perhaps the most important factor of all lay in the nature of the national character—in the respect for law and order which was deeply rooted in Holland. When a small strike was settled with no great difficulty in one of the newly freed Dutch cities, one of the Underground leaders assured the representative

[1] The Queen, while in exile, had already outlined a progressive policy in regard to Indonesia. In July 1941 she had announced plans for an Imperial Conference to be held in February 1942. The conference had been forestalled by the Japanese attack, but in another speech in December 1942 (*The Times*, 7 December 1942) the Queen had put forward a proposal for a Netherlands Commonwealth, and the suggestions had been elaborated further in a statement issued in April 1944.

of the Military Administration: 'We will see to it that Holland does not become a second Greece.'[1]

To the national character and temperament, also, must in large measure be attributed the failure of the Communists to extend their influence after the war. When Schermerhorn was asked to compare the Dutch with the Belgian political situation, he said:

> Our situation is different. Indeed, not only the Catholics, but the other parties too, are loath to collaborate with the Communists. The fact is that, as a people, we have more than a little regard for theory and dogma, and for this reason the Communist interpretation of democracy seems to us, by western standards, rather unsound.[2]

Nevertheless, the Communists were in a much stronger position in Holland after the war than before it, since here, as in other countries, they had gained considerable prestige in the Resistance Movement and had hoodwinked at least a part of the population into a belief in their pose as democrats and nationalists.[3] On the other hand, their belated volte-face at the time of the German attack on Russia had offered them a less clear field in the Resistance Movement in Holland than elsewhere, because in Holland other equally able hands had already seized the reins; and, even before the end of the war, they had begun to throw off all pretence of co-operation with other Resistance elements, when they had founded their own 'Council of Resistance' as a rival to the 'Netherlands Forces of the Interior', in which all these other elements were united under a common leadership. Having thus so early and unwisely revealed themselves in their true colours, the Communists were unable to exploit a potentially favourable opportunity. Moreover, such action on their part defeated its own purpose by evoking sympathy and support for the other Left-wing parties' unyielding refusal to collaborate with the Communists—a pitfall into which Socialist Parties in other countries had, much to their later regret, allowed themselves to fall.

Far from being able to influence the Socialists, the Dutch Communists found themselves isolated and ignored. This was, however, a policy which the Dutch Socialists could no more have afforded than could their foreign confrères, had they not taken the initiative in putting themselves through a process of regeneration and re-forming themselves into a Christian-Social 'Labour Party' on a basis that was broad enough to allow them to collaborate with a reformed Catholic Party.[4]

[1] Despatch from *Sunday Times* special correspondent, 31 December 1944.

[2] Report of interview with Professor Schermerhorn (*Le Soir*, 17 May 1946).

[3] At the first post-war elections in 1946 (see below, p. 561 and note 2) they more than doubled the strength in representation which had been theirs in 1933 and 1937. They captured 502,935 votes and ten seats in the Second Chamber. Their success was particularly striking in the big cities—Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague—where they quadrupled their votes.

[4] See below, p. 562.

(*d*) The Break-up of the Old Political Pattern

By the date of the outbreak of the Second World War, Holland's political life had long been frozen in an unrealistic pattern that was far from corresponding to the living issues of the modern world. The basis of the traditional party system was an antithesis between religious and non-religious parties dating from the 1880s, when Roman Catholics and orthodox Protestants had entered into political coalition in order to strengthen their demands for schools of their own at a time when all public education had been non-confessional. In 1917 the school conflict had been settled by placing public and private (i.e. confessional) education on an equal footing. The coalition had remained in being, however, and the two allies, Catholic and Protestant, had developed into parties of the Right which had provided Holland, between the wars, with a succession of coalition Governments—five of them led by the Calvinist 'grand old man', Dr. Colijn. The opposition parties had consisted of the Liberals,[1] the Liberal Democrats,[2] the Social Democrats, and the Communists—though it should be emphasized that the real political antithesis, which was the division between conservatives and progressives, cut across this grouping. For instance, the Liberals, on most political issues, took their stand very close to the Right, while the religious parties of the Right were themselves divided. The more conservative members of the Catholic Party and the three Protestant parties pursued their traditional policy and retained their hold over a considerable part of the electorate, but some of the younger 'confessionals' declared themselves, during the war, in favour of a progressive policy and advocated the formation of a progressive party in collaboration with some of the Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats. The creation of such a party—the new Labour Party—was in fact the most important of the changes which took place in the political scene as a result of Holland's experiences in the war.

The Labour Party was the logical outcome of the war-time Netherlands People's Movement, which, by canalizing most of the progressive, but non-Marxist, currents in the Resistance Movement, managed to provide an effective counterweight to the Communist influence. The movement was designed to regenerate Dutch politics by inculcating such concepts as respect for the individual, freedom of conscience, participation of workers in the management of industry, social justice, a feeling of responsibility for the common weal, and reorganization of relations between overseas territories and the homeland. Above all, it aimed at strengthening the unity of Dutchmen, especially through the exclusion of confessional

[1] *Liberale Staatspartij de Vrijheidsbond.* Representation (1937 election): three in First Chamber, four in Second Chamber.

[2] *Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond* (Radical Liberals). Representation (1937): two in First Chamber, six in Second Chamber.

influences and the abandonment of class war. In fact, it exploited the widespread European desire to re-establish politics on a basis of Christian ethics and values, while endeavouring to adapt this desire to the equally widespread wish for political, economic, and social reform. Its leader and founder, Professor Schermerhorn, was entrusted, as we have seen, with the government of the country in the interim phase immediately following liberation, and he was thus given the opportunity not only of offering to his countrymen something that, for them, was virtually a fresh approach to politics, but also of demonstrating the practicability of his thesis, though his task was made difficult by his having to work with a States-General which was, unavoidably, not yet representative of the new tendencies.

The new Labour Party was not a mere continuation or revised version of the old Social Democratic Party, but a blending of progressive elements in the other traditional parties, for which the Social Democratic Party served as no more than a nucleus. The Social Democratic Party itself was just as liable to be labelled 'traditional' as were the confessional parties. It availed it little not to have collaborated with the Catholics and Protestants until the very eve of the war,[1] nor yet to have emerged from the last two pre-war elections as the second largest parliamentary group. Like its counterparts in several other Western countries, it was already then suffering from a kind of chronic debility, and the decline of its prestige became more rapid and more obvious as the war proceeded and as the prestige of the Communists rose. Moreover, the failure of both the Social Democratic Party and of the Socialist trade unions to rise to the occasion under the German occupation was registered in the rate at which the Communist trade unions drew away the members of the Socialist trade unions.

The Social Democrats were fully conscious of the attraction which the Communists exercised over their adherents, but, fortunately for them, an opportunity presented itself to them for offsetting these losses by identifying themselves with the great Christian-Social movement which was sweeping the political Centre and even permeating some of the Right. This movement, they could claim, was undoubtedly Socialist in inspiration, though it rejected the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism and substituted for it the Christian doctrine of the sanctity of the individual. Hence Schermerhorn, who was its foremost champion in Holland, called it 'personalistic socialism', or just 'personalism'. Its aim was to bring about

> the union of all those who, on the basis of their personal view of life, tend towards the same political ideas . . . so that the spiritual diversity which characterizes the people shall be united in a solid political force . . . while ensuring

[1] On 9 August 1939, after Colijn had received a rebuff at the hands of the Catholics, Jonkheer de Geer, the leader of the Christian Historical Union, had formed a Cabinet including, for the first time in Dutch history, two Social Democrats, Jonkheer Albarda and Dr. Van den Tempel.

that the different groups preserve their individuality within the framework of the social structure and are not swamped by a central organism—not even the state.[1]

Thus the new Labour Party, which was founded in February 1946, was composed of people with widely differing backgrounds and views—Catholics and Protestants, Liberals and Socialists—who were nevertheless united in a common aim of creating a new democratic and mildly Socialist, but essentially Christian, society. Undoubtedly such a party filled a gap in the Dutch political scene; it was therefore a matter for surprise among its adherents that it did not achieve a greater success in the first post-war elections, those for the Second Chamber, held on 17 May 1946.[2] The party had hoped to gain 35 out of the 100 seats in the Second Chamber, but actually only 29 were won, as against the Catholics' 32 and the three Protestant Parties' 23.[3] As had been expected, the Labour Party's policy of sternly repelling all Communist advances and repudiating Marxist doctrines lost the party many votes—especially among the former Social Democrats—which went to the Communists and contributed to the increase of Communist representation from three seats (1937) to ten. The Catholic Party, on the other hand, had emerged as the strongest single

[1] Report of interview given to *Le Soir* (17 May 1946) by Schermerhorn.

[2] The first provincial elections were held on 29 May, the elections for the First Chamber on 12 July, and the first municipal elections on 26 July. The results, in full, of the general elections for the First and Second Chambers of the States-General were:

First Chamber		*Second Chamber*	
Catholic	17	Catholic	32
Labour	14	Labour	29
Anti-Revolutionary	7	Anti-Revolutionary	13
Christian Historical	5	Communist	10
Communist	4	Christian Historical	8
Freedom Party	3	Freedom Party	6
		State Reformed Party	2
	50		100

[3] The political predominance of the Catholics in a country with a Protestant majority could be explained by the fact that the Catholics were not divided by party, sect, or class. The single Catholic Party, which observed a strict discipline, included workmen, small farmers, industrialists, and patricians. The Protestants, on the other hand, were more class-conscious and were divided among several sects and three parties (Anti-Revolutionary, Christian Historical, and State Reformed—see below, pp. 563–4). Moreover, the Catholic Party had always been more liberal-minded than the Protestants, and became more so after the war. The Protestants, too, attempted to regenerate themselves politically after the war, but the 'National Christian Front' which they established was only a loose association between the two older parties, and the creation of a single party was not achieved.

The numerical preponderance of the Protestants over the Catholics in Holland was not, in fact, very large. According to the *Statesman's Year Book* (1952) the census of 1947 gave the following totals:

Dutch Reformed Church	2,988,558
Other Protestants	1,261,744
Total	4,250,302
Roman Catholics	3,703,526

O O

party. It had 31 per cent. of the electorate behind it, and it had been revitalized by having cut itself off from its former allies, the Calvinist parties, and as having given the lie to imputations of reaction, and by having opened its ranks in December 1945 to admit non-Catholics who were in sympathy with its general policy. It might be said, indeed, that in Holland, as in Belgium, it was the Catholics who had reaped the greatest benefit from the 'Christian-Social' movement that had developed during the occupation. In spite of the tendency to disparage 'confessionalism', the familiar age-old Church—when once it had slightly modernized its façade—offered a more acceptable rallying-point than the new vague 'humanism'.[1]

Since the elections had not given the Labour Party the commanding position for which they had hoped, they had the option of either collaborating with the Catholics or going into opposition. While fear of losing working-class support may have made the leaders of the party hesitate to collaborate with the Catholics, they had gone too far in repudiation of Marxism to be able, even if they wished, to collaborate with the Communists in the opposition, and, besides, the opposition contained extreme elements of the Right, as well as of the Left, which might have proved embarrassing company. In the Netherlands, modern Socialists and progressive Catholics could co-operate with less difficulty than in most countries because neither side was hampered by its own extreme wing, and the Labour Party's decision was made easier by the Queen's choice of Dr. Beel as the new Prime Minister. Dr. Beel belonged to the Left Wing of the Catholic Party and was known as a progressive; and, as a member of the Schermerhorn Cabinet, he had shared responsibility for the liberal policy towards Indonesia. Collaboration between the Catholics and the Labour Party on this colonial issue would therefore be relatively easy, and continuity of policy would be assured.

In a sense, it was undeniable that the result of the elections in May 1946 was a defeat for Socialism in so far as it was a defeat for Schermerhorn and his social and financial policy,[2] which the Catholics, though associated with his Government, had frequently attacked. The Catholics therefore

[1] Referring to the widening of the Catholic Party to include non-Catholics, a Catholic newspaper, *De Maasbode* of Rotterdam, wrote in January 1946: 'Does it not behove our party to extend a measure of hospitality to those compatriots who, while not sharing our religious faith, yet do not find themselves attracted to a Labour Party resting upon vague tenets of humanism?'

[2] In pursuance of the policy announced by the Prime Minister on taking office, the Schermerhorn Government (*a*) set up a commission to investigate the prospects of nationalizing the Netherlands Bank, (*b*) introduced a bill (January 1946) for the reorganization of trade and industry, under which boards were to be set up composed of representatives of employers and workers from each industry, headed by a government commissioner appointed for four years.

On 12 September 1945 the Finance Minister, Dr. Lieftinck, announced drastic measures designed to trace black-market profits, check inflation, and control wages and prices, involving a 'moneyless week' between 26 September and 3 October, in which all bank notes were called in and replaced by a new issue.

now appeared to have a mandate to modify these policies, if they so wished; but on the other hand, if they were to collaborate successfully with the Labour Party, it was obviously incumbent on them to make concessions on their side too, and to modify their own policy as hitherto expressed.

Dr. Beel, in any case, appears to have deemed the creation of a strong Centre bloc to be the overriding consideration, and accordingly he applied himself to bringing this about. On 5 July 1946, in a statement of policy which he made on assuming the Premiership, he declared that the Netherlands Bank was to be nationalized, and also certain industries, if investigation showed this to be desirable; but that the Government took the view that state control would gradually have to give place to private enterprise and to functional, quasi-public bodies vested with special powers. Thus he gave a sop with one hand to the Socialists and with the other to his own party, the Catholics. Regarding imperial policy, Beel indicated that he was not proposing to make any appreciable departure from the previous Government's policy of compromise with the Indonesian nationalist leaders. For reasons already described, the Indonesian question profoundly agitated public opinion and largely dominated parliamentary discussion. The Communists wanted complete independence for the colonies; the Labour Party favoured reconciliation and 'dominion status'; the Anti-Revolutionary and State Reformed Parties would hear of no compromise. The Liberal 'Party of Freedom' and the Christian Historical Union, though also parties of the Right, eventually came to accept the Government's Indonesian policy. The attitude of the Catholics was at first uncertain, but the majority finally supported the Government's plans for compromise, while those who could not stomach these plans broke away from the party and formed the Catholic Committee of Action.

Since the elections had given the Catholics 32 of the 100 seats in the Second Chamber, and the Labour Party 29, the two parties jointly controlled almost two-thirds of the seats in the House. The three Protestant parties with a total of twenty-three seats, the Communists with ten, and the Liberals with six, formed a very heterogeneous and unorganized opposition. This was obviously a not altogether healthy state of affairs in a democracy. The Communists—though they would undoubtedly have acted their now accustomed role of 'nigger in the woodpile', whether in the Government or in opposition—had at any rate a definite object in view, but the Right-wing opposition parties (among which were to be numbered the Liberals) seemed to have objectives which were so vague, and were founded upon such antiquated conceptions, that they could offer little that was likely to appeal to the average elector.

The Anti-Revolutionary Party, for instance, was not—at least theoretically—at issue with the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, but was still

grappling fiercely with the legacy of the French Revolution of 1789. Although it claimed to have a democratic outlook on social questions, its rigidly Calvinistic, anti-Socialist, and also chauvinistic flavour branded it almost inevitably as an ultra-conservative party. Schermerhorn said of it: 'Without being conservative in principle, it has more or less taken refuge in the conservative camp.' But he added—and the remark was characteristic of his mature outlook—'I think it is to the detriment of Dutch politics that no group dares openly to declare itself conservative, since I am convinced that conservatism has as useful a role to play in the life of a people as its rivals.'[1] In theory, the second Protestant party, the Christian Historical Union, ought to have been the conservative party *par excellence*, since it was an offshoot of the Anti-Revolutionary Party formed by members of it who disliked its growing democratic tendencies at the turn of the century. Yet the new party ended by trying to outbid the parent party on this very point of canvassing a reform of labour legislation. A third Protestant party which made its appearance after the Second World War—the State Reformed Party—stood, like the Anti-Revolutionary Party, for strict Calvinistic principles in political life and legislation, and also ranged itself alongside that party on the Indonesian question; in these respects it was another virtually conservative party. But, despite a loose alliance within the so-called National Christian Front, the Protestants' factionalism continued to hamstring their potential solidarity and effectiveness as a political force, and in any case they could not be other than uneasy bedfellows with Communists and Liberals.

The Liberals, considered on their own merits, were no better qualified to stiffen the opposition. The old Liberal State Party had once been important and influential as the counterweight of the doctrinaire parties of the two confessions; but progressive splintering had so weakened it that, immediately before the Second World War, it could only count upon 5 per cent. of the electorate to support it. Then, after the war, many Liberals were attracted away to the new Labour Party. However, in March 1945 a 'Party of Freedom' was founded, which absorbed the bulk of the old Liberal State and Liberal Democratic Parties and any other liberal-minded people who could not feel at home in the Labour Party. The Party of Freedom fought under the banner of individual liberty and free competition; it advocated free trade, and, while not in principle resisting social legislation, it opposed nationalization and restrictions on free enterprise. Yet, at the 1946 elections, this rejuvenated Liberal Party still only gained the support of 6 to 7 per cent. of the electorate. On the ground that it opposed the 'dogmatism' of the Catholics at the same time as it opposed nationalization and state interference, it chose to consider itself as a Centre party; but this was an empty claim, since the role was already

[1] Report of interview with Schermerhorn (*Le Soir*, 17 May 1946).

filled by the coalition of Labour and progressive Catholics which was governing the country.

The chief criticism heard among Dutchmen, and others, of the turn which Dutch affairs had taken after the war was that they were too calm, too humdrum—that, in spite of the upheaval of the war and occupation, in spite of revolt in the Empire and an initial zeal for reform and progress at home, political life had returned to an almost disappointing state of normality, or, rather, *status quo ante bellum*. Thus, when the Truman Doctrine of aid to fight Communism was announced, the Dutch Minister of Finance, Dr. Lieftinck, declared almost dolefully: 'We do not live close enough to the political storm centres to be eligible for political loans.'[1] Yet it was perhaps in truth a token of the politically auspicious characteristics, shared by the Dutch with the British, that so much genuine change could take place without the outward face of things showing any marked alteration.

(iv) Denmark

(*a*) The Background

By the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, Denmark had gained the reputation of being perhaps the most successful and progressive social democracy in the world, and, although she suffered many—but admittedly not all—of the tribulations of her neighbours during the war, unlike them she emerged with the fabric of her national life and institutions largely unimpaired. This happy state of affairs may be ascribed to the fact that her political health and stability had been acquired so recently, compared with the histories of other Western states, and at the cost of so much effort, that the memory of her achievements was still fresh enough to carry her triumphantly through the ordeal of occupation. In other words, Denmark was still, in a sense, in a revolutionary mood: she had not been prepared to truckle to Nazi oppression during the occupation and did not feel herself threatened by Communist designs for domination in the years immediately following the liberation.[2] Thanks to the achievements of Danish reformers, the Danish national house was so hygienic that the germs of discontent—which could breed Fascism or Communism with equal facility—could find few unscrubbed corners in which to establish a breeding-ground.

The comparatively late date at which Denmark's social and political life had become emancipated and at which she had entered the fraternity of 'modern states' could be explained by her having made too early and

[1] Howard Smith: *The State of Europe* (London, Cresset Press, 1950), p. 171.

[2] The confidence of the Danes was strengthened by, for instance, the Russian withdrawal from Bornholm (see below, p. 575, note 2).

too sudden a start on the path of democracy in 1849. This had, of course, been the time at which other European states had been assuming the main features of the democratic guise which they were still wearing at the outbreak of the Second World War, but it had been too early for Denmark, because she would have had to make the transition to democracy straight from absolutism, which most of the other states concerned had cast off gradually in a succession of earlier stages.

Like other states which had had too much parliamentarism too early in their history, Denmark had, in 1660, gone to the opposite extreme by putting herself under an hereditary absolute monarchy. In its later phase this theoretically autocratic régime had taken a number of highly important steps along the road towards parliamentary and social democracy,[1] and in 1849 the King had actually granted the country a democratic Constitution. This measure, however, had crushed, among those whose vested interests it had threatened, a reaction which had been powerful enough to render the provisions of the Constitution virtually inoperative and to put off the attainment of democratic liberties for another half-century. The reversion to arbitrary government which had followed this setback had not only been completely out of step with the general contemporary trend in Western Europe; it had also sharpened the antagonism between social classes and had strengthened radical propensities among those who did not enjoy special privileges, at a time when radicalism had everywhere been gaining ground owing to other causes. On the other hand, it had had the merit of stimulating progressive movements which became all the more effective for the spirit of defiance in which they had been initiated. Thus, throughout this otherwise retrograde period of government in the latter half of the nineteenth century, such institutions as the Folk High Schools,[2] the Workers' Educational Association, the Co-operative and the Trade Union Movements, and the free press had become active forces in the civic education of the humbler strata of the community.

In 1901 the progressive Lower House (*Folketing*) had won a victory over the reactionary Upper House (*Landsting*), and thereafter there had been a steady drive towards a complete reform of the state, with the result that, within twenty years, Denmark had become a model democratic nation. The continuity of Danish progress in democracy—as well as Denmark's singular good fortune—had been thrown into relief when in 1915, while

[1] e.g. the wide reforms of Christian VII's ill-fated Minister Struensee in 1770; the emancipation of the peasants in 1788; the Education Act of 1814; the Local Government Act of 1831; and the Advisory Diets, 1834–48.

[2] The idea of the Folk High Schools had been conceived as far back as the 1830s; the majority of the students were recruited from the rising generation of the farming population, who could here imbibe the elements of culture and of political and social democracy. These newly acquired interests had found expression in the Co-operative Movement, and this, in turn, had contributed towards the remarkable progress made by Danish farming.

the major European states were throwing all their energies into war, the Danes had introduced a revision of their Constitution, whereby, *inter alia*, the franchise had been extended to all persons over twenty-five years of age, including women. After the war, in 1920, they had begun the parcelling out of great estates into small holdings, which had led to the eventual creation of 20,000 independent small farms.[1]

These achievements indicated a predominance of Left-wing sentiments and Left-wing parties in Denmark, but since the beginning of the twentieth century no single Danish party had been able to command a majority in the *Folketing*. This had been the consequence of an elaborate system of proportional representation under which every minority had been so meticulously represented that coalition had been the only alternative to minority government. In fact, from 1920 to 1929 the country had been ruled by minority governments—two Liberal and one Social Democrat; and from 1929 to 1940 by a coalition of Socialists and Radicals. The collaboration of two or more parties had been required to secure the passing of bills by the Rigsdag, but fortunately this had usually proved possible to arrange, and political factionalism had not blocked the road of progress. For instance, in 1933, when Denmark, like other countries, had been suffering from labour troubles arising out of the world economic depression, the Socialists, Radicals, and Liberals had pledged themselves by the so-called Kanslergade Agreement to take certain measures which had been considered necessary to deal with the situation. Again, in 1937, a complete overhaul of elementary education had been achieved by similar co-operation between parties. About the same time all parties had also combined to make a further revision of the Constitution; but, though they had secured the bill's passage through both Chambers of the Rigsdag, it had failed in 1939, by a hair's breadth, to secure the 45 per cent. vote in a national referendum which was required by law to endorse the parliamentary decision.[2]

During this period *Venstre*, the Farmers' Liberal Party, had ceded the first place among the political parties to the Social Democrats. The Danish peasant farmers had come to the fore as champions of liberal democracy even before the granting of the first Constitution in 1849; and since 1870 their party, known then as the 'United Left', had maintained a majority in the *Folketing* for more than a generation, though Conservative Ministries had been kept in power by the Court and by a majority in the *Landsting*. When the supremacy of the *Folketing* had been acknowledged in 1901, *Venstre* had come into its own, forming several Ministries and intro-

[1] Usually of about fifteen to twenty-five acres, which was the area that was considered large enough to support a family.

[2] The revised Constitution would have created a 205-member unicameral Rigsdag, elected by a half-direct, half-indirect method. Voting age would have been lowered to twenty-three.

ducing many reforms, but the ever-growing prosperity of the peasant farmers had gradually changed the character and outlook of their party. Its sympathies with social reform had begun to wane, and by 1920 its programme had come to consist mainly in the expression of a desire for free trade and economic liberalism—the system which had made the peasants rich. Moreover, it was taking little interest in the acute problems of urban industry, although in Denmark, as everywhere else, the urban element of the proletariat had come to be a force to be reckoned with. A sharp antithesis between town and country had always been a feature of Danish political life, and, while *Venstre* had remained strongly entrenched in rural districts,[1] its increasing inability to keep on terms with the supporters that its democratic policy had originally won for it in the towns had resulted in the growth of a new party known as the *Radikale Venstre* (Radical Left).

Though the Radicals had always been the smallest of the four major parties, they had rapidly become a power in the land because they had had outstanding leaders drawn from the intelligentsia and because they had held the balance between the other parties. In this party the rather doctrinaire type of intellectual democrat, literary, free-thinking, and pacifist, had become the spokesman both of the urban artisan of the towns and of the humbler sort of agricultural labourers and crofters, who felt themselves exploited by the peasant farmers and whom *Venstre* had neglected. The Radicals had ultimately been eclipsed by the Social Democrats, but for a time the two parties had worked in partnership and had thus achieved a governing majority.

The Social Democrat Party had had a small following among the rural population, but had relied primarily on the support of the urban workers, and had increased in prestige and importance, as this class had increased in numbers and influence, until it had become the first party in the state. Most of the leaders, however, had been intellectuals rather than trade unionists, and its programme had always been moderate. Its ultimate aim had been ostensibly socialization of the means of production, but it had always shown willingness to work for immediate social amelioration within the existing framework. Above all it had never wavered in its determination to have no truck with the Communists—except with the sort of guarantees which the Communists would never give.

During the period of Left-wing predominance between the wars, the fourth of the major political parties had been undergoing vicissitudes. The Conservative People's Party had been founded in 1916, as the successor of the old 'Party of the Right', and had been modelled somewhat on the pattern of contemporary English conservatism. For a time, during the 1920s, the party had incurred the suspicion of having fascist tendencies,

[1] See below, p. 574, for *Venstre*'s recovery in 1945.

but that impression had been obliterated by the skilful and dynamic leadership of Christmas Moeller during the next fifteen years.

Moeller's leadership of the Conservative Party had had a great influence on its development. His progressive and strongly individualistic policy had invigorated the party, but this at the cost of splitting it into two factions: a progressive group which had accepted Moeller's ideas and an orthodox group which had resisted them. Moeller's aims had been to free the Conservative Party from any lingering traces of a reactionary spirit, and from any suspicion of being in the pay of 'high finance'. He had also wished to liberate it from political dependence on the other large middle-class party —the *Venstre*—and to build up its position in the political Centre. He had supported defence measures[1] and advocated an active policy of reform as the best means of countering Socialism. He had co-operated with the other party leaders in making a new draft Constitution on the eve of the war, but he had failed to carry the bulk of Conservative voters with him, and the draft had been defeated in the national referendum.[2]

(*b*) Moral and Material Recovery after Liberation

The German occupation of Denmark during the war and the gradual development of Danish resistance to the occupying forces[3] had resulted in a strengthening of the solidarity of the nation and not, as in France and Belgium, in the aggravation of old differences or the creation of new ones. There had been, on the whole, far less collaboration with the Germans, and consequently far less internal bitterness, in Denmark than in some other occupied countries. This was largely attributable to the social, political, and economic soundness of the country at the time of its occupation. There had been little serious criticism of the King and of the Government, who had concluded an agreement with Germany shortly before the war,[4] because these had shown by their subsequent behaviour that even this submission to *force majeure* had been actuated by patriotic motives and had also by no means been unlimited in time or extent. No quisling had ever attained to power in Denmark, and when parliamentary elections had been held in 1943[5] the local Nazis had polled only 2 per cent. of the votes cast. Denmark had had to wait for her liberation until the German forces had surrendered on 5 May 1945, but she was then able to restore constitutional government with unusual rapidity. Her King did not have

[1] He had, indeed, originally joined the Conservative Party because he had thought it the most likely party to ensure a strong defence policy.

[2] See above, p. 567.

[3] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 523 seqq.

[4] See below, p. 577.

[5] These had been the only free elections allowed by the Germans in any occupied country—free, that is, save for a ban on the Communist Party. See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, pp. 527–8.

to return from exile; he was still in the country, with his reputation unscathed, and there was a Parliament in existence, which, though lately suspended, had been elected as recently as 1943, and in which, moreover, 143 out of 148 deputies were outspoken opponents of Nazism and German rule. Furthermore, a Cabinet, with strong Resistance representation, had been agreed upon even before the Germans left, and was thus able to take over the control of the country immediately.

On the material side, in spite of German plunderings and native sabotage, the productive capacity of Denmark emerged almost wholly intact, in both industry and agriculture. At the end of the war the national larder was fully stocked with food ready to be exported as soon as ships could cross the mine-infested seas. Denmark was, therefore, not faced with the problem of a black market, but she did impose voluntary rationing on herself in order to help other less fortunate countries. Industry was equipped with efficient modern machinery (the Germans had supplied new tools in the hope of getting increased production), and the damage done by sabotage and reprisals was for the most part reparable. On the other hand, Denmark had no raw materials whatsoever and depended solely on imports, especially of coal and coke. Before the war she had received 400,000 tons of fuel monthly from Britain, and during the occupation she obtained, at the very worst, 125,000 tons a month from Germany. The general scarcity of both shipping and raw materials, however, precluded any hope of maintaining imports at this rate after the war.

Hence Denmark, after her liberation, had less coal for industry and domestic consumption than she had had under the occupation. She was also dismayed to find that she could not obtain prices for her butter and bacon as high as those that the Germans had paid during the war. Owing to the general European scarcity, Danish agricultural produce would have fetched unprecedentedly high prices in a free market, but, since the Allied Great Powers controlled all coal and shipping, the Danes were unable to drive a good bargain. Moreover, Britain and Germany had formerly been Denmark's best customers and suppliers of her raw materials, but both countries were now obliged drastically to cut down their imports, and Denmark was automatically obliged to follow suit. Such economic difficulties as she experienced, therefore, in this immediate post-war phase were due to extraneous causes rather than inherent in her own condition.

(*c*) Political Developments after Liberation

In spite of her comparatively healthy political and social condition, Denmark, in common with her neighbours, did not escape difficulties with the Resistance Movement when liberation had been achieved. There was the usual tension at first over the future role of the Resistance and over the question of dealing with collaborators. Under Communist influence

strikes were called in industries where the presence of collaborators was either known or suspected, and attempts were made—though with far less justification here than elsewhere—to brand all parliamentarians as collaborators. Again, in Denmark as elsewhere, the inclusion of representatives of the Resistance in the Cabinet was portrayed as an attempt to buy off, or tie the hands of, the Resistance Movement. There was also tension between the police and members of the Resistance Movement when the former resumed their functions, and arrests of persons suspected of collaboration were allowed only under police supervision. An additional irritant was provided by the presence in the country of 350,000 German refugees and wounded and by the discovery, after the liberation, of hitherto unknown German iniquities and channels of propaganda and espionage (including even the Red Cross). In general, indeed, the Resistance Movement had a more revolutionary spirit in Denmark than in Norway.

Although, as in other countries, the Communists had come very much to the fore in the Danish Resistance Movement, other elements had also obtained a firm foothold in it from the very start, and Communist influence and prestige had never seemed likely to overwhelm the traditional political groups. Before 1932 the Communist Party had had no representation of importance in Denmark, but the economic troubles of the 1930s had given it some following among the seamen and harbour workers of Copenhagen, Esbjerg, and Aalborg. In 1932 it had won two seats in the *Folketing*, one of which had fallen to the party leader, Aksel Larsen. Larsen had been, at the time, an uncompromising revolutionary who had attacked the Social Democrats for betraying the working class and denying their own past. Later, following the general *mot d'ordre* from Moscow, he had swung over to the Popular Front policy and had advocated co-operation with the Socialists. At the general election of 1939 the party had increased its representation in the *Folketing* from two seats to three. At the outbreak of war, following the new directive resulting from the Hitler–Stalin pact, Larsen had again assumed an intransigent attitude against the Government and the other political parties; indeed, after the German occupation had begun he and his party had regarded themselves, with accuracy, as forming the only 'opposition'. After the German invasion of Russia, when other leading Communists had been arrested by the Germans, Larsen had 'gone underground' and had collaborated with the Conservative leader Christmas Moeller in producing the Resistance newspaper *Frit Danmark*. In November 1942 Larsen, too, had been arrested by the Germans and, later, had been taken to Germany and been imprisoned.

After the liberation Larsen returned to Denmark and, true to current Communist form, took up a conciliatory attitude towards the other parties and co-operated in the interim Government appointed before the departure of the Germans. This Government consisted of nine members

representing the traditional parties (four Socialists, two Conservatives, two Liberals, one Radical), and nine representing the Resistance Movement, including two leaders of the Communist Party and two of the Danish Unity Party (*Dansk Samling*), both of which had participated in the Resistance Movement as individual groups.

As leader of the largest party, the Social Democrat Vilhelm Buhl was appointed Premier, and Christmas Moeller became Foreign Minister. Ministers with wide and vaguely defined powers for dealing with the exceptional circumstances of the immediate post-liberation phase included Mogens Fog, a professor, psychiatrist, and Communist whose exploits as leader of the Resistance on Danish soil had made him an almost legendary figure, and who was charged with the 'normalization of the Resistance Movement'; Frode Jakobsen, a Social Democrat professor and military leader of the Resistance, charged with 'Arrests and Accusations'; Aksel Larsen; and Henrik Kauffmann, who, as Danish Minister to the United States, had proclaimed himself the representative of a Free Denmark a year after the German invasion.[1] The Communist Party was, moreover, reinstated in its old rights, and three Communist members were allowed to take their seats in the Rigsdag—that being the party's representation before it had come under the German ban.

In the conciliatory atmosphere of this first summer after the liberation, Larsen tried to negotiate a union with the Social Democrats, but his refusal to fulfil the requirement that he should make an unequivocal declaration of faith in democracy caused the breakdown of the negotiations;[2] and at the general elections held in the autumn of 1945 the Communists won many seats from the Social Democrats.[3] Larsen then led a vigorous opposition to the Liberal (*Venstre*) Government, which had been formed after the elections, especially when the Government accepted Marshall Aid and showed an increasing tendency to align the country's policy with that of the Western Great Powers.

The war and occupation produced no new parties in Denmark and did not much change the characters of the old parties,[4] though their relative influence was modified. Indeed, the comparative slightness of the effect of the war on the political life of Denmark can be gauged by tracing the

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 522.

[2] A Left-wing British newspaper, wrongly anticipating the success of these negotiations, wrote that the forthcoming elections were 'expected to show striking working-class gains owing to the creation recently [*sic*] of a single Socialist Party' (*Reynolds News*, 12 August 1945).

[3] See below, pp. 574–5.

[4] In 1939 the four major parties (i.e. Social Democrat, *Venstre*, Conservative, and Radical) had held between them 134 seats in the *Folketing*, and the other parties only fourteen; seventy-four seats in the *Landsting*, and the other parties only one. Indeed, the minor parties had represented altogether only about one-eighth of the electorate before the war, and, as in other countries, the experiences of the war period tended to reduce their significance even more, and to solidify political opinion into larger blocs.

fortunes of the Danish Nazi Party (DNSAP), which might reasonably have been expected to react more strongly than any other party to events during the German occupation. In 1935 this then new party had won about 15,000 votes, but no seat in the Rigsdag; in 1939 it had won about 30,000 votes and three seats in the Rigsdag; yet in 1943, when the country was completely under German Nazi domination, it had increased its votes only to 43,000 and had still won only three seats. This had been due partly to the solid support given by the bulk of the nation to the governing coalition parties, and partly to the lack of support given by the Germans to the leader of the DNSAP, Frits Clausen, who was, to put it mildly, a mediocrity.

A more awkward challenge to the coalition during and immediately after the war was presented by the 'Danish Unity Party' (*Dansk Samling*), which had secured representation in the *Folketing* for the first time in 1943 with three seats.[1] Since the party was advocating unconditional opposition to the Germans, this had been in some ways a gratifying portent; yet, at the same time, the public could not have demonstrated their feelings towards the occupation by voting for the *Samling* without weakening the coalition parties and impairing that very national unity for which the party nominally stood. The party's leaders, Arne Soerensen and Kaj Munk, were both patriots of the highest order (the latter paid with his life for his cool defiance of the Germans); but as politicians they were not reliable. In 1945 the *Samling*'s fortunes reached their peak and it obtained four seats, but in 1947 it did not return a single candidate. Incidentally, it was in this party that almost the only trace[2] was to be found in Denmark of the Christian-Social trend which was so marked a feature of other West European countries at this time. Kaj Munk was a Lutheran pastor and poet; Soerensen, a publisher of religious books, drew a parallel between the *Samling* and the French MRP and Norwegian Christian Party, but denied that the *Samling* was, at bottom, a religious party.[3]

Of the four major parties, it was the Conservatives who lost most ground after the war. Moeller had become a member of the Coalition Government during the occupation; but his intransigent attitude towards the Germans had eventually cost him his seat both in the Government and in the Rigsdag and had finally led to his escaping to England. It was perhaps as a leader of the Danish Resistance that he had really found himself, and it was typical of the unorthodoxy of his views that he should have con-

[1] The party had been formed in 1936, but had polled only 8,500 votes in the 1939 elections.

[2] A section of the Conservative Party also perhaps showed slight traces of the Christian-Social influence. Both Fibiger (Chairman of the Conservative Party after Moeller) and Bjorn Kraft (Chairman of the Conservative Group in the *Folketing* 1940–5 and again in 1947) stressed the necessity for Christian values in Danish politics.

[3] In a reported interview with *Chicago Daily News*, 25 October 1945. Soerensen said that his party's platform was 'an interesting combination of nationalism, humanism, and Christian approach to the political'.

sented to collaborate closely in the Resistance with the Communist leader, Aksel Larsen. After the liberation he resumed his leadership of the Conservative Party and also became Foreign Minister in the Interim Government; but the first post-war parliamentary elections, held in October 1945, made it clear that he had already lost much of his support,[1] and he soon found himself in opposition to the bulk of his party over the burning topic of the day—the Slesvig Question—and resigned from the party on this issue.[2] The Conservative Party's decline in 1945 and thereafter was partly due to the commercial treaty with Britain signed by Moeller, as Foreign Minister, to which farmers and industrialists objected, since it maintained the value of the *krone* at the cost of gradually reducing prices. It was also partly due to the fact that Moeller's attitude to the Slesvig question had split the party.

The elections of October 1945 resulted in a moral victory for *Venstre*, though the largest number of seats still fell to the Social Democrats. In 1943 *Venstre* had won twenty-eight seats—two less than it had held in 1939; but now, rallying all the farmers who had been divided for sixteen years, it regained something of its old prestige and won thirty-eight seats. In a stubborn fight against the two Left-wing parties, *Venstre* also secured the support of many middle-class voters in the towns who were suspicious both of the traditional policy of the Conservative Party and of the new progressive programme formulated by Moeller. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, while retaining their lead, suffered the biggest setback of their career in the 1945 elections. This was perhaps inevitable, since the party had been in power for sixteen years and, as the senior partner in the governing coalition during the occupation, it had often had to incur disagreeable responsibilities.

After the war Denmark, like many of her neighbours, was in the mood for drastic reforms or even for a change at any price; and at the Social Democrats' congress in August 1945 the party attempted to strengthen its appeal to the electorate by adopting a resolution in favour of a 'peaceful revolution', involving state control of the whole economic life of the nation.[3] This programme, however, did not prevent many Left-wing voters from transferring their votes to the Communists. As we have seen,[4]

[1] In 1939 the Conservatives had held twenty-six seats in the *Folketing*. In the 1943 elections, when Moeller's prestige was probably at its height, they won thirty-one seats; but in 1945 they fell again to twenty-six, and in 1947 obtained only seventeen seats.

[2] Moeller stood as an independent candidate in the 1947 elections, but was not elected. He died soon afterwards.

[3] The three main objects of this programme were: full employment, social security, and the democratization of economic life, to be achieved through state direction and the participation of workers and consumers in the control of productive enterprises. Each firm was to have a works council, and each industry was to be subject to a council composed of representatives of state, employers, trade unions, and consumers. Finally, there was to be an Economic Council to draw up an economic plan for the whole country.

[4] See above, p. 572.

negotiations for close co-operation between the Social Democrats and the Communists came to nothing, and in the elections the Communists gained eighteen seats at the expense of the Social Democrats, whose representation now sank to forty-eight seats.[1] The Communists' success in winning support from a working class which already enjoyed a very high standard of living and a large share of political power was probably due less to their programme (which indeed differed little from that of the Social Democrats) than to the part which they had played in the Resistance, and to the fact of their having been the only party which had been prohibited from presenting candidates at the last election, that of 1943. They were also helped by the momentarily conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Union (which was obviously deliberate) in regard to the evacuation of the island of Bornholm.[2]

In spite of the relative change in party strengths, the Social Democrats remained the most powerful single party; but, even with the support of the Radicals,[3] with whom they had shared power for so many years before the war, they could not muster a majority, and therefore decided to go into opposition. *Venstre* and the Conservatives could not agree between themselves or with any other party to form a coalition government, and finally *Venstre* consented to form a minority government under their leader Kristensen, with the promise of full support from the Radicals and of fair play from the Conservatives.

In his opening address to Parliament, Kristensen declared for reform and for the development of social legislation. He promised the setting up of a commission to consider changes in the Constitution, the reformation of the tax system, and a large-scale building programme, but implied that his Government were not in favour of expanding state controls and restrictions. To show that *Venstre* had not forgotten that they were the Farmers' Party, he promised to give special attention to fitting the Danish economy into the post-war pattern of international trade and to opening up good markets for Danish products.

The Kristensen Government remained in office for two years, and its fall was due not to dissatisfaction with its economic or social policy or to

[1] Until 1945, at each election held in Denmark since 1898 the number of votes cast for the Social Democrats had increased. In 1939 the party had won sixty-four seats in the *Folketing* with 730,000 votes, and thirty-five in the *Landsting* with 509,000 votes, and had thus only just missed securing an absolute majority in both Chambers. Even in 1943 it was still able to win 895,000 votes and increase its representation in the *Folketing* to sixty-six seats.

[2] Even after Germany's unconditional capitulation, the German commander on Bornholm refused to surrender. Soviet troops landed on 9 May 1945 and rapidly established control (by agreement between the Allies the island had been included in the Soviet operational zone in the last stages of the war). They did not interfere with the Danish administration, and behaved with exemplary discipline. They began to leave on 16 March 1946, and the evacuation was complete by 5 April (see *The Times*, 15 May 1945, 6 April 1946).

[3] The Radical Party had always been the smallest of the 'Big Four', and in the 1945 election it won only eleven seats, compared with thirteen in 1943 and fourteen in 1939.

any ideological issue but to the reappearance of a very old problem with a dynastic origin—that of South Schleswig. Schleswig and Holstein, formerly duchies in personal union with the Danish Crown, had been annexed by Prussia after the war of 1864–6, and, though Schleswig, unlike Holstein, had originally been part of Denmark, not of Germany, the population in most of South Schleswig, as well as in the whole of Holstein, was, by this time, German and not Danish. On the other hand, the Danish element had remained predominant in Nord Slesvig, which adjoined Jutland. After the First World War a plebiscite had been held in Nord Slesvig, which had been divided into a northern and southern zone for the purpose.[1] In the result 75 per cent. in the northern zone had voted to rejoin Denmark, and 79 per cent. in the southern zone to remain with Germany. Nord Slesvig had accordingly been transferred from Germany to Denmark with a German minority of some 30,000, while South Schleswig had been left to Germany with a Danish minority of about the same size. After the Second World War, there appeared to be evidence of a considerable change of feeling in South Schleswig. This change (the extent of which was, perhaps, exaggerated by Danish nationalists) was no doubt partly due to the contrast between Denmark's and Germany's respective economic situations at the time. At any rate, the membership of the 'South Schleswig Association', founded in the province to support the movement for union with Denmark, far surpassed the actual number of Danes resident in the province.[2]

In Denmark itself the parties were divided on the issue. The Social Democrats, the Radicals, and the Communists were sceptical about the likelihood of pro-Danish sentiment in South Schleswig persisting, and they considered that the initiative on the question of reunion with Denmark ought to be left to the South Schleswigers, whereas *Venstre* and the majority of the Conservatives wanted provision for a plebiscite to be made in an eventual German peace treaty. When the Danish Government took the question up with the British Government (who were the occupying Power in that part of Germany), they disclaimed any desire for a change of frontier, a plebiscite, or even an exchange of minorities. They asked only that common civic and democratic rights should be assured to the Danes living in the province, that the 300,000 German refugees should be removed with the least possible delay, and that the administration of South Scheswig should be separated from that of Holstein. As a result of negotiations which took place between October and December 1946, the British Government agreed in principle to these proposals. The situation was complicated by the attitude of the Danish Prime Minister, Kristensen; for he continued openly to advocate a plebiscite for South Schleswig in accor-

[1] See *H.P.C.*, ii. 202–6.

[2] Moreover, 62 per cent. of the population had voted Nazi in 1932.

dance with the views of his party, but contrary to the official view of the Government as stated in the note to the British Government. This state of affairs finally caused the Radicals and a section of the Conservatives led by Moeller to withdraw their support from the Government; and it resigned after the *Folketing* had passed a vote of no confidence by 88 to 66 votes (October 1947). In the election which followed the Social Democrats again emerged as the strongest party, and this time they agreed to form a government, with the support of their old allies the Radicals. In this election the Communist Party lost half its seats,[1] and was unable to make any effective opposition to the Government on the questions of defence and foreign policy which had now acquired such importance.

One result of the war was that defence ceased to be a question dividing the parties and became a principle accepted by all of them—except the Communists. After Denmark's military defeat and despoliation by Germany in the 1860s and the progressive whittling away of her empire in the succeeding years, she had become more and more pacific, neutral, and unmilitaristic in her outlook. The abolition of defence measures had been one of the main planks in the platform of *Venstre* in the days of that party's greatest power, and the dropping of this plank had been one of the factors that had caused a section of the party to break away and form the Radical Party. The Radicals had then become the foremost champions of neutrality and pacifism and of the reduction of defence forces to a mere 'frontier guard'; and they had been in power during the First World War without having had to reap any dire consequences from this policy. The party which had eventually reaped the consequences had been the Social Democrat Party.

The Social Democrats had been too much absorbed in domestic policy during the inter-war years to be able to spare much time for the question of defence, and, as they had needed the support of the Radical Party to secure a governing majority, they had allowed the Radicals to control and formulate defence policy. It had been a logical result of this policy that in May 1939 the Stauning Government, after having rejected a Swedish proposal for the conclusion of a 'Nordic Pact', had agreed to sign a ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany; and after Germany's breach of this agreement in May 1940 the Social Democrats, as the leading partner in the ruling coalition, had incurred some odium for the Government's policy during the last few months before the war—a fact which was reflected in the outcome of the first post-war election.[2] In fact, throughout the quarter of a century preceding the Second World War, the Conservatives had been the only consistent advocates of the upkeep of military

[1] The Communist leader, Larsen, again entertained for a time the idea that it might be possible to co-operate with the Social Democrats, but, as in 1945, nothing came of this.

[2] See above, pp. 574–5.

service and of the country's defences. But after the war the other main parties—excepting always the Communists—gradually came to take the same view. The Danish Government were thus able, without arousing internal strife, first to accept the defence obligations imposed by the United Nations Charter, and later, after the collapse of negotiations for a Scandinavian defence pact in 1948–9,[1] to resolve to join their forces to those of the Western Powers in a common defence against the threat from the east.[2]

(v) Norway

(*a*) The Background

Norway, like Denmark, emerged from the ordeal of German occupation in good moral fettle, despite temporary material distress, largely owing to the fact that her achievement of full political emancipation was still a recent and inspiring experience. Although Denmark had had to wait till the dawn of the twentieth century for the full attainment of parliamentary government, she had always been a sovereign state; but Norway, though she had enjoyed a measure of parliamentarism for much longer than Denmark, had had no king of her own until the same late date.[3] The Norwegians' pride in their nationhood was therefore specially strong, and this was of great value in enabling them to resist the Germans and to place country above party in 1940 as they had done in 1905. Moreover, the Norwegians' historic political struggles had been against other countries—first Denmark, then Sweden—not, as in Denmark, against opponents at home; so that they had acquired the habit of national solidarity and had less tradition of domestic strife than the Danes.

This legacy from their history might help to explain why the Norwegians turned with exceptional ferocity upon the traitors in their midst—the fascist movement led by Vidkun Quisling, a man whose chief claim to distinction was that he gave his name to his species. The *Nasjonal Samling*, or NS as it was commonly called, was the only group in Norway openly opposed to democracy and constitutional parliamentarism. Its appeal might have found some support, even in a country like Norway, in the unsettled inter-war period if the personality of its leader had been stronger. In fact, the movement had succeeded in winning only an infinitesimal measure of support. In 1933, the year of its foundation, the party had gained only 27,850 votes in the whole country, and in 1936 it

[1] See *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 132–5; *Survey* for 1949–50, pp. 130–1.

[2] See ibid. p. 134.

[3] The Constitution of 1814 had made Norway 'a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable kingdom' subject to personal union with Sweden under one king.

had fared even worse. In spite of a big propaganda campaign it had not won a single seat in the Storting (the Norwegian parliament).

When the union with Sweden had been forced on the Norwegians in 1814 they had asserted their right to self-determination by adopting a democratic Constitution. In the early days of parliamentarism, however, representatives had tended to be drawn from the ultra-conservative bureaucrats who had formerly governed in the name of the Danish Crown, and, because of the repressive influence exerted by the Swedish Crown, the transition to complete democratic self-government had inevitably been rather gradual. Nevertheless the delay had in some respects been salutary, since it had saved Norway from the violent reaction against a premature democratization that had occurred in Denmark;[1] and the great Liberal victory, when it had come in 1884, had been achieved, not at the risk of revolution, but as the logical outcome of a popular election.

Under the Constitution promulgated in 1814, in which only a few alterations had subsequently been made, legislation and taxation had been expressly declared to be the function of the people through their representatives, and it had been stipulated that there should be complete liberty to express individual opinions in speech or writing. The parliamentary system itself, however, had deviated in certain particulars from the usual pattern.[2]

Despite the strongly individualistic temperament of the Norwegians, political parties had always been relatively few in number. In the nineteenth century it had been the Liberal Party which had championed, as in other countries, the aspirations of the predominantly peasant population towards individual liberty and which had led the struggle against foreign domination. But, with the development of hydro-electricity at the turn of the century and the consequent growth of a large number of industrial centres, a new element in the population had begun to appear whose needs had had to be catered for. During the first quarter of the twentieth century the claims of this new industrial proletariat had been met by the rapid growth of a Labour Party and of powerful (even dictatorial) trade unions,

[1] See above, pp. 565–6.

[2] First, the Storting had been a single chamber, consisting of 150 members—one-third elected as members for the towns and two-thirds as members for the rural districts—though, when engaged in actual legislation, it had sat in two divisions known as the *Odelsting* and the *Lagting*. The *Lagting* had consisted of thirty-eight members chosen by the Storting from its own number to constitute an *élite* committee, which, in the legislative procedure, had acted as a sort of Upper House. Much business, however, including the budget, had been dealt with by the whole Storting sitting as a single chamber. Secondly, members of the Government had had no vote in the Storting, though they might be present to speak and to introduce bills and proposals. (They had gained this right after 1884 after much bitter controversy.) Thirdly, there had been no power under the Constitution to dissolve Parliament, so that every Storting had continued in session for four years without any intermediate appeal to the people. The voting system had been a form of proportional representation, and electors had in fact cast their votes for parties and groups rather than individuals.

and by the early attainment of high industrial wages and of exemplary social services.

It had not been until 1927, however, that the Labour Party had emerged from an election as the strongest party in the country and had formed a government. The programme which this Government had put forward had been so radical that it had met with the united opposition of the other parties and had caused an alarming flight of capital. The Government had been forced to resign almost at once, and the consequent reaction had brought the Liberals back into power—and for a time also the Agrarians. The general elections of 1933, held under the influence of the world economic crisis and of growing unemployment, had given Labour unprecedented strength in the Storting (sixty-nine seats out of the total 150); but they had not taken office again until the spring of 1935. During the next few years both the Agrarians and the Liberals had lost strength, and the issue had become a clear-cut one between Socialism and Conservatism. However, Labour had remained virtually in power from 1935 onwards—apart from the war-time and immediate post-war coalitions—and had introduced important social reforms, such as unemployment insurance, new factory laws, and new school laws.

The Norwegian Labour Party had always been more extreme in its views and programmes than Labour movements in other Western countries —largely owing, no doubt, to the impact of sudden industrialization on a primitive and inexperienced community—and it had been greatly influenced by the Russian Revolution of 1917. In 1919 the party had gone so far as to leave the Second (Socialist) International and to join the Third (Communist) International, but in 1923 the rigid discipline imposed by Moscow had caused the Norwegians to break the connexion. The Communists had then formed a separate party in Norway. In 1938 the Labour Party had reaffiliated itself to the Second International—a step which had reasserted its social democratic (as opposed to communistic) character, but which had also emphasized its pacific leanings. Up to the time of the German invasion, and even during the early part of the occupation, the Labour Party's outlook had been less nationalist than that of the other parties, and it had even inculcated a class-consciousness which had proved detrimental to national solidarity in the face of the invader. This attitude had changed, however, when the Germans had shot the Labour officials V. Hansteen and R. Wickström in September 1941; although, not unnaturally, the Labour Party had continued to be rather suspect in the eyes of the more conservative section of the community.

The history and character of the Labour Party, however, had given it the advantage of being able to hold its own against the Communists and even to steal their thunder to some extent. Before 1930 the Communists had held three seats in the Storting, but after that date they had lost all

representation until 1945.[1] During the war the Norwegian Communists had adopted tactics which had been markedly different from those employed by Communists in other countries. In the Resistance they had preferred to play a lone hand, and to conduct independent operations against the Germans instead of trying to lead and monopolize the whole Resistance Movement. The coups planned by the Home Front leaders had aimed at doing the maximum amount of damage to the enemy with the minimum loss of Norwegian lives and destruction of property and without provoking reprisals which might fall on the innocent. The Communists had had their own sabotage organization which had engaged in more reckless activities, and they had refused to submit to the discipline of the Home Front. As a natural consequence, and contrary to what had happened in every other occupied country, they had never been represented in the Home Front leadership. This omission had been a sore point with them, although in fact it had been of some service in providing them with a plausible grievance after the war and in enabling them to preserve their identity, instead of being swamped by the equally Marxist but constitutional Labour Party.

(*b*) Moral and Material Conditions at the Time of Liberation

On the evening (7 May 1945) on which the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, General Böhme, announced over the radio the German cease-fire, the Home Front forces, between 30,000 and 40,000 strong, took over strategic points throughout the country. Contingents of Allied troops only arrived gradually thereafter and never numbered more than a few thousand.[2] The members of the Resistance showed great restraint, and here it was easy to discern the influence of the two leading figures in the movement, Chief Justice Berg and Bishop Berggrav, who represented the two dominant influences in Norwegian life, law and religion. There were no summary executions, no acts of personal vengeance, and even the quislings were dealt with in strict accordance with the law of the land and without the aid of special tribunals or 'people's courts'. Indeed, scruples were felt by Bishop Berggrav and many other Norwegians regarding the reintroduction of the long-since abolished death penalty, even during the period of 'purgation'. About 18,000 of Quisling's followers were arrested, but only some fifty or sixty were charged with major offences likely to involve capital or life sentences. The remainder of the former members of

[1] In 1936 they won only 3,000 out of 1 million votes. For the 1945 election see below, p. 585.

[2] By contrast, German troops in Norway at the liberation numbered 364,000—and even in November 1945 there were still 80,000 left. There were also nearly 100,000 slave-labourers (including 80,000 Soviet citizens) who had been brought in by the Germans from all parts of Europe. The Russian liberation force in East Finnmark was withdrawn in September 1945; the United States forces left in October, and the British by the end of the year.

the *Nasjonal Samling* (numbering about 20,000), who were not arrested, automatically lost their civic rights. Quisling himself, however, was tried, convicted, and shot in October 1945.

In Norway, no political or moral problem arose in connexion with the purge of the quislings. This singular good fortune of hers was due to the fact that all organs of justice were in the hands of men whose loyalty was proved by their Resistance record or by the time spent in German concentration camps. There was no reinfiltration of doubtful persons into positions of responsibility. Economic collaborators—such as the so-called 'barrack barons', who had made large fortunes by doing constructional work for the Germans—were stripped of their gains by the law courts and by the Internal Reparations Commission. The public could therefore feel satisfied in general that justice had been done. Moreover, in contrast to some other ex-occupied countries, there was not the feeling in Norway that 'liberation' involved anything more than liberation from the Germans. This explains the alacrity with which the Resistance Movement brought about its own dissolution by a decision taken at its first public mass meeting. Members of the Resistance Movement had been drawn from all sections of the community, and in consequence there existed a remarkable measure of social harmony. Thanks largely to the prompt and unanimous agreement, after the liberation, between the employers and the reinstated trade unions for an increase in wages, there was economic harmony as well.

On the political side there was no fundamental constitutional problem. The King's popularity had been enhanced by the correctness of his attitude during the occupation, while the Government in Exile had been invested with full powers by the Storting at Elverum in 1940[1] and had acted as a conscientious trustee of the nation's interests ever since. Finally, the Resistance Movement had been drawn into consultation with the Government at an early stage and had shared in the responsibility for the Government's actions. The only institution whose lustre had been somewhat dimmed had been the Storting, on account of its Presidential Board's request to the King, in 1940,[2] to abdicate. Attention had been drawn to this, shortly before the liberation, by the clandestine newspaper *Fritt Land*, which had warned the Storting that, until elections had been held, its right to represent the people was not beyond dispute either morally or constitutionally. However, it was recognized that the political life of the people would be incomplete without a Storting and that the only possible course was to recall, in the first place, the members elected in 1936 (excluding members who, during the occupation, had followed Quisling).

Crown Prince Olav and five members of the Government had arrived

[1] See *Survey* for 1939–46: *Hitler's Europe*, p. 535.
[2] See ibid. p. 536.

back in Norway within a week of the German surrender (13 May 1945); the Premier, Johan Nygaardsvold, and the rest of the Government arrived on 31 May; but the King did not return till 7 June, when it was certain that the Germans could be disarmed without opposition. Almost immediately after the King's return, on 12 June, the Government resigned in accordance with a promise made in 1940. The King then called upon Chief Justice Paal Berg, the leader of the Home Front Central Committee, to form an interim government, but Berg was unable to rally round himself the extremes of Left and Right, and advised the appointment of the leader of the Labour Party, Einar Gerhardsen, who duly succeeded in forming a coalition Government. Gerhardsen, at the age of forty-seven, was the youngest Premier Norway had ever had, and he was extremely popular.[1] As an active Home Front leader he had been arrested and deported by the Germans, had later been brought back as a hostage after a British commando raid, and had finally been sent back to a concentration camp. His 'caretaker' coalition Cabinet was composed of six Labour Ministers, two Liberals, two Conservatives, two Communists, one member of the Christian People's Party, and one non-party (ex-Resistance) member. The granting of two posts to the Communists, who had never held a Cabinet post before the war and had no seats in the existing Storting, was interpreted rather as a friendly gesture towards the Soviet Union than as a reflection of the relative strength of the Communist Party in Norway—although it was correctly assumed that the party had gained appreciably in strength since the beginning of the war.

During the last months of the German occupation living conditions in Norway had gone rapidly from bad to worse. Money had become meaningless, since the shops had had nothing to sell, and barter had become widespread. This had been due partly to the reduction of supplies from Germany and partly to the damage suffered by Norwegian home production. The Germans had requisitioned more foodstuffs than they had needed for themselves, but on the other hand they had sent 200,000 tons of grain per annum to Norway, in addition to large supplies of sugar and fats. Unemployment had been no problem during the first four years of the occupation, thanks to the huge German industrial and defensive works; indeed, there had been a shortage rather than an excess of labour owing to the escape of so many young people to Britain, Sweden, or their native mountains. By the winter of 1944–5, however, much of this work had been brought to a standstill by sabotage, bombing, commando raids, and the general breakdown of communications through lack of fuel. From that time on, the position had been so completely changed that unemployment had threatened to become a danger second only to the food shortage.

[1] He had begun life as a road-mender, and had risen to be Lord Mayor of Oslo before the war.

After the liberation it became necessary to find work for at least 150,000 people till then directly employed by the Germans, mostly in unproductive work. But Norwegian private industry, which was suffering from lack of raw materials and fuel, was only able to absorb a part of this labour power. It was therefore obvious that the state would have to take a hand in solving the problem. Indeed, there was ample scope for public works: there was an acute housing shortage—hundreds of thousands of dwellings had been destroyed and the population had increased by 12 per cent. since 1939—roads and bridges had to be rebuilt and repaired, and devastated areas, especially Finnmark, had to be cleared up.

On the whole probably the most serious blow which Norway had suffered as a result of the war had been the loss of half of her 'floating empire', for, till the war, she had had the biggest merchant fleet in the world per head of population and the biggest and best-equipped whaling fleet. The earnings of Norwegian shipping in the carriage of the goods of all nations had been the most remunerative of the nation's business transactions. Most of this shipping, being scattered over the world, had escaped the Germans, had entered the service of the Allies, and had played an indispensable part in bringing vital supplies of food and petrol to Britain, especially during the period when Britain had stood alone. But in the course of this service it had lost about half its strength. To rebuild it would impose a considerable burden on the already strained national finances, for the estimated cost of rebuilding was 4,000 million kroner and the insurance money forthcoming on the vessels lost in the war amounted to only 1,600 million kroner.

In her finances Norway was confronted by the familiar post-war spectre of inflation, conjured up by the immensity of the volume of currency in circulation as a result of the huge German occupation expenditure of 11·3 milliard kroner (£560 million). An important step towards keeping inflation in check was taken in the decree of 5 September 1945 enacting a monetary reform.[1] The note issue was called in and exchanged for new notes, but 40 per cent. of the excess of any holding above 100 kroner was transferred to a blocked account. The amount thus blocked was 350 million kroner. At the same time a portion of all current banking accounts was blocked. The total of blocked accounts amounted in May 1946 to 1,037 million kroner. The amount blocked was not of itself sufficient to restore monetary equilibrium, and consequently it was necessary to check inflation by a rigid control of prices, rents, dividends, and interest rates, and by a nationally determined wage policy. Indeed, the fact that the Government succeeded in maintaining a stable price level was due partly to price subsidies, but also to the moderation shown in wage demands.

[1] *Monthly Bulletin* of Norges Bank, October 1946.

(*c*) The Post-War Evolution of Parties

In Norway, with its extremist Labour Party, there seemed to be better grounds than anywhere else for the fusion between the Communists and other Left-wing parties which was being mooted everywhere immediately after the war. Very shortly after the liberation the Labour organ *Arbeiderbladet* (16 May 1945) expressed the hope that plans for amalgamation would materialize in the creation of a 'united front of workers' parties', and declared that the ideological differences which had kept Communists and Socialists apart before the war were no longer valid, since 'now the Communists too take up their stance on a democratic basis'. On 3 May 1945 it was announced in the press that the Trades Union Secretariat had offered to conduct negotiations for the amalgamation of the parties. In support of the plan the Secretariat referred to a meeting in Stockholm in 1943 at which trade union representatives belonging to each of the two parties had agreed that the time had come to amalgamate. On 30 May the Norwegian Labour Party Congress adopted a resolution to the effect that 'the Norwegian Communists have proved that they stand on national and democratic bedrock in the same way as the Norwegian Labour Party. There is thus no reason for the Labour movement to be split into two parties.' The two parties accordingly decided to amalgamate before the general election which was to be held in October.

It had been agreed originally that the Communists should have ten seats out of the seventy held by Labour in the existing Storting, but they soon began to demand many more. There were also difficulties in agreeing on joint lists in certain constituencies, and the Communists began to put up their own lists. The truth was that the Communists were beginning to feel once again, as they had felt in the Resistance, that they might be able to do better if untrammelled by association with the Labour Party. Therefore, at the eleventh hour, the much-heralded amalgamation fell through. In the election on 8 October Labour won seventy-six seats, by the votes of nearly half the electorate,[1] and the Communists won only one seat more than they would have received under the original bargain. After the election, the Communists offered to collaborate with Labour, but now they were rebuffed. This ill-starred courtship had also had its effect on other parties; and leading members of the Liberal, Agrarian, and Christian People's Parties had issued an appeal for the creation of a 'unity

[1] The Labour Party polled 608,939 votes out of the total of 1,497,118 votes cast. The results of the election in terms of seats won in the Storting were:

Labour seventy-six, gain of six;
Conservatives twenty-five, loss of eleven;
Liberals twenty, loss of three;
Agrarians ten, loss of eight;
Communists eleven, gain of eleven;
Christian People's Party eight, gain of six.

party', which had been signed also by Bishop Berggrav and by the Free Church Leader, Professor Hallesby. But the Conservatives had stood aloof from these proposals, and, like the Communist-Labour negotiations, they had been abortive.

It was not surprising that the first post-war general election should have given the Labour Party, for the first time in its history, a clear majority over all other parties, for Labour had steadily increased its vote at every election, and the party's victory was also in consonance with the general current European trend towards the Left. On the other hand, it did seem surprising at the time that the Christian People's Party also made substantial gains. With the main issue sharply drawn on a Left and Right basis, most political experts had believed that minor parties of the Centre would lose most, if not all, their support; but, though the country made a distinct movement to the Left, it also made it clear at the election that it was not prepared to follow an out-and-out radical course.

The success of the Christian People's Party, like that of the Labour Party, was the manifestation of one of the currents of European political thought. This party was the Norwegian expression of the Christian-Social trend, which, though less noticeable in the sister Scandinavian states, was a prominent feature of post-war political life in almost every other West European country. Founded in 1933 by Nils Larvik, a former 'leftist' deputy and a strong Lutheran, the Christian People's Party had won two seats in the Storting in 1936. Immediately after the liberation the party began a new drive, and it gained almost 10 per cent. of the country's votes in the first post-war elections. Its programme, which advocated the improvement of social conditions and the development of religious instruction so as to permeate the whole education system, was ill-defined and unpractical, but the support which the party received proved that it appealed to a latent craving for more religion and morality in every aspect of political and national life.[1]

The Liberal Party (*Venstre*) suffered unexpectedly light losses[2] at the 1945 election, and its continuing strength, long after Liberal parties in other countries had begun to wane, may be accounted for by the extremist

[1] The popularity of the Christian People's Party was explained by one of its Storting members (Erling Wikborg) as being due to its appeal to Christian values and rejection of materialism: 'During the occupation we learned for the first time what a pagan political system was like. . . . We wish active Christianity to be the foundation of our State.' Politically, he declared, 'we are neither of the Right nor of the Left', but he added: 'In social questions we have radical ideas. . . . Russia is a big question-mark to us, although we do not think we oppose Communism as such.' Further, 'we have no religious or racial bias, but our candidates must be active, church-going Protestants. Neither Jews nor Catholics can be candidates, but they can be party members. This is really an unimportant question, as there are only 700 Jews left in the country and a few thousand Catholics. We are in no way anti-Semitic' (see *New York Times*, 18 November 1945).

[2] A loss of about half their seats had been forecast, whereas they were only reduced from twenty-three to twenty.

character of the Norwegian Labour Party; owing to this, the Liberals retained a measure of support from moderate progressives of the kind that in other countries had transferred their allegiance to the Social Democrats. The party was inclined, indeed, to set itself up as the advocate of moderate social reform in contradistinction to the Conservatives, and it refused to join the latter in a general opposition to the Labour Party. The main issue dividing the Liberals and the Conservatives had become that of free enterprise versus planned economy. The Conservatives, despite their gradual acquisition (since the days when they had been identified with the alien Danish and afterwards Swedish domination) of a good democratic tradition, and despite their persistent and amply vindicated advocacy of adequate defences before the war, were unable to hold their ground in the election. The Conservative Party drew its main support from the large towns and from the prosperous agricultural districts of the south-east; but, as the second strongest party in the legislature, it could not fairly be accused of being a purely class party in a country where capitalists in the popular sense were so few. Nevertheless, as the representative of the unfashionable Right, the party lost eleven seats at the general election.

Relatively, the heaviest loss was suffered by the Agrarian Party (*Bondeparti*), whose seats were reduced from eighteen to ten. Ostensibly founded, as its name implied, for the promotion of a purely sectional interest, this party had originally derived much of its support from the large farmers, whom it had detached from the Conservatives. Hence it really represented only a very narrow circle within the agricultural population, whose interests were in any case already well safeguarded both by preferential treatment in the Norwegian Constitution and by a non-political body—the *Landmannsforbund* or *Bondelag* (Farmers' Association). This fact facilitated the *Bondeparti*'s decline into a sort of self-appointed makeweight with no clearly defined policy, tipping the party scales first one way, then the other—though latterly more and more regularly in favour of the Labour Party.

(*d*) Post-War Problems of Internal Recovery and External Reorientation

Now that Labour had won the election so decisively, the King called upon their leader Gerhardsen, who had been head of the caretaker Government, to form an all-Labour Cabinet. Theoretically, the new Government which took office on 1 November 1945 had a clear mandate to conduct an unadulterated Socialist policy, but in fact Gerhardsen continued, in all matters concerning finance and reconstruction, to adhere to the programme which had been worked out during the war-time period of national solidarity. To cope with all the formidable tasks with which the Government were confronted—the stabilization of the currency and

of prices, the general reconstruction of the national economy, the rebuilding of the merchant navy, the reorganization of national defence—they were compelled to impose a strict system of controls and to spend an unprecedented amount of money.[1] In this policy they were at first supported by all parties, and in the first year after the war no serious crisis arose. During the year, indeed, a remarkable degree of recovery was achieved. The fear of widespread unemployment proved to have been a false alarm; there was no serious labour unrest; and, although rationing continued, supplies of food and essential goods soon arrived in sufficient quantities to stave off any crisis. Housing, however, still remained a serious problem, and the question of price control soon caused a renewal of party controversy.

In 1945 the Labour Government secured the enactment of a new measure giving the authorities the right to levy certain special taxes upon industry in order to keep prices stable. This measure met with considerable opposition, especially from the Conservatives, and uncovered the fundamental differences between parties. The stabilization of the price-level also made it necessary to subsidize agriculture, and these subsidies made heavy inroads on the budget which, in turn, necessitated higher taxation. In spite of this the farmers remained extremely dissatisfied with what they considered to be the low level of prices paid for agricultural produce; and, although the Government, in 1947, agreed to raise the prices fixed for the most important farm products, the continuance of unrest was manifested by an increase in the votes for the Conservatives and Agrarians at the municipal elections in the autumn of 1947. Since the economic resources of Norway were limited, the heavy expenditure on price subsidies was necessarily at the expense of national defence; and this rendered the Conservatives, as the traditional champions of defence, more than ever critical of this use of the taxpayers' money.

In this matter the Conservatives were ahead of public opinion—as indeed they had been before the war[2]—but not so very far ahead, since a big change of feeling was now taking place. Norway came out of the war with one illusion shattered. She was now convinced that, because of her strategic position and the military value of her merchant fleet, the policy of permanent neutrality was impracticable. At the same time she was equally convinced that peace could in future be safeguarded only by collective security based on the continued co-operation of the Great

[1] The first post-war budget was the biggest that Norway had ever known.

[2] The First World War, which had not directly affected Norway, had been followed by a long period of progressive disarmament. Extra funds for defence had been voted, belatedly and reluctantly, during the period of international tension in the late 1930s, but this had been too late to produce much effect. The Labour Party, which was in power at the time and had been in power since 1935, inevitably incurred some blame for the defence deficiencies, but not enough to prevent their being reconfirmed in office after the war.

Powers—and, because she had faith in the good intentions of the Soviet Union, she felt confident that peace would in fact be so preserved. Moreover, a sort of Norwegian vested interest in the United Nations was created by the election in February 1946 of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie, to be Secretary-General of that body. This feeling of general complacency and of particular benevolence towards the Soviet Union continued in Norway for long after suspicion of Russian policy had begun to grow up in Britain and in the United States, and in spite of the increasing frequency of disturbing reports from Germany and Eastern Europe. Indeed, at first Norway was able to pride herself on her ability to steer clear of the deadlocks and clashes which so early characterized the relations of the Western Great Powers with the Eastern colossus. This confidence was fostered by the Russians' withdrawal in September 1945, without demur, from the northern Norwegian provinces which they had liberated—a move which may be compared with their evacuation of the Danish island of Bornholm.[1] On the Norwegian side, Trygve Lie, as Foreign Minister, adopted a studiously amicable and conciliatory attitude towards the Soviet Government, and his example was followed at first by his successor, Halvard Lange.[2] There existed, indeed, the same pious hope in Norway of 'Left talking to Left' as had been uttered by the Socialists on taking office in Britain, and, in view of the history of the Norwegian Labour Party, the hope seemed, at first sight, to have better grounds there. Norway also had a cogent reason for keeping on good terms with the Soviet Union in the fact that she now, once again, had a common frontier with her owing to the Soviet Union's reacquisition of the corridor of Finnish territory previously extending to the Arctic Ocean at Petsamo.[3]

The Norwegian public's belief in the Soviet Union's good intentions was shaken early in 1947 when they learned for the first time of the Russian request, originally put forward in the autumn of 1944, for a share in the defence of the Norwegian territory of Svalbard (Spitzbergen).[4] Confidence returned, however, at least temporarily, when it was found that the Storting's firm rejection of the Soviet Government's demand had not evoked any hostile reaction in Moscow. In fact, for another year, despite

[1] See above, p. 575 and note 2.

[2] So far was conciliation carried that a projected visit of Winston Churchill to Norway in May 1946 was cancelled at the request of King Haakon (acting on the advice of Lange), after Churchill's speech at Fulton, U.S.A., in which he had called for a 'special relationship' between the British Empire and the United States, and had referred to 'Communist fifth columns'. Lange's attempts to 'hush up' the affair only produced explosions in certain sections of the press and led even to the accusation that he had acted under direct Soviet pressure.

[3] See above, p. 349. Down to 1918 Norway had had a common frontier with Russia. Between the wars, the two countries had been insulated from one another by the corridor, extending to the shore of the Arctic Ocean at Petsamo, which had been ceded by the Soviet Union to Finland.

[4] See *Survey* for 1947–8, p. 131, note 4.

the growing international tension, the Norwegians persisted in putting a blind eye to the telescope, in their unwillingness to recognize that their foreign policy might need reorientation. Nevertheless, to more thoughtful Norwegians it was now apparent that the Great Powers were taking up strategic positions for a possible future conflict; that, in such a conflict, the Arctic Ocean would probably be a vital strategic theatre; and that Norway's northern shores, as well as Spitzbergen itself, would figure as part of the Soviet Union's defensive glacis. But it was not until the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948[1] had been followed by Russian pressure on Finland[2] and by the beginning of a 'war of nerves' on Norway itself that a real change of outlook took place among the population at large. This eventually resulted in a complete disillusionment over the Soviet Union and in a growing readiness for alignment with the West.

[1] See *Survey* for 1947–8, pp. 153–5.

[2] Ibid. pp. 157–9.

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[1] In the cross-references in this Index references in capitals and small capitals are to other main headings, while those in ordinary type are to subdivisions of the same main heading.

For the explanation of Abbreviations see also list on p. xiii.

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


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Post-war boundary between spheres of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union ▨



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